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According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects’ levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement.

An individual’s well-being – or, equivalently, their welfare or quality of life – is the extent to which their life is going well for them. The philosophical question about well-being that has received the most attention is what constitutes or grounds it. When a person has a certain level of well-being, or when one individual is higher or lower in well-being than another, in virtue of what is this true? What is the correct standard for ranking lives in accordance with how well they are going? Theories of well-being, which attempt to answer these questions, come in four main varieties. Experientialist theories, of which hedonism is the most prominent example, claim that an individual’s well-being is entirely determined by how their experiences feel (e.g., how pleasant they are). Subjective theories, of which the desire-satisfaction theory is the main paradigm, claim that an individual’s well-being is entirely fixed by the degree to which their favourable attitudes (e.g., desires) are satisfied. Objective theories, of which perfectionism and the objective list theory are the primary examples, contend that at least some goods can contribute to an individual’s well-being regardless of whether the individual has a favourable attitude toward them. Hybrid theories combine elements of different theories.

No abstract.

Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to obtain than it previously was. I argue that this view has been unfairly neglected, that it avoids serious problems faced by many other views, and that it is a contender for the correct theory of promotion.

Subjectivism about welfare is the view that something is basically good (bad) for you if and only if, and to the extent that, you have the right kind of favorable (disfavorable) attitude toward it under the right conditions. I make a presumptive case for the falsity of subjectivism by arguing against nearly every extant version of the view. My arguments share a common theme: theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants. Even if a theory is intended to apply only to adults, the fact that it is false of newborns may give us sufficient reason to reject it.

The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a particular way of using the experience machine to argue against hedonism – one that appeals directly to intuitions about the welfare values of experientially identical lives rather than to claims about what we value or claims about whether we would, or should, plug into the machine. The two issues are connected: the conviction that the experience machine leaves hedonism unscathed is partly due to neglect of the best way to use the experience machine.

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive.

Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare must answer the timing question: when do you benefit from the satisfaction of one of your desires? There are three existing views about this: the Time of Desire view, on which you benefit at just those times when you have the desire; the Time of Object view, on which you benefit just when the object of your desire obtains; and Concurrentism, on which you benefit just when you have the desire and its object obtains. This paper introduces a new view, Asymmetrism, on which you sometimes benefit at the time of desire and sometimes benefit at the time of object. On this view, if the time at which you have a desire is later than the time at which its object obtains, then you benefit at the time of the desire. On the other hand, if the time of object is later than the time of desire, then you benefit at the time of object. Three arguments are given for the conclusion that Asymmetrism is superior to the Time of Desire and Time of Object views. It is argued that Asymmetrism and Concurrentism are the most credible answers to the timing question.

Humeans about normative reasons claim that there is a reason for you to perform a given action if and only if this would promote the satisfaction of one of your desires. Their view has traditionally been thought to have the revisionary implication that an agent can sometimes lack any reason to do what morality or prudence requires. Recently, however, Mark Schroeder has denied this. If he is right, then the Humean theory accords better with common sense than it has been thought to. I argue that Schroeder is mistaken, even if welfare (and thus prudence) is understood in terms of the satisfaction of one's desires: any Humean must concede that one can sometimes lack any reason to act morally or prudently. I also identify a novel variant on Humeanism that could perhaps avoid its revisionary implications about prudence (but not morality) if desire satisfactionism is the correct theory of welfare.

David Chalmers maintains that certain kinds of conceivability are reliable guides to metaphysical possibility. In this essay, I argue that Chalmers is wrong about the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility. I begin by explaining the notion of metaphysical possibility and by distinguishing it from those of other kinds of so-called possibility (including epistemic, logical, conceptual, physical, and natural possibility). I then explain Chalmers’s view on the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical possibility—a view that he calls modal rationalism. Next, I examine his positive case for his view, and I argue that it is unpersuasive. In particular, I argue, his attempt to show that modal rationalism is a priori is clearly a failure: given a proper understanding of the notion of metaphysical possibility, the balance of reasons overwhelming favors the hypothesis that modal rationalism is not a priori, and we are entitled to assume that it is not a priori unless compelling reasons to think otherwise are revealed. Finally, I produce two arguments that show that because modal rationalism is not a priori, it is false. I conclude that since there is every reason to think that modal rationalism is not a priori and no plausible reason to think that it is a priori, and since the falsity of modal rationalism follows from its not being a priori, there is every reason to think that modal rationalism is false.