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One of the most heated debates in psychological science concerns the concept of repressed memory. We discuss how the debate on repressed memories continues to surface in legal settings, sometimes even to suggest avenues of legal reform. In the past years, several European countries have extended or abolished the statute of limitations for the prosecution of sexual crimes. Such statutes force legal actions (e.g., prosecution of sexual abuse) to be applied within a certain period of time. One of the reasons for the changes in statutes of limitations concerns the idea of repressed memory. We argue that from a psychological standpoint, these law reforms can be detrimental, particularly when they are done to endorse unfounded psychological theories. The validity of testimonies is compromised many years after the alleged facts, and abolishing the statute of limitations increases the chance that even more (false) recovered memories of abuse might enter the courtroom. We propose solutions to these changes such as establishing an independent expert committee evaluating claims of sexual abuse.

On the basis of converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious blockage of psychological trauma (i.e., repressed memory) remains very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In his commentary, Brewin (this issue, p. 443) conducted a cocitation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to his claims. First, we inspected his cocitation analysis and found that some scholars support notions that are closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis on the basis of articles' similarity. Again, we found examples of scholars specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, as opposed to what Brewin reports, recent survey research now exists that bears directly on people's beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This work reveals that large percentages of people (e.g., students and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] clinicians) endorse the concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., false accusations of abuse).

In three studies, we examined whether beliefs in repressed memory and dissociative amnesia could be changed. Participants provided agreement ratings to statements related to repressed memory and dissociative amnesia. Then, they received a university course which included education on the science of memory. Following this, participants had to re-rate the statements. In Study 3, at Times 1 and 2, participants also received a case vignette on a therapy-induced recovered memory and rated several statements related to this case. Participants who received education on the science of memory were less likely to agree with statements endorsing repressed memory and dissociative amnesia--and participants were more likely to state that the case vignette involved a false memory. Providing education on the science of memory can help people (e.g., legal professionals, people from the general population) to use critical thinking on the topic of repressed memory and dissociative amnesia.

This study examined the relevance of the cognitive interview (CI) for the recall of a road accident by actual victims, depending on the level of stress experienced at the time of the event. Fifty-six victims (or witnesses) were interviewed, either with a CI or control interview, after completing a series of questionnaires including measures of their stress level during the accident. Participants who reported a high level of stress recalled more central details than those with a low level. In addition, participants interviewed with the CI recalled more details than those interviewed with a control interview, regardless of the level of stress experienced during the accident. This experiment confirms the CI's relevance in a stressful context, and after an extended period of time. Practical implications for interviewing victims are discussed.

We examined the incidence of recovered memories of child abuse in a large French general public sample (N = 3346). Of the 905 (27% of total sample) who reported having memories of abuse, 211 (23%) reported recovered memories of child abuse that they had no previous memory of, with 82 of these (9% of the 905) reporting that they did not know they were abused beforehand. Ninety percent of the latter reported having recovered their memories when not in a therapy at the time. Those who reported recovered memories outside of therapy often reported discussions with peers and/or media exposure related to childhood abuse that occurred either before or during memory recovery. Our prevalence results are discussed in light of the hypothesis that many recovered memories are in fact reinterpreted continuous memories. The findings on context are discussed in relation to the work on the malleability of memory.

Recent research shows that the quality of a baseline (i.e., the analysis of one's behavior in normal conditions) decreases when the second narrative is expected and deceitful. However, a first step would be to investigate whether the writing of a first narrative might influence the second, independently of its expectancy. In this study, we hypothesized that second narratives would be less detailed, especially if these narratives are deceptive. Participants (N = 71) were asked to narrate two consecutive truthful and deceptive narratives. The second narrative was unexpected, and the order of the narratives was counterbalanced. Results suggest a detrimental effect of deceptiveness and order on the frequency of details. Moreover, an interaction was observed, suggesting when narratives are written after a first one, the frequency of details decreases, all the more if they were deceptive. The results of this experiment are discussed from both a theoretical and an applied perspective.

Debates surrounding the origin of recovered memories of child abuse have traditionally focused on two conflicting arguments, namely that these memories are either false memories or instances of repressed memories (i.e., reflecting the idea that people can unconsciously block traumatic autobiographical experiences and eventually regain access). While scientific evidence for the first is clearly established, the second is the subject of a controversy in the academic, clinical, and legal fields. This controversy rages on today. In this introductory article to our topic "Beyond Repressed Memory: Current Alternative Solutions to the Controversy," we present alternative and more parsimonious explanations for repressed memories that we sorted into three categories: cognitive, motivational, and biological factors. Our aim is to provide a timely overview to help clinical and legal professionals, academics, and the general public to move beyond the idea that traumatic memories can be unconsciously repressed. There is an ongoing debate about the origin of recovered memories, traditionally viewed as either false or repressed memories. While false memories are scientifically supported, repressed memories remain controversial. We propose alternative explanations categorized into cognitive, motivational and biological factors to explain recovered memory cases.A [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1990s, repressed and recovered memories were at the heart of intense debates within the clinical field as well as in academia. Recent data suggest that this controversy has not yet been resolved in the clinical field. However, it is unclear to what extent repressed and recovered memories are studied in peer-reviewed outcomes in the 21st century. The current article examined the volume of publications and citations regarding repressed and/or recovered memories during the years 2001-2018. Analysis of the 145 articles retrieved shows that these issues are still being investigated within the academic sphere. Proponents and opponents of repressed memories regularly published articles, and these were cited as often as articles published during the 1990s. These issues were also multidisciplinary (i.e., social/clinical/experimental psychology, psychiatry, and law) and often dealt with dissociation, child abuse, and/or false memory. The results are encouraging for furthering the research field and for the understanding of traumatic memory mechanisms.

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do people really think of when they say they believe in repressed traumatic memory? In two studies (NStudy 1 = 3158; NStudy 2 = 305) using an integrative method taking into account recent methodological discussions, we found that, in total, 2458 participants (71% of the two combined samples) reported that they believed in repressed memory. In Study 1, based on separate questions on the whole group, we found 71% of agreement with the concept of repression, 74% with the concept of unconscious repression, and 54% with the concept of deliberate memory suppression. Participants with no memory of childhood abuse endorsed unconscious and deliberate mechanisms less than those with such memories. In Study 2, the order in which the items were presented was not associated with the beliefs in the different statements. Overall, our results show that people see repression as an unconscious mechanism. We suggest the use of within-subject designs and/or follow-up questions to determine how people understand the concept of repression. Such adherence to this controversial concept can have adverse implications in the clinical and legal arenas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A context-driven analysis was performed to assess the quality of French investigative interviews with three age groups of child witnesses (under 7 years old, 7–10 years old, and 11–17 years old). We measured how age was related to the quality of 24 real-life interviews by evaluating how child-centered the interview was: (i) did it follow recommendations for each phase of the interview and, (ii) was the questioning style appropriately adapted to the child's previous answer. Results showed that the older children gave more detailed responses to open questions. However, investigators did not encourage their recall through the use of appropriate questions, but instead asking closed and leading questions. With the younger children, interviewers also asked predominantly closed and leading questions but after evasive answers. Our findings suggest different strategies underpin the use of inappropriate questions with respect to the age of the witnesses. Implications for training are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]