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Maltreatment and autism can be associated with overlapping difficulties across functional domains (e.g., social, emotional, and sensory) and high rates of mental health problems. A cognitive approach focussing on affect-laden cognition, here on episodic future thinking (FT), could help inform cognitive assessments and adapt psychological interventions. Three groups of adolescents (N = 85), (i) maltreatment (n = 28), (ii) autism (n = 29), and (iii) typical development without maltreatment/autism (TD; n = 28), matched in age (10–16 years old), sex (assigned at birth), and socioeconomic status, completed a newly adapted online Autobiographical Future Thinking Test. As predicted, the maltreatment group generated significantly fewer specific future events relative to the TD group, however, the number of specific future events did not significantly differ between the autism and the other groups. Exploratory analyses showed that lower FT specificity was significantly associated with more depressive (but not anxiety) symptoms across the three groups. These findings shed light on the cognitive profiles of both maltreatment and autism during adolescence and signal FT as a potential therapeutic target for adolescents with these developmental differences. Our study lays the foundation for additional comparisons of maltreatment-related presentations versus autism with improved designs and a broader set of cognitive and clinical domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Future events can spring to mind unbidden in the form of involuntary mental images also known as 'flashforwards', which are deemed important for understanding and treating emotional distress. However, there has been little exploration of this form of imagery in youth, and even less so in those with high psychopathology vulnerabilities (e.g. due to developmental differences associated with neurodiversity or maltreatment). Aims: We aimed to test whether flashforwards are heightened (e.g. more frequent and emotional) in autistic and maltreatment-exposed adolescents relative to typically developing adolescents. We also explored their associations with anxiety/depression symptoms. Method: A survey including measures of flashforward imagery and mental health was completed by a group of adolescents (n =87) aged 10–16 (and one of their caregivers) who met one of the following criteria: (i) had a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder; (ii) a history of maltreatment; or (ii) no autism/maltreatment. Results: Flashforwards (i) were often of positive events and related to career, education and/or learning; with phenomenological properties (e.g. frequency and emotionality) that were (ii) not significantly different between groups; but nevertheless (iii) associated with symptoms of anxiety across groups (particularly for imagery emotionality), even after accounting for general trait (non-future) imagery vividness. Conclusions: As a modifiable cognitive risk factor, flashforward imagery warrants further consideration for understanding and improving mental health in young people. This implication may extend to range of developmental backgrounds, including autism and maltreatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shared cognitive processes underlie our ability to remember the past (i.e., episodic memory) and imagine the future (i.e., episodic simulation) and age-related declines in episodic memory are also noted when simulating future scenarios. Given older adults' reduced cognitive control and protracted memory retrieval time, we examined whether imposing time limits on episodic simulation of future helping scenarios affects younger and older adults' willingness to help, phenomenological experience, and the type of details produced. Relative to a control task, episodic simulation increased younger and older participants' willingness to help, scene vividness, and perspective-taking regardless of the time spent imagining future helping scenarios. Notably, time spent imagining influenced the number, but not proportion of internal details produced, suggesting that participants' use of episodic-like information remained consistent regardless of the time they spent imagining. The present findings highlight the importance of collecting phenomenological experience when assessing episodic simulation abilities across the lifespan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives How does creative expression change across the life span? Although creativity is generally preserved well into adulthood, certain cognitive functions, such as episodic detail and ideational fluency, have been shown to decline with age. The present study employs computational linguistic analyses to investigate the salient features of creative writing in older adults. Methods We collected short stories from a sample of 50 older adults (age 65≤) which were subsequently rated for creativity by an independent set of participants. Mixed-effects linear regression models were used to describe semantic diversity and perceptual details as predictors of creativity. Semantic diversity reflects the extent to which a narrative connects divergent ideas and is closely associated with creativity. Perceptual details, characterized by sensorial descriptions, have been previously associated with creative writing and may serve to transport readers to alternative times and places. Additionally, we compare these measures to a previously collected sample of stories from younger adults. Results Results indicate that the presence of perceptual details and semantic diversity were significant positive predictors of creativity (p  < .05). Moreover, we find that stories written by older adults contain fewer perceptual details compared with stories written by younger adults. Discussion These results advance our understanding of age-related changes in creativity and highlight the potential role of episodic simulation in writing creative short stories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic simulation effectively promotes an individual's willingness to help, and temporal distance can influence an individual's mental representation and reaction. However, the effect of episodic simulation on pro-social behavior at different temporal distances has not been explored, and this perspective is crucial to understand how episodic simulation can more efficiently promote individuals' pro-social behavior. The present study examined how episodic simulation and temporal distances promote pro-social behavior and its scope of applications. Experiment 1 (N = 200) used a two-factor experimental design to explore how episodic simulation and temporal distance (near: after 1 day vs. far: after 1 year) interacted to influence willingness to help and donation behavior. Experiment 2 (N = 335) employed a mixed experimental design to examine the interactive effects of episodic simulation and temporal distance on willingness to help and donation behavior among individuals with different social value orientations (pro-self orientation vs. pro-social orientation). The two experiments used a 7-point scale of willingness to help people and the amount of money donated to charity as indicators of pro-social behavior. The results showed that willingness to help and subsequent donation behavior were significantly higher after initiating the episodic simulation. Individuals matched with the far temporal distance condition (compared to the near temporal distance condition) had a significantly increased willingness to help and donation behavior. Notably, episodic simulation and far temporal distance significantly enhanced the donation behavior of individuals with a pro-self orientation but not of those with a pro-social orientation. The matching of episodic simulation and distant temporal distance facilitated the production of pro-social behavior, especially for individuals with low helping tendencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My commentary focuses on Khalidi's defense of episodic memory as a cognitive kind. His argument relies on merging two distinct accounts of episodic memory—the phenomenal and the etiological. I suggest that Khalidi's framework can be used to carve the contemporary memory literature differently. On this view, the phenomenal account supports constructive episodic simulation as a cognitive kind, the etiological account supports event memory as a cognitive kind, and episodic memory ceases to be. The question for Khalidi is, then, how to evaluate this alternative proposal—and more broadly how to adjudicate between competing and overlapping accounts of cognitive kinds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemplative interventions designed to cultivate compassion are receiving increasing empirical attention. Accumulating evidence suggests that these interventions bolster prosocial motivation and warmth toward others. Less is known about how these practices impact compassion in everyday life. Here we consider one mechanistic pathway through which compassion practices may impact perception and action in the world: simulation. Evidence suggests that vividly imagining a situation simulates that experience in the brain as if it were, to a degree, actually happening. Thus, we hypothesize that simulation during imagery-based contemplative practices can construct sensorimotor patterns in the brain that prime an individual to act compassionately in the world. We first present evidence across multiple literatures in psychology that motivates this hypothesis, including the neuroscience of mental imagery and the emerging literature on prosocial episodic simulation. Then, we examine the specific contemplative practices in compassion-based interventions that may construct such simulations. We conclude with future directions for investigating how compassion-based interventions may shape prosocial perception and action in everyday life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagining helping a person in need increases one's willingness to help beyond levels evoked by passively reading the same stories. We examined whether episodic simulation can increase younger and older adults' willingness to help in novel scenarios posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Across three studies, we demonstrate that episodic simulation of helping behavior increases younger and older adults' willingness to help during both everyday and COVID-related scenarios. Moreover, we show that imagining helping increases emotional concern, scene imagery, and theory of mind, which in turn relate to increased willingness to help. Studies 2 and 3 also showed that people produce more internal, episodic-like details when imagining everyday compared to COVID-related scenarios, suggesting that people are less able to draw on prior experiences when simulating such novel events. These findings suggest that encouraging engagement with stories of people in need by imagining helping can increase willingness to help during the pandemic. General Audience Summary: Since late 2019, news outlets and social media platforms have shown examples of people in need amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Across a series of studies, we examine whether people are more willing to help others in need after imagining a scenario in which they help the other person, compared to when they passively read the same story. Specifically, we examined whether imagining helping scenarios increase younger and older adults' willingness to help in novel scenarios posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Across three studies, we found that imagining helping others in need increases one's willingness to help during both everyday and COVID-related scenarios of people in need. Further, we show that imagining helping increases emotional concern, scene imagery (i.e., vividness of a scene), and theory of mind (i.e., perspective-taking), all of which are related to participants' willingness to help those in need. In Studies 2 and 3, we found that people produce richer, more event-related details when imagining everyday scenarios, but more basic, factual details for COVID-related scenarios. This suggests that people may use memories of similar past events to help imagine familiar scenarios and rely more on factual knowledge when imagining more novel or unfamiliar scenarios. These findings suggest that encouraging audiences to engage with stories of people in need by imagining helping can increase willingness to help during the pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper outlines the case for a future research program that uses the tools of experimental cognitive science to investigate questions that traditionally fall under the remit of the philosophy of historiography. The central idea is this – the epistemic profile of historians' representations of the past is largely an empirical matter, determined in no small part by the cognitive processes that produce these representations. However, as the philosophy of historiography is not presently equipped to investigate such cognitive questions, legitimate concerns about evidential quality go largely overlooked. The case of mental state representation provides an excellent illustration of this. Representations of past mental states – the thoughts and fears and knowledge and desires of past agents – play much the same evidential role in historiography as in everyday life, serving in the causal explanation of agents' behaviors and supporting normative evaluation of those behaviors. However, we have good reason to suspect that the theory of mind processes that support these representations may be more susceptible to error when deployed in the context of historiography than under everyday conditions. This raises worries about the quality of evidence that theory of mind can provide historiography, worries which require experimental cognitive science to properly address. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructs mental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructs mental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events.

Prior work suggests that imagining helping others increases prosocial intentions and behavior toward those individuals. But is this true for everyone, or only for those who tend toward—or away from—helping more generally? The current study (N = 283) used an imagined helping paradigm and a battery of behavioral and self‐report measures of trait prosociality to determine whether the prosocial benefits of imagination depend upon an individual's general tendency to help others. Replicating prior work, we found links between imagination and prosociality and support for a three‐factor model of prosociality comprising altruistically, norm‐motivated, and self‐reported prosocial behaviors. Centrally, the effects of imagination on prosociality were slightly larger for less altruistic individuals but independent of norm‐motivated and self‐reported prosociality. These results suggest leveraging people's abilities for episodic simulation as a promising strategy for increasing prosociality in general, and perhaps particularly for those least likely to help otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagination and other forms of mental simulation allow us to live beyond the current immediate environment. Imagination that involves an experience of self further enables one to incorporate or utilize the contents of episodic simulation in a way that is of importance to oneself. However, the simulated self can be found in a variety of forms. The present study provides some empirical data to explore the various ways in which the self could be represented in observer-perspective imagination as well as the potential limits on such representations. In observer-perspective imagination, the point of view or perspective is dissociated from the location of one's simulated body. We have found that while there are different ways to identify with oneself in an observer-perspective imagination, the identification is rarely dissociated from first-person perspective in imagination. Such variety and limits pave the way for understanding how we identify with ourselves in imagination. Our results suggest that the first-person perspective is a strong attractor for identification. The empirical studies and analysis in this paper demonstrate how observer-perspective episodic simulation serves as a special case for research on identification in mental simulation, and similar methods can be applied in the studies of memory and future thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research has documented changes in autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD). However, cognitive decline occurs gradually and recent findings suggest that subtle alterations in autobiographical cognition may be evident earlier in the trajectory towards dementia, before AD-related symptoms emerge or a clinical diagnosis has been given. The current study used the Autobiographical Interview to examine the episodic and semantic content of autobiographical past and future events generated by older adults (N = 38) of varying cognitive functioning who were grouped into High (N = 20) and Low Cognition (N = 18) groups based on their Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) scores. Participants described 12 past and 12 future autobiographical events, and transcripts were scored to quantify the numbers of internal (episodic) or external (non-episodic, including semantic) details. Although the Low Cognition group exhibited a differential reduction for internal details comprising both past and future events, they did not show the expected overproduction of external details relative to the High Cognition group. Multilevel modelling demonstrated that on trials lower in episodic content, semantic content was significantly increased in both groups. Although suggestive of a compensatory mechanism, the magnitude of this inverse relationship did not differ across groups or interact with MoCA scores. This finding indicates that external detail production may be underpinned by mechanisms not affected by cognitive decline, such as narrative style and the ability to contextualize one's past and future events in relation to broader autobiographical knowledge. • Older adults in the Low Cognition group generated events with less episodic content. • The Low Cognition group did not show an overproduction of external/semantic details. • For both groups, trials with less episodic content had more semantic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Divergent thinking (the ability to generate creative ideas by combining diverse types of information) has been previously linked to the ability to imagine novel and specific future autobiographical events. Here, we examined whether divergent thinking is differentially associated with the ability to construct novel imagined future events and recast future events (i.e., actual past events recast as future events) as opposed to recalled past events. We also examined whether different types of creative ideas (i.e., old ideas from memory or new ideas from imagination) underlie the linkage between divergent thinking and various autobiographical events. Divergent thinking ability was measured using the Alternate Uses Task (AUT). In Experiment 1, the amount of episodic details for both novel and recast future events was associated with divergent thinking (AUT scores), and this relationship was significant with AUT scores for new creative ideas but not old creative ideas. There was no significant relationship between divergent thinking and the amount of episodic detail for recalled past events. We extended these findings in Experiment 2 to a different test of divergent thinking, the Consequences Task. These results demonstrate that individual differences in divergent thinking are associated with the capacity to both imagine and recast future events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the theory of reconsolidation, the contents of an original memory can be updated after reactivation with subsequent new learnings. However, there seems to be a lack of an appropriate behavioral paradigm to study the reconsolidation of explicit self-related memory, which is of great significance to further explore its cognitive neural mechanism in the future. In two separate experiments, we adapted a trial-by-trial interfering paradigm with a self-episodic simulation process and investigated (1) whether it is possible to reconsolidate negative memories under the new behavioral paradigm and (2) how the emotional valence of post-retrieval interference material affects the reconsolidation of negative memories. The results showed that the negative memories under trial-by-trial self-simulation can be degraded and updated via post-retrieval interference processes. Individuals whose original memories were reactivated by initial background cues and who were then presented with new interference situations were less able to recall original scenes and showed more memory intrusions on these scenes than those who had experienced new learning without reactivation or only reactivation without interference. Furthermore, the extent and manner of memory change/updating were greatly influenced by the characteristics of interference information. For memories with negative valences, new learning materials with the same valence produced superior interference effects in the form of lower correct recalls and more integrated false; whereas the neutral interference materials can cause more memory intrusion. Post-retrieval memory distortions of negative self-memory may underlie different functional mechanisms.

According to the theory of reconsolidation, the contents of an original memory can be updated after reactivation with subsequent new learnings. However, there seems to be a lack of an appropriate behavioral paradigm to study the reconsolidation of explicit self-related memory, which is of great significance to further explore its cognitive neural mechanism in the future. In two separate experiments, we adapted a trial-by-trial interfering paradigm with a self-episodic simulation process and investigated (1) whether it is possible to reconsolidate negative memories under the new behavioral paradigm and (2) how the emotional valence of post-retrieval interference material affects the reconsolidation of negative memories. The results showed that the negative memories under trial-by-trial self-simulation can be degraded and updated via post-retrieval interference processes. Individuals whose original memories were reactivated by initial background cues and who were then presented with new interference situations were less able to recall original scenes and showed more memory intrusions on these scenes than those who had experienced new learning without reactivation or only reactivation without interference. Furthermore, the extent and manner of memory change/updating were greatly influenced by the characteristics of interference information. For memories with negative valences, new learning materials with the same valence produced superior interference effects in the form of lower correct recalls and more integrated false; whereas the neutral interference materials can cause more memory intrusion. Post-retrieval memory distortions of negative self-memory may underlie different functional mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a range of externally-directed tasks, intra-individual variability of fMRI BOLD signal has been shown to be a stronger predictor of cognitive performance than mean BOLD signal. BOLD variability’s strong association with cognitive performance is hypothesised to be due to it capturing the dynamic range of neural systems. Although increased BOLD variability is also speculated to play a role in internally-directed thought, particularly when creative and flexible cognition is required, there is a relative lack of research exploring whether BOLD variability is related to internally-directed cognition. Thus, we investigated the relationship between BOLD variability and a key component of creativity – divergent thinking – in various tasks that required participants to think flexibly. We also determined whether any associations between BOLD variability and creativity overlapped with, or differed, from associations between mean BOLD signal and creativity. First, we performed task Partial Least Squares (PLS) analyses that compared BOLD signal (either mean or variability) during two future imagination conditions that differed in the amount of cognitive flexibility required: a Congruent condition in which autobiographical details (people, places, objects) comprising an imagined event belonged to the same social sphere (e.g., university) and an Incongruent condition in which details belonged to different social spheres and required greater cognitive flexibility to integrate. Results indicated that the Incongruent condition was associated with a widespread reduction in both BOLD variability and mean signal (relative to the Congruent condition), but in largely non-overlapping regions. Next, we used behavioral PLS to determine whether individual differences in performance on future simulation tasks as well as the Alternate Uses Task relates to BOLD variability and mean BOLD signal. Better performance on these tasks was predominantly associated with increases in mean BOLD signal and decreases in BOLD variability, in a range of disparate brain regions. Together, the results suggest that, unlike tasks requiring externally-directed cognition, superior performance on tasks requiring creative internal mentation is associated with less (not more) variability.

Cognitive bias modification of interpretation style (CBM-I) is a family of cognitive training programs that seek to reduce anxious thinking by training people to assign relatively more positive meanings to ambiguous situations. CBM-I's effects may be enhanced by encouraging more vivid imagery-based episodic simulation of events and by increasing engagement with the training materials. This study investigated the role of sensory scaffolding (whether pictures, or pictures + sound were added) and verbal scenario modality (whether scenarios were delivered visually or aurally) on episodic simulation (Vivid; Plausible; Changing Perspective ratings) and user engagement (Relatable, Comprehensible, Enjoyable ratings). Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (N = 187) with varied anxiety symptom severity read or listened to brief scenarios that varied by sensory scaffolding and verbal scenario modality. Results were somewhat mixed. Generally, picture scaffolding tended to facilitate both episodic simulation and user engagement (relative to no scaffolding), irrespective of scenario modality and anxiety level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People frequently feel less empathy for and offer less aid to out-groups in need relative to their in-groups. Most attempts aimed at reducing intergroup bias in helping emphasize group-focused cognitions and emotions. However, little is known about how the sensory properties of intergroup episodes informs intergroup decisions. Here we investigate whether episodic simulation (i.e., the ability to imagine events in a specific time and place) (a) increases participants' general willingness to help, and (b) decreases the difference in prosocial intentions and behavior toward in-group versus out-group targets. Experiment 1 revealed that imagining a helping episode significantly increased self-reported intention to help in-group and out-group targets, and eliminated the gap between groups relative to a control manipulation. Path modeling analyses indicated that the effect of episodic simulation was mediated by the vividness of the imagined episode and heightened perspective-taking for the target. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and ruled out reduced encoding of group membership as an explanation for the effect. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the effect of episodic simulation on prosocial intentions was distinct from the effects of imagining people (or contact with them). Experiments 4 and 5 replicated previous experiments with helping behaviors (i.e., writing in a letter of support to the victim of a misfortune; monetary donation to the person in need). These results shed light on a previously unexplored channel of group debasing and conflict reduction. We close by considering implications for future research at the intersection of episodic and intergroup processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagining future scenarios involves recombining different elements of past experiences into a coherent event, a process broadly supported by the brain's default network. Prior work suggests that distinct brain regions may contribute to the inclusion of different simulation features. Here we examine how activity in these brain regions relates to the vividness of future simulations. Thirty-four healthy young adults imagined future events with familiar people and locations in a two-part study involving a repetition suppression paradigm. First, participants imagined events while their eyes were tracked during a behavioral session. Immediately after, participants imagined events during MRI scanning. The events to be imagined were manipulated such that some were identical to those imagined in the behavioral session while others involved new locations, new people, or both. In this way, we could examine how self-report ratings and eye movements predict brain activity during simulation along with specific simulation features. Vividness ratings were negatively correlated with eye movements, in contrast to an often-observed positive relationship with past recollection. Moreover, fewer eye movements predicted greater involvement of the hippocampus during simulation, an effect specific to location features. Our findings suggest that eye movements may facilitate scene construction for future thinking, lending support to frameworks that spatial information forms the foundation of episodic simulation. • The interplay between fixations and vividness during episodic processes is unclear. • A repetition suppression study on simulation was conducted with eye-tracking. • Fewer fixations predicted more vivid simulations. • Fixations predicted neural suppression, an effect driven by location features. • Eye movements may set the scene to initiate simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attachment theory indicates that romantic partners' availability and responsiveness provide individuals with a sense of security and the repeated experience of which could have enduring effects on individuals' subjective well-being and relationship outcomes. We proposed that retrieving episodic memory and episodic simulation related to secure-base support could also help individuals obtain information about partners' responsiveness, which in turn would promote long-term subjective well-being and relationship satisfaction. To provide the evidence of this notion, the current study investigated the relationship between partner's responsiveness in episodic memory/simulation of secure-base support and relationship satisfaction as well as subjective well-being. We recruited 136 young adults (M age = 21.89, SD = 2.57) who were currently involved in a romantic relationship for at least 6 months. Participants completed measures of relationship satisfaction and subjective well-being; then, they provided specific episodic memory and simulations related to secure-base support as well as rated partners' responsiveness in each event. Results indicated that partners' responsiveness in both episodic memory and simulations was significantly positively related to participants' relationship satisfaction and subjective well-being. These results provide novel implications for the function of episodic memory and episodic simulation of secure-base support in the attachment system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans have a remarkable capacity to mentally project themselves far ahead in time. This ability, which entails the mental simulation of events, is thought to be fundamental to deliberative decision making, as it allows us to search through and evaluate possible choices. Many decisions that humans make are foraging decisions, in which one must decide whether an available offer is worth taking, when compared to unknown future possibilities (i.e., the background). Using a translational decision-making paradigm designed to reveal decision preferences in rats, we found that humans engaged in deliberation when making foraging decisions. A key feature of this task is that preferences (and thus, value) are revealed as a function of serial choices. Like rats, humans also took longer to respond when faced with difficult decisions near their preference boundary, which was associated with prefrontal and hippocampal activation, exemplifying cross-species parallels in deliberation. Furthermore, we found that voxels within the visual cortices encoded neural representations of the available possibilities specifically following regret-inducing experiences, in which the subject had previously rejected a good offer only to encounter a low-valued offer on the subsequent trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reduced specificity of autobiographical memory has been well established in depression, but whether this overgenerality extends to future thinking has not been the focus of a meta-analysis. Following a preregistered protocol, we searched six electronic databases, Google Scholar, and personal libraries and contacted authors in the field for studies matching search terms related to depression, future thinking, and specificity. We reduced an initial 7,332 results to 46 included studies, with 89 effect sizes and 4,813 total participants. Random-effects meta-analytic modeling revealed a small but robust correlation between reduced future specificity and higher levels of depression (r = −.13, p <.001). Of the 11 moderator variables examined, the most striking effects were related to the emotional valence of future thinking (p <.001) and the sex of participants (p =.025). Namely, depression was linked to reduced specificity for positive (but not negative or neutral) future thinking, and the relationship was stronger in samples with a higher proportion of males. This meta-analysis contributes to our understanding of how prospection is altered in depression and dysphoria and, by revealing areas where current evidence is inconclusive, highlights key avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are we willing to help others? Recent behavioral work on episodic processes (i.e. the ability to represent an event that is specific in time and place) suggests that imagining and remembering scenes of helping a person in need increases intentions to help. Here, we provide insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms that enhance prosocial intentions via episodic simulation and memory. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants using functional neuroimaging as they imagined and remembered helping episodes, and completed non-episodic control conditions accounting for exposure to the story of need and conceptual priming of helping. Analyses revealed that activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, as well as the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) predicted the effect of conditions on the strength of prosocial intentions. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt activity in the RTPJ, and better isolate the contribution of MTL subsystem to prosocial intentions. The effect of conditions on willingness to help remained even when activity in the RTPJ was disrupted, suggesting that activity in the MTL subsystem may primarily support this prosocial effect. It seems our willingness to help may be guided, in part, by how easily we can construct imagined and remembered helping episodes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has found that episodic simulation of events of helping others can effectively enhance intentions to help the same person involved and the identical situational context as the imagined scenarios. This 'prosocial simulation effect' is argued to reflect, at least in part, associative memory mechanisms whereby the simulation is reactivated when in the same situation as that imagined. However, to date, no study has examined systematically whether this 'prosocial simulation effect' can be transferred to response scenarios involving different people and/or situational contexts to the imagined scenarios, and if so, whether the degree of overlap with the imagined helping episode modulated the transfer effect. Across two experiments, we systematically varied the overlap of the simulated and response scenarios, both in terms of the persons in need and/or the situational contexts, and whether would influence the magnitude of prosocial simulation effect. Results from both experiments showed that the prosocial simulation effect can be transferred to response scenarios involving different people and situational contexts to the simulated scenarios. However, this finding was primarily driven by response scenarios that had a high degree of overlap to the simulated scenarios. The application of our findings to the practical implementation of simulation to promote prosociality in the real world is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience being the protagonist in the memory scene. This is the “phenomenal presence of self.” To explore this special sense of self in memory, this paper focuses on the issue of how one identifies oneself in episodic simulation at the retrieval of memory and draws attention to the field and observer perspectives in episodic memory. Metzinger (2013a,b, 2017) recently introduced the concept of the phenomenal unit of identification (UI) to characterize the phenomenal property that gives rise to the conscious experience of “I am this.” This paper shows how observer-perspective remembering provides an interesting opportunity for studying the sense of self. It is argued that observer-perspective remembering is a stable state of consciousness that is distinct from autoscopic phenomena with respect to the dimensions of minimal phenomenal self (MPS). Together, the notion of UI and the particular style of remembering offer a way of understanding the phenomenal presence of self, and three possible ways in which phenomenal properties constitute UI in memory are raised. The study of perspectives in episodic simulation may prompt new empirical and conceptual issues concerning both the sense of identity and the relationship between MPS and extended self.

In this article I discuss some of the major questions, findings, and ideas that have driven my research program, which has examined various aspects of human memory using a combination of cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging approaches. I do so from a career perspective that describes important scientific influences that have shaped my approach to the study of memory and discusses considerations that led to choosing specific research paths. After acknowledging key early influences, I briefly summarize a few of the main takeaways from research on implicit memory during the 1980s and 1990s and then move on to consider more recent ideas and findings concerning constructive memory, future imagining, and mental simulation that have motivated my approach for the past 2 decades. A main unifying theme of this research is that memory can affect psychological functions in ways that go beyond the simple everyday understanding of memory as a means of revisiting past experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience being the protagonist in the memory scene. This is the "phenomenal presence of self." To explore this special sense of self in memory, this paper focuses on the issue of how one identifies oneself in episodic simulation at the retrieval of memory and draws attention to the field and observer perspectives in episodic memory. Metzinger (2013a,b, 2017) recently introduced the concept of the phenomenal unit of identification (UI) to characterize the phenomenal property that gives rise to the conscious experience of "I am this." This paper shows how observer-perspective remembering provides an interesting opportunity for studying the sense of self. It is argued that observer-perspective remembering is a stable state of consciousness that is distinct from autoscopic phenomena with respect to the dimensions of minimal phenomenal self (MPS). Together, the notion of UI and the particular style of remembering offer a way of understanding the phenomenal presence of self, and three possible ways in which phenomenal properties constitute UI in memory are raised. The study of perspectives in episodic simulation may prompt new empirical and conceptual issues concerning both the sense of identity and the relationship between MPS and extended self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How we imagine and subjectively experience the future can inform how we make decisions in the present. Here, we examined a prosocial effect of imagining future episodes in motivating moral decisions about helping others in need, as well as the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Across three experiments we found that people are more willing to help others in specific situations after imagining helping them in those situations. Manipulating the spatial representation of imagined future episodes in particular was effective at increasing intentions to help others, suggesting that scene imagery plays an important role in the prosocial effect of episodic simulation. Path modeling analyses revealed that episodic simulation interacts with theory of mind in facilitating prosocial responses but can also operate independently. Moreover, we found that our manipulations of the imagined helping episode increased actual prosocial behavior, which also correlated with changes in reported willingness to help. Based on these findings, we propose a new model that begins to capture the multifaceted mechanisms by which episodic simulation contributes to prosocial decision-making, highlighting boundaries and promising future directions to explore. Implications for research in moral cognition, imagination, and patients with impairments in episodic simulation are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies indicate that episodic simulation (i.e., imagining specific future experiences) and episodic memory (i.e., remembering specific past experiences) are associated with enhanced activity in a common set of neural regions referred to as the core network. This network comprises the hippocampus, medial prefrontal cortex, and left angular gyrus, among other regions. Because fMRI data are correlational, it is unknown whether activity increases in core network regions are critical for episodic simulation and episodic memory. In the current study, we used MRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to assess whether temporary disruption of the left angular gyrus would impair both episodic simulation and memory (16 participants, 10 females). Relative to TMS to a control site (vertex), disruption of the left angular gyrus significantly reduced the number of internal (i.e., episodic) details produced during the simulation and memory tasks, with a concomitant increase in external detail production (i.e., semantic, repetitive, or off-topic information), reflected by a significant detail by TMS site interaction. Difficulty in the simulation and memory tasks also increased after TMS to the left angular gyrus relative to the vertex. In contrast, performance in a nonepisodic control task did not differ statistically as a function of TMS site (i.e., number of free associates produced or difficulty in performing the free associate task). Together, these results are the first to demonstrate that the left angular gyrus is critical for both episodic simulation and episodic memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated the effects of imagining (episodic simulation) helping behavior on helping efficacy. Participants were asked to imagine (imagine condition) and remember (remember condition) helping behavior, and make a headline (headline condition) in response to sentences describing a person in need. Then, they rated their helping efficacy and helping intention regarding the person. The results showed that helping efficacy and helping intention in the imagine and remember conditions were significantly higher than in the headline condition. Thus, it is suggested that helping efficacy is enhanced by imagining helping situations without actual behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While future imagination is largely considered to be a cognitive process grounded in default mode network activity, studies have shown that future imagination recruits regions in both default mode and frontoparietal control networks. In addition, it has recently been shown that the ability to imagine the future is associated with cognitive flexibility, and that tasks requiring cognitive flexibility result in increased coupling of the default mode network with frontoparietal control and salience networks. In the current study, we investigated the neural correlates underlying the association between cognitive flexibility and future imagination in two ways. First, we experimentally varied the degree of cognitive flexibility required during future imagination by manipulating the disparateness of episodic details contributing to imagined events. To this end, participants generated episodic details (persons, locations, objects) within three social spheres; during fMRI scanning they were presented with sets of three episodic details all taken from the same social sphere ( Congruent condition) or different social spheres ( Incongruent condition) and required to imagine a future event involving the three details. We predicted that, relative to the Congruent condition, future simulation in the Incongruent condition would be associated with increased activity in regions of the default mode, frontoparietal and salience networks. Second, we hypothesized that individual differences in cognitive flexibility, as measured by performance on the Alternate Uses Task, would correspond to individual differences in the brain regions recruited during future imagination. A task partial least squares (PLS) analysis showed that the Incongruent condition resulted in an increase in activity in regions in salience networks (e.g. the insula) but, contrary to our prediction, reduced activity in many regions of the default mode network (including the hippocampus). A subsequent functional connectivity (within-subject seed PLS) analysis showed that the insula exhibited increased coupling with default mode regions during the Incongruent condition. Finally, a behavioral PLS analysis showed that individual differences in cognitive flexibility were associated with differences in activity in a number of regions from frontoparietal, salience and default-mode networks during both future imagination conditions, further highlighting that the cognitive flexibility underlying future imagination is grounded in the complex interaction of regions in these networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Imagining future events conveys adaptive benefits, yet recurrent simulations of feared situations may help to maintain anxiety. In two studies, we tested the hypothesis that people can attenuate future fears by suppressing anticipatory simulations of dreaded events. Participants repeatedly imagined upsetting episodes that they feared might happen to them and suppressed imaginings of other such events. Suppressing imagination engaged the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which modulated activation in the hippocampus and in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Consistent with the role of the vmPFC in providing access to details that are typical for an event, stronger inhibition of this region was associated with greater forgetting of such details. Suppression further hindered participants' ability to later freely envision suppressed episodes. Critically, it also reduced feelings of apprehensiveness about the feared scenario, and individuals who were particularly successful at downregulating fears were also less trait-anxious. Attenuating apprehensiveness by suppressing simulations of feared events may thus be an effective coping strategy, suggesting that a deficiency in this mechanism could contribute to the development of anxiety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Task-related functional connectivity ( fc-MRI ) indexes the interaction of brain regions during cognitive tasks. Two general classes of methods exist to investigate fc-MRI: the most widely-used method calculates temporal correlations between voxels/regions within subjects, and then determines if within-subject correlations are reliable across subjects ( ws-fcMRI ); the other calculates the average (BOLD) signal within voxels/regions and then performs correlations across subjects ( as-fcMRI ). That is, while both methods rely on correlational techniques, the level at which correlations are calculated is fundamentally different. While conceptually distinct, it is not known how well these two methods of fc-MRI analyses converge on the same findings. The current study addresses this question across a number of analyses. First, using default-mode network regions as seeds, we show that as-fcMRI does not strongly predict ws-fcMRI during episodic simulation tasks. Next, we show that the relationship between as-fcMRI and ws-fcMRI is contingent on whether correlations are calculated between regions from the same functional network (default mode or dorsal attention networks) or between regions from different functional networks. Lastly, we compare seed partial least squares (PLS) – a well-established as-fcMRI method – with a novel version of seed PLS that combines the multivariate approach of PLS analyses and within-subject correlations. The results showed that while many regions exhibited congruent as-fcMRI and ws-fcMRI effects, in some regions the two analyses produced effects in opposite directions. Results are discussed in relation to the Simpson's Paradox, a phenomenon in which across-subject correlations are reversed within individuals present in a sample. Overall, our results suggest that the findings of as-fcMRI do not always map onto those from ws-fcMRI . We end by discussing the advantages associated with using ws-fcMRI to assess the task-related interactions between brain regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction Major depressive disorder (MDD) and trauma-related disorders are associated with deficits in remembering the past and imagining the future (i.e., episodic simulation). We examined parental bonding and neuropsychological performance in relation to episodic simulation in trauma-exposed patients with recurrent MDD. Methods Trauma-exposed patients with MDD ( n = 21) and matched controls ( n = 20) completed a future-oriented Autobiographical Interview, the Parental Bonding Instrument, and a standardized neuropsychological battery. Results Patients with major depressive disorder generated fewer episodic details for future neutral events compared to controls. Although higher reported levels of maternal care were associated with increased specificity of negative future events among the patient group, higher maternal overprotection was related to decreased specificity of negative and positive future events. Higher levels of performance on measures of intelligence, verbal memory, executive functioning, and sustained attention were associated with increased specificity of future events. Conclusions Maternal relations during childhood and neuropsychological performance are related to the specificity of episodic simulation in adult patients with MDD. Childhood experience continues to influence memory performance into adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remembering and imagining are intricately related, particularly in imagining the future: episodic future thinking. It is proposed that remembering the recent past and imagining the near future take place in what we term the remembering–imagining system. The remembering–imagining system renders recently formed episodic memories and episodic imagined near-future events highly accessible. We suggest that this serves the purpose of integrating past, current, and future goal-related activities. When the remembering–imagining system is compromised, following brain damage and in psychological illnesses, the future cannot be effectively imagined and episodic future thinking may become dominated by dysfunctional images of the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies have shown that imagining or simulating future events relies on many of the same cognitive and neural processes as remembering past events. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, such overlap indicates that both remembered past and imagined future events rely heavily on episodic memory: future simulations are built on retrieved details of specific past experiences that are recombined into novel events. An alternative possibility is that commonalities between remembering and imagining reflect the influence of more general, non-episodic factors such as narrative style or communicative goals that shape the expression of both memory and imagination. We consider recent studies that distinguish the contributions of episodic and non-episodic processes in remembering the past and imagining the future by using an episodic specificity induction—brief training in recollecting the details of a past experience—and also extend this approach to the domains of problem solving and creative thinking. We conclude by suggesting that the specificity induction may target a process of event or scene construction that contributes to episodic memory as well as to imagination, problem solving, and creative thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Episodic simulation, the ability to imagine the self in a specific time and place, can be used to imagine future prosocial events. Recent work on episodic simulation indicates that imagining scenes of helping a person in need increases one's own intent to help. This work, however, leaves open the question of underlying mechanisms. While research on imagination points to the sensory quality of the imagined event as critical to the effect, research on moral cognition suggests that self-referential processing-imagining oneself versus another person-may be a key feature. Across three experiments, we investigated the role of self-referential processing and sensory quality on enhancing prosocial intentions via episodic simulation. The findings suggest that we are willing to help others, in part, because we can vividly imagine ourselves-or someone else-doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although our ability to remember future simulations conveys an adaptive advantage, enabling us to better prepare for upcoming events, the factors influencing the memorability of future simulations are not clear. In this study, participants generated future simulations that combined specific people, places and objects from memory, and for each trial, made a series of phenomenological ratings about the event components and the simulation as a whole. Memory for simulations was later assessed using a cued-recall test. We used multilevel modelling to determine whether the phenomenological qualities of event components (familiarity, emotionality and significance) and simulations (detail, plausibility) were predictive of whether the simulation was successfully encoded and later accessible. Our results demonstrate that person familiarity, detail and plausibility were significant predictors of whether a given future simulation was encoded into memory and later accessible. These findings suggest that scaffolding future simulations with pre-existing episodic memories is the path to a memorable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been suggested that the simulation of hypothetical episodes and the recollection of past episodes are supported by fundamentally the same set of brain regions. The present article specifies this core network via Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE). Specifically, a first meta-analysis revealed joint engagement of expected core-network regions during episodic memory and episodic simulation. These include parts of the medial surface, the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex within the medial temporal lobes, and the temporal and inferior posterior parietal cortices on the lateral surface. Both capacities also jointly recruited additional regions such as parts of the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. All of these core regions overlapped with the default network. Moreover, it has further been suggested that episodic simulation may require a stronger engagement of some of the core network's nodes as well as the recruitment of additional brain regions supporting control functions. A second ALE meta-analysis indeed identified such regions that were consistently more strongly engaged during episodic simulation than episodic memory. These comprised the core-network clusters located in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior inferior parietal lobe and other structures distributed broadly across the default and fronto-parietal control networks. Together, the analyses determine the set of brain regions that allow us to experience past and hypothetical episodes, thus providing an important foundation for studying the regions’ specialized contributions and interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans can vividly simulate hypothetical experiences. This ability draws on our memories (e.g., of familiar people and locations) to construct imaginings that resemble real-life events (e.g., of meeting a person at a location). Here, we examine the hypothesis that we also learn from such simulated episodes much like from actual experiences. Specifically, we show that the mere simulation of meeting a familiar person (unconditioned stimulus; US) at a known location (conditioned stimulus; CS) changes how people value the location. We provide key evidence that this simulation-based learning strengthens pre-existing CS-US associations and that it leads to a transfer of valence from the US to the CS. The data thus highlight a mechanism by which we learn from simulated experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our capacity to re-experience the past and simulate the future is thought to depend heavily on visual imagery, which allows us to construct complex sensory representations in the absence of sensory stimulation. There are large individual differences in visual imagery ability, but their impact on autobiographical memory and future prospection remains poorly understood. Research in this field assumes the normative use of visual imagery as a cognitive tool to simulate the past and future, however some individuals lack the ability to visualise altogether (a condition termed "aphantasia"). Aphantasia represents a rare and naturally occurring knock-out model for examining the role of visual imagery in episodic memory recall. Here, we assessed individuals with aphantasia on an adapted form of the Autobiographical Interview, a behavioural measure of the specificity and richness of episodic details underpinning the memory of events. Aphantasic participants generated significantly fewer episodic details than controls for both past and future events. This effect was most pronounced for novel future events, driven by selective reductions in visual detail retrieval, accompanied by comparatively reduced ratings of the phenomenological richness of simulated events, and paralleled by quantitative linguistic markers of reduced perceptual language use in aphantasic participants compared to those with visual imagery. Our findings represent the first systematic evidence (using combined objective and subjective data streams) that aphantasia is associated with a diminished ability to re-experience the past and simulate the future, indicating that visual imagery is an important cognitive tool for the dynamic retrieval and recombination of episodic details during mental simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Functional neuroimaging studies have noted that brain regions supporting theory of mind (ToM) overlap remarkably with those underlying episodic memory, suggesting a link between the two processes. The present study shows that memory for others’ past experiences modulates significantly our appraisal of, and reaction to, what is happening to them currently. Participants read the life story of two characters; one had experienced a long series of love-related failures, the other a long series of work-related failures. In a later faux pas recognition task, participants reported more empathy for the character unlucky in love in love-related faux pas scenarios, and for the character unlucky at work in work-related faux pas scenarios. The memory-based modulation of empathy correlated with the number of details remembered from the characters’ life story. These results suggest that individuals use memory for other people’s past experiences to simulate how they feel in similar situations they are currently facing. The integration of ToM and memory processes allows adjusting mental state inferences to fit unique social targets, constructing an individualized ToM (iToM).