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Rodents can cause considerable changes in plant community composition. However, relationships between shifts in species dominance and plant functional traits caused by rodents have seldom been investigated, especially for belowground functional traits. In this study, a set of enclosures was constructed to analyze the effects of 10 years of Brandt's voles' activities on the defense strategies and dominant position changes of three gramineous plants (Leymus chinensis, Stipa krylovii, and Cleistogenes squarrosa) in Inner Mongolia. Here, we measured the dominance, biomass, and fourteen functional traits of three plants. The effects of Brandt's voles on dominance, biomass, and functional traits were analyzed, and then we explored the effect of functional traits on plant dominance by using the structural equation model. Results showed that long‐term feeding by Brandt's voles resulted in a significant decrease in the dominance of L. chinensis and S. krylovii, whereas C. squarrosa was positively affected. The belowground biomass of L. chinensis and S. krylovii was higher in the vole treatment, which showed that they were increasing their escape characteristics. The leaf thickness of L. chinensis and the leaf C:N ratio of S. krylovii significantly increased, while the specific leaf area of C. squarrosa significantly decreased. All three gramineous showed increased resistance traits in response to Brandt's voles, which positively affected their dominance. Tolerance‐related traits of S. krylovii significantly increased, with the increasing growth rate of root length contributing to enhancing its dominance. We highlight that selective feeding by rodents led to the selection of different defense strategies by three gramineous plants, and that changes in biomass allocation and functional traits in the different species affected plant dominance, driving changes in the plant communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Rodents can cause considerable changes in plant community composition. However, relationships between shifts in species dominance and plant functional traits caused by rodents have seldom been investigated, especially for belowground functional traits. In this study, a set of enclosures was constructed to analyze the effects of 10 years of Brandt's voles' activities on the defense strategies and dominant position changes of three gramineous plants (Leymus chinensis, Stipa krylovii, and Cleistogenes squarrosa) in Inner Mongolia. Here, we measured the dominance, biomass, and fourteen functional traits of three plants. The effects of Brandt's voles on dominance, biomass, and functional traits were analyzed, and then we explored the effect of functional traits on plant dominance by using the structural equation model. Results showed that long‐term feeding by Brandt's voles resulted in a significant decrease in the dominance of L. chinensis and S. krylovii, whereas C. squarrosa was positively affected. The belowground biomass of L. chinensis and S. krylovii was higher in the vole treatment, which showed that they were increasing their escape characteristics. The leaf thickness of L. chinensis and the leaf C:N ratio of S. krylovii significantly increased, while the specific leaf area of C. squarrosa significantly decreased. All three gramineous showed increased resistance traits in response to Brandt's voles, which positively affected their dominance. Tolerance‐related traits of S. krylovii significantly increased, with the increasing growth rate of root length contributing to enhancing its dominance. We highlight that selective feeding by rodents led to the selection of different defense strategies by three gramineous plants, and that changes in biomass allocation and functional traits in the different species affected plant dominance, driving changes in the plant communities.

Copyright of Journal of Social & Technology / Jurnal Sosial dan Teknologi (SOSTECH) is the property of Green Publisher and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The contemporary legal framework in various jurisdictions includes provisions aimed at preventing the abuse of market-dominant enterprises, with the overarching goal of addressing monopolistic practices. This research centres on the examination of competition law in the contexts of Albania and Kosovo, specifically within the realm of addressing abusive behaviour by dominant market players. This article looks at the existing legal framework pertaining to the abuse of dominant market positions in Albania and Kosovo, and how closely it aligns with European legislation in this domain. Additionally, it considers the efficacy of the provisions prohibiting abusive conduct by dominant enterprises. Examining these two distinct legal systems is crucial, because both are currently in the early stages of alignment with EU legislation.Through analysing the legislative frameworks and the decisions rendered by the Competition Authorities in the countries under scrutiny, several key findings emerge: Firstly, the competition legislation in the examined states, particularly in Albania, bears a striking resemblance to the European Union's legal framework. Secondly, it is evident that Albania has devoted more research and attention to the issue of abuse of dominant positions than Kosovo. Specifically, the Albanian Competition Authority has conducted comprehensive investigations across various sectors of the economy, leading to the imposition of fines on dominant enterprises found to engage in abusive practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Economy & Market Communication Review / Casopis za Ekonomiju i Trzisne Komunikacije is the property of Pan-European University Apeiron and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

After an introduction of competition due to liberalisation, there is an expectation of lower prices and better quality. However, these overall positive effects could be also driven by the incumbent's incentive to exclude competition within the liberalised markets. Such a situation occurred on the Prague-Ostrava line where liberalisation brought lower prices and an increase in quality. However, it also brought multiple accusations by both the Czech competition authority and the European Commission of the state-owned incumbent, České dráhy, that it had engaged in predatory pricing. This paper then assesses whether the price decreases within this line were driven by actual competition or by predatory behaviour of České dráhy by analysing the position of České dráhy. The aim of this paper therefore is to assess the real market power of the Czech state incumbent, České dráhy, on the Prague-Ostrava line. To achieve this aim, we used unique data we had gathered from our previous research (such as price development, market shares and customer behaviour). Our results then show that it is unlikely that České dráhy could have acted independently of its competitors and customers, which indicates that it could not have had a dominant position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digitalization and the rapid development of society determine the need to adapt legislation and law enforcement practice to the requirements of the digital age. Antitrust policy is also changing and developing tools that allow timely response to the challenges of the digital economy. One such tool is behavioral economics, which is becoming increasingly important in today’s digital environment, and allows regulators to be flexible and contribute to the achievement of the main goals of competition law — to maintain a competitive state of the market and avoid the concentration of excessive power in the hands of one economic entity.The practice of applying behavioral economics by antitrust authorities is becoming more extensive, as there is a large pool of data in the digital environment, including information about consumers, which can be used by companies to influence users, as well as lead to unfair competition. Thus, the paper will study the issue of using behavioral economics in terms of consumer choice by antitrust authorities in order to identify possible behavioral insights of consumers that affect the correct establishment of product markets and the identification of competition law violations by companies.Applying the legal doctrinal approach, the descriptive method, and the comparative law method makes it possible to establish the issue’s relevance in different countries and the prospects and trajectories of the usage of behavioral economics in antitrust practice.As a result of the study, a global trend has been established in the application of behavioral economics by antitrust authorities both in determining the boundaries of commodity markets and in detecting violations of antitrust laws. It is concluded that the use of such a tool will continue, as it contributes to the timely adaptation of existing antitrust laws to the challenges of the digital age, contributes to the achievement of competition law goals, and creates a thriving competitive environment.

The competition policy and norms in the European Union are a vital part of the internal market. Competition, although it is an element whose existence is essential for the proper functioning of the market, can be seen as an element of pressure on companies in trying to offer consumers a variety of products at the lowest possible prices. European Union competition policy has, at its disposal, a set of tools to protect against anti-competitive practices. The purpose of this paper is to analyse how anticompetitive policy is implemented in the European Union. This essay aims to understand the way in which the European Union is treating anti-competitive practices, addressing the various illegal issues, as well as the exceptions and their conditions. In the case of defining legal terms, the interpretations offered in the case law of the Luxembourg Court will be used. An assessment of the European Union's purpose and objectives with regard to protecting against anti-competitive practices is also an indicator of the implementation of the policy in this area. The paper will analyse the legal instruments and the way in which the Commission applies these instruments of protection against anti-competitive practices in order to restore the competitive conditions, by correcting the inappropriate practices of the enterprises. The results of the interaction between anti-competitive practices (agreements and abuse of a dominant position) and unfair trade practices (including dumping and subsidisation) will be discussed to understand the effectiveness of legal instruments in practice.

We propose a simple theoretical model emphasizing the importance of a multi-sided platform (MSP) in fostering innovation. This model aims to assess the effects of structuring industries around an MSP on innovation dynamics and emphasizes the impact of cross-platform competition. It teaches us how to encourage cross-platform competition in terms of competition policy. The outcome is threefold. To begin, the presence of an MSP is critical for market innovation. Second, our findings indicate that skewed market power in favor of the MSP may stifle innovation in this industry, even if the negative impact on the industry's rate of innovation is not immediately apparent. Finally, we demonstrate that industries with multiple MSPs have a higher rate of innovation. The model's conclusions emphasize the critical importance of preserving the contestability of digital markets through competition rules enforcement. Even if the inherent technical characteristics of this industry result in a situation of dominance, competition rules should aim to preserve the possibility of market competition through, among other things, interoperability requirements, data portability requirements, and control of exclusivity clauses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the submitted contribution the authors follow up on the case of Facebook, which was assessed by the German competition authority – Bundeskartellamt. Proceedings moved from administrative to judicial phase, as this case was assessed by Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf) and also by Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). However, German national courts had adopted differing views in this regard. National German court (Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf, Germany) rendered a prejudicial question to Court of Justice of the European union (hereinafter referred to as “CJEU”), concerning mainly (1) interpretation of GDPR regulation and (2) question of whether competition authority is entitled to apply this regulation in its investigations. In the corresponding case No. C-252/21, the Opinion of Advocate General (delivered on 20 September 2022) was recently published. The aim of this paper is to assess the interaction between personal data protection in correlation with the competition rules, more precisely, whether the competition authority is entitled to apply GDPR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many years, exclusivity payments and its specific type – loyalty rebates – were treated by the European Commission (Commission) as restrictions by object. This approach has been gradually revised towards a more effect-based reasoning. In the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (Guidance), the Commission demonstrated its willingness to follow the so-called ‘economic approach’. In particular, the Commission announced that for price-based exclusionary conduct the so-called ‘as-efficient competitor’ test (AEC test) is going to be used. This article aims to verify whether the Commission followed the Guidance in its assessment of exclusionary practices in two cases, Qualcomm and Google (Android), considered by the Author as an opportunity to make a move from a form-based to an economic-based approach. In his considerations, the Author provides proposals on how the practice of the Commission should be changed to ensure dominant undertakings are provided with a sufficient level of legal certainty.

Copyright of Competition Journal / Rekabet Dergisi is the property of Turkish Competition Authority and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Conclusion of codeshare agreement between international and domestic airlines at first was emerged as a way to advertising, but currently it is used as a strategic approach to gain market share and consequently creating a dominant position for airline services market. One of the legal issues of these agreements is doubt raised about their anti-competitive nature. The results of this research, that is a comparative study of the subject in related legal systems in a descriptive-analytic method, indicate that based on the type of the agreement and its specific characteristics, scope of activity and parties’ share in the market, both aspects-competitive and anticompetitive- are probable in these agreements. Furthermore, although competition law has no clear position as to these types of agreements in various legal systems, legally speaking, such agreements should be investigated case by case and a general rule should not be prescribed for all of their examples.

Purpose:Like other Southeast European countries, Kosova applies the principles of a market economy. Despite the difficulties, in the efforts to create a free and competitive market economy, Kosovo must undertake reforms to face the reality of economic integration and global markets in general. In this regard, an important aspect is the implementation of economic reforms, the justice system, and the effective implementation of competition law under the 'Acquis communautaire'. Therefore, the purpose of the research is to analyse the issues related to the regulation and protection of competition in Kosovo, with particular attention to controlling the concentration of enterprises based on EU practices. Methodology: In answering the above questions, we carried out a desk review of comprehensive professional literature, EU treaties and directives, international competition institutions standards and requirements as well as other national laws and legal acts. Findings:Moderate progress has been made, but the necessary steps are still taken to have a competitive economy and to be in the right position for EU integration. Concentrations are one of the important parts of competition law where through this practice it is possible to merge and acquire enterprises. Many cases of abuse can be encountered in this type of practice, so the role of competent supervisory authorities is necessary to regulate them. Concentration problems have been addressed since the establishment of joint ventures and their operation within the market modernisation becomes more complex both in the application and in the investigation by the competent controlling authorities. The analysis and functioning of the internal market, as well as the lack of practices in the field of concentration within an effective competition, is the focus of this chapter. Significance:This chapter addresses issues raised in terms of competition law and possible improvements that can be made through the implementation of European regulations, creating market stability and sustainable economies in the long-run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of College of Law Journal for Legal & Political Sciences / Magallat Kulliyyat Al-Qanun Li-L-ulum Al-Qanuniyyat Wa-Al-Siyasiyyat is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the laws in the Republic of north Macedonia (hereinafter RNM), that prohibit agreements among competitors to fix prices, divide markets or in other ways avoid or undermine market competition, otherwise known as competition laws. it explores the conditions and challenges in implementing Macedonian competition laws, as well as the role of the state (regulatory) authorities, the degree to which the competition laws comply with the European Union’s competition laws, and finally, the degree to which competition laws are effective and beneficial for the Macedonian economy. Properly implemented competition laws hold much promise. The enactment of competition laws is fundamental for the benefits of a market economy to be achieved. This encompasses economic growth, innovation, lower prices and higher quality of goods and services. The enactment of competition laws since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia1 is furthermore important. This is due to Macedonian obligations to meet the requirements for EU accession. Additionally, adoption of competition law and competition by-laws in RNM, positively affects on the work of authorities for the protection of competition. What is most important, this competition legal regime represents a base for reducing the abuse of the state authorities and theirs incompetent behaviors. At the end, the article contains conclusions, opinions and suggestions from the conducted research, which hopefully will be beneficial for the relevant auditorium. The analytical-descriptive method, the comparative method, the method of analysis and synthesis, and the method of induction and deduction were used to analyze the subject matter for this article.

In this paper authors analyse a case of Facebook which was assessed by German competition authority -- Bundeskartellamt. Facebook has been suspected of abusing its dominant position in the context of protection of personal data. This case was subsequently considered by the competent national judicial authorities, which finally referred the questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union (Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf ) in case C-252/21. At the present stage of the proceedings are published exclusively Application and Request for preliminary ruling. The authors aim heads to examine the disputed action of platform in the context of the proposed Digital Markets Act and to confront them with the obligations imposed by this proposal for a regulation for new category of entities -- so called- gatekeepers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors have conducted research aimed at determining the most effective and significant techniques and tactics during athletic competitions. The results of summarized and analyzed research material on competitive mixed martial arts provide information as to what techniques and tactics can allow one to reach advantages in the evaluated techniques (combinations of techniques) and to achieve superior results in terms of activity and domination in the active position, which are essential for judges making a decision according to the results of the bout. The article presents a comparative analysis of competitive fights in mixed martial arts of MMA fighters of young and adult men. The most frequent techniques and tactics in MMA fights assessed by us are the transfers or throws of the opponent from the "stance" position to the "ground" position, in the result of which the attacking athlete took a dominating position and continued the attack in 26 % - for young men, and in 32 % - for adult men. 35% and 25% of athletes, respectively, used an accentuated hand strike in the standing position. We registered a range of the simplest striking techniques used by young male fighters in the majority of competitions as the main way of achieving the techniques being assessed. According to the pedagogical observation of the MMA competitions, interviews and talks with the specialists in this kind of sport, the basic type of martial arts chosen by the fighters has a great influence on their fighting style and the use of techniques/tactics in MMA competitions, which is confirmed by the results of the research. The analysis of MMA competitions shows the predisposition of some fighters to striking martial arts - 19% or to wrestling - 47%, also there are universal fighters - 34%. This is natural, as various athletes use different methods to achieve victory: some use mainly striking techniques, others use mainly technical fighting techniques, and universal fighters use both striking and wrestling techniques and their combinations successfully. Fighters, who have skills of "basic" martial arts, achieve advantages in a competitive fight due to the techniques and tactics of their kind of martial arts, gradually adapting to the conditions and rules of mixed martial arts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From our beginning, the fight for resources and the human wish of growth and wealth leaded to a competitive behaviour of individuals and, by extension, that of their economic undertakings. While some developed an economic outlook on competition, there were some authors further adding the legal component as a governing principle of competition. In the spirit of a form-based approach, early EU competition law aimed to insure the economic freedom, missing openness towards certain practices. The founding Treaties, the modifying ones and the European acts in the field outlined the safeguarding of the internal market as a goal of competition law. Still, an important source of European competition law was offered to us by the case law. The shift towards the effects-based approach ensued the regulation as ex-post assessments of the merger impact on competition were undertaken. Different implications of Merger Control in EU competition law will be discussed in this paper, one which follows the spectacular evolution of the impact of different European Decisions on the change of competition law. The paper is a study on evolution of the Merger control and the analysis how much impacted two European Commission decisions prohibiting mergers the Single Market the reforms of each regulation development before each one of them.

This article considers the implications of restricting the ability of business users to interact with a plurality of platforms for competition between platforms and between the merchants themselves. After examining the economic implications of the merchants' choice of single- versus multi-homing, the article will analyse the legality of two practices that can restrict, if not altogether deny, the ability of merchants to choose whether to use one or a plurality of platforms in light of the EU Competition rules, namely exclusivity clauses and across platforms parity agreements. It will be argued that due to the features of platform markets, the ability of merchants to multi-home should be preserved so as to ensure that these markets remain open and competitive and that the incentive for new intermediaries to continue innovating in the way they provide their services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of Antitrust & Regulatory Studies is the property of University of Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The following text addresses the challenges that the increasing use of artificial intelligence, in particular smart algorithms that collect and process large amounts of data for internet gatekeepers (i.e., the largest online service providers), poses for competition protection. The analysis focuses on three areas: the potential clash between competition protection and consumer (privacy) protection that may be caused by the push for sharing and portability of client data in order to open up online markets; then the issue of super-dominance caused by internet gatekeepers escaping both their competitors and effective control due to the massive deployment of AI; and finally, the issue of the algorithmic price collusion that seemingly turns some existing competition protection paradigms on their head. These three challenges are critically analyzed regarding their reflection in the literature and in the existing decision-making practice of competition authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 20 April 2021, the Spanish Competition Authority (the "CNMC") issued two resolutions of great importance for the pharmaceutical sector. In particular for innovative laboratories that have been have been targeted by the Spanish and European Competition Authorities for several years now. In both resolutions, two pharmaceutical companies, AbbVie and AstraZeneca, were suspected of having abused their alleged dominant position - in the first case by offering exclusionary discounts and, in the second, by setting predatory prices - both with the aim of preventing competitors from entering the market after the lapse of their respective patents. The CNMC concluded, in both cases, not to initiate sanctioning proceedings. At the same time, the CNMC provided long overdue clarifications and guidance on certain key issues: (i) the use of "effective clinical practice" and therapeutic guides in the definition of relevant markets, (ii) the dynamic analysis of market shares and (iii) the explicit acceptance of the "meeting competition" defence when ruling out an abuse of dominant position. Therefore, these rulings set two precedents of notable importance on the application of antitrust rules in the pharmaceutical sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Competition Journal / Rekabet Dergisi is the property of Turkish Competition Authority and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this article is to assess the market power of the state-owned incumbents within the open-access lines in Europe and compare it among themselves. This article investigates three open-access lines in Europe: Prague-Ostrava line (in the Czech Republic), Vienna-Salzburg line (in Austria) and Bratislava-Košice (in Slovakia). The market power assessment of each of the state-owned incumbents on these lines is based on their market shares, average revenues per passenger-kilometre, whether there is a vertical separation of the infrastructure owner and railway service provider and the role of state intervention. Our results show that the state-owned incumbent in the Czech Republic on the Prague-Ostrava line has the lowest market power in comparison to other investigated open-access lines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term of relevant market was used for the first time in the Sherman Act of 1890, condemning monopolies or monopoly attempts. The term of relevant market is analyzed as being the place where demand and supply of products or services, interchangeable with each other, are confronting; however, the term of "relevant market” is much more complex than that, being characterized by fundamental dimensions in connection with the term of product (service) market and geographic market, both in close connection.

The debate about the "just price" has ancient origin and returns forcefully to the scene when, in the event of crises of various kinds, there is a rapid and significant increase in prices of given goods or services. In this article it is examined the problem of whether price increases of such a nature could, or should, be considered illicit under EU competition law. The central part of the article reviews different theories on what a "just price" should be and focuses on the idea that a price is "just" when it functions as index of relative scarcity in free markets. It is claimed that such a function deserves protection by EU law. Therefore, price adjustments in response to shocks cannot and should not be considered illegal: it is unacceptable to sanction private firms by attributing them the wrong of not having substituted, at their own expense, for the exercise of a public function (that of making sure that price increases do not put at risk solidarity and other constitutional principles). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Competition Journal / Rekabet Dergisi is the property of Turkish Competition Authority and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It is quite difficult to delineate competition on merits and predatory pricing. A dominant undertaking engages in predatory conduct by deliberately incurring losses or foregoing profits in the short term in order to foreclose or be likely to foreclose one or more of its actual or potential competitors with a view to strengthen or maintain its market power. This represents an exclusionary abuse and pricing practice intended to eliminate actual or potential competitors. The abuse is exercised on the market in which the undertaking holds a dominant position. Predatory strategy comprises of two phases. In the first phase, referred to as sacrifice, the dominant undertaking reduces prices of its products to the loss making level. This conduct may be aimed at forcing competitors to lower their prices, incur losses and consequently, leave the market or at disciplining actual competitors or at defending from new entries of potential competitors. In the second, recoupment phase, when the goal of predation is achieved, the predator raises its prices and thereby, accumulates higher profits. This paper analyzes abuse of dominant position through predatory pricing. The author adresses views expressed in doctrine and in case law of the EU courts regarding predatory pricing.