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This article presents research on the synthesis and evaluation of new compounds as potential anticancer agents. The compounds, derived from N-(benzo[d]thiazol-2-yl)-3-amino-but-2-enamide, were synthesized and characterized using various techniques. Molecular modeling and docking studies were conducted to understand their interactions with DNA. The compounds showed significant cytotoxic activity against lung cancer cells, with one compound being particularly effective. The authors acknowledge the support they received from the National Institute for Medical Research Development. [Extracted from the article]

To examine Putnam's views on the application of quantum logic is the aim of this paper. Hilary Putnam defends quantum logic in his works. According to him, classical logic cannot answer the problems arising in quantum mechanics. Therefore, we need to present a non-classical logic, namely quantum logic. Putnam argues three main reasons for the transition from classical logic to quantum: I. to be false some of the necessary truths of logic, II. have to change of logic, III. the pattern of three-valued logic. Putnam's views about this transition to quantum logic can be considered from several points: First, despite Putnam's criticism of classical logic, he defends quantum logic through the rules of classical logic. Second, it is a bulky claim to know of quantum logic as "true" logic. Third, the conclusions of the Cartesian product have changed in Putnam's analysis. Fourth, in his logic system, Putnam pays attention to "intuition" instead of relying on "axioms." Fifth, the middle value of truth is ineffective and erroneous in quantum logic. Despite these criticisms, many of them can be answered analytically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of science is to explain reality and the world, and the goal of philosophy is also ontology. Philosophical views on scientific opinions and scientific opinions have had a direct influence on the way of worldview and ontology. Since the early twentieth century, the scientific flow of reduction affects logic and philosophy, psychology and sociology, and even theology and religion. On the other hand, the new emergent flow of emergentism in opposition to reductionism flourished in the late twentieth century. The philosophical and analytical validation of these two seemingly contradictory views promotes the levels of scientific methods and approaches, as well as philosophical views, especially philosophies such as the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of psychology, and the philosophy of sociology. Reductionism is trying to coordinate with unity, realize the unity of sciences, eliminate the waste of scientific theories, and provide the possibility of a stronger justification. On the other hand, emergentism involves the hierarchical plurality of the world's creatures. On the other hand, emergentism involves the hierarchical plurality of the world's creatures which causes the classification of science. Each level and class have its lows, rules, and concepts per se. Reductionism is unable to explain the plurality of facts and levels of existence; But emergentism with its theoretical framework explains both the continuum, unity and multiplicity of reality means the hierarchical plurality of reality. the reduction merely is an essential step in understanding and discovering down-up causality that is used as one of the theoretical concepts of emergentism and somewhat explains the cause of the relationship between the layers of existence. But reduction strategy is not successful in recognizing and explaining the existence of layers and classes of science. Reductions with a priority look at reality are subject to selfish judgment and preference, but in emergentism, reality and ontology determine and identify the methodology and epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of naturalism's self-defeat has a long historical lineage. In more recent times, two prominent formulations of the self-defeat objection against naturalism have emerged: the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument. These arguments aim to address two fundamental tenets of naturalism. The argument from reason challenges the idea that mental states are solely causally related, while the evolutionary argument questions the inherent reliability and trustworthiness of cognitive faculties. Both the evolutionary argument and the argument from reason account for the self-defeating aspects of naturalism, accurately pinpointing its inherent flaws: (1) A simplistic justification of mental phenomena within a materialistic context is not the most comprehensive or exclusive rational justification available; (2) according to the theory of natural selection, naturalism prioritizes survival and reproduction over the pursuit of true beliefs; (3) the assertion that cognitive faculties are products of chance undermines the reliability and trustworthiness of these faculties; (4) rather than pursuing epistemic persuasion through its explanatory power, methodological naturalism has transformed into an epistemic presupposition. While these arguments possess strengths in challenging naturalism, it is important to acknowledge their inherent limitations as well. We argue that these flaws are specific to the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument, and therefore, they do not absolve naturalism from other selfdefeating objections. Utilizing the analytical-critical methodology, this article aims to accomplish two objectives: firstly, to conduct a comparative study of the argument from reason and the evolutionary argument in elucidating the self-defeating nature of naturalism, and secondly, to articulate the strengths and weaknesses of these two arguments through supplementation and criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]