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Much recent research and theorizing in the field of reasoning has been concerned with intuitive sensitivity to logical validity, such as the logic-brightness effect, in which logically valid arguments are judged to have a "brighter" typeface than invalid arguments. We propose and test a novel signal competition account of this phenomenon. Our account makes two assumptions: (a) as per the demands of the logic-brightness task, people attempt to find a perceptual signal to guide brightness judgments, but (b) when the perceptual signal is hard to discern, they instead attend to cues such as argument validity. Experiment 1 tested this account by manipulating the difficulty of the perceptual contrast. When contrast discrimination was relatively difficult, we replicated the logic-brightness effect. When the discrimination was easy, the effect was eliminated. Experiment 2 manipulated the ambiguity of the perceptual task, comparing discrimination performance when the perceptual contrast was labeled in terms of rating "brightness" or "darkness". When the less ambiguous darkness labeling was used, there was no evidence of a logic-brightness effect. In both experiments, individual sensitivity to the perceptual discrimination was negatively correlated with sensitivity to argument validity. Hierarchical latent mixture modeling revealed distinct individual strategies: responses based on perceptual cues, responses based on validity or guessing. Consistent with the signal competition account, the proportion of those responding to validity increased with perceptual discrimination difficulty or task ambiguity. The results challenge explanations of the logic-brightness effect based on parallel dual-process models of reasoning.

Four experiments examined the claims that people can intuitively assess the logical validity of arguments, and that qualitatively different reasoning processes drive intuitive and explicit validity assessments. In each study participants evaluated arguments varying in validity and believability using either deductive criteria (logic task) or via an intuitive, affective response (liking task). Experiment 1 found that people are sensitive to argument validity on both tasks, with valid arguments receiving higher liking as well as higher deductive ratings than invalid arguments. However, the claim that this effect is driven by logical intuitions was challenged by the finding that sensitivity to validity in both liking and logic tasks was affected in similar ways by manipulations of concurrent memory load (Experiments 1 and 2) and variations in individual working memory capacity (Experiments 3 and 4). In both tasks better discrimination between valid and invalid arguments was found when more working memory resources were available. Formal signal detection models of reasoning were tested against the experimental data using signed difference analysis (Stephens, Dunn, & Hayes, 2018b). A single-process reasoning model which assumes that argument evaluation in both logic and liking tasks involves a single latent dimension for assessing argument strength but different response criteria for each task, was found to be consistent with the data from each experiment (as were some dual-process models). The experimental and modeling results confirm that people are sensitive to argument validity in both explicit logic and affect rating tasks, but that these results can be explained by a single underlying reasoning process.

When asked to assess the deductive validity of an argument,people are influenced by their prior knowledge of the content.Recently, two competing explanations for this belief biaseffect have been proposed, each based on signal detectiontheory. Under a response bias explanation, people set morelenient decision criteria for believable than for unbelievablearguments. Alternatively, believable and unbelievablearguments may differ in subjective argument strength for bothvalid and invalid items. Two experiments tested theseaccounts by asking participants to assess the validity ofcategorical syllogisms and rate their confidence. Conclusion-believability was manipulated either within- or between-groups. A two-step signal detection model was applied toexamine the effects on the relative location of the decisionthreshold and the distributions of argument strength.Equivalent belief bias effects were found when believabilitywas manipulated within- and between-groups, supporting theview that the belief bias effect is due to response bias.

When asked to determine whether a syllogistic argument is deductively valid, people are influenced by their prior beliefs about the believability of the conclusion. Recently, two competing explanations for this belief bias effect have been proposed, each based on signal detection theory (SDT). Under a response bias explanation, people set more lenient decision criteria for believable than for unbelievable arguments. Under the alternative argument strength explanation, believability affects the reasoning stage of processing an argument, with believable and unbelievable arguments differing in subjective strength for both valid and invalid items. Two experiments tested these accounts by asking participants to make validity judgments for categorical syllogisms and to rate their confidence. Conclusion-believability was manipulated both within group (Experiment 1) and between groups (Experiment 2). A novel two-step version of the signal detection model was fit to receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for believable and unbelievable arguments. Model fits confirmed that in both experiments there was a shift in decision criterion but not argument discriminability as a function of argument believability. Crucially, when believability is manipulated between groups, this shift is expected under the response bias account but not under the argument strength account. Therefore, the results support the view that belief bias primarily reflects changes in response bias: people require less evidence to endorse a syllogism as valid when it has a believable conclusion. This has important implications for theories of deductive reasoning.

Laboratory-based mock crime studies have often been interpreted to mean that (i) eyewitness confidence in an identification made from a lineup is a weak indicator of accuracy and (ii) sequential lineups are diagnostically superior to traditional simultaneous lineups. Largely as a result, juries are increasingly encouraged to disregard eyewitness confidence, and up to 30% of law enforcement agencies in the United States have adopted the sequential procedure. We conducted a field study of actual eyewitnesses who were assigned to simultaneous or sequential photo lineups in the Houston Police Department over a 1-y period. Identifications were made using a three-point confidence scale, and a signal detection model was used to analyze and interpret the results. Our findings suggest that (i) confidence in an eyewitness identification from a fair lineup is a highly reliable indicator of accuracy and (ii) if there is any difference in diagnostic accuracy between the two lineup formats, it likely favors the simultaneous procedure.

Three-experiments examined the number of qualitatively different processing dimensions needed to account for inductive and deductive reasoning. In each study, participants were presented with arguments that varied in logical validity and consistency with background knowledge (believability), and evaluated them according to deductive criteria (whether the conclusion was necessarily true given the premises) or inductive criteria (whether the conclusion was plausible given the premises). We examined factors including working memory load (Experiments 1 and 2), individual working memory capacity (Experiments 1 and 2), and decision time (Experiment 3), which according to dual-processing theories, modulate the contribution of heuristic and analytic processes to reasoning. A number of empirical dissociations were found. Argument validity affected deduction more than induction. Argument believability affected induction more than deduction. Lower working memory capacity reduced sensitivity to argument validity and increased sensitivity to argument believability, especially under induction instructions. Reduced decision time led to decreased sensitivity to argument validity. State-trace analyses of each experiment, however, found that only a single underlying dimension was required to explain patterns of inductive and deductive judgments. These results show that the dissociations, which have traditionally been seen as supporting dual-processing models of reasoning, are consistent with a single-process model that assumes a common evidentiary scale for induction and deduction.

Background: In recent years, the placement of a subacromial balloon (SAB) spacer has emerged as a treatment option for massive irreparable rotator cuff tears (MIRCTs); however, there is significant controversy regarding its utility in comparison with other surgical interventions. Purpose: To compare outcomes after SAB spacer placement versus arthroscopic debridement for MIRCTs. Study Design: Dual-armed systematic review and meta-analysis (level IV evidence). Methods: A literature search of PubMed (MEDLINE), Scopus, and CINAHL Complete databases for articles published before May 7, 2022, was conducted to identify patients with MIRCTs undergoing the 2 procedures. For the SAB arm, 14 of 449 studies were considered eligible for inclusion, while 14 of 272 studies were considered eligible for inclusion in the debridement arm. Results: In total, 528 patients were eligible for inclusion in the SAB arm and 479 patients in the debridement arm, and 69.9% of patients undergoing SAB placement also underwent concomitant debridement. Decreases in the visual analog scale (VAS) pain score and increases in the Constant score were found to be significantly larger after debridement (–0.7 points [ P <.001] and +5.5 points [ P <.001], respectively), although the Patient Acceptable Symptom State for the VAS was not achieved after either procedure. Both SAB placement and debridement significantly improved range of motion in forward flexion/forward elevation, internal and external rotation, and abduction (P <.001). Rates of general complication were higher after debridement versus SAB placement (5.2% ± 5.6% vs 3.5% ± 6.3%, respectively; P <.001); however, there were no significant differences between SAB placement and debridement in rates of persistent symptoms requiring a reintervention (3.3% ± 6.2% vs 3.8% ± 7.3%, respectively; P =.252) or reoperation rates (5.1% ± 7.6% vs 4.8% ± 8.4%, respectively; P =.552). The mean time to conversion to reverse total shoulder arthroplasty was 11.0 versus 25.4 months, respectively, for the SAB versus debridement arm. Conclusion: While SAB placement was associated with acceptable postoperative outcomes in the treatment of MIRCTs, there was no clear benefit over debridement alone. Shorter operative times coupled with better postoperative outcomes and longer times to conversion to reverse total shoulder arthroplasty rendered debridement a more attractive option. While there may be a role for SAB placement in poor surgical candidates, there is burgeoning evidence to support debridement alone without SAB placement for the treatment of MIRCTs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Traumatic finger amputations are a common and well-known hand injury, yet there are few studies addressing long-term epidemiologic data and associated mechanisms of injury. This paper aims to use a large national database to identify the relationship of patient demographics and mechanism of injury in finger amputations. Methods: The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) was queried for finger amputations in the United States from 2010 to 2019. Patient demographic information was collected and analyzed by gender, race, age, and further statistical analysis was performed to determine correlations with consumer products. Results: Finger amputations accounted for an estimated 234,304 emergency department visits from 2010 to 2019. Most of the patients were male (79%) and identified as white (46.2%). The most commonly implicated products overall were power saws and related power tools, followed by doors and then lawn mowers. A bimodal age incidence was observed with the highest incidence rates occurring in children ages 0 to 4, followed by a second peak incidence rate in the adults ages 65 to 74. The most common mechanisms of injury were found to differ in patients less than 19 and those 20 and over. Conclusion: Traumatic finger amputations have a bimodal incidence with changing epidemiology and mechanism of injury with age. The first peak occurs from ages 0 to 4, involves predominantly doors, and has a male to female ratio of 1.30. The second peak occurs from ages 65 to 74, involves mostly power saws, and has a male to female ratio of 6.68. Level of Evidence: Prognostic, Level IV [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]