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The ultimate goal of trade integration in Africa is the total elimination of tariffs, the free movement of people and goods, the reduction of transaction costs and the convergence of economic rules and policies on trade, while ensuring the cohesion of the stages of regional and continental integration. In this paper, we investigate whether or not there is a need for a more comprehensive approach to trade integration in Africa, and if so, how this can be achieved. In this paper, we investigate whether currency and common language, taken together, are determining factors in trade intensity. For this purpose, we use the gravity model augmented with variables such as language, currency and common language interaction (mon≠lancom), currency and common border interaction (mon≠frntcom), border and trade agreement interaction (frntcom≠accom), bilateral trade volume by the economic weight of two countries (their GDP or GDP/capita in general) and by the distance between them which can evolve as a function of time Disdier and Head (2008) and Buch et al. After estimating the model with 2129 observations, we find a lack of overall significance in ECOWAS and IGAD, but in the other communities, namely ECCAS, EAC, CENSAD, AMU, SADC and COMESA, the model is globally significant. This means that currency and language remain determinant in the intensification of trade in Africa. As economic policy recommendations, accelerate the process of finalising and putting into circulation the single currency and a uniform continental communication system. Keywords: Trade intensity; Intra-CER; Determinants JEL Classification : F02 F15 F19 F42 Paper Type: Empirical Research, L’objectif ultime de l’intégration par le commerce en Afrique est la suppression totale des tarifs douaniers, la libre circulation des personnes et des biens, a diminution des coûts de transactions et à la convergence des règles et des politiques économiques sur le commerce, tout en assurant une bonne cohésion des étapes de l’intégration régionale voir continentale. Dans ce papier, nous essayons de savoir si la monnaie et la langue commune, prises ensemble, sont des facteurs déterminants dans l’intensité commerciale. Pour cela, nous utilisons le modèle de gravité augmenté des variables comme la langue, l’interaction monnaie et langue commune(mon≠lancom), l’interaction monnaie et frontière commune(mon≠frntcom), l’interaction frontière et accords commerciaux (frntcom≠accom), le volume des échanges bilatéral par le poids économique de deux pays (leur PIB ou PIB/habitant en général) et par la distance qui les sépare et qui peut évoluer en fonction temps Disdier et Head (2008) et Buch et al. (2004). Après estimation du modèle avec 2129 observations, nous constatons une absence de significativité globale dans la CEDEAO et IGAD par contre dans les autres communautés, à savoir CEEAC, CAE, CENSAD, UMA, SADC et le COMESA le modèle est globalement significatif. Ce qui veut dire que la monnaie et la langue restent déterminantes dans l’intensification des échanges en Afrique. Comme recommandations de politique économique, accélération du processus de finalisation et de la mise en circulation de la monnaie unique et un système de communication uniforme continentale. Mots clés: Intensité du commerce; Intra-CER; facteurs déterminants Classification JEL: F02 F15 F19 F42 Type de l’article : Article empirique

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The objective of the paper is to evaluate whether there is a change in the level or trend of food prices in fragile countries following the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. The empirical evidence is based on Interrupted Time Series Analysis. The following findings are established. Firstly, an immediate and sustained positive effect is noted, indicating that for each month that passes after the Covid-19 and Russia-Ukraine war, food prices increase in most of the fragile countries. Secondly, if the Covid-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war had not happened, the price level and its trend would have been at a significantly lower level in fragile countries. Thirdly, the Russia-Ukraine war intervention period slope is significantly and considerably higher than that of the Covid-19 indicating that the Russia-Ukraine war has increased food prices in fragile countries more proportionately than the Covid-19 pandemic did.

This study investigates how governance and infrastructure modulate the effect of natural resource rents on economic growth in a sample of 110 countries for the period 2000-2018. The empirical evidence is based on Panel Smooth Transition Regressions (PSTR). The following findings are established. First, the nexus between economic growth and natural resources is not linear and the underlying non-linearity is contingent on existing infrastructural and governance levels. Second, evidence of a "natural resource curse" is apparent in countries with extremely low levels of governance and infrastructural development. Third, the favorable effect of natural resources on economic growth requires a governance threshold of -1.210 and an infrastructure threshold of 2.583 indicating that countries with governance and infrastructure level higher than these values tend to benefit much more from the wealth of natural resources. With high levels of the transition variables (governance and infrastructure), the established thresholds are low and situated between the 5 th and the 10th percentiles. Countries identified below the established thresholds are mainly from Africa. Policy implications are discussed with specific emphasis on African countries.

Several previous studies have explored the nexus between trust and socio-economic conditions but do not attempt to examine channels through which the relation operates. In this paper, we examine how political fractionalization mitigates the positive relationship between trust institutions and national economic performance in Africa. Using Round 7 data of Afrobarometer in over 1000 districts in 34 countries, we find that trust institutions positively and significantly affect economic performance. Nevertheless, the positive effect is attenuated in districts with a high level of political diversity. More specifically, a higher level of trust is associated with lower economic performance at a higher level of political fractionalization and vice versa, with a steady linear decrease of the estimated coefficients. Policy implications are discussed.