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This article analyses whether and how fairness considerations affect citizens' support of European Union (EU) policies and integration. While past literature has revealed that perceptions of procedural and substantive fairness impact on public opinion at the level of the nation state, we know less about the fairness‐support nexus when it comes to international cooperation. We here make use of the case of differentiated integration (DI) to experimentally dissect normative and utility‐oriented considerations in the evaluation of EU policies. DI as an instrument to overcome heterogeneity‐induced gridlock has been linked to both autonomy and dominance, and it can generate winners and losers in the EU. Our experiments reveal that citizens largely support DI. However, they are opposed to forms of DI which impose negative externalities on a subgroup of EU member states. This holds irrespective of the affectedness of citizens' own member states. We take these findings as a first experimental confirmation that citizens, indeed, care about the fairness of the EU and its policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union (EU) introduced a New Economic Governance (NEG) regime, which enabled much more coercive interventions of EU executives in social policy areas hitherto shielded from them. This study assesses the policy orientation of their NEG prescriptions in healthcare for Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Romania from 2009 to 2019 and the potential for countervailing actions of labour movements. Acknowledging organized labour's contribution to the making of decommodified healthcare systems after 1945, we ask if the NEG prescriptions were informed by an overarching healthcare commodification script, as this is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for transnational counter-movements. Our analysis reveals that the country-specific NEG prescriptions of the European Commission and the Council followed an overarching commodification script, which especially targeted the countries that lagged behind in health service commodification. NEG thus represents a case of reversed differentiated integration, which provided both opportunities and challenges to transnational counter-movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The link between European institutions and European identities remains under-explored. Similarly, we know little about how countries opting out of European integration has helped shape their citizens’ view of themselves as more or less European. Using general synthetic control models and data from 1983 to 2020, I find that people in countries with opt-outs tend to identify as more strongly European in the years after an opt-out is implemented, and most prominently so in the countries where opt-outs responded to a popular demand and were associated with great politicisation. This shows that providing individual countries with greater autonomy may strengthen their citizens’ attachment to Europe, but that any such effect is likely to depend on domestic variations in for instance elite politicisation of European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration is often considered a solution to gridlock in the European Union. However, questions remain concerning its perceived legitimacy among the public. While research shows that most citizens are not, in principle, opposed to differentiated integration – although support varies across different differentiated integration models and different country contexts – we still know little about the role institutional design plays in citizens' evaluations of differentiated integration. This article inspects how citizens evaluate different hypothetical differentiated integration arrangements, with varying decision-making procedures, using a conjoint experiment. We ask whether institutional arrangements can overcome citizens' preference heterogeneity over differentiated integration, and thereby foster the legitimacy of a differentiated European Union. We find that while a majority of citizens care about the inclusiveness of differentiated integration arrangements, they also support limiting the number of veto points. Our analysis also reveals noteworthy differences across citizens with pro- and anti-European Union attitudes in the perceived fairness of differentiated integration arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institutional developments in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) during the sovereign debt crisis were mostly studied with reference to intergovernmentalist theories. However, they can hardly explain the dominant role of the Eurogroup and Eurogroup working group (EWG) compared to the EU-27 formats in the Council, the ECOFIN and the Economic and Financial Committee. This article seeks to address this puzzle. Based on sociological-institutionalist theories, I argue that the distinction between euro area member states (EAMS) and non-EAMS structured how member state representatives organised EMU governance processes during the sovereign debt crisis. The reinforcement of the Eurogroup and EWG is interpreted as an explicit manifestation of this institutionalisation of differentiated integration (DI) in EMU. The empirical findings suggest that the two informal formats were transformed into viable euro area bodies providing the EAMS with the political authority, normative environment and administrative resources to design and implement policies independently. In this reinforced shape, the Eurogroup and EWG enabled a distinction between EU and euro area matters and provided EAMS with suitable instruments to manage their issues. The institutionalisation of DI has long-term implications for EMU reform processes and governance practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In post-Soviet non-European cities, the opposition between the negation of signs of the past and the exaltation of new national identities often generates a dichotomy in the value production of public works. It oscillates between the Euro-Western models of intensive building that privatise the public dimension and the repropositions of pre-modern public space typologies. Conversely, research in Yerevan, Armenia, reveals a possible third way oscillating between mending and innovation public works. Through a process of differentiated integration to build, stabilise, and reconstruct variable contextual relationships, the building/open-space system takes on value as a boundary organism, becoming an artefact that co-evolves with social and environmental changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key Eurosceptic argument is that countries can selectively retain only those aspects of European integration from which they benefit, while opting out of those aspects they dislike. How convincing is this "have your cake and eat it, too" argument to voters? This article argues that voters can learn about the feasibility of such a strategy by looking at the experience of countries that pursued a similar path. Positive experiences can strengthen voters' support for a similar strategy, while negative experiences can deter them. This argument is tested in a study of the effects of the Brexit negotiations on public opinion in Switzerland. Drawing on a panel survey fielded between 2019 and 2021, the article shows that Brexit had a small but non-negligible impact on Swiss voters' expectations about the EU's resolve, as well as on vote intentions on two EU-related policy proposals. These findings confirm that voters learn from foreign political developments about the costs of non-cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflecting on twenty years of Cyprus's EU membership, this paper aims to provide an account of the rationale for its accession to the EU and the euro area, and an assessment of their benefits. The argument made in the paper is that although it was security rather than economic considerations that accounted for Cyprus's EU accession, the latter also came with certain financial benefits. Moreover, while Cyprus's accession to the single currency was motivated by its desire to be part of the hard core of the European unification project, its euro area participation was to stand Cyprus in good stead in its hour of need, during the Cypriot sovereign debt crisis of 2012-2013. The paper also explores whether the unprecedented accession of a divided country to the EU may provide a source of inspiration for future enlargements, where sui generis circumstances prevail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has been challenged by several crises lately. In addition to Brexit, the Euro crisis, and the migration crisis; global issues such as the coronavirus pandemic and the Russian attack on Ukraine affected the EU. The migration crisis, on the one hand, differs from the above-mentioned crises with one remarkable feature. The member states have no real consensus about forming a common migration policy. Besides, for geographic reasons, some member states put much more burden on immigrants. Agreeing on immigration becomes impossible for the border countries on the migration route and also transit countries. The paper argues that, unlike the other crises of the EU, the migration crisis reinforces EU integration in such a way that disputes between member states prevent the EU from making institutional changes about the issue. The study results assume that the other above-mentioned crises, on the other hand, stimulated institutional change throughout the EU. In light of this information, this study evaluates, using a method of relevant literature review and comparing the arguments of the researchers, how the migration issue became a subject of dispute between member states by evaluating the 2015 crisis.

This paper introduces the concept of decompression as a specific process of differentiation. Decompression can be anchored as one of the phenomena of non-compliance, representing a distinctive phenomenon, however. Governments or leaders acting in a decompression way are not Eurosceptics and they do not want to reverse the course of integration. We define decompression as a sudden violation of an EU rule by a member state, which leads to immediate disruption of shared trust in a basic EU policy or principle. In the case of a crisis, we can see a 'compression', an unexpected crisis-driven demand placed on domestic institutions. Decompression is a relaxation of this pressure triggering the non-application of an EU policy or principle in reaction to changes external to the political equilibrium. It sheds new light on the persistent power of individual politicians to compromise European integration in an unintended way, so far under-reported by the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) has been challenged by several crises lately. In addition to Brexit, the Euro crisis, and the migration crisis; global issues such as the coronavirus pandemic and the Russian attack on Ukraine affected the EU. The migration crisis, on the one hand, differs from the above-mentioned crises with one remarkable feature. The member states have no real consensus about forming a common migration policy. Besides, for geographic reasons, some member states put much more burden on immigrants. Agreeing on immigration becomes impossible for the border countries and transit countries on the migration route. The paper argues that, unlike the other crises of the EU, the migration crisis reinforces EU integration in such a way that disputes between member states prevent the EU from making institutional changes about the issue. The study results assume that the other above-mentioned crises, on the other hand, stimulated institutional change throughout the EU. In light of this information, this study evaluates, using a method of relevant literature review and comparing the arguments of the researchers, how the migration issue became a subject of dispute between member states by exemplifying the 2015 crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Union (EU) institutions have become increasingly involved in direct policy implementation in the member states, creating a new domain of differentiation in EU governance. What brings about such differentiation, and how does it vary across policy fields? Drawing on theories of differentiated integration, this article argues that differentiated implementation occurs at the intersection of postfunctional obstacles (politicisation) and functional pressures for joint implementation (interdependence). There are two identified dimensions of direct implementation, a territorial one referring to states' participation in such activities, and a procedural one capturing the degree of uniformity in the guidelines for organising implementation. The resulting typology is applied to direct implementation activities (DIAs) conducted by EU agencies alongside national authorities. The qualitative analysis reveals that differentiated participation is a stable feature of DIAs in politicised fields, and although there is a tendency to create more uniform procedures over time and across policy fields, higher uniformity prevails under symmetric interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration (DI) and flexibility in implementation (FI) are two forms of differentiation that can be used to cope with heterogeneity among EU member states. Given the different ways in which they do so, this article asks whether DI and FI are alternatives for each other or whether they serve different functions in EU legislation. Based on a dataset that maps the occurrence of opt-outs and flexibility provisions in EU directives, the analysis shows that DI and FI tend to be used together. A qualitative analysis of directives that combine different levels of DI and FI shows that, within that overall pattern, DI is used to accommodate individual outliers, while FI is used to address widespread concerns among member states. This suggests that DI and FI are two forms of differentiation in the EU, which are used to address different aspects of a common underlying set of concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue analyses the patterns, causes and consequences of Differentiated Policy Implementation (DPI) in the European Union (EU). DPI is an umbrella term for the diversity in the presence and use of discretion during legal and practical policy implementation processes and outcomes in the EU. The emergent DPI research agenda emphasises differentiation in EU policy implementation beyond mere legal compliance, which is more widespread, and its role in the broader political and policy processes of EU multilevel governance. The contributions highlight anticipated implementation as one dimension of DPI, as well as legal and practical implementation. DPI serves as an alternative to differentiated integration (DI), accommodating heterogeneous national preferences, capacities and conditions, and feeding back into EU policy-making. The impact of DPI on the EU's output legitimacy and effectiveness depends on scope conditions that require more scholarly attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the practice of Covid‐related bank regulatory forbearance measures of eight East‐Central European Union member states from the perspective of differentiated integration. In line with the integration‐deepening nature of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, our expectation was that countries within the Banking Union (BU) would impose harmonized forbearance measures, while non‐BU members would use more discretional measures. Indeed, the practice of forbearance measures is significantly more harmonized within the BU than outside; however, there were also notable differences in the practice of BU members. For non‐BU member states, our expectation was that countries with the intention of favouring their domestic financial system would ease regulatory requirements more, while those that wanted to place the burden of the pandemic on foreign banks would ease these requirements less. However, the analysis only partially confirmed this expectation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration is the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations resulting from states’ diverse preferences on the European Union’s systemic model. The heterogeneity of states’ preferences is rooted in many factors of differentiation, where economy and ideology play the leading roles. Their specific interconnection contributed to the creation of the Polish conservative vision of European integration proposed by ideologists close to the Law and Justice party. Three main postulates emerged from their opinions: re-constitution, intergovernmental democracy, and de-hierarchization. This article aims to place this EU vision in the context of the debate on differentiated integration. The thesis is the view that Polish ideologists transformed the political ‘vision’ into a hybrid ‘concept’ of differentiation combining temporal, institutionally based, policy-based, and territorial divergencies.

The main purpose of the article is to describe differentiated integration in the EU energy policy which concerns the exemption of the Nord Stream 2 and OPAL pipelines from European law, and more precisely from the so-called Third Energy Package. The attempt to derogate EU law in relation to these pipelines in Germany was of great economic and political importance for Central Europe as a whole. It also affected the modification of EU law and thus had systemic consequences for the entire EU. In this article, I will analyse the process aimed at derogation from the application of European law and its consequences. Furthermore, I will try to answer the question to what extent the public discussion hindered the possibilities of exemption from European law. Finally, I will turn to clarifying the reasons why exclusion from EU law in the case under review has failed. This seems to be of great importance when explaining other failed attempts to diversify integration in recent years as well; it may also help delineate what limitations there are for the very process in the future.

This article identifies what is specific about Romania’s differentiated integration (DI) into European institutions. It outlines Romania’s expectations and priorities towards the European Union (EU) across three time periods: 1990–2000, 2001–2006 and 2007 onwards. Through this, it evaluates multiple perspectives on EU membership: DI; the development of macro-economic indicators; and Romanian attitudes towards European integration. In some areas, Romania has recorded substantial progress; in others it is still behind other Central and East European member states. Romania remains one of the most determined supporters of EU integration, as membership is considered a key impulse for economic stability and growth. Even if Romania is still outside the Schengen area and the eurozone, it continues to adhere to its accession objectives.

The European Research Area and Framework Programme 7 represents a conducive means for positive differentiation beyond the borders of the EU. The article aims to identify the ERA’s differentiated integration and segmentation swatches by concentrating on the closely-tied neighbouring countries of Morocco and Tunisia. The thematic distinction of the Mediterranean represents positive differentiation that surpasses EU territory. It occurs based on the thematic priorities co-decided by key EU institutions and articulated by the European Commission in annual work programmes. Segmentation in research across the Mediterranean area is a centrally-steered process incentivised by the European Commission through open calls for project applications. Process tracing allows for even more nuanced thematic steering patterns to be explored. A content analysis of open calls with a specific focus on the annual work programmes demonstrates the important role played by the fact that Morocco and Tunisia correspond to the country category of “(African) Mediterranean Partner Countries”. This geographical position offers preferential treatment to participate in several project applications explicitly inviting geographical focus on the Mediterranean area and/or partnerships with a Mediterranean membership.

After the sovereign debt crisis, scholars concluded that euro area member states (EAMS) and non-EAMS embarked on diverging paths of integration. Yet, their united response countering the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis contradicts the path-dependency argument. This article takes an ideational approach. It demonstrates that the different crisis outcomes regarding differentiated integration (DI) in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) coincide with variations of how DI influenced elite crisis perceptions as an idea. While policymakers perceived the sovereign debt crisis as a currency area crisis with threats and spillovers applying to EAMS, they interpreted the COVID-19 crisis as a health emergency threatening all EU member states. These differences in elite crisis perceptions facilitated different outcomes regarding DI despite unchanged economic and fiscal circumstances among EAMS and non-EAMS. The findings challenge deterministic assumptions on the self-reinforcing nature of DI in EMU and establish DI as an idea structuring elite perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflections on the sovereign debt crisis often portray the Eurogroup and the Eurogroup Working Group (EWG) as inaccessible for euro area outsiders. Yet, common wisdom suggests that Council representatives can circumvent exclusion due to differentiated integration (DI) by complying with insider norms. This article studies whether and how compliance with procedural norms socialised amongst representatives from euro area member states (EAMS) determined patterns of non‐EAMS involvement in Eurogroup and EWG interaction during the sovereign debt crisis. The argument highlights the role of deliberation and consensus‐building norms, suggesting that they gained particular robustness amongst EAMS representatives. Those non‐EAMS representatives who consistently complied with these insider norms could secure involvement in intergovernmental debates amongst EAMS. Exclusion was mostly relevant to norm violators. This article sheds light on the institutional consequences of DI in Economic and Monetary Union, highlighting its structural effects on governance and decision‐making processes during the sovereign debt crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An extensive literature investigates individual support for European integration. However, support for differentiated integration has only recently become an important topic of study for public opinion scholars. Previous literature on this issue has not probed how differentiated integration is shaped by exclusively national identities and whether the effect varies by how differentiation has been framed. Using survey data from 2020 to 2021, I show that exclusively national citizens are most likely to support differentiated integration that allows for greater national autonomy and may oppose differentiation whose primary goal is to facilitate further integration. However, I find no clear link between elite framing of differentiated integration and popular support for it. This raises important questions both about what kind of differentiated integration will enjoy public legitimacy and how cues shape support for European Union (EU) differentiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the European Union, non-compliance with EU law and uneven protection of rights may be caused by differentiated policy implementation, potentially creating a problem of legal certainty. A Norwegian 'scandal' caused by the misapplication of EU law provides a case in point. To analyse the case, this article outlines an instrumental, an advocate and a conciliatory mode of incorporation, showing how these give rise to different assumptions about how agencies incorporate EU law and why they sometimes err. Under conditions of complexity, the instrumental mode of incorporation may be unable to ensure legal certainty. The Norwegian scandal is explained as the result of undue political influence and the fact that differentiated integration gives rise to the illusion of a national 'room for manoeuvre'. Hence the explanatory value of the advocacy mode. The conciliatory mode of incorporation recommends itself as a way of ensuring legal certainty in complex orders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated integration has become ubiquitous in the European Union today. However, the evaluation of differentiated integration by the academic community is much contested: While some see it as a remedy to political gridlock, others think of it as the beginning of the end of the EU (i.e., disintegration). Our article sheds light on the relationship between differentiated integration and disintegration from the viewpoint of subnational members of Parliament. Assuming that at least some scenarios of differentiated integration are related to disintegration, we report on data from a survey of seven EU member states about subnational members of Parliament’s preferences regarding future scenarios for the EU. Our results find that a preference for a Europe with a singular focus on “nothing but the single market” is related to a functionalist approach towards European integration and the perceived disintegration of the EU. This preference is especially prevalent among subnational MPs in the Czech Republic and Poland, both known for having opt-out solutions. While the Czech Republic constantly shows high levels of Euroscepticism in public surveys, the reverse is true in Poland. Obviously, a general commitment to the EU should not be equated with a shared common goal of further European integration. If such differences become permanent, European integration may genuinely be endangered.

The aim of this study was to identify the circumstances in which the Common Agricultural Policy, once the most centralised policy in the EU, changed, after 2013, into one which is the most decentralised and diversified. The following hypothesis was put forward that the introduction of significant flexibility in the CAP reflects the search by Member States for the most effective ways to identify and implement their own preferences on the EU forum. The research was conducted from the perspective of the liberal intergovernmentalism theory based on a critical analysis of the respective literature and the applicable strategic documents and regulations. In the study, a large heterogeneity of agricultural sectors in the EU has been shown, resulting from several enlargements of the EU. Consequently, it has led to an increasing diversification of national preferences, significantly affecting the shape of the CAP reforms proposed on the EU forum. Other important drivers influencing the changes in the CAP were the introduction of a co¬decision procedure in the area of agriculture, along with the increasing impact of Member States on the decision-making process since the economic crisis of 2008–2009. As a consequence, EU budget negotiations have been dominated by narrowly-defined sectoral and national interests. The concentration of Member States on an acceptable net position contributes to maintaining the status quo in terms of the expenditure part of the EU budget or its reduction. Thus, there is a risk that the deficit of European integration in areas assuming the distribution of costs and benefits between Member States may have a negative impact on the future of the EU.

This introductory article conceptualizes the notion of third country influence on European Union (EU) law and policy and proposes an analytical framework theorizing the venues and means through which third countries may gain such impact, under what conditions and with which implications for the EU's legal and political order. The article first introduces the focus on outside‐in influence in the context of European studies, generally, and EU privileged third country relations, specifically. Thereafter, an analytical framework is developed for mapping and explaining the outside‐in dynamics on EU law and policy‐making differentiating between diplomatic, governance and discursive venues; coercive versus technocratic and normative mechanisms of influence; and the legal constraints and political implications of these processes. Turning to the potential determinants of these occurrences, the article then proposes a set of hypotheses for conditions under which third countries can influence EU law and policies, before summarizing the individual contributions to this Special Issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2017, member states established the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO), an EU body investigating and prosecuting offences against the EU financial interests. This article analyses the relation between the institutional design of the EPPO and sovereignty concerns of member states. Combining the core state powers framework with literature on Council negotiation dynamics, it argues that the Council was divided regarding how far-reaching the authority of this new body vis-à-vis member states should be or to what extent member states should retain control over the body. A qualitative discourse analysis shows that the competition between states sharing a supranational position regarding the EPPO and those sharing an intergovernmental position resulted in the creation of a complex and ambiguous body. These findings contribute to the literature on agencification of Justice and Home Affairs as well as, more broadly, to scholarship on the construction of new types of authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decentralized EU agencies have played an important role in the Union's institutional landscape over the last three decades. Various engagement logics and types of cooperation have previously been investigated for the European Economic Area and EU Eastern Partnership countries, but not for the five countries that received EU candidate status by 2021—Turkey and four Western Balkans countries—Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and Northern Macedonia. Covering the period between 1999 and 2021 analysis found that 23 out of 34 agencies observed had some type of engagement with these candidates, while serving both EU's broader foreign policy interests and advancing the sector-specific alignment of candidates. This also suggests that it is possible to frame these engagements as a form of external EU differentiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the debate on domestic politicisation of EU issues by suggesting hitherto overlooked explanation of (non)politicisation. This paper uses Czechia as an intriguing case in which the mainstream explanations of a low level of domestic politicisation of EU issues do not apply. The Czech case illustrates that, first, even in the context of high public Euroscepticism, EU issues do not necessarily become politicised, particularly so when the public does not consider them to be important. Second, high politicisation does not occur when there is a path dependency of a mismatch between positions of political parties and significant parts of their electorates on EU issues. Finally, the rise of catch-all populist parties prevents a high level of politicisation of EU issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an innovative, comprehensive quantitative analysis of legal integration and differentiation in the European Union (EU) from 1958 to 2020. Building on a streamlined analytical framework and new or revised datasets on EU primary, EU secondary and EU‐related international law, it challenges or qualifies several aspects of the received wisdom on European integration. Specifically, it delivers the first‐ever quantitative estimate of integration in terms of integration opportunities, shows that differentiation is deployed in a reluctant and eclectic manner and offers clear measurements for the prevalence of various modes of temporal, spatial and policy differentiation. These methodological and empirical findings confirm the fruitfulness of the quantitative approach to the study of European integration and point to promising avenues for future research on international integration and comparative regionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1165-1190 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Sources of rigidity. - II.1. Omnidirectional reciprocity as a source of rigidity. - II.2. Interconnectedness as a source of rigidity. - II.3. Effectiveness as a source of rigidity. - II.4. The clash between rigidity and the dynamics of differentiation. - III. Brexit insights for future attempts at structural differentiation. - III.1. The transition period as sheer rigidity. - III.2. The Northern-Ireland Protocol: Flexible borders and rigid law. - III.3. The TCA as the residual space of rigidity. - IV. Conclusion: Rigidity roadblocks to future structural integration. | (Abstract) This Article argues that the legal space for truly structural forms of differentiation in the EU is limited by several sources of rigidity. Sources of rigidity are thereby understood as legal rules and principles that, either by themselves or in interaction with other rules, principles and material facts, limit the scope for structurally significant differentiation in the EU's legal and constitutional set-up. A source of rigidity can therefore be broader than a single legal rule or principle because the rigidity may stem from a combination of or interaction between multiple principles, rules and facts. Using Brexit as a prism, this Article identifies at least three such sources of legal rigidity, being reciprocity, interconnectedness and effectiveness. These sources of rigidity also place significant limits on the possible dynamics of differentiation. It is demonstrated how Brexit brought these sources of rigidity to the surface, and how legal rigidity can and likely will collide with an increasing political desire for more structural differentiation in the future.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1191-1209 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Potential for legislative differentiation: Space offered by the EU legislature. - II.1. Comparing the GDPR and the SAD. - II.2. Legislative contexts. - II.3. Zooming in: Identifying discretion. - III. Using the potential: Member States' implementation. - IV. Alternative to differentiated integration? - IV.1. Real decision-making authority or decisions on details? - IV.2. Political decision-making or fitting the directive into pre-existing structures? - V. Conclusions. | (Abstract) The "uniformity-based"-model of EU integration has lost considerable ground. It has become more and more considered as a model which takes too little account of national differences in economic, social, cultural and constitutional conditions and in political views. Differentiated integration (DI) raises issues, however. Equality of the Member States and the effectiveness of EU law and policy may be seriously impaired. This Article explores the potential of legislative differentiation as an alternative to more classic forms of DI. With legislative differentiation, we refer to the situation in which Member States are allowed to make substantive policy choices in the implementation of EU legislation and use such flexibility to customize EU legislation to their own domestic contexts. We explore this potential by assessing two case studies: the General Data Protection Regulation and the Child Sexual Abuse Directive. The analysis of these case studies shows that legislative differentiation is a multifaceted phenomenon that indeed has the potential to be an alternative to the classic forms of DI. Yet, in practice sub-optimal results have been found as well. Therefore, more consideration and a better incorporation of diversity in legislative processes is required to further enhance the potential of differentiated legislation.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1325-1356 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. CSDP: Between a common and differentiated policy. - II.1. CSDP as a common policy of the EU. - II.2. Differentiated integration in CFSDP. - III. PESCO's microcosm of differentiated integration. - III.1. The awakening of the "Sleeping Beauty". - III.2. Participation in PESCO. - III.3. PESCO projects. - IV. PESCO: Contributing to a common security and defence policy? - IV.1. General principles in EU CFSP and their enforcement. - IV.2. Consistency in relation to differentiated integration in PESCO. - IV.3. Sincere cooperation in relation to differentiated integration in PESCO. - V. Conclusion- | (Abstract) The use of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by the European Union to manage defence cooperation between its Member States is the most recent example of Differentiated Integration (DI) in the EU. Yet differentiation may come at a price. The main aim of the present Article is to assess to what extent defence cooperation under the umbrella of PESCO can be cut up in pieces and yet still be considered a common defence adhering to the EU's general principles of consistency and sincere cooperation. The question, therefore, is whether DI in PESCO is limited by these principles, and consequently, whether the CSDP, despite the differentiation, still contributes to a common policy. In short, the question is whether there is a tension between commonness and differentiation in EU security cooperation.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1211-1227 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Conceptual confusion. - III. Learning the lessons on differentiated integration. - III.1. The advent of Brexit. - III.2. The challenge for the future. - IV. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Historically, the use of differentiated integration mechanisms has been based on the idea of the widening and deepening of the European Union, necessitated by the enlargement of the bloc through the addition of Member State countries. The advent of Brexit means that we are in a rather different situation today, where the monodirectional march towards deeper, uniform integration between an ever increasing number of States is neither inevitable nor assured. The differences between all of the then 28 individual Member States in the pre-Brexit Union were multifarious. These differences have not disappeared along with the UK upon its exit from the Union. They still exist between the remain-ing 27 Member States and will likely increase in prominence as the European Union pursues its future path. Addressing those differences will require an alternative approach to uniform integration from the EU, it will require differentiated integration. This Article suggests that there are lessons to be learnt on differentiated integration from applying Brexit as a framework. The confusion surrounding differentiated integration as a concept, and the prominent role of the UK in availing itself of opportunities to utilise differentiated integration mechanisms, has led differentiated integration to be attributed to the UK as a form of British exceptionalism. Brexit is not just an opt-out but the ultimate opt-out, a form of flexibility sought from outside the European Union, consequent on a lack of wider acceptance of differentiated integration in terms of both legal permissiveness and extent as well as attitude within the Union. The maintenance of differences between the remaining Member States means that there needs to be increased open acceptance of the likely need for greater differentiated integration in the future.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1243-1263 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. The evolution of differentiated integration in the field of asylum. - III. Flexible solidarity in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. - III.1. The Proposal for a Regulation on Asylum and Migration Management: A fresh start? - III.2. The management of flexible solidarity. - III.3. Return sponsorship: A concept that did not please anyone. - IV. Solidarity in cooperating with third countries in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. - V. The gradual approach: Towards a voluntary solidarity mechanism. - VI. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Flexible solidarity is presented by the Commission in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum as a solution to break the deadlock in the reform of the EU asylum policy. The aim of this Article is to analyse to what extent the development of flexible solidarity in the field of asylum will allow the EU to address the shortcomings that the CEAS is facing today. The key question is whether differentiation as regards solidarity serves to further develop the EU asylum policy by introducing a useful degree of flexibility to accommodate the different interests of the Member States or the multiplication of forms of solidarity will lead in the long run to more disintegration. It will also be assessed to what extent the gradual approach followed by the French Presidency of the Council in the first semester of 2022 will allow to make concrete progress on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and achieve the ambition of a comprehensive asylum and migration policy at EU level in the future.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1287-1302 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Post-Brexit security and defence cooperation as differentiated disintegration - III. Theresa May and the proposed "security partnership". - IV. The trade and cooperation agreement and beyond. - V. The war in Ukraine: A game changer? - VI. Conclusion. | (Abstract) Research on differentiated integration has flourished in recent years, highlighting the political and efficiency gains to be had from selective participation and third country engagement in EU policy areas. Proposals for an EU-UK security and defence agreement represented a paradigmatic example of differentiated disintegration, for which both strategic and political prospects initially appeared positive, yet which ultimately foundered on the back of the EU's reluctance to create new third country models and subsequent political upheaval in the UK. This Article asks why these proposals failed and what this can tell us about the politics of differentiated (dis)integration, focusing on the referendum to the recent Ukraine crisis, and drawing on several elite interviews conducted with policymakers in London and Brussels. It shows that while the strategic benefits of differentiation increased following the Brexit vote, the growing concern in Brussels for the precedent set by Brexit, the collapse of issue-specific dynamics into a singular concern for UK "cherry picking", and the rightward shift in UK politics occasioned by the Brexit negotiations all undermined the prospects for a differentiated outcome in security and defence. The Ukraine crisis, while precipitating significant changes in many European states, had thus far failed to alter the new status quo locked in after Brexit.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1303-1324 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. PESCO and differentiated integration in European Defence. - II.1. Approaching the definition of differentiated integration. - II.2. Pre-PESCO landscape. - II.3. Differentiated integration via PESCO. - III. The participation of third States. - IV. Strategic Review 2020. - V. Conclusions. | (Abstract) After decades of bi-national and multinational military programmes that arrived in dribs and drabs, and once the United Kingdom decided to withdraw from the EU, the launch and implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017 has emerged as a real game-changer. Thus, favouring differentiated integration in defence matters within the European Union after Brexit. This Article focuses on the analysis of both horizontal and vertical differentiated integration from an eminently practical point of view. All of this, aimed at illustrating the distinction between the pre-PESCO scenario and the current one with 60 projects underway within its framework. In this sense, the analysis makes it possible to distinguish a real group of frontrunners in the implementation of PESCO and the window of opportunity that opens up by allowing third states to participate in individual projects, with particular attention to the case of the United Kingdom.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2022 7(3), 1141-1144 | Article | (Abstract) This Article provides insights into the question of whether there is a tension between commonness and differentiation in EU policies, in particular post-Brexit. Brexit triggered new discussions on so-called differentiated integration (DI) in the European Union. Not only was Brexit perceived as a potential tool to take further integrative steps in certain policy areas, it also pointed to the idea that there is a risk in trying to force each and every Member State to follow the same pace. Hence, while part of the scholarship sees Brexit as a tragedy for the European integration process, others have pointed to possible advantages that would allow for further integration in certain areas. In any case, the present Special Section underlines that Brexit seems to have renewed the debate on the ways in which the EU Member States could proceed, together or in smaller groups. It takes stock of the DI possibilities in different concrete policy areas and highlights options and obstacles.

The Institute of Enhanced Cooperation (EnC) was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) but it was made more flexible and operational by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Its main objective was to overcome the blockages in the law-making process, as well as to strengthen the cooperation among EU member states and deepen the integration process in specific areas. In this paper, the authors examine the institute of enhanced cooperation as a form of flexible and differentiated integration. The authors first present a brief historical overview of the legal regulation of this institute in the provisions of the founding treaties of the EU. Then, they provide an overview of the sources of law adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation in certain areas of Private International Law, and particularly for the purpose of establishing the European Public Prosecutor's Office. Based on the analysis of a number of legal acts adopted within this institute, the authors draw a conclusion that the institute of enhanced cooperation has only partially justified its contractually defined role. Viewed from the perspective of the legal order of the European Union as a whole, this institute requires special attention due to the particularities of its application, which ultimately entails different solutions in the EU member states on certain issues of particular importance for legal and natural persons in the Union. There is no doubt that this institute provides many opportunities to the EU member states in terms of realizing or deepening their cooperation in certain issues, particularly if it is perceived as a stage on the way to establishing general, common rules for all member states. However, its application may challenge the unity and the integral structure of the EU legal order. It may also be inconsistent with some of the basic EU legal principles which have been continuously strengthened and expanded by the Court of Justice of the EU. Above all, it refers to the principle of unity of the legal order, the principle of prohibition of discrimination on the basis of citizenship, and the principle of legal certainty.

This article presents empirically substantiated answers on the salience of differentiated integration (DI) from the perspective of Croatian governments between 2004 and 2020. Considering DI's relevance for the future of EU integration as well as the fact that DI was de facto adopted by the Croatian governments in order to maintain a healthy relationship with the EU, the main assumption is that DI – as a broad and multifaceted integration phenomenon – appears prominently in the domestic political discourse. By employing text mining and sentiment analysis on a corpus of 376 various governmental documents we answer, do governments talk about DI and specific DI mechanisms at a conceptual level? Which differentiated policy fields do they talk about most often? Our results show that DI has been – and remains – a low salience issue for Croatian governments over the last 15 years, which is surprising considering that over this period, Croatia consolidated its position in the EU in the shadow of the 'polycrisis', also thanks to DI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]