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This article examines the ways the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has claimed to supply eastern voters with important elements of political representation that they demand. Rather than seeking 'revenge,' which would suggest voting purely out of protest against a government or policy, the evidence examined in this article suggests that some voters in the East support the AfD to express something else. The reactions of some of the other political parties in the wake of recent elections suggest that they have begun to pay more attention to their roles in the electorate and to the various dimensions of political representation. Keywords: Alternative for Germany (AfD), eastern Germany, elections, political integration, political representation, Introduction: AfD Successes in Recent Elections Describing the 2017 Bundestag election results as 'The Late Revenge of the East,' the German newspaper taz reflected on why so many eastern Germans [...]

ABSTRACT This article investigates the politics of representing everyday life (Alltag) in the German Democratic Republic in state-mandated museums and memorials in the contemporary Federal Republic. Through an analysis of [...]

An argument is presented that the contraction of higher education in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was caused by the practice of manpower planning and various socialist ideologies as well as the inability to fully develop the idea of education as an individual civic right.

Abstract: Building on 25 months of fieldwork in eastern Germany from 1991 to 2003, this article explores the interpenetration of aesthetics anal politics, and questions them as theoretical categories. A [...]

The article emphases on the category of neurosis as a mental disorder and diagnostic preferences in pre and post -1989 East Germany.

The main aim of the GDR's foreign policy was to promote the survival and stabilisation of the SED dictatorship, and the so-called 'worldwide revolution', by seeking external recognition. After it was granted full sovereignty in 1954-5 the East German state carefully cultivated relations with Western countries. The Scandinavian countries received special attention on the basis of common history, natural economic and transport links, a close relationship with their respective communist parties and East German conformity to Soviet policy in the Baltic region. Up to the 1970s the GDR's main aim was to end its own international isolation. Despite a few spectacular successes, not even Sweden was won over and the final breakthrough did not come until the government of the FRG embarked on its new and successful Ostpolitik. In 1972-3 the Scandinavian countries were among the first officially to recognise the GDR.

Questions are raised of how the East German leader Walter Ulbricht survived destalinization in the 1950s and continued in power till 1971 when other leaders were forced to flee to the USSR in July 1956. The East Germans called Ulbricht 'Goatbeard' (Spitzbart), which was hardly flattering, yet he managed to survive Khrushchev's destalinization and the turbulent events of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, resigning only in 1971.

Regional traditions thrived throughout the existence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and not just in the 1970s as a popular response to the re-evaluation of regional traditions by state and party as some scholars maintain. Distinctive local identities developed and evolved without associating themselves with either socialism or the state over the forty years of the GDR's existence and they long outlasted the GDR that finally dissolved in 1990.

Between 1956 and 1960 East Germany's state-owned film company DEFA released in relatively quick succession four major feature films co-produced with French companies. Although it also developed limited partnerships with [...]

Unlike West German film studios, which produced Schlagerfilme (popular music films) in abundance during the 1960s, the East German DEFA studios released only about a dozen musical films during the [...]

All law reform must look for local precedents to build on. Does this claim also apply to formerly totalitarian states? Building on her research on East German legal history, the author asks whether there might be some generally applicable reasons explaining why in the German Democratic Republic the first tender shoots of a rule of law appeared before the collapse of socialism. She finds an inverse relationship between political and legal faith: as one declines, the other rises, and vice versa. The waning of utopian hopes tends to be compensated for by an increased interest in law and rights and by the growing professionalism of a disenchanted legal class. The author believes that not only is the 'prerogative state' a constant threat to the 'normative state,' but that, vice versa, the practice of legality, even the legality of totalitarian state, can threaten and undermine the effectiveness of autocratic rule. Keywords: GDR; socialism; capitalism; rule of law; trial courts; law reform

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) became the focus of a recurrent and sometimes heated debate within the British Labour party before 1973. The official stance of the party followed an all-party consensus within parliament about the non-recognition of the second German state. Yet many on the left wing of the Labour party came, for various reasons, to perceive such an inflexible stance as governed not by reason but dictated by the West German government. Such ambivalence towards West Germany and the Adenauer government in particular led to ambiguities within the party's policy as a considerable minority, including some key figures within the party, offered alternative strategies for maintaining or improving relations with the GDR. The most radical alternative, official recognition of the GDR as a legal, political entity, was only propounded by a core of hard left campaigners both within and outside the party. This article examines why sections of the Labour left came to sympathize with the GDR and how successful it was in influencing official party policy during the whole period of non-recognition of the GDR between 1949 and 1973.

Based on sources from the East German regime's internal archives, this article examines how the exodus of over 3 million people from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) before the construction of the Berlin Wall undermined the communist regime's ability to exert its authority over internal affairs. Instead of focusing on the relatively well-known economic and diplomatic costs of the mass exodus, it considers rather the grass-roots political ramifications of this unique phenomenon among the Soviet satellite states. The article focuses on three interrelated issues: first, the government's little-known efforts to curb and control emigration before the Wall; second, the myriad causes of the mass emigration and how these were perceived by the party/state apparatus; and third, the variety of strategies through which ordinary East Germans who stayed in the GDR attempted to use the possibility of flight to the West to enhance their bargaining position with state authorities. It argues that the refugees to the West were not the only East Germans to capitalize on the permeable border around West Berlin. The possibility of emigrating westwards also gave those who stayed a degree of power vis-a-vis the regime that they otherwise would not have had.

In December 1989, the ruling communist party of East Germany, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), was reconstituted when it adopted the name Socialist Unity Party-Party of Democratic Socialism (SED-PDS), which [...]

This article provides a comparison between the post-totalitarian governments of China, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. The author, focusing of the outcomes of mass protests against hardline regimes, examines why the events at Tiananmen Square ended in massacre compared with the democratic revolutions in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, concluding that China's post-totalitarian regime was strong while civil society was weak.

This article examines the levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with democracy among East and West Germans, based on a 1997 general population survey. The authors find that although there are some differences in the level of conception over what constitutes a democracy among east and west populations, most of these differences are channeled into relatitvely benign forms of political action, and may even provide a stimulus for the vitality of emerging democracies.

This article discusses the changes in the relationship of former East German citizens with regards to socialist values and democratic support, finding that the direct effect of socialist values on support of democracy declined substantially from 1993 to 1998. The authors find that experience with democracy leads to assessing the system via political and economic performance rather than in relation to the previous regime and socialism.

Using the example of East Germany, patterns of elite characteristics unique to communist regimes which fostered their success and, paradoxically, also their failure are discussed. The same factors which provided for stability also undermined initiative and critical evaluation.

This article explores the shifting strategies of the German Communist party (KPD, later SED) towards the 'woman question' in the Soviet zone of occupation. In the fluid post-war situation, the KPD/SED had to resort to heterodox experiments as it attempted, initially, to mobilize electoral support among women and, later, to organize women on the shopfloor. Women Communists played a prominent role in these efforts which included the creation of a women's league. In consequence, they enjoyed more influence in the young SED than ever before (or after) in the German Communist movement. As they proceeded, activists stumbled, however, not only against the hostility of women towards the Communist message but also against the resistance of male comrades and trade union leaders to 'apolitical', proto-feminist appeals. To break internal impasses, women relied on the support of the top leadership and, especially, Soviet command. If the centralization of power initially helped their cause, the tightening of the Stalinist vice in 1948-9 knocked out its foundations. Electoral politics counted for little, while women's integration in the workforce slid down the ladder of priorities. Its 'separatist' tendencies quashed, the women's league continued only as a transmission belt of the party line to housewives.

Explaining the revolutions of 1989 and 1990 in East Germany and other East European countries presents a challenge to social scientists. Despite the likelihood of severe repression, hundreds of thousands [...]

Former ruling communist parties in East Central Europe have undertaken varying routes in their goals and aspirations after the breakdown of the communist regimes in the region. The political paths taken by the communist parties of East Germany and Hungary were compared by examining their political environments and by performing a content analysis to determine their strategic goals. The East German party retained its Marxist concepts while the Hungarian party embarked on a practical reform path and rejected traditional Marxist principles.

The revolutionary process that resulted to the 'Wende,' or the end of the German Democratic Republic, can be examined in the light of the socialist labor process experienced by the working class. The passive participation of the workers in the struggle created a political vacuum that facilitated the entry of political and economic reforms. This behavior also resulted to the decline of socialism in East and Central European countries., The summer of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). By early spring 1990 the country, for all intents and purposes, no longer existed. [...]

The decision by the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe of placing restrictions on the right to an abortion will profoundly affect German women's right to choose. This decision is a culmination of efforts to errode the right to choose for West as well as East German women. In the former GDR, even though liberal abortion laws allowed women access to free abortions, for ideological reasons, the government devised policies that discouraged abortions as a means of birth control. This policy becomes particularly apparent in the early 1980s when the East German government, confronted with a declining birth rate, faced the dilemma of how to leave the existing liberal abortion law intact while discouraging women from aborting their fetuses. To accomplish this task officials persuaded writers to produce literary works that promoted a three-child family policy where abortion was relegated to an inappropriate option. The article analyzes several literary works written in the early 1980s within the context of this renewed effort to encourage women to produce more children at the expense of their personal choice, and concludes that, in spite of the liberal abortion rights in the former GDR, the conditions for exercising these rights proved to be far less favorable. (HB)

Anti-fascism in the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany, was quickly transformed after World War II from a widely accepted social ideal into an ideological prop used to legitimize the communist East German state. The state employed anti-fascist rhetoric to characterize its struggles against West Germany, which it portrayed as a US-sponsored continuation of the Nazi regime. The Berlin Wall, for example, was justified by asserting that it served as a bulwark against fascism. The true story of the struggle against Nazism eventually rigidified into a state ritual cult managed by the Communist Party.

For obvious reasons, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) is widely seen as a unique and exceptional case of postcommunist transformation. As a result of its swift and complete incorporation [...]

INTRODUCTION Before 1989, Germans used the term 'Wende' (the turn) to refer to the transition from the Schmidt to the Kohl government in 1981-82. This meaning disappeared overnight between November [...]

The travails of German unification have now become almost woefully commonplace.(1) Even the most optimistic observers of several years ago now readily admit that, while the country's formal unification was [...]

East Germany's unanticipated revolution in 1989 poses an interesting challenge to social movement research. The relatively spontaneous, peaceful revolution that toppled the communist regime cannot be fully explained by the prevailing theories of revolution and collective action. While both structurally oriented and identity-oriented theory offers insight into the revolutionary process, neither are completely satisfactory. Most theories assume a relatively open field of political contestation and conditions of relative social freedom that were absent in East Germany. I suggest a synthetic, historically specific approach in which collective identities are situated with small-scale social networks. The crucial factors in making the revolution possible were shared grievances and the expectation of social solidarity. Though they were politically subordinated, ordinary East Germans expressed grievances and nurtured opposition in small circles of confidants. Reference to collective identities helped to mobilize and frame opposition in East Germany making a swift, unexpected revolution possible once the state began to founder., The massive popular demonstration in Leipzig on the evening of 9 October, 1989 marked a crucial moment in the East German revolution. Seventy thousand East Germans, chanting 'We are the [...]

This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of elite and institutional (in this case parliamentary) changes in times of political transitions, and more specifically, to a better understanding of the political changes currently under way in Germany. In doing so, it illuminates patterns of elite change by looking at the composition of the state diets (Landtage) in the five new federal states which were created in October 1990. The focus is on predictors of explanation in elite recruitment and elite replacement. Elite replacement in 1990 was thorough and continued in 1994. Members of parliament display remarkably similar background and career characteristics within and across states. In turn, commonalities of origin and career have facilitated efficiency in parliamentary work., Elite and parliamentary changes during political transitions were analyzed to better understand Germany's ongoing political changes. An examination of the composition of state diets in the country's five new federal states created in Oct. 1990, particularly the predictors of explanation in elite recruitment and replacement, highlights patterns of elite change. Parliament members were found to have strikingly identical traits within and across states, in terms of background and careers. As a result, commonalities of origin and career have improved parliamentary work efficiency., The most recent wave of democratisation(1) which started in the 1970s, has resulted in renewed scholarly attention to issues of political regime transitions. While many facets of transition are being [...]

A variable affecting the chances of regime exit - weak 'nation-stateness' - has often been overlooked. If a country enjoys no single, exclusive national identity, then democratic transition poses a threat to the survival of the state and the interests connected with it. The Honecker regime was unwilling to exit from communism - unlike Polish and Hungarian parties which negotiated democratic transition with the opposition because it (rightly) feared for the survival of the German Democratic Republic. The GDR's 'national problem' also explains why the opposition did not demand power after the fall of the hardliners. Opposed to dictatorship, they nonetheless believed in many of the ideals upon which the state had been founded. These dissidents found they had more in common with reform communists trying to preserve the GDR than the majority of the population favouring unification.

Liberal democracy was established in West Germany as a means to prevent a return to fascism. In East Germany a Platonic and authoritarian framework was developed. Reunification poses the challenge of integrating the East Germans and redefining Germany's international role in Europe.

The Soviets used the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to exert considerable influence on Eastern German politics. The CDU played an important role in transmitting Soviet and Socialist Unity Party policies to middle-class and professional groups and in reducing the political activities of Christians and Christian socialists. However, CDU's unrealistic dreams of unity and of withdrawal of occupation forces in Germany led to the party's demise.

University students strongly opposed the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) because of similar characteristics with the Nazis despite the SED's anti-Nazi stance and its members anti-fascist credentials. The SED classified the student movement as fascist since it opposed a government that had denazified the public institutions and restored many freedoms to the students. However, student opposition caused the SED to adopt many totalitarian tactics to suppress the opposition, possibly stunting the potential to develop a non-fascist state.

The rebuilding of public administration in the new German Lander can be described as a process of increasing differentiation. The new states share the common legacy of 'democratic centralism' and face similar reform challenges; but the analysis of the establishment of state administrations, local government reform and personnel policy reveals important differences amongst the states. West-East institutional transfer plays a decisive role in creating effective institutions of governance in the East. However, it does not imply the imposition of a uniform West German 'model'; rather, institutional transfer encourages administrative differentiation., The transformation of their institutional frameworks of governance is a challenge common to all post-Communist countries in Europe.(1) In its defining elements -- legal foundations, tasks, structures, procedures, personnel -- [...]

We focus on the roles of groups and personal networks in demonstrations in the repressive setting of East Germany between May and October 1989. We first propose a micro-model specifying a broad set of individual incentives to participate; then we contend that political events and changes in the social context together with existing coordinating mechanisms produced the large-scale demonstrations in 1989. Most of our hypotheses are tested using a representative survey of Leipzig's population in the fall of 1990 that focuses on the 1989 protests. Among the incentives, only political discontent, weighted by perceived personal political influence, has a major impact on participation in the demonstrations. The expectation of repression was irrelevant. Opposition groups were unable to shape the incentives of the population, and incentives for their members to participate were weak, whereas negative incentives prevailed for members of the Socialist Party. Incentives to participate were concentrated in personal networks of friends. Thus, personal networks were the most important contexts for mobilizing citizens. A 'spontaneous coordination model' explains how discontented citizens met at particular times and places, and why few incentives were necessary to prompt participation in the demonstrations.

This study investigates the revolutions in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia in the context of comparative theories of protest and revolution. After a review of recent methodological advances and the two revolutions, the Gurr-Lichbach mobilization of discontent model is adapted to the two cases and tested with longitudinal data. Rational action theories are integrated into a final model that can be used to analyze protest in authoritarian systems. The model performs better for the two revolutions than any predecessor. In ex post and ex ante forecasting tests, the model generated large prediction error; however, it forecasted historically unprecedented levels of sustained protest.

The East German experiment of Communism collapsed because its government failed to administer justice, solidarity and subsidiarity, which are all intimitely connected to social welfare. By ignoring these facets, a regime of terror was created. When the level of terrorism overcame the people's limits, they revolted. The government failed to realize that all socio-economic structures must remain flexible enough to adapt to new conditions.

Four long-term structural complications have prevented the Social Democratic Party of Germany from establishing a large party membership in eastern Germany since unification: the injurious legacy, of Nazi and communist rule, the contradictions that arose in the 1980s out of the SPD's Ostpolitik, the flawed birth and development of the eastern SPD, and continuing tensions between the eastern and western wings of the party. Since none of these structural Problems is likely to change quickly, the SPD will remain impaired in the East for the foreseeable future. This in turn will make it extremely difficult for the SPD to win federal elections., At first glance, it appears that the poor performance of the SPD, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, in the four elections held east of the Elbe during 1990 (including [...]

The reformation of East Germany's public services sector has proven to be difficult primarily because of the uniqueness of public administration in the former communist countries. A rational public administration system was non-existent in East Germany and its place was a system heavily dependent on cadres. Consequently, political reformers needed to eliminate the attitudinal and behavioral factors associated with the cadre system without radically altering the existing public service institutions.

The article examines the similarities between the 90s process of de-Stalinisation and the post-World War II process of denazification. De-Stalinisation is following denazification by oversimplifying East German history and focusing on the crimes of the state security police the Stasi. Criminal charges are being conducted against all members of the Stasi before due consideration of the correct political and social system which should replace the old one. Resulting xenophobia and political fundamentalism threatens democracy.