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As a solution to demographic decline, do Japanese favor more robotization technological developments than increasing their immigration levels? Facing this downward trend in the size of the population and its important economic consequences, Japan is right now forced into taking consequential decisions to face this challenge (Kingston 2019). Two solutions are being implemented so far: 1) the late Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s “structural reforms” aimed at promoting the participation of women in the economy by easing the “family burden” traditionally put on them (e.g., childcare allowance, childcare services, parental leave, etc.) (Schoppa 2020); and, 2) the promotion of automation, especially robots, to face labor shortage (Robertson 2007, 2018). The solution of admitting more immigrants adopted by many other countries facing similar problems does not seem to be favored in Japan. In fact, while some mention that Japan is increasingly admitting immigrants (Roberts 2017; Kage, Rosenbluth and Tanaka 2022), the country is still well below the number of 381,000 new immigrants per year suggested by the United Nations in order to face their demographic decline. Furthermore, their immigration law is still highly restrictive for the low-skilled workers who are only allowed to stay in the country for a maximum of five years and cannot be accompanied by their family (Sugimoto 2021). The problem is that the Japanese workforce’s main need is exactly for this type of worker. Research on public support for immigration in Japan is mixed. While Roberts (2017), based on newspaper surveys, support that a majority of the Japanese are in favor of welcoming more immigrants, some scholars warn that the concept of “immigrant” might not translate well in the Japanese context: Nagayoshi (2021) shows, for instance, that most Japanese consider the term “immigrants” as referring to visitors instead of permanent residents. The question remains whether Japanese’s views of immigration underlie the choice of solutions to address their demographic decline challenges. Could their attitudes toward immigration explain the lack of consideration for immigration-based solutions and bolster instead support for technology-based solutions?

How does automation affect preferences for redistribution, protectionism, and immigration restrictions? A growing literature demonstrates how labour disruptions caused by automation fuel popular support for far-right political parties, can increase favourability toward redistributive or protectionist policies, and even cause citizens to blame foreigners for job losses. Notwithstanding these contributions, prior work often obscures the many trade-offs associated with automation. Automation can also increase the competitiveness of domestic firms in global markets, increase firm profitability, and help address labour shortages. In this project, we evaluate how information about the different effects of automation shape citizens’ views toward redistribution, protectionism, immigration, and automation more generally. Empirically, we use a vignette experiment and vary whether automation is linked to economic nationalism, economic inequality, and immigration. Moreover, fielding the experiment in both Japan and Canada offers evidence for the generalizability of the findings while also highlighting how important variation in contextual factors (such as the domestic immigration regime) might shape the effects of different justifications. This project thus aims to broaden our understanding of the political economy of automation and the impacts of automation on policy preferences.

Studies of public opinion about new and emerging technologies are gaining momentum (Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005; Cobb, 2005; Druckman & Bolsen, 2011; Zhang & Dafoe, 2019). At the centre of this emerging research agenda is a focus on people’s technological readiness (i.e., Liljander et al., 2006; Mankins, 2009) and evaluation of perceived risks (i.e., Macoubrie, 2004; Priest et al., 2010; Gallego et al., 2022). More recently, scholars have attempted to understand how one’s judgement about the seriousness or pervasiveness of new technologies impacts public acceptance (Renn & Benighaus, 2013), particularly given the salience of ChatGPT, which has raised concerns about academic integrity, personal security (Lund & Wang, 2023), and the spread of misinformation (Hsu & Thompson, 2023). Previous work suggests that individual risk evaluations have become increasingly multidimensional (Nelkin, 1989; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990; Cobb, 2005; Renn & Benighaus, 2013), with beliefs about familiarity and the technology’s degree of danger often serving as primary concerns. However, two recently overlooked dimensions with important theoretical implications for opinions about the extent to which new technologies should get adopted in society include perceived dread and control (Slovic, 1987). Cobb (2005) summarises these two dimensions as beliefs about the perceived magnitude of the risk posed by the new technology (i.e., dread) and its controllability, which refers to the perceived capacity to control the growth and outcome of the technology. Consequently, we leverage original data and a survey experiment fielded in Canada and Japan - the former a significantly understudied context for investigations of attitudes toward technology (Besley, 2013), to examine the following questions: • What is the nature of perceptions of dread and controllability concerns regarding artificial intelligence (A.I.) technology in Canada and Japan? • Who is most susceptible to beliefs about dread and controllability concerns posed by A.I. technology in these contexts? • How do frames showing varying degrees of the perceived magnitude and controllability of technological risks impact public opinion about adopting A.I.-based technology in society? And, does it vary by topic?

Emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, robots, and nanotechnology, have the potential to fundamentally alter military capabilities and strategies. While there is a growing interest in public attitudes toward such technologies, existing work remains largely focused on the conditions under which citizens, especially in the United States, support their use in combat. In contrast to prior work, we focus on public preferences for military technology development in “middle” powers. Unlike “great” powers, like the United States, “middle” power countries operate in a much different strategic environment. This project thus asks: how do the specific features of emerging military technologies affect public support for their development? We argue that citizens’ multidimensional preferences toward the development of new military technology encompass particular strategic (e.g., technology transfer to allies) and consequentialist (e.g., potential harm to civilians) concerns. To empirically test our argument, we rely on a conjoint experiment embedded in population surveys in Canada and Japan. Our findings provide original causal evidence of how different strategic and consequentialist dimensions of military technology development shape citizens’ preferences.