Unmet needs of low-income Americans have been unaddressed for more than 100 years. Neither governments nor random pro bono effort, are adequate to provide meaningful access to advice and representation for millions of citizens otherwise left out. Since Powell v. Alabama, due process has been the standard for the criminal right to counsel, and a movement toward civil cases has since commenced. After Gideon v. Wainwright, decades of litigation, and significant social and legal developments, the right to counsel in civil cases has gained limited acceptance in certain circumstances. When the Supreme Court accepted Turner v. Rogers, many observers and advocates logically thought a larger civil right to counsel might emerge. Turner's facts (involving a litigant facing jail for civil contempt), with applicable due process precedents, seemed to portend a broader standard for appointed civil counsel. But the Supreme Court reasoned out of such a homing based on a speculative due-process perspective of "alternative procedures," not appointment of counsel. Like so many times before, Turner shows the Court's resistance to a civil right to counsel due to policy preferences, despite its fundamental fairness. This contrasts with many Western jurisdictions, and it seems primarily based on unspoken economic considerations. Although some claim Turner is some kind of progress, it feels like déjà vu. So, the unmet need has left trial courts and state court administrators to develop resources for pro se litigants, although no one knows if such structures substantively improve access. Overall, the denial of due process due to practical realities leaves us with an unjust system and an impaired society. Any improvement may have to be derived from social change outside the courtroom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]