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Many adults worldwide do not meet current physical activity (PA) guidelines. Mental fatigue decreases the likelihood of choosing to engage in PA. Message framing may enhance PA motivation when fatigued. We examined the effects of mental fatigue and message framing on PA motivation with additional focus on the messaging "congruency effect." Three hundred and twenty undergraduates completed measures of dispositional motivational orientation and were exposed to either gain-framed or loss-framed messages before completing an effort discounting questionnaire. Results showed lower motivation to engage in PA of higher intensities and longer durations. Direct effects of message framing on PA motivation were not significant. Interaction effects revealed that participants receiving messages congruent with their dominant motivational orientation showed increased motivation for light-intensity PA and decreased motivation for vigorous-intensity PA as mental fatigue increased. Findings suggest that providing messages congruent with one's dominant motivational orientation may increase motivation for engaging in light-intensity PA when fatigued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A vast literature highlights the prevalence of impulsive decision making in maladaptive outcomes. Most research has focused on one form—delay discounting. Less research has focused on effort discounting, possibly because of a lack of a standardized task for assessment. In published effort‐discounting tasks, effort is conceptualized in many ways, making it difficult to compare findings across studies. Additionally, most effort‐discounting tasks do not control for the time inherent in completing the effortful task, which makes it difficult to disentangle effort discounting from delay discounting. The current study evaluated the validity of a novel hypothetical effort‐discounting task. The novel task was used to evaluate the influence of the effort‐delay confound on rates of effort discounting in humans. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a confounded or a controlled version of the novel effort‐discounting task. The effort‐discounting data were well described by hyperbolic and exponential functions. When effort and delay were confounded, effort‐discounting rates were significantly higher than when effort alone influenced discounting. The results suggest that data that are produced by effort‐discounting tasks that do not control the effort‐delay confound should be interpreted cautiously because they are also influenced by delay discounting. Task limitations and future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to value rewards is crucial for adaptive behavior and is influenced by the time and effort required to obtain them. Impairments in these computations have been observed in patients with schizophrenia and may be present in individuals with subclinical psychotic symptoms (PS). In this study, we employed delay and effort-discounting tasks with food rewards in thirty-nine participants divided into high and low levels of PS. We investigated the underlying mechanisms of effort-discounting through computational modelling of dopamine prefrontal and subcortical circuits and the electrophysiological biomarker of both delay and effort-discounting alterations through resting-state frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA). Results revealed greater delay discounting in the High PS group compared to the Low PS group but no differences in the effort discounting task. However, in this task, the same levels of estimated dopamine release were associated with a lower willingness to exert effort for high-calorie food rewards in High PS participants compared to Low PS participants. Although there were no significant differences in FAA between the High PS and Low PS groups, FAA was significantly associated with the severity of participants' negative symptoms. Our study suggests that the dysfunction in temporal and effort cost computations, seen in patients with schizophrenia, may be present in individuals with subclinical PS. These findings provide valuable insight into the early vulnerability markers (behavioral, computational, and electrophysiological) for psychosis, which may aid in the development of preventive interventions. These findings are preliminary and warrant further investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present research tested the effect of manipulated perceived control (over obtaining the outcomes) and effort on reward valuation using the event‐related potential known as the Reward Positivity (RewP). This test was conducted in an attempt to integrate two research literatures with opposite findings: Effort justification occurs when high effort leads to high reward valuation, whereas effort discounting occurs when high effort leads to low reward valuation. Based on an examination of past methods used in these literatures, we predicted that perceived control and effort would interactively influence RewP. Consistent with the effort justification literature (cognitive dissonance theory), when individuals have high perceived control, high effort should lead to more reward valuation than low effort should. Consistent with the effort discounting literature, when individuals have low perceived control, low effort should lead to more reward valuation than high effort should. Results supported these interactive and integrative predictions. Our research integrated two contrasting hypotheses for how effort influences reward valuation. The hypotheses were effort justification and effort discounting. Perceived control (low vs. high) should interact with effort to influence reward valuation. When individuals had high perceived control, high effort led to high reward valuation. When individuals had low perceived control, high effort led to low reward valuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mexican Journal of Behavioral Analysis / Revista Mexicana de Análisis de la Conducta is the property of Sociedad Mexicana de Analisis de la Conducta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Objectives: Many individuals who experience depression do not seek psychotherapy, and past research has had limited success in predicting help‐seeking in this population. Accounting for behavioral characteristics of depression that affect help‐seeking decisions, such as effort discounting (devaluation of rewards as a function of effort), may address this gap. Methods: Individuals with moderate‐severe depression symptoms who were not in psychotherapy (N = 253) reported their depression symptom severity and the amount of effort they anticipated seeking psychotherapy would require; they also completed a behavioral measure of effort discounting. At a 3‐month follow‐up, they reported whether they initiated psychotherapy during the follow‐up period. Results: Depression symptom severity was associated with perceptions that seeking psychotherapy would be more effortful. In turn, perceptions that seeking psychotherapy would be more effortful prospectively predicted a lower likelihood of initiating psychotherapy. Effort discounting was unrelated to psychotherapy use. Conclusions: These results suggest that differences in the anticipated effort required to seek psychotherapy can increase depressed individuals' risk of going untreated. Future research may test whether reducing the effort of seeking psychotherapy increases psychotherapy use among those with depression. For instance, streamlining insurance enrollment procedures, implementing patient decision aids, or offering telehealth treatment options may be beneficial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dopamine is thought to play a crucial role in cost-benefit decision making, but so far there is no consensus on the precise role of dopamine in decision making. Here, we review the literature on dopaminergic manipulations of cost-benefit decision making in humans and evaluate how well different theoretical accounts explain the existing body of evidence. Reduced D2 stimulation tends to increase the willingness to bear delay and risk costs (i.e., wait for later rewards, take riskier options), while increased D1 and D2 receptor stimulation increases willingness to bear effort costs. We argue that the empirical findings can best be explained by combining the strengths of two theoretical accounts: in cost-benefit decision making, dopamine may play a dual role both in promoting the pursuit of psychologically close options (e.g., sooner and safer rewards) and in computing which costs are acceptable for a reward at stake. Moreover, we identify several limiting factors in the study designs of previous investigations that prevented a fuller understanding of dopamine’s role in value-based choice. Together, the proposed theoretical framework and the methodological suggestions for future studies may bring us closer to a unifying account of dopamine in healthy and impaired cost-benefit decision making.

Despite the importance of persistence in early learning, we know little about how children reason about outcomes that result from their efforts. Here we examined the role of effort type (i.e., physical vs. cognitive) and intensity (i.e., high vs. low effort) in shaping children's decision making about effort‐based rewards. Five‐ to 7‐year‐olds (N = 133) were assigned to one of four conditions (High Physical Effort, Low Physical Effort, High Cognitive Effort, Low Cognitive Effort) and completed a series of tasks to construct a toy. Tasks varied in the type (physical/cognitive) and intensity (high/low) of effort required to complete them. After constructing their toy, children completed a series of tasks to probe how much they valued that toy. Across conditions, children preferred their toy and gave it a higher monetary value, relative to a stranger's. However, when choosing their toy came at a cost, children no longer preferred it. Only children who built their toy through either cognitive or low effort were willing to incur a cost for their toy. Older children, across conditions, were also more likely to incur a cost for their toy. These findings demonstrate that by age five, children are sensitive to variations in effort type and intensity, and these factors shape how they evaluate effort‐based rewards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effort discounting describes the devaluation of rewards that require effort to obtain. The present study investigated whether discounting of cognitive effort depends on how near the effort is in time. The present study also investigated whether effort discounting, and its modulation by temporal distance to the effort, might depend on need for cognition, a personality trait that describes how much one enjoys cognitively demanding tasks. Participants performed a validated effort discounting task that measured the extent to which they subjectively devalued a $20 reward when effort was required to receive it. Immediacy of the effort was manipulated by having participants imagine exerting varying levels of effort either immediately, in a day, or in a month. Results revealed linear increases in discounting of rewards as a function of both how much effort was involved and how imminent the effort was. The extent to which both these variables influenced discounting correlated with need for cognition. Individuals low in need for cognition exhibited more effort discounting overall and a linear increase in effort discounting as the effort grew imminent. Individuals high in need for cognition engaged in less effort discounting, which was not modulated by how imminent the effort was. These results indicate that people exhibit dynamic inconsistency in effort-related decisions, such that the degree to which they discount effort depends on how soon the effort is. Additionally, this tendency is linked with systematic individual differences in need for cognition. Lastly, this study demonstrates that these tendencies can be quantitatively operationalized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The stability of delay discounting across time has been well-established. However, limited research has examined the stability of probability discounting, and no studies of the stability of effort discounting are available. The present study assessed the steady-state characteristics of delay, probability, and effort discounting tasks across time with hypothetical rewards in humans, as well as whether response characteristics suggested a common discounting equation. Participants completed delay, probability, and effort discounting tasks on three occasions. We found moderate relative stability of delay and probability tasks, and similar evidence for absolute stability across time for all tasks. The interclass correlations coefficient showed some correspondence across time points and tasks, and higher levels of between subject variability, especially for the effort discounting task, suggesting trait level variables has a stronger influence on performance than state level variables. Performance on the delay and probability tasks were moderately correlated and similar mathematical functions fit choice patterns on both tasks (hyperbolic), suggesting that delay and probability discounting processes shared some common elements. Lower correlations and different function fits suggested that effort discounting involves more unique features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effort discounting is the decrease in the subjective value of a reward as the effort required to obtain it increases. In the present study, we assessed the effects of two procedures (fixed sequence and titrating sequence procedures) and two effort types (climbing floors and pedaling) on data-systematicity and the rate of effort discounting with human participants. There were no differences in the rate of discounting or in the production of systematic data between procedures. However, discounting was steeper when the required effort was climbing floors compared to pedaling, and there were more nonsystematic data production due to the use of pedaling as the required effort. Both the hyperbolic and parabolic models were fitted to the indifference points and there was a better fit of the hyperbolic model compared with the parabolic model. The effort type, but not procedure, affected the level of data systematicity and influences the degree of effort discounting, suggesting these two factors influence behavior by different mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discounting of costly rewards is robustly correlated with maladaptive tendencies like substance use, relapse, and poor health habits. Because of this, many laboratory-based interventions have been developed to reduce discounting. Most of these interventions aim to reduce discounting of delayed rewards (delay discounting) but many desirable outcomes in daily life also require effort. The present experiment sought to evaluate the efficacy of episodic future thinking (EFT) to reduce effort discounting. EFT has proven effective in reducing delay discounting, but has not been evaluated as a means of reducing effort discounting. We also evaluated the influence of different types of examples provided to participants during the EFT and control tasks. In a 2x2 between-groups design, participants were randomly assigned to an EFT or control group, combined with one of two example-type conditions. Participants completed the EFT or control tasks, followed by delay- and effort-discounting tasks. As in prior studies, EFT significantly reduced delay discounting, but the effect on effort discounting fell short of significance. Example type did not affect these outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

RationaleDrug addiction can be described as aberrant allocation of effort toward acquiring drug, despite associated costs. It is unclear if this behavioral pattern results from an overvaluation of reward or to an altered sensitivity to costs.ObjectivePresent experiments assessed reward sensitivity and effortful choice in rats following 1 week of withdrawal from methamphetamine (mAMPH).MethodsRats were treated with either saline or an escalating dose mAMPH regimen, then tested after a week without the drug. In experiment 1, rats were given a free choice between water and various concentrations of sucrose solution to assess general reward sensitivity. In experiment 2, rats were presented with a choice between lever-pressing for sucrose pellets on a progressive ratio schedule or consuming freely-available chow.ResultsIn experiment 1, we found no differences in sucrose preference between mAMPH- and saline-pretreated rats. In experiment 2, when selecting between two options, mAMPH-pretreated rats engaged in less lever-pressing for sucrose pellets (p

Growing evidence suggests that humans and other animals assign value to a stimulus based not only on its inherent rewarding properties, but also on the costs of the action required to obtain it, such as the cost of time. Here, we examined whether such cost also occurs for mentally simulated actions. Healthy volunteers indicated their subjective value for snack foods while the time to imagine performing the action to obtain the different stimuli was manipulated. In each trial, the picture of one food item and a home position connected through a path were displayed on a computer screen. The path could be either large or thin. Participants first rated the stimulus, and then imagined moving the mouse cursor along the path from the starting position to the food location. They reported the onset and offset of the imagined movements with a button press. Two main results emerged. First, imagery times were significantly longer for the thin than the large path. Second, participants liked significantly less the snack foods associated with the thin path (i.e., with longer imagery time), possibly because the passage of time strictly associated with action imagery discounts the value of the reward. Importantly, such effects were absent in a control group of participants who performed an identical valuation task, except that no action imagery was required. Our findings hint at the idea that imagined actions, like real actions, carry a cost that affects deeply how people assign value to the stimuli in their environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Individuals tend to avoid effortful tasks, regardless of whether they are physical or mental in nature. Recent experimental evidence is suggestive of individual differences in the dispositional willingness to invest cognitive effort in goal-directed behavior. The traits need for cognition (NFC) and self-control are related to behavioral measures of cognitive effort discounting and demand avoidance, respectively. Given that these traits are only moderately related, the question arises whether they reflect a common core factor underlying cognitive effort investment. If so, the common core of both traits might be related to behavioral measures of effort discounting in a more systematic fashion. To address this question, we aimed at specifying a core construct of cognitive effort investment that reflects dispositional differences in the willingness and tendency to exert effortful control. Methods We conducted two studies (N = 613 and N = 244) with questionnaires related to cognitive motivation and effort investment including assessment of NFC, intellect, self-control and effortful control. We first calculated Pearson correlations followed by two mediation models regarding intellect and its separate aspects, seek and conquer, as mediators. Next, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis of a hierarchical model of cognitive effort investment as second-order latent variable. First-order latent variables were cognitive motivation reflecting NFC and intellect, and effortful self-control reflecting self-control and effortful control. Finally, we calculated Pearson correlations between factor scores of the latent variables and general self-efficacy as well as traits of the Five Factor Model of Personality for validation purposes. Results Our findings support the hypothesized correlations between the assessed traits, where the relationship of NFC and self-control is specifically mediated via goal-directedness. We established and replicated a hierarchical factor model of cognitive motivation and effortful self-control that explains the shared variance of the first-order factors by a second-order factor of cognitive effort investment. Conclusions Taken together, our results integrate disparate literatures on cognitive motivation and self-control and provide a basis for further experimental research on the role of dispositional individual differences in goal-directed behavior and cost–benefit-models.

Background: Social motivation is crucial for healthy interpersonal connections and is impaired in a subset of the general population and across many psychiatric disorders. However, compared with nonsocial (e.g., monetary) motivation, social motivation has been understudied in quantitative behavioral work, especially regarding willingness to exert social effort. We developed a novel social effort discounting task, paired with a monetary task to examine motivational specificity. We expected that social task performance would relate to general motivation and also show selective relationships with self-reported avoidance tendencies and with sociality., Methods: An analyzed sample of 397 participants performed the social and nonsocial effort discounting task online, along with self-report measures of various aspects of motivation and psychiatric symptomatology., Results: Social and nonsocial task motivation correlated strongly (ρ = 0.71, p < .001). Both social and nonsocial task motivation related similarly to self-reported general motivation (social, β = 0.16; nonsocial, β = 0.13) and to self-reported approach motivation (social, β = 0.14; nonsocial, β = 0.11), with this common effect captured by a significant main effect across social and nonsocial conditions. Significant condition interaction effects supported a selective relationship of social task motivation with self-reported sociality and also with avoidance motivation., Conclusions: Our novel social effort discounting task revealed both domain-general and social-specific components of motivation. In combination with other measures, this approach can facilitate further investigation of common and dissociable neurobehavioral mechanisms to better characterize normative and pathological variation and develop personalized interventions targeting specific contributors to social impairment., (Copyright © 2024 Society of Biological Psychiatry. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Humans tend to avoid cognitive effort. Whereas evidence of this abounds in adults, little is known about its emergence and development in childhood. The few existing studies in children use different experimental paradigms and report contradictory developmental patterns. We examined effort-related decision-making in a sample of 79 five- to 11-year-olds using a parametric induction of cognitive effort and three paradigms that each involved decision-making between low- and high-effort options but varied in how explicit effort was made. This included a demand avoidance and an effort discounting paradigm. We also probed cognitive processes linked to effort-related decisions, including task performance, metacognitive accuracy, effort perception, and mental demand. We found that children of all ages were sensitive to parametric modulations of cognitive effort as indicated by self-report. In terms of effort-related decision-making we found that overall children demonstrated no implicit behavioral preference for low effort tasks, that older children stated a preference for low effort tasks, and that all children discounted effort. Further, implicit preference in the demand avoidance paradigm was linked to children's metacognitive insight into how well they could perform effortful tasks. These findings strongly suggest that although children are clearly sensitive to manipulations of cognitive effort, whether and when they use this information to guide their decisions to engage in effortful tasks depends strongly on the extent to which effortful features are made salient to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Growing evidence suggests that humans and other animals assign value to a stimulus based not only on its inherent rewarding properties, but also on the costs of the action required to obtain it, such as the cost of time. Here, we examined whether such cost also occurs for mentally simulated actions. Healthy volunteers indicated their subjective value for snack foods while the time to imagine performing the action to obtain the different stimuli was manipulated. In each trial, the picture of one food item and a home position connected through a path were displayed on a computer screen. The path could be either large or thin. Participants first rated the stimulus, and then imagined moving the mouse cursor along the path from the starting position to the food location. They reported the onset and offset of the imagined movements with a button press. Two main results emerged. First, imagery times were significantly longer for the thin than the large path. Second, participants liked significantly less the snack foods associated with the thin path (i.e., with longer imagery time), possibly because the passage of time strictly associated with action imagery discounts the value of the reward. Importantly, such effects were absent in a control group of participants who performed an identical valuation task, except that no action imagery was required. Our findings hint at the idea that imagined actions, like real actions, carry a cost that affects deeply how people assign value to the stimuli in their environment.

Background: Individuals tend to avoid effortful tasks, regardless of whether they are physical or mental in nature. Recent experimental evidence is suggestive of individual differences in the dispositional willingness to invest cognitive effort in goal-directed behavior. The traits need for cognition (NFC) and self-control are related to behavioral measures of cognitive effort discounting and demand avoidance, respectively. Given that these traits are only moderately related, the question arises whether they reflect a common core factor underlying cognitive effort investment. If so, the common core of both traits might be related to behavioral measures of effort discounting in a more systematic fashion. To address this question, we aimed at specifying a core construct of cognitive effort investment that reflects dispositional differences in the willingness and tendency to exert effortful control. Methods: We conducted two studies (N = 613 and N = 244) with questionnaires related to cognitive motivation and effort investment including assessment of NFC, intellect, self-control and effortful control. We first calculated Pearson correlations followed by two mediation models regarding intellect and its separate aspects, seek and conquer, as mediators. Next, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis of a hierarchical model of cognitive effort investment as second-order latent variable. First-order latent variables were cognitive motivation reflecting NFC and intellect, and effortful self-control reflecting self-control and effortful control. Finally, we calculated Pearson correlations between factor scores of the latent variables and general self-efficacy as well as traits of the Five Factor Model of Personality for validation purposes. Results: Our findings support the hypothesized correlations between the assessed traits, where the relationship of NFC and self-control is specifically mediated via goal-directedness. We established and replicated a hierarchical factor model of cognitive motivation and effortful self-control that explains the shared variance of the first-order factors by a second-order factor of cognitive effort investment. Conclusions: Taken together, our results integrate disparate literatures on cognitive motivation and self-control and provide a basis for further experimental research on the role of dispositional individual differences in goal-directed behavior and cost–benefit-models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deficits in goal-directed decision making and motivation are hallmark characteristics of several neuropsychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia (SZ) and major depressive disorder (MDD). Studies using effort-based decision-making tasks have shown that both patients with SZ and MDD invest less physical effort in order to obtain rewards. However, how these motivational deficits relate to clinically assessed symptom dimensions such as apathy remains controversial. Using a grip-strength-based effort discounting task we assessed effort-based decision-making behavior in healthy controls (HC) (N = 18), patients with SZ (N = 42), and MDD (N = 44). We then investigated how effort discounting relates to different symptom dimensions. There were no differences in effort discounting between HC participants and patients with SZ or MDD. In addition, we did not observe a correlation between effort discounting and negative symptoms (NS) in patients with SZ or MDD. In conclusion, the current study does not support an association between effort discounting and NS in SZ or MDD. Further studies are needed to investigate effort discounting and its relation to psychopathological dimensions across different neuropsychiatric disorders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human behavior is more strongly driven by the motivation to avoid losses than to pursue gains (loss aversion). However, there is little research on how losses influence the motivation to exert effort. We compared the effects of loss and gain incentives on cognitive task performance and effort-based decision making. In three experiments, participants performed a cognitively effortful task under gain and loss conditions and made choices about effort expenditure in a decision-making task. Results consistently showed significant loss aversion in effort-based decision making. Participants were willing to invest more effort in the loss compared to the gain condition (i.e., perform a longer duration task: Experiments 1 and 2; or higher task load: Experiment 3). On the other hand, losses did not lead to improved performance (sustained attention), or higher physiological effort (pupil diameter) in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3, losses did enhance working memory performance, but only at the highest load level. Taken together, these results suggest that loss aversion motivates higher effort investment in effort-based decision-making, while the effect of loss aversion during a performance may depend on the task type or effort level.

Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is well‐known for its role in exerting mental work, however the contribution of DLPFC for deciding whether or not to engage in effort remains unknown. Here, we assessed the causal role of DLPFC in effort‐based decision making. We disrupted functioning of DLPFC with noninvasive brain stimulation before participants repeatedly decided whether to exert mental effort in a working memory task. We found the same DLPFC subregion involved in mental effort exertion to influence also effort‐based decisions: First, it enhanced effort discounting, suggesting that DLPFC may signal the capacity to successfully deal with effort demands. Second, a novel computational model integrating the costs of enduring effort into the effort‐based decision process revealed that DLPFC disruption reduced fatigue after accumulated effort exertion, linking DLPFC activation with fatigue. Together, our findings indicate that in effort‐based decisions DLPFC represents the capacity to exert mental effort and the updating of this information with enduring time‐on‐task, informing theoretical accounts on the role of DLPFC in the motivation to exert mental effort and the fatigue arising from it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Abnormal effort-based decision-making represents a potential mechanism underlying motivational deficits (amotivation) in psychotic disorders. Previous research identified effort allocation impairment in chronic schizophrenia and focused mostly on physical effort modality. No study has investigated cognitive effort allocation in first-episode psychosis (FEP). Method: Cognitive effort allocation was examined in 40 FEP patients and 44 demographically-matched healthy controls, using Cognitive Effort-Discounting (COGED) paradigm which quantified participants' willingness to expend cognitive effort in terms of explicit, continuous discounting of monetary rewards based on parametrically-varied cognitive demands (levels N of N-back task). Relationship between reward-discounting and amotivation was investigated. Group differences in reward-magnitude and effort-cost sensitivity, and differential associations of these sensitivity indices with amotivation were explored. Results: Patients displayed significantly greater reward-discounting than controls. In particular, such discounting was most pronounced in patients with high levels of amotivation even when N-back performance and reward base amount were taken into consideration. Moreover, patients exhibited reduced reward-benefit sensitivity and effort-cost sensitivity relative to controls, and that decreased sensitivity to reward-benefit but not effort-cost was correlated with diminished motivation. Reward-discounting and sensitivity indices were generally unrelated to other symptom dimensions, antipsychotic dose and cognitive deficits. Conclusion: This study provides the first evidence of cognitive effort-based decision-making impairment in FEP, and indicates that decreased effort expenditure is associated with amotivation. Our findings further suggest that abnormal effort allocation and amotivation might primarily be related to blunted reward valuation. Prospective research is required to clarify the utility of effort-based measures in predicting amotivation and functional outcome in FEP. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human behavior is more strongly driven by the motivation to avoid losses than to pursue gains (loss aversion). However, there is little research on how losses influence the motivation to exert effort. We compared the effects of loss and gain incentives on cognitive task performance and effort-based decision making. In three experiments, participants performed a cognitively effortful task under gain and loss conditions and made choices about effort expenditure in a decision-making task. Results consistently showed significant loss aversion in effort-based decision making. Participants were willing to invest more effort in the loss compared to the gain condition (i.e., perform a longer duration task: Experiments 1 and 2; or higher task load: Experiment 3). On the other hand, losses did not lead to improved performance (sustained attention), or higher physiological effort (pupil diameter) in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3, losses did enhance working memory performance, but only at the highest load level. Taken together, these results suggest that loss aversion motivates higher effort investment in effort-based decision-making, while the effect of loss aversion during a performance may depend on the task type or effort level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Mexican Journal of Behavioral Analysis / Revista Mexicana de Análisis de la Conducta is the property of Sociedad Mexicana de Analisis de la Conducta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Activation of D 1 receptors has been related to successful goal-directed behavior, but it remains unclear whether D 1 receptor activation causally tips the balance of weighing costs and benefits in humans. Here, we tested the impact of pharmacologically stimulated D 1 receptors on sensitivity to risk, delay, and effort costs in economic choice and investigated whether D 1 receptor stimulation would bias preferences toward options with increased costs in a cost-specific manner. In a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group phase 1 study, 120 healthy young volunteers received either placebo or 1 of 3 doses (6 mg, 15 mg, or 30 mg) of a novel, selective D 1 agonist (PF-06412562). After drug administration, participants performed decision tasks measuring their preferences for risky, delayed, and effortful outcomes. Higher doses of the D 1 agonist increased the willingness to exert physical effort for reward as well as reduced the preference for risky outcomes. We observed no effects on preferences for delayed rewards. The current results provide evidence that D 1 receptor stimulation causally affects core aspects of cost-benefit decision making in humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is presumed to involve mental effort application difficulties. To test this assumption, we manipulated task difficulty and measured behavioral, as well as subjective and psychophysiological indices of effort.Methods: Fifteen adolescent ADHD boys and 16 controls performed two tasks. First, subjective estimates and behavioral and pupillary measures of effort were recorded across five levels of N-back task difficulties. Second, effort discounting was assessed. In the latter, participants made repeated choices between performing a difficult N-back task for a high reward versus an easier N-back task for a smaller reward.Results: Increasing task difficulty led to similar deteriorations in performance for both groups – although ADHD participants performed more poorly at all difficulty levels than controls. While ADHD and control participants rated the tasks equally difficult and discounted effort similarly, those with ADHD displayed slightly different pupil dilation patterns with increasing task difficulty.Conclusion: The behavioral results did not provide evidence for mental effort problems in adolescent boys with ADHD. The subtle physiological effects, however, suggest that adolescents with ADHD may allocate effort in a different way than controls.

Discounting refers to decreases in the subjective value of an outcome with increases in some attribute of that outcome. The attributes most commonly studied are delay and probability, with far less research on effort and social discounting. Although these attributes all represent costs that reduce subjective value, it is as yet unclear how the extent to which they do so is related at the individual level. Accordingly, the present study examined the degree to which individual participants discounted hypothetical monetary rewards on each of four discounting tasks in which the delay, probability, effort, and number of people with whom the money was to be shared were manipulated. At the group level, larger amounts were discounted less steeply than smaller amounts when delay and effort were varied, whereas larger amounts were discounted more steeply when probability and number of people were varied. At the individual level, the correlational pattern was examined using exploratory factor analysis. A six-factor structure (with separate factors for delay and effort, and two factors each for social and probability discounting) described the relations among indifference points. At a more molar level, a two-factor structure, which corresponded to the direction of the observed magnitude effects, described the relations among area-under-the-curve measures of discounting in the eight conditions resulting from crossing two monetary amounts with the four cost factors. We conclude that despite sharing some similarities, individual and group differences in discounting involving the different types of costs reflect mostly separate processes and traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has demonstrated that better value-based decision making (e.g., waiting or working for rewards) relates to greater executive function (EF) ability. However, EF is not a static ability, but is influenced by the emotional content of the task. As such, EF ability in emotional contexts may have unique associations with value-based decision making, in which costs and benefits are explicit. Participants (N = 229) completed an EF task (with both negative and neutral task conditions) and two value-based decision-making tasks. Willingness to wait and to work were evaluated in separate path models relating the waiting and working conditions to the EF conditions. Willingness to wait and willingness to work showed distinct relationships with EF ability: Greater EF ability on a negative, but not on a neutral, EF task was related to a willingness to wait for a reward, whereas greater EF ability across both EF tasks was related to a greater willingness to work for a reward. EF ability on a negative EF task showed an inverted-U relationship to willingness to wait for reward, and was most related to willingness to wait at a 6-month delay. Greater EF, regardless of whether the task was negative or neutral, was related to a greater willingness to work when reward was uncertain (50%) or was likely (88%), but not when reward was unlikely (12%). This study suggests that the emotional content of value-based decisions impacts the relationship between EF ability and willingness to wait or to work for reward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Delay discounting refers to the devaluation of a reward given increasing delays to delivery. Similarly, effort discounting refers to the devaluation of a reward given increasing effort required to obtain it. Individuals with substance use disorder show higher rates of delay discounting, exacerbating short‐term positive reinforcement at the expense of long‐term consequences. This study explores how effort discounting compares to delay discounting behavior among alcohol users as well as how these preferences change between monetary and alcohol rewards. Methods: A total of 100 participants completed an online survey through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participant alcohol use was evaluated using DSM‐5 and the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test criteria. All participants completed 4 randomized discounting tasks involving delay or effort discounting, in which the reward was money or alcohol. A follow‐up experiment (n = 423) added the alcohol purchase task to assess alcohol valuation. Results: Individuals with greater alcohol use disorder (AUD) severity discounted future money and alcohol significantly more than those with less AUD. However, individuals meeting more DSM‐5 criteria were only willing to perform more effort for alcohol. The follow‐up experiment replicated these findings and demonstrated that individuals with greater AUD also showed an increased valuation of alcohol and alcohol value‐mediated effort discounting. Conclusions: These results suggest that individuals with greater AUD were less willing to wait for money or alcohol. While all participants were willing to work for money regardless of AUD severity, individuals with greater AUD showed increased valuation of alcohol drinks and were willing to exert more effort to obtain alcohol. Together, these results paint a picture of individuals with increased AUD as both more impulsive and willing to work to obtain alcohol, contributing to our understanding of decision making among individuals who abuse substances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Letting effort-free gratification derail us from effort-requiring goals is one reason why we fail to realize health-relevant intentions like 'exercise regularly'. We tested the effectiveness of the self-control strategy precommitment in such effort-related conflicts, using a novel laboratory choice paradigm, where participants could precommit to an effort-requiring large reward by pre-eliminating an effort-free small reward from their choice set. Our participants used precommitment frequently and effectively, such that they reached effort-requiring large rewards more often. Using computational modelling and Bayesian model comparisons, we assessed whether participants employed precommitment to avoid anticipated willpower failures (i.e. as a self-regulatory measure) or to maximize their motivation to choose the effort-requiring option (i.e. as a self-motivational measure). Observed choices and precommitment decisions were consistent with the motivation maximization hypothesis, but not the willpower hypothesis. Our findings show that offering precommitment is effective in helping individuals optimize their motivation and choice behaviour and thereby achieve effort-requiring goals, and strongly encourage application of precommitment schemes in exercise and rehabilitation interventions. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dopamine is known to influence motivational processes, however the precise role of this neurotransmitter remains a contentious issue. In the current study we sought to further characterize dopamine signaling in reward-based decision-making and consummatory behavior in mice, via lateral ventricle infusion of the dopamine D2 receptor antagonist eticlopride. In Experiment 1, we examined effort-based decision-making, in which mice had a choice between one lever, where a single response led to the delivery of a low value reward (2% sucrose); and a second lever, which led to a higher value reward (20% sucrose) that gradually required more effort to obtain. As the response schedule for the high value reward became more strict, low dose (4 μg in 0.5 μl) central infusions of eticlopride biased preference away from the high value reward, and toward the lever that led to the low value reward. Similarly, a higher dose of eticlopride (8 μg in 0.5 μl) also disrupted choice responding for the high value reward, however it did so by increasing omissions. In Experiment 2, we assessed the effects of eticlopride on consumption of 20% sucrose. The antagonist led to a dose-dependent reduction in intake, and through an analysis of licking microstructure, it was revealed that this in part reflected a reduction in the motivation to engage in consummatory behavior, rather than alterations in the evaluation of the reward. These results suggest that disruptions in D2 receptor signaling reduce the willingness to engage in effortful operant responding and consumption of a desirable outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Effort discounting theory suggests that the value of a reward should be lower if it was effortful to obtain, whereas contrast theory suggests that the contrast between the costly effort and the reward makes the reward seem more valuable. To test these alternative hypotheses, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as participants engaged in feedback-based learning that required low or high cognitive effort to obtain positive feedback, while the objective amount of information provided by feedback remained constant. In the low effort condition, a single image was presented with four response options. In the high effort condition, two images were presented, each with two response options, and correct feedback was presented only when participants responded correctly to both of the images. Accuracy was significantly lower for the high effort condition, and all participants reported that the high effort condition was more difficult. A region of the ventral striatum selected for sensitivity to feedback value also showed increased activation to feedback presentation associated with the high effort condition relative to the low effort condition, when controlling for activation from corresponding control conditions where feedback was random. These results suggest that increased cognitive effort produces corresponding increases in positive feedback-related ventral striatum activity, in line with the predictions made by contrast theory. The accomplishment of obtaining a hard-earned intrinsic reward, such as positive feedback, may be particularly likely to promote reward-related brain activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: People with depression typically exhibit diminished cognitive control. Control is subjectively costly, prompting speculation that control deficits reflect reduced cognitive effort. Evidence that people with depression exert less cognitive effort is mixed, however, and motivation may depend on state affect., Methods: We used a cognitive effort discounting task to measure propensity to expend cognitive effort and fractal structure in the temporal dynamics of interbeat intervals to assess on-task effort exertion for 49 healthy control subjects, 36 people with current depression, and 67 people with remitted depression., Results: People with depression discounted more steeply, indicating that they were less willing to exert cognitive effort than people with remitted depression and never-depressed control subjects. Also, steeper discounting predicted worse functioning in daily life. Surprisingly, a sad mood induction selectively boosted motivation among participants with depression, erasing differences between them and control subjects. During task performance, depressed participants with the lowest cognitive motivation showed blunted autonomic reactivity as a function of load., Conclusions: Discounting patterns supported the hypothesis that people with current depression would be less willing to exert cognitive effort, and steeper discounting predicted lower global functioning in daily life. Heart rate fractal scaling proved to be a highly sensitive index of cognitive load, and data implied that people with lower motivation for cognitive effort had a diminished physiological capacity to respond to rising cognitive demands. State affect appeared to influence motivation among people with current depression given that they were more willing to exert cognitive effort following a sad mood induction., (Copyright © 2022 Society of Biological Psychiatry. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Rats chronically infected with protozoan Toxoplasma gondii exhibit greater delay aversion in an inter-temporal task. Moreover T. gondii infection also results in dendritic atrophy of basolateral amygdala neurons. Basolateral amygdala is reported to bias decision making towards greater effortful alternatives. In this context, we report that T. gondii increases effort aversion in infected male rats. This host–parasite association has been widely studied in the context of loss of innate fear in the infected males. It is suggested that reduced fear towards predators reflects a parasitic behavioral manipulation to enhance trophic transmission of T. gondii . Observations reported here extend this paradigm away from a monolithic change in fear and towards a multi-dimensional change in decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Making decisions about rewards that involve delay or effort requires the integration of value and cost information. The brain areas recruited in this integration have been well characterized for delay discounting. However only a few studies have investigated how effort costs are integrated into value signals to eventually determine choice. In contrast to previous studies that have evaluated fMRI signals related to physical effort, we used a task that focused on cognitive effort. Participants discounted the value of delayed and effortful rewards. The value of cognitively effortful rewards was represented in the anterior portion of the inferior frontal gyrus and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Additionally, the value of the chosen option was encoded in the anterior cingulate cortex, caudate, and cerebellum. While most brain regions showed no significant dissociation between effort discounting and delay discounting, the ACC was significantly more activated in effort compared to delay discounting tasks. Finally, overlapping regions within the right orbitofrontal cortex and lateral temporal and parietal cortices encoded the value of the chosen option during both delay and effort discounting tasks. These results indicate that encoding of rewards discounted by cognitive effort and delay involves partially dissociable brain areas, but a common representation of chosen value is present in the orbitofrontal, temporal and parietal cortices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]