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Given that large scale change has to start somewhere, the image of a pebble in a pool provides a visual for the primary goal for this paper to examine employee [...]

Several qualitative, as well as quantitative studies are conducted to explain the impact of the nonprofit, as well as for-profit contractor ownership on the nature of performance measurement of different state and local contracts. The differences observed in the conceptualization of performance in different sectors are also analyzed.

Presented in this case is the Cards Companies' movement towards 100% employee shared ownership and governance with an emphasis on and investment in education; focus on 'quality of life'; economic, [...]

Corporate governance research indicates that large owners provide effective monitoring. In this article, we expand firm-level notions of monitoring to include large institutional owners' investment portfolios and suggest that portfolio characteristics affect owners' motivation and capacity to monitor, which compromises the positive effects of monitoring at the firm level. Specifically, using data from 533 large firms over a 10-year period, we find that increases in the size of portfolio holdings, number of portfolio blockholdings, portfolio turnover, and the importance of a particular holding reduce monitoring effectiveness in the context of executive compensation. Overall, we provide preliminary evidence that the portfolio characteristics of the largest institutional owners contradict firm-level monitoring effects; therefore, we strongly recommend that future studies consider both firm-and portfolio-level effects simultaneously to understand monitoring effectiveness. Key words: large owners; institutional investors; executive compensation, Ever since Berle and Means (1932) examined the implications of dispersed owners and self-interested managers using the separation of ownership and control thesis, monitoring by large owners has been considered [...]

A study proving that increase in managerial ownership improves the performance of business enterprise is presented. The study is based on analysis of performance of listed Danish companies.

Byline: Stephen E. Clapham (1), Robert W. Cooper (2) Keywords: boards of directors; corporate governance; ethics; employee voice; stakeholders Abstract: Traditionally, corporate governance has focused on the problem of crafting mechanisms to align the interests of owners and managers. The key characteristic has been to minimize the potential for managers to act in their own self-interest at the expense of shareholders. The purpose of this paper is to focus on employees as stakeholders in the governance process. We argue that creating an environment where employees have help in behaving ethically, in the course of their work, is the first step in encouraging them to voice observations of wrongdoing. Seven groups of professionals in the accounting and insurance fields were surveyed during a 10-year period and asked to indicate the extent to which 14 items were helpful in dealing with ethical challenges. Over 2700 responses were analyzed. The findings indicate that professionals think that their organizational culture and policy for voice was more helpful in dealing with ethical dilemmas than was their professional association. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Management and International Business, College of Business and Public Administration Drake University, Des Moines, IA, 50311, USA (2) Employers Mutual Distinguished Professor of Insurance, College of Business and Public Administration Drake University, Des Moines, IA, 50311, USA Article History: Registration Date: 18/05/2005 Article note: *Presented at the 2004 European Academy of Management Conference in St. Andrews, Scotland

The authors examines stock compensation to managers and executives. Topics include managerially ownership, stock options, and modern portfolios.

Financial participation in the Belgian savings bank HBK-Spaarbank is described in terms of origin, principles and evolution. The cooperative company Personnel Cooperative HBK, which represents all employees of HBK-Spaarbank, is the embodiment of this participation. The cooperative company, founded in 1979 has grown to become a very important stakeholder, owning 22.5% of the capital of the credit institution.

Empowerment assures that various members of an organization have sufficient control. Trust and morale are not the only factors improved by empowerment but also the ability of employees to take risks and respond to challenges at every level of the organization. Necessary steps for empowering employees include sharing of information on all aspects of the organization's operations and employee training. These two factors should be used to foster individual or collective leadership within a team.

Organizational efficiency among franchising organizations may be enhanced through the adoption of a promotion-based employment system. Results revealed that a promotion based system does not only motivate lower level managerial employees, but help owners get rid of contracting problems, as well. However, in corporate settings where such a scheme is impossible to implement, a dual system of promotion-based and pay-for-performance type of contract is advised.

Employee buyout (EBO) permits companies to gain entry into excess pension assets by changing the defined benefit pension capital of employees to equity claims. Conversion of pension capital releases the excess assets in the pension plan which can later be used in funding the buyout. Participation of employees in EBOs greatly helps in terms of financially supporting the buyout.

Distinctions in China's economic transition were explored in a study that compared state enterprise reform and overall system transformation. A dinosaur model of economic reform is used to analyze the political dynamics and underlying economic conditions during Chinese economic reform. Chinese reform has five features. These are stabilization under the aegis of the old administrative system, quick success with rural reforms, opening up manufacturing and foreign trade to the private sector, creation of a dual price system and fixed size of the central plan.

Chinese enterprise reform is evaluated using two new sets of data coming from 300 state-owned enterprises (SOE) and 200 town and village enterprises (TVE). Research indicates that total factor productivity (TFP) growth may be influenced by underinflation of gross output and overdeflation of intermediate inputs. Thus, as a criteria for success, TFP is overvalued. Research also indicates that intertemporal efficiency and SOE contribution to macroeconomic stability should be criteria for success.

Nineteen ninety-four marks the twentieth anniversary of the passage of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), which codified the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) as a form of [...]

The first employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) was launched in California during the 1950's. ESOPs were designated as employee benefits plans by the 1974 Employment Retirement and Income Security Act. ESOPs can help develop the economy of the country if conditions such as organizational commitment, profit-sharing and stock benefits are met by the company. However, there are limitations to the functioning of ESOPs, such as the legal exclusion of workers affiliated to unions, inadequate voting rights and non-compulsory nature of dividend payments.

Monitoring of workers' efforts may contribute to a better evaluation of compensation according to individual production. A standard model for incentives in a producer's cooperatives is analyzed to reveal its inherent inapplicability to all types of cooperative settings. Two types of monitoring set-ups are examined. Two models based on these two monitoring settings are presented as an alternative to an incomplete monitoring effort.

Employee share ownership cannot simultaneously benefit all union members and external owners. The study shows that an egalitarian share arrangement will increase employment and thus reduce income for employees overall while increasing it for owners. Inegalitarian arrangements, in which some union members do not receive stock, could be viable.

This paper analyzes the evolution of American unions' attitudes and policies concerning employee ownership that coincided with the rapid growth of employee stock-ownership plans during the 1980s. From an initial position of opposing employee ownership and viewing it as a threat, many major unions have come to accept, and in some cases to promote, stock ownership for their members. Among the factors driving this change of view have been economic necessity, evidence that many of the labor movement's traditional concerns about employee ownership are largely unfounded, and the growing realization among unions that employee ownership is a potentially useful strategic asset. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

The increased discussion of economic democracy in America in recent years makes sense given the context of crises in Keynesianism, the welfare state, corporate legitimacy and American 'competitiveness'. Departing from Dahl's recent analysis, this paper argues that one notion of economic democracy -- the internal democratization of the firm -- can be conceived and plausibly linked to objectives of increased American competitiveness and community stability. The argument rejects purist schemes of universal cooperative ownership as well as so-called shareholder democracy. It proposes a representative system for the firm based on a balance among shareholder, employee and community interests, a separation of powers between boards of directors and management, and a concept of transition based on democratic development of already widespread employee stock-ownership plans.