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This presentation presents the findings of the EMN Luxembourg inform entitled Interpretation and distinction between labour exploitation in the context of trafficking in human beings and particularly exploitative working conditions under the Employers Sanctions Directive and the conclusions of the Benelux thematic day entitled "Human Trafficking" on 11 October 2022 that took place under the Luxembourgish presidency of the Benelux.

The Grand Duchy is considered as the third most open economy in the world, with an openness rate of 158.2% of GDP. The country has an export-intensive economy, with a recurrent trade deficit. The share of foreign trade in Luxembourg’s GDP is currently higher then 30%. Even in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, the country is pursuing its strategy of public investments. Direct and indirect investments envisaged to reach 4.3% of GDP in 2021, a significantly higher cap than the average of 3.7% during the years 2015-2019.Luxembourg has a highly qualified workforce (59.6% of the active population). Over the past 12 month the overall employment growth rate was 1.6%, and that related to the cross-border workers was 2,2%. Two-thirds of jobs created in Luxembourg are aimed at higher education graduates.With an outstanding social security system, a level of material wellbeing above the EU average and sound public finances, Luxembourg is currently one of the most politically stable and prosperous countries in the world. Its strong fiscal position is well illustrated by a longstanding AAA credit rating, a significant accumulation of government financial assets, and a balanced, healthy fiscal position. The public administration, almost completely digitalised, is efficient and the overall economic outlook remains stable.

One of the problems perceived to be at the heart of the global financial crisis was an amalgamation of various commercial and investment banking activities under one entity, as well as the interconnectedness of the banking entities with other financial institutions, investment funds, and the shadow banking system. This paper focuses on various measures that aim to structurally separate the banking entities and their core functions from riskier financial activities such as (proprietary) trading or investments in alternative investment funds. Although banking structural reforms in the EU, the UK, and the US have taken different forms, their common denominator is the separation of core banking functions from certain trading or securities market activities. Having reviewed the arguments for and against banking structural reforms and their varieties in major jurisdictions, including the EU, UK, US, France, and Germany, the paper argues that a more nuanced approach to introducing such measures at the EU level is warranted. Given the different market structures across the Atlantic and the lack of conclusive evidence of the beneficial impact of banking structural reforms, the paper concludes that the withdrawal of the banking structural reforms proposal by the European Commission has been a prudent move. It seems that in the absence of concrete evidence, experimenting with structural reforms at the Member-State level would be less costly and would provide for opportunities for learning from smaller experiments that could pave the way for a more optimal approach to banking structural reforms at the European level in the future.

The initial evidence indicates that EU financial market governance has performed well in its response to the Covid-19 crisis. In the European Union (EU), the need for coordination and cooperation over this crisis has been a particular concern given that national competent authorities (NCAs) operate under the single rulebook and supervisory action must, accordingly, be consistent. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has, however, shown itself to be nimble, responsive, and speedy in deploying its supervisory powers, including those additional powers it has recently been granted under the 2019 ESA Reform Regulation. This has particularly been the case as regards the application by NCAs of ‘supervisory forbearance’ and as regards the application of market disclosures rules, notably the financial reporting standard IFRS 9. ESMA has also been successful in coordinating the few NCAs which decided to impose restrictions on short selling. ESMA’s actions during the Covid-19 crisis underline the de facto power it wields through its soft supervisory convergence powers and the entrepreneurial but effective approach it deploys in their use.See generally, Niamh Moloney, the Age of ESMA. Governing EU Financial Markets (Hart Publishing, 2018), chapter 4.

The need to promote cross-border regulation and cooperation between supervisors of financial markets has become acute ten years after the 2008 global financial crisis. This is due to a rise in extra-territorial legislation and cross-border access to foreign markets conditioned on “equivalence” and “deference” among jurisdictions. Brexit has made the issue more critical in Europe because the United Kingdom will rely on “equivalence” decisions on many aspects of its future cross-border financial relationships with the European Union. Equivalence decisions by the European Commission are based on a technical assessment but also include a political dimension which can punish or reward the other party. It is not just a European issue since the financial world will be more connected in the next twenty years and will need to rely even more on cross-border cooperation and equivalence. In addition, the amount of bilateral equivalence assessments and decisions could very quickly become unmanageable with dozens of jurisdictions dealing with hundreds of various regimes. The global financial architecture needs to be adapted, market fragmentation to be pre-empted, and international standards to become more granular. The International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO), made up of all securities supervisors in the world, should play a leading role in cross-border regulation and deference. It is the interest of many Europeans countries, and not just the European Union, to be the driving force to strengthen IOSCO so that a more rule-based and cooperative system can prevail and prevent future market fragmentation. For this goal to be achieved, IOSCO should become a new treaty-based World Finance Organisation.

Das ARUG II wurde im November 2019 vom Deutschen Bundestag verabschiedet, der Bundesrathat es passieren lassen, die Publikation im Bundesgesetzblatt folgte am 19.12.2019(BGBl. I 2019, 2637). Der Beitrag stellt die Neuerungen zur Aktionarsidentifikationund -legitimation sowie zum HV-Verfahren vor, ordnet die neuen Vorschriften des ARUG IIsowie der zur Umsetzung der zweiten Aktionarsrechte-Richtlinie erlassenen Verordnungin den Ablauf der Hauptversammlung ein und nimmt zu einigen Zweifelsfragen Stellung.

This is a short review of an important anniversary volume of the "International Tax Group", which has made many significant contributions to international tax law over the last 50 years.