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This monograph asserts that the United States military conducted World War II with few restrictions on its firepower beyond those imposed by the International Rules of War. An unlimited war justified unlimited fires, including the strategic use of atomic bombs in August of 1945 to end the conflict. However, World War II proved an anomaly in the twentieth century as America reverted in the post war period to conducting limited wars. Absent a threat to national survival, policy makers ruled out the use of nuclear weapons as a serious option at the strategic level. At the tactical level, commanders had a full array of mortars, tube artillery, and air support. This closely replicated both the concept and effects of what was available to their World War II predecessors. Yet, in limited conflicts, the use of these weapons developed implications beyond their tactical battlefield effects. The monograph examines how strategic policy makers shaped the battlefield for operational fires. At one extreme, the fear of escalation provided an upper limit for field commanders in Korea and Vietnam. At the lower end of the scale, fires previously considered solely tactical in nature had operational and strategic consequences. Stability and support operations (SASO) like the United States Marine Corps intervention in Beirut in the early 1980s came with limitations on commander s ability to employ operational fires. Commanders involved in SASO faced the difficulty of using their weapons without provoking charges of disproportionate response. The monograph also discusses the effect of increased connectivity of the global information environment. For commanders after the Korean War, the results of choices they made were instantly communicated to a worldwide audience. Thus, weapons previously thought to reside solely in the tactical arena now carried an operational, if n The monograph concludes by arguing that operational artists must be trained to be able

Five years after emerging victorious from World War II, the United States became embroiled in the Korean War. In August of 1950, despite the relative industrial and technological disadvantages suffered by the enemy North Korean Peoples Army, the American Eighth Army was nearly defeated and pushed into the sea while trying to defend a toehold on the Korean peninsula around the port of Pusan. The poorly trained and equipped U.S. soldiers and marines defending the Pusan Perimeter relied heavily on fire support assets to stem the tide and defeat the North Korean attack. This monograph asks if the fire support, including both artillery and air fires, provided to the Eighth Army Infantry and Armor units was effective. It also examines the reasons for the success or failures of fire support by contrasting the use of fire support by different Army and Marine Corps units as they defended the perimeter. Additionally, the monograph addresses the question of how the force development process shaped the success or failure of the Pusan fire support effort. Finally, the monograph discusses lessons from the Pusan defense that are applicable to current fire support and force development. The monograph concludes that the fire support effort in the Pusan campaign was effective. However, because of the force reductions and training lapses that occurred after World War II in the United States Army and Air Force, it was not as effective as it could have been. The time taken to relearn the lessons of World War II and to rebuild units to doctrinal war time strength needlessly cost lives. The Pusan perimeter fight contains valuable lessons for current fire support leaders as they grapple with challenges similar to those faced by their predecessors in the summer of 1950.

This monograph asserts that the United States military conducted World War II with few restrictions on its firepower beyond those imposed by the International Rules of War. An unlimited war justified unlimited fires, including the strategic use of atomic bombs in August of 1945 to end the conflict. However, World War II proved an anomaly in the twentieth century as America reverted in the post war period to conducting limited wars. Absent a threat to national survival, policy makers ruled out the use of nuclear weapons as a serious option at the strategic level. At the tactical level, commanders had a full array of mortars, tube artillery, and air support. This closely replicated both the concept and effects of what was available to their World War II predecessors. Yet, in limited conflicts, the use of these weapons developed implications beyond their tactical battlefield effects. The monograph examines how strategic policy makers shaped the battlefield for operational fires. At one extreme, the fear of escalation provided an upper limit for field commanders in Korea and Vietnam. At the lower end of the scale, fires previously considered solely tactical in nature had operational and strategic consequences. Stability and support operations (SASO) like the United States Marine Corps intervention in Beirut in the early 1980s came with limitations on commander’s ability to employ operational fires. Commanders involved in SASO faced the difficulty of using their weapons without provoking charges of disproportionate response. The monograph also discusses the effect of increased connectivity of the global information environment. For commanders after the Korean War, the results of choices they made were instantly communicated to a worldwide audience. Thus, weapons previously thought to reside solely in the tactical arena now carried an operational, if not strategic, impact. The monograph concludes by arguing that operational artists must be trained to be able to deliver op

Five years after emerging victorious from World War II, the United States became embroiled in the Korean War. In August of 1950, despite the relative industrial and technological disadvantages suffered by the enemy North Korean Peoples’ Army, the American Eighth Army was nearly defeated and pushed into the sea while trying to defend a toehold on the Korean peninsula around the port of Pusan. The poorly trained and equipped U.S. soldiers and marines defending the Pusan Perimeter relied heavily on fire support assets to stem the tide and defeat the North Korean attack. This monograph asks if the fire support, including both artillery and air fires, provided to the Eighth Army Infantry and Armor units was effective. It also examines the reasons for the success or failures of fire support by contrasting the use of fire support by different Army and Marine Corps units as they defended the perimeter. Additionally, the monograph addresses the question of how the force development process shaped the success or failure of the Pusan fire support effort. Finally, the monograph discusses lessons from the Pusan defense that are applicable to current fire support and force development. The monograph concludes that the fire support effort in the Pusan campaign was effective. However, because of the force reductions and training lapses that occurred after World War II in the United States Army and Air Force, it was not as effective as it could have been. The time taken to relearn the lessons of World War II and to rebuild units to doctrinal war time strength needlessly cost lives. The Pusan perimeter fight contains valuable lessons for current fire support leaders as they grapple with challenges similar to those faced by their predecessors in the summer of 1950.