Search

In this paper, we present a Lacanian perspective on football, while notably fathoming its normative dimension. Starting with a defining imperative, the prohibition against ‘handling’ or touching the ball with your hands, diverging football historically from rugby, we will subsequently focus our attention on the role of the foot, the eye (notably the eyes of the audience) and the ‘object a’ (in the context of gender). Against this backdrop, we will address pressing issues such as the troubled position of the referee (as an ‘impossible profession’), the commercialisation of football, and the rising tides of violence, match—fixing and other instances of systemic deviance. As we will argue, football exemplifies modern sport as an arena defined by prohibitions and desire, by inclusion and exclusion, by purity and abuse, culminating in recent challenges involved in gender trouble. Symbolical practices, like modern football, are based on in- and exclusion. Instead of more regulations and dichotomies, we advocate careful attention to the delicate art of handling desire in practice.

In this paper, I argue that the central ontological presupposition in the philosophy of sport is the ‘sport-as-play’ paradigm. In reconstructing its archaeological origins, a normative narrative is uncovered in which ‘play’ represents a creative and ‘lusory’ social practice, governed by game rules. In the philosophy of sports discourse, Homo Ludens is considered as the ideal, virtuous and innocent character, free from repressive, work-related duties or constraints. In the early works of Giorgio Agamben (1942), the conceptual pair play—ritual offers a contemporary frame of reference, rigorously different from our Homo Ludens ideal. In Agamben’s later works, the provocative Homo Sacer concept can hardly be more opposite to the utopian Homo Ludens paradigm. As Agamben states, political power in late modernity is based on a so-called ‘state-of-exception’, in which ‘bare life’ (as expressed in Homo Sacer) at first is excluded from society, but then again reincluded as an exception, in order to realize law and order. In this paper, I introduce philosophical archaeology as a promising new method in the philosophy of sport, debunking our prevailing Homo Ludens discourse. I argue that modern sports in our times—inadvertently—more and more seem to function as a ‘state-of-exception’, strengthening bio-political power.

In this article, we address the aporia(s) of the Olympic discourse produced by the troubled split between sport and politics. To start our argument, we will show that sporting governing bodies continuously insist that they are still on the other side of any kind of politics. Guided by Aristotle, who presented the reciprocity of ethics and politics, we will unveil the fallacy of this discourse. In a short genealogy of the relationship between sport, ethics, and politics, we will highlight the Munich Olympics 1936 and Mexico Olympics 1968, where political engagement of sport was exposed clearly. At the same time, the supposed political neutrality of sport manifested an aristocratic preference for radical right regimes. After that, we will analyse the contemporary relation between sport, ethics, and politics in the light of recent developments, including sport’s ambiguous reaction on the Ukraine war. Further argument will be that sport’s in- and external politics, supported by sport ethics and the inherited mantra of the split between sport and politics, is more than just a hypocrisy. At the start, modern sport claims autonomy of governance to keep away from state domination, yet this very autonomy also freezes sport’s ethical core, forbidding athletes, coaches and others active in sport, to express any political engagement, other than passive acceptance of the regulation by governing sport bodies, as the only politics to be respected without deliberation. In the final part an alternative understanding of the dynamics between politics, the political and sport’s ethical core, will be presented to be included in the philosophy of sport and fully developed in following articles.

Trouw

NRC Weeken

Can digital games be used for persuasion? The results of studies that have tried to validate the persuasive potential of digital games seem to be inconclusive. This is because there are multiple ways and strategies to persuade players through games, and some of these may work to address specific goals while others do not. So, the question is not if digital games can be used to persuade players but how these games can be efficiently designed to intentionally change attitudes. To better explain how digital games can be efficiently designed for persuasion, we will refer to the shortcomings mentioned by Sicart when arguing against procedurality and how we believe these flaws can be addressed to ensure the persuasive efficiency of digital games.

de Volkskrant

Trouw

Algemeen Dagblad

De Volkskrant

Trouw

Trouw

In the human sciences, experimental research is used to establish causal relationships. However, the extrapolation of these results to the target population can be problematic. To facilitate extrapolation, we propose to use the statistical technique Latent Class Regression Analysis in combination with the analogical reasoning theory for extrapolation. This statistical technique can identify latent classes that differ in the effect of X on Y. In order to extrapolate by means of analogical reasoning, one can characterize the latent classes by a combination of features and then compare these features to features of the target.

Trouw

Reformatorisch Dagblad

NRC Handelsblad

De Volkskrant

HUMO

Trouw

Phenomenologically speaking, one can consider the experiencing body as normative insofar as it generates norms through repeated actions and interactions, crystallizing into habits. On the other hand according to Foucauldian approaches, the subjective body does not generate norms but is itself produced by norms: Dominant social norms are incorporated via repeated practices of discipline. How is the individual level of habit formation in phenomenology related to this embodiment of supra-individual norms? In what sense can we differentiate between a habit formation that results in a skill and one that disciplines a body? To address these questions the paper will analyze examples of the embodiment of norms in Foucault and feminist philosophy and show how they rely on the phenomenological concept of the actual and habitual body.

In the course of the 20th century the so-called Modern Synthesis of Neo-Darwinism has become the dominant paradigm in modern biology. First, it is explained how and why Darwin’s broad definition of evolution, in which the environment plays an important role, was narrowed down by Neo-Darwinism to a radical gene-centric view. Next, the paradigm shift taking place today in ‘postgenomic’ evolutionary biology and genetics is discussed. It is argued that this shift opens the way to a more humane conception of evolution, more in line with Darwin’s view. Finally, I will discuss some of the implications of this paradigm shift for human self-reflection, taking The Music of Life. Biology Beyond Genes of systems biologist Denis Noble as a starting point.

Controversies about time discounting loom large in decisions about climate change. Prominently, a particularly controversial debate about time discounting in climate change decision-making has been conducted within climate economics, between the authors of Stern et al. (Stern review on the economics of climate change, 2006) and their critics (most prominently Dasgupta in Comments on the Stern review's economics of climate change, 2006; Tol in Energy Environ 17(6):977-981, 2006; Weitzman in J Econ Lit XLV:703-724, 2007; Nordhaus in J Econ Lit XLV:686-702, 2007). The article examines the role of values in this debate. Firstly, it is shown that time discounting is a case in which values are key because it is at heart an ethical problem. Secondly, it is argued that time discounting in climate economics is a case of economists making frequent and routine references to ethical values and indeed conduct ethical debates with each other. Thirdly, it is argued that there is evidence for deep and pervasive entanglement between facts and values in the prevalent methodologies for time discounting. Finally, it is argued that this means that economists have given up the 'value-free ideal' concerning time discounting, and discussed how the current methodology of time discounting in economics can be improved.

William James's reputation in the field of emotion research is based on his early psychological writings where he defines emotions as 'feelings of bodily changes'. In his later work, particularly in his study of mystic emotion (1902), James comes up with what looks like a completely different approach. Here his focus is on positive feelings of inspiration and joy, but also on downbeat moods like melancholy and depression. He examines how these feeling states give meaning to an individual's life. Theorists often speculate about a gap between James's early writings and his later work, and assume that the later James turned from an evolutionary-minded natural scientist into a metaphysical philosopher. In my paper, I follow Ratcliffe (2008) in his view that a sharply drawn line between the early and the late work is implausible and that James's later study of mysticism fits nicely with his early psychology. Drawing on James (1902), I show how in his later work, James develops a theory of embodied emotions that anticipates the role ascribed by twentieth century phenomenology to anxiety and other 'bad moods', as possibilities for philosophical reflection and self-understanding.

In this article, I analyze the use of historical counterfactuals in the Campaign of 1815 by Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). Such is the importance of counterfactuals in this work that its gist can be given in a series of 25 counterfactuals. I claim that a central role is played by evaluative counterfactuals. This specific form of counterfactuals is part of a didactic method that allows Clausewitz to teach young officers a critical method that prepares them for the challenge of decision-making in real warfare. I conclude with the enduring relevance of Clausewitz’s use of evaluative counterfactuals for contemporary military historiography.

Trouw

In the Netherlands, the poet Herman Gorter (1864–1927) is mostly known as the author of the neo-romantic poem May and the “sensitivistic” Poems, but internationally he became famous as a propagandist of radical Marxism: the author of influential brochures and of an “open letter” to comrade W.I. Lenin in 1920. During the 1890s, Gorter became increasingly dissatisfied with his poetry, considering it as ego-centric, disinterested and “bourgeois”, unconnected with what was happening in the real (material-political) world. He wanted to put his poetry on a scientific footing, notably by endorsing a dialectical materialist worldview. In the communist society he envisioned, science would become poetry and poetry would become science. In his opus magnum Pan (11,000 lines of verse, published in 1916), two terms are rather prominent, namely heelal (“universe”) and kristal (“crystal”). These signifiers not only reflect important themes, but also two friendships which began around 1900, namely with prominent astronomer and marxist Anton Pannekoek (who studied the universe) and with Ada Prins, the first woman in the Netherlands who acquired a PhD in chemistry, specialised in liquid crystal research. Whereas Ada Prins is mostly remembered as one of Gorter’s secret lovers, she was first and foremost his educated guide into the complex and enigmatic world of twentieth-century chemistry research. Liquid crystal chemistry became an important source of inspiration for Gorter’s work and the main objective of this paper is to demonstrate her influence on Gorter’s Pan as a scientific poem After presenting the two heroes of this paper, and their work in poetry and chemistry respectively, I will analyse the role of liquid crystals in Herman Gorter’s Pan, highlighting important connections with Ada Prins’ research into liquid crystal chemistry.

During the past decades, our image ofHomo neanderthalensishas changed dramatically. Initially, Neanderthals were seen as primitive brutes. Increasingly, however, Neanderthals are regarded as basically human. New discoveries and technologies have led to an avalanche of data, and as a result of that it becomes increasingly difficult to pinpoint what the difference between modern humans and Neanderthals really is. And yet, the persistent quest for a minimal difference which separates them from us is still noticeable in Neanderthal research. Neanderthal discourse is a vantage point from which the logic of ‘us’ versus ‘other’ is critically reconsidered. Studying contemporary academic literature and science autobiographies from an oblique perspective, focusing not on Neanderthals as objects, but on the dynamics of interaction between Neanderthal researchers and their finds, basic convictions at work in this type of research are retrieved. What is at issue is not the actual distinction between modern humans and Neanderthals (which is continuously being redefined), but rather the dualistic construction of human and nonhuman. Neanderthal understanding is affected by the desire to safeguard human uniqueness. The overall trend is to identify the human mark or spark, which defines us as favoured ‘winners’. The paradoxes emerging in contemporary Neanderthal discourse are symptomatic of the fact that a dualistic style of thinking is no longer tenable.

Immediately after Spinoza's death in 1677 his first biographers framed a life which would play an important part in the eighteenth-century perception of the Dutch philosopher. Bayle's entry on Spinoza in the Dictionnaire in particular, together with Jelles's preface to the Opera posthuma, created the image of a philosopher whose dedication to philosophy was unconditional and whose moral behavior was impeccable. Despite the general hostility which Spinoza's views continued to meet, his life appears to have contributed considerably to the gradual rediscovery of his works during the dying decades of the eighteenth century, most notably in Germany and the Netherlands.

Understanding the diversifying role of civil society in Europe’s sustainability pathway is a valid proposition both scientifically and socially. Civil society organisations already play a significant role in the reality of cities, what remains to be explored is the question: what is the role of civil society in the future sustainability of European cities? We first examine the novelty of new forms of civil society organization based on a thorough review of recent case studies of civil society initiatives for sustainable transitions across a diversity of European projects and an extensive literature review. We conceptualize a series of roles that civil society plays and the tensions they entail. We argue that, civil society initiatives can pioneer new social relations and practices therefore be an integral part of urban transformations and can fill the void left by a retreating welfare state, thereby safeguarding and servicing social needs but also backing up such a rolling back of the welfare state. It can act as a hidden innovator—contributing to sustainability but remaining disconnected from the wider society. Assuming each of these roles can have unintended effects, such as being proliferated by political agendas, which endanger its role and social mission, and can be peeled off to serve political agendas resulting in its disempowerment and over-exposure. We conclude with a series of implications for future research on the roles of civil society in urban sustainability transitions.

Philosophical theories of fairness propose to divide a good that several individuals have a claim to in proportion to the strength of their respective claims. We suggest that currently, these theories face a dilemma when dealing with a good that is indivisible. On the one hand, theories of fairness that use weighted lotteries are either of limited applicability or fall prey to an objection by Brad Hooker. On the other hand, accounts that do without weighted lotteries fall prey to three fairness paradoxes. We demonstrate that division methods from apportionment theory, which has hitherto been ignored by philosophical theories of fairness, can be used to provide fair division for indivisible goods without weighted lotteries and without fairness paradoxes.

This paper addresses Peter Sloterdijk’s optimistic ‘attitude’. I show that it is a philosophical posture based on pragmatic speculation and spiritual exercise. By situating it in a tradition that passes from Leibniz’s meliorism to Whitehead’s ecology of propositions, I argue that optimism is an essential component of a public use of reason of which the finality is no longer the good sense of critique but of the care for common sense. At stake is the cosmological and cosmopolitical care for the possibility of rationalization processes in a ‘monstruous world’ of ever denser feedback mechanisms.

This essay investigates a hitherto-unexamined collaboration between two of the founders of modern history of science, Henry Guerlac and I. Bernard Cohen, and two economists, Paul Samuelson and Rupert Maclaurin. The arena in which these two disciplines came together was the Bowman Committee, one of the committees that prepared material for Vannevar Bush’s Science—The Endless Frontier. The essay shows how their collaboration helped to shape the committee’s recommendations, in which different models of science confronted each other. It then shows how, despite this success, the basis for long-term collaboration of economists and historians of science disappeared, because the resulting linear model of science and technology separated the study of scientific and economic progress into noncommunicating boxes .

We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis (in Analysis 74:417–57, 2014) is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s (in Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable ingredient of any theorizing about fair division problems and allocative justice.

The paper presents a history of the concept of “secular stagnation”, from Alvin Hansen in the 1930s and 1940s to its recent revival by Larry Summers. We examine Hansen's ideas and those of young economists associated with him, notably Evsey Domar, Everett Hagen, Benjamin Higgins, Alan Sweezy, and Paul Samuelson, who were the economists who kept the doctrine alive in the 1950s and to whom Summers and others taking up the idea recently turned. Their ideas are contrasted with the theories of stagnation associated with Josef Steindl and Joseph Schumpeter. It is a label for a historical thesis about the American economy, which, initially seen as distinct from Keynes General Theory, came to be seen as a theoretical proposition based on Keynesian theory. It is argued that the idea of secular stagnation had a political dimension, connected to the New Deal and the Cold War and changing conceptions of economic maturity.

Hodgson and Knudsen want their version of Generalized Darwinism to meet two /desiderata. /First, their formulation of Darwinism should be sufficiently general and abstract, so that it only refers to general, domain-unspecific features that processes of biological and of socio-cultural evolution have in common with each other. Their formulation should leave out features of Darwinism that are specific to the biological domain only. Second, their version should be able to guide the development of theories that can causally explain processes of economic evolution. Hodgson and Knudsen argue that the latter - going from their abstract and general formulation of Darwinism to such full-fledged economic theories - is a matter of adding details that are specific to the economic domain. Both desiderata seem reasonable. Yet they pull in opposite directions. It is argued that in order to meet the first desideratum the formulation of Darwinism should be so general and abstract that it is bereft of any substance and content and, as such, of little use in guiding further theory development. If going from such a formulation to a full-fledged economic theory is called a matter of adding details, the devil surely is in the details.