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This dissertation examines broad questions of interest and decision-making in specific historical context. In the spring of 1948, the Democratic Truman administration requested that the Republican-controlled Congress adopt two conventional force measures, universal military training and selective service, and accelerate slightly the procurement of military aircraft. The conventional force measures were requested to underwrite the administration's diplomatic and economic policies toward Europe. Congressional opponents removed universal military training from the legislative agenda, greatly weakened the selective service bill, and approved significantly more procurement of aircraft than the administration wanted. Why was the Truman administration able to gain bipartisan passage of its major foreign diplomatic and economic programs, but not of its military programs? Three questions are examined. First, what interests were represented by major actors? The complex and conflicting interests represented within the executive branch are explored: the president and Budget Bureau; the Department of State; and the military, particularly the Air Force. Conflicts of interest within Congress are also analyzed. Certain of these interests are best described in terms of class, some in terms of bureaucratic and political concerns. Second, why did various individuals and groups act as they did? Actors' calculations of opportunities and constraints are discussed. Particular attention is paid to the audacious tactics of the Air Force, which included a public defection from the president's military program, and to the underst and ing between senators Taft and V and enberg, which led to V and enberg's silence on the issue of universal military training. Third, why did certain interests prevail and others not? The converging interests of the Air Force and the Taft wing of the Republican party led to an alliance, which, given conflicting interests among the military services and also V and enberg's wider calculation of interest, led to an uncharacteristic major foreign policy defeat for the Truman administration. This dissertation provides a lens to see better the nature of the American state and political forces at work in the early Cold War period. The decisions constrained force planning in the Truman administration and were an important factor in the dramatic buildup of nuclear weapons which began shortly thereafter.