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This study documents an increase in the prevalence of extreme poverty among US households with children between 1996 and 2011 and assesses the response of major federal means-tested transfer programs. Extreme poverty is defined using a World Bank metric of global poverty: $2 or less, per person, per day. Using the 1996-2008 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), we estimate that in mid-2011, 1.65 million households with 3.55 million children were living in extreme poverty in a given month, based on cash income, constituting 4.3 percent of all nonelderly households with children. The prevalence of extreme poverty has risen sharply since 1996, particularly among those most affected by the 1996 welfare reform. Adding SNAP benefits to household income reduces the number of extremely poor households with children by 48.0 percent in mid-2011. Adding SNAP, refundable tax credits, and housing subsidies reduces it by 62.8 percent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Means-tested retirement benefits create strong disincentives to work and to save prior to retirement. This article outlines the structure of means-tested benefits in the UK and the USA, and reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence of their incentive effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects upon probabilities for the progressive implementation of a basic income in Brazil and presents a proposal to that end. It considers short- to medium-term prospects within a context that lacks a tradition of universal policies. Although a Law approving the right to a basic income became effective in 2005, Brazilian social policies are increasingly focused on increasing the number of means-tested income programmes while making them conditional on a proven lack of resources and targeting only the very poorest segments of society for a limited period. Such is the case with the Bolsa-Família programme, which is at the forefront of the Brazilian government's agenda. Our proposal is to progressively move from means-tested programmes to a basic income through the adoption of a universal child benefit scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building upon the intuition of Ross, a definition ofmore risk averseis proposed for situations in which preferences are over mean and variance. If agents can be compared by this definition, the more risk averse agent will choose a less risky alternative. If this definition cannot be applied, it is not clear which agent will choose a riskier alternative. The definition applies whenever agents are ordered according to Ross's notion of more risk averse. The definition may or may not be consistent with the Arrow–Pratt notion of more risk averse (and therefore may apply when Ross's notion does not). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores ethnic group differences in the severity of child poverty in Britain. Using administrative data it looks at benefit receipt of families with children over a period of a year and a half. Building on existing work on 'welfare dynamics', but taking the child as the unit of analysis it explores both mobility in benefit receipt and severity of poverty among children supported by benefits. Severity is viewed as a function both of benefit dependency and the extent to which benefits fall short of needs; and in ascertaining income-to-needs shortfalls external measures against which to assess benefit adequacy are introduced. The article investigates differences in benefit mobility and in severity of poverty by ethnic group, and demonstrates that differences in family patterns can result in extreme cumulative disadvantage for British children of Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnicity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study asset prices in an economy where investors derive direct utility not only from consumption but also from fluctuations in the value of their financial wealth. They are loss averse over these fluctuations, and the degree of loss aversion depends on their prior investment performance. We find that our framework can help explain the high mean, excess volatility, and predictability of stock returns, as well as their low correlation with consumption growth. The design of our model is influenced by prospect theory and by experimental evidence on how prior outcomes affect risky choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the attitudes of different socio-economic groups toward means-testing. By using data from an opinion survey of 1,117 Finns, the study seeks to answer the following questions: Are universal social benefits more popular than selective ones? Who are the most vigorous opponents of means-testing, the middle classes or blue-collar workers? Results give some support to the hypothesis that selective benefits are the most unpopular. The study also shows that opinions on selectivity do not cluster in one dimension, but that there are several aspects of selectivity and that the attitudes of socioeconomic groups vary depending on which aspect of selectivity is at stake. The working class and Social Democrats have more reservations toward selectivity which targets the needy, whereas they are more eager to introduce selectivity into universal welfare programs by discriminating against high-income earners. Salaried employees and voters of the Conservative Party are more reluctant to exclude well-to-do people from universal benefits, whereas they accept tighter means-testing in currently means- or income-tested schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the topic of the role of a means test to those who are unemployed or are otherwise receiving social services in West Germany. The author discusses the debate surrounding the removal of the means test and other suggestions for improving the accessibility to social services, especially for women dependent on their husbands' income, workers whose wages do not meet a minimum standard of living, etc.

This paper contrasts the use of means-tested and universal schemes in the alleviation of poverty. Using a class of poverty measures, we illustrate the trade-off from that the fact that means testing is costly to both the government and the claimant, while universal provision entails a leakage to the non-poor. The paper provides numerical as well as analytical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the nature of the solidarity principle as not being based on needs testing or assistance only when the recipient's own resources have been outstripped. The author says the state is obliged to make social security mandatory and benefit recipients cannot have a negative means test, that is the right of benefit refusal. The author says means tests demean human dignity and the value of the person.

This articles explores targeting and means testing among an increasingly diverse aging population in the United States. There is no doubt that as we approach the year 2000, diversity is the hallmark of our aging society. It is no longer scientifically sufficient or politically acceptable to simply note that the older population includes people of different ethnicities, economic and social classes, or health statuses. The policy implication of this challenge, simply stated, is that diversity does not stop at the edge of ethnic status. We should recognize also that minority elderly are not all alike; nor are older Hispanics or older blacks or older Asians/ Pacific Islanders or older Native Americans all alike. We are now coming to recognize that ethnic or minority status may not be the best-and is certainly not the only--basis for social policy. And so we return to the basic question that all societies face: What should be the societal rules for allocating scarce resources? Let me suggest three principles that should guide any consideration of the specific rules that will be debated in this matter. First, clearly there must be different rules for different programs and policies. Entitlements and earned benefits represent broad social contracts that we should not tamper with. Following from the first principle, if a program is indeed a poverty program, then clearly financial resources should be the primary criterion for access to program benefits. Third, as a general principle for discussing the rules of allocation for scarce resources, clearly we should distinguish between centralist and federalist policies--acknowledging that the allocation rules should be different. There should be little debate that programs designed explicitly for the poor, such as Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income, are appropriately means-tested programs. But cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) may well be a different story.

The article discusses the impact of social benefits and income on incentives to work and the way the welfare state has come to influence attitudes towards work in context to the book "The Moral Hazard of Social Benefits." The article says that once government introduces income maintenance for the unemployed, the wages floor is set by social security benefits plus a margin to offset the disutilities of work. The preservation of that margin is essential if the labor market is to function efficiently. For low-income families and lone parents pay differentials have become largely meaningless because the wage earner has to pay income tax on each extra pound of earnings, whilst simultaneously entitlement to means-tested benefits is reduced or withdrawn. The book reveals that social benefits encourage people to stay out of work longer and to work intermittently or not at all, because the relative gains from working have disappeared or become too small. The tax benefit system undermines work incentives because income tax, national insurance contribution and local authority rates are charged even on earnings below supplementary and other means-tested benefits.

The article disapprovingly discusses a German bill for a "Federal Subvention Law," which was put forward by financial specialists in the Christian Democratic faction of the Bundestag. The author sees the proposal as a first step toward an eventual needs test for social benefit recipients. The measure calls for a registry of such benefits and a written declaration of the subvention recipient's economic status and eligibility.