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In this study, we investigate how firm expectations about their own developments respond to different types of news. We classify news as either micro or macro, with micro news being information about firm-specific developments and macro news being information about the aggregate economy. Our analysis of firm surveys from Germany and Italy shows that both types of news consistently predict forecast errors, contradicting the idea of full-information rational expectations. Yet while firm expectations overreact to micro news, they underreact to macro news. We propose a model in which firms suffer from "island illusion" to explain these patterns in the data.

We assess to which degree an international transfer mechanism can enhance consumption risk sharing as well as allocative efficiency and apply our results to a potential European unemployment benefit scheme (EUBS). Specifically, we first develop a simple model with nominal rigidities to build intuition by deriving analytical results. We then use a rich DSGE model, calibrated to the Core and the Periphery of the euro area, to quantitatively analyze the changing dynamics that a EUBS brings about. We find that a EUBS can provide risk sharing by stabilizing relative consumption as well as unemployment. Following supply shocks, however, the cross-country transfer embodied in the unemployment benefits is spent to a large degree on relatively inefficiently produced goods in the receiving countries. This renders the allocation even more inefficient by opening country-specific labor wedges further, also after government-spending shocks. Yet, since this trade-off between allocative efficiency and consumption risk sharing does not exist after certain demand shocks, the welfare effects of a EUBS depend on the cause for international unemployment differentials. A EUBS that is only active after specific shocks would therefore maximize overall welfare. Even without this feature, a EUBS would raise welfare in the Core, leaving the Periphery's welfare almost unchanged.

Based on a new survey of German households, we investigate the role of information channels and lifetime experience for households’ inflation expectations. We show that the types of information channels that households use to inform themselves about monetary policy are closely related to their socio-economic characteristics. These information channels, in turn, have an important influence on the level of perceived past and expected future inflation, as well as uncertainty thereof. The expected future change of inflation and the unemployment rate, however, is strongly influenced by individual experience of these variables. Similarly, the expected response of inflation to a change in the interest rate is also shaped by experience. We propose the interpretation that households obtain inflation numbers from the media, but their ‘economic model’ is shaped by experience. Not Reviewed

Releases of key macroeconomic indicators are closely watched by financial markets. We investigate the role of expectation dispersion and economic uncertainty for the stock-market reaction to indicator releases. We find that the strength of the financial market response to news decreases with the preceding dispersion in expectations about the indicator value. Uncertainty, in contrast, increases the response. We rationalize our findings in a model of imperfect information. In the model, dispersion results from a perceived weak link between macroeconomic indicators and fundamentals that reduces the informational content of indicators, while higher fundamental uncertainty makes this informational content more valuable. Not Reviewed

We assess how firm expectations about future production impact current production and pricing decisions. Our analysis is based on a large survey of firms in the German manufacturing sector. To identify the causal effect of expectations, we rely on the timing of survey responses and match firms with the same fundamentals but different views about the future. Firms that expect their production to increase (decrease) in the future are 15 percentage points more (less) likely to raise current production and prices, compared to firms that expect no change in production. In a second step, we show that expectations also matter even if they turn out to be incorrect. Lastly, we aggregate expectation errors across firms and find that they account for about 15 percent of aggregate fluctuations.

The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 spread through different channels from its origin in the United States to large parts of the world. In this paper we explore the financial and the trade channel in a unified framework and quantify their relative importance for this transmission. Specifically, we employ a DSGE model of an open economy with an internationally operating banking sector. We investigate the transmission of the crisis via the collapse of export demand and through losses in the value of cross-border asset holdings. Calibrated to German data, the model predicts the trade channel to be twice as important for the transmission of the crisis than the financial channel. In the UK, the latter dominates due to higher foreign-asset holdings, which, at the same time, serve as an automatic stabilizer in case of plummeting foreign demand. The transmission via the financial channel triggers a much longer-lasting recession relative to the trade channel, resulting in larger cumulated output losses and a prolonged crisis particularly in the UK. Stricter enforcement of bank capital requirements would have deepened the initial slump while simultaneously speeding up the recovery. The effects of higher capital requirements depend on the way banks’ balance sheets adjust to this intervention.

We develop a model of rational bubbles based on leverage and the assumption of an imprecisely known maximum market size. In a bubble, traders push the asset price above its fundamental value in a dynamic way, driven by rational expectations about future price developments. At a previously unknown date, the bubble will endogenously burst. Households optimally decide whether to lend to traders with limited liability. Bubbles increase welfare of the initial asset holders, but reduce welfare of future households. We provide general conditions for the possibility of bubbles depending on uncertainty about market size, traders' degree of leverage and the risk-free rate. This allows us to discuss several policy measures. Capital requirements and a correctly implemented Tobin tax can prevent bubbles. Implemented incorrectly, however, these measures may create the possibility of bubbles and can reduce welfare.

The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 spread through different channels from its origin in the United States to large parts of the world. In this paper we explore the financial and the trade channels in a unified framework and quantify their relative importance for this transmission. Specifically, we employ a DSGE model of an open economy with an internationally operating banking sector. We investigate the transmission of the crisis via the collapse of export demand and through losses in the value of cross-border asset holdings. Calibrated to German and UK data, the model attributes around half of the observed maximum output decline in Germany to these channels, and 87% for the UK. While the trade channel explains 30% of the empirical output decline in both countries, the financial channel plays a much larger role in the UK than in Germany. The UK's larger vulnerability to financial shocks is due to higher foreign-asset holdings, which simultaneously serve as an automatic stabilizer in case of plummeting foreign demand. The transmission via the financial channel triggers a much longer-lasting recession relative to the trade channel, resulting in larger cumulated output losses and a prolonged crisis particularly in the UK. Stricter bank capital regulations would have deepened the initial slump while simultaneously speeding up the recovery.

We develop a parsimonious model of bubbles based on the assumption of imprecisely known market depth. In a speculative bubble, traders drive the price above its fundamental value in a dynamic way, driven by rational expectations about future price developments. At a previously unknown date, the bubble will endogenously burst. We provide a general condition for the possibility of bubbles depending on the risk-free rate, uncertainty about market depth, and traders’ degree of leverage. This allows us to discuss several policy measures. Bubbles always reduce aggregate welfare. Among others, certain monetary policy rules, minimum leverage ratios, and a correctly implemented Tobin tax can prevent their occurrence. Implemented incorrectly, however, some of these measures backfire and facilitate bubbles.

This paper examines the effects of expansionary technology shocks (shocks that increase labor productivity and factor inputs) as opposed to contractionary technology shocks (shocks that increase labor productivity, but decrease factor inputs). We estimate these two shocks jointly based on a minimum set of identifying restrictions in a structural VAR. We show that most of the business cycle variation of key macroeconomic variables such as output and consumption is driven by expansionary technology shocks. However, contractionary technology shocks are important to understand the variation in labor productivity and production inputs. In addition, these shocks trigger different reactions of certain variables, which can help explain why existing evidence on technology shocks does not deliver clear results. In a simple DSGE model with managerial technology, which is consistent with our identifying restrictions, we interpret contractionary technology shocks as process innovations and motivate the difference to expansionary technology shocks.

This paper examines how segmented asset markets can generate real and nominal effects of monetary policy. I develop a model, in which varieties of consumption bundles are purchased sequentially. Newly injected money thus disseminates slowly through the economy via second-round effects and induces a longer-lasting, non-degenerate wealth distribution. As a result, the demand elasticity differs across consumers, affecting optimal markups chosen by producers. The model predicts a short-term inflation-output trade-off, a liquidity effect, countercyclical markups, and procyclical wages and expenditure dispersion across consumers after monetary shocks. Including a modest degree of real or nominal wage rigidity yields responses that are also quantitatively in line with empirical evidence.

This paper incorporates a global bank into a two-country business cycle model. The bank collects deposits from households and makes loans to entrepreneurs, in both countries. It has to finance a fraction of loans using equity. We investigate how such a bank capital requirement affects the international transmission of productivity and loan default shocks. Three findings emerge. First, the bank's capital requirement has little effect on the international transmission of productivity shocks. Second, the contribution of loan default shocks to business cycle fluctuations is negligible under normal economic conditions. Third, an exceptionally large loan loss originating in one country induces a sizeable and simultaneous decline in economic activity in both countries. This is particularly noteworthy, as the 2007-09 global financial crisis was characterized by large credit losses in the US and a simultaneous sharp output reduction in the US and the Euro Area. Our results thus suggest that global banks may have played an important role in the international transmission of the crisis., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We develop a model of rational bubbles, based on the assumptions of an unknown potential market size and delegation of investment decisions. In a bubble, the price of an asset rises above its steady-state value, which must be justified by rational expectations about possible future price development. The higher the expected future price increase, the more likely is the market potential reached, in which case the bubble will burst. Depending on the interaction of uncertainty about the market potential, fundamental riskiness of the asset, the compensation scheme of the fonds manager, and the risk-free interest rate, we give a condition for whether rational bubbles are possible. Based on this analysis, several widely-discussed policy measures are investigated with respect to their effectiveness to prevent bubbles. A modified Taylor rule, long-term compensation, and capital requirements can have the desired effect. Caps on bonuses can create or destroy the possibility of bubbles, depending on their implementation, whereas a Tobin tax is unlikely to prevent bubbles.

We develop a model of rational bubbles based on the assumptions of unknown market liquidity and limited liability of traders. In a bubble, the price of an asset rises dynamically above its steady-state value, justified by rational expectations about future price developments. The larger the expected future price increase, the more likely it is that the bubble will burst because market liquidity becomes exhausted. Depending on the interactions between uncertainty about market liquidity, fundamental riskiness of the asset, the compensation scheme of the fund manager, and the risk-free interest rate, we give a condition for whether rational bubbles are possible. Based on this analysis, we discuss several widely-discussed policy measures with respect to their effectiveness in preventing bubbles. A reduction of manager bonuses or a Tobin tax can create or eliminate the possibility of bubbles, depending on their implementation. Monetary policy and long-term compensation schemes can prevent bubbles.

In this paper we analyze European business cycles before and under EMU. Across the two periods we find 1) a significant decline in real exchange rate volatility, 2) significant changes in cross-country correlations, and 3) the volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals largely unchanged. We develop a two-country business cycle model and show that the calibrated model is able to replicate key features of the data prior to and under EMU.We find that the euro has a strong bearing on the transmission mechanism as cross-country spillovers increase substantially under EMU. As a result, foreign shocks become more and domestic shocks less important in accounting for the (unchanged) volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals.