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Conceptions of well-being are cognitive representations of the nature and experience of well-being. These conceptions can be described generally by the degree to which hedonic and eudaimonic dimensions are emphasized as important aspects of the experience of well-being. In two studies, the prediction that eudaimonic dimensions of individual conceptions of well-being are more robustly associated with self-reported well-being than hedonic dimensions was investigated. Correlational analyses indicated that both hedonic and eudaimonic dimensions were associated with well-being, with more robust associations observed between the eudaimonic dimension and each measure of well-being. In several regression analyses, only the eudaimonic dimension significantly predicted well-being, with the hedonic dimension failing to account for unique variance in well-being beyond that predicted by the eudaimonic dimension. Results thus generally suggest that conceptualizing well-being in eudaimonic terms may be relatively more important for positive psychological functioning.

Until now children's attention to the beliefs of people they wish to persuade has been examined experimentally via tasks that were artificial in important respects. To determine whether such research has underestimated children's psychological perspective taking, two studies that manipulated task elements pertinent to ecological validity were conducted. Children in three age groups (3, 4/5, and 6/7 years) were asked (forced-choice and open-ended formats) how best to persuade puppets and people, with differing beliefs, to pet and play with various toy animals. Children offered as many or more belief-relevant arguments in response to forced-choice as to open-ended questions. Only the oldest group attended to beliefs more when persuading a person compared with a puppet. Even on more realistic tasks, significant improvement with age across task formats confirmed a developmental trajectory in line with extant reports of children's belief reasoning. The findings support the idea that enhanced social competence corresponds specifically to children's increasing attention to beliefs in social interactions such as persuasion.

Young children's persuasion tactics, and how these reflected attunement to others' mental states, were explored in archived longitudinal samples of transcribed at-home conversations of four children, three to five years old. Over 87,000 utterances were examined to identify conversation "chunks" involving persuasion; 1,307 chunks were then coded for who initiated the persuasion, the persuader's goal, tactics employed, the presence of cues about others' beliefs and desires, and whether children attended to such information. Analyses suggested that persuasion exchanges were initiated similarly by children and adults, were stable in frequency and length across time, and involved a limited set of persuasion tactics. Children's attempts to change beliefs increased although explicit mental-state cues were only rarely available. When such cues were available, children more often than not altered their tactics. Implications for our understanding of children's developing social cognition and theory of mind, as well as the limitations of conversational analysis, are discussed.

Four-year olds, 6-year olds, and adults were given a computer-game mental rotation task, but with no instructions on mental rotation or other mental activity. Reaction time patterns and verbal reports revealed that 6-year olds were comparable to adults in spontaneous use and subjective awareness of mental rotation. Four-year olds who referred to mental activity to explain their performance also demonstrated mental rotation. (EV)

Describes three studies that examined how young children distinguish between the real, physical world and the mental world; between objects and thoughts; and between doing something and imagining it. (HOD)

Examines whether young children make explicit references to beliefs, ideas, thoughts, and intentions. Relates that three-year-old children correctly distinguish between real and mental items and that they think and dream about things that are not real. Concludes that conceptual development theories portraying early development as concrete and external need to be re-examined. (AEW)

James Baldwin, a renowned essayist, has written extensively on a range of topics, including life in Harlem, Paris, and Atlanta, as well as influential figures like Martin Luther King and Malcolm X. In his book, The Evidence of Things Not Seen, Baldwin delves into the Atlanta child-murder case, drawing from his personal experience of the "terror of being destroyed." Unlike his earlier essays, Baldwin's writing style in this book is more subtle, aiming to provoke important questions rather than explicitly stating them. The book has been well-received in France, where it is seen as an exploration of a social crisis with racial undertones. In an interview, Baldwin discusses his approach to writing nonfiction and autobiography, emphasizing the importance of finding his own perspective rather than portraying himself as a victim. He also reflects on the challenges of using his own experiences as a means to shed light on broader social issues and the relationship between writing autobiography and shaping one's identity. Baldwin concludes by contemplating the fragmented nature of American society and the role of the artist in connecting with an audience. [Extracted from the article]

Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) proposal of a social interaction account makes clear the need for researchers of all theoretical orientations to get specific about how social experience influences children's developing understanding of mind, but it is premature to reject other theories, such as theory-theory, which also attribute a major role to experience.

Developmental psychology should play an essential constraining role in developmental cognitive neuroscience. Theories of neural development must account explicitly for the early emergence of knowledge and abilities in infants and young children documented in developmental research. Especially in need of explanation at the neural level is the early emergence of meta-representation.

Karmiloff-Smith's landmark work decisively addresses central problems in developmental psychology and cognitive science. Her most valuable contributions include specifying how nativist and constructivist views of development are complementary, how development can be both domain-specific and domain-general, and how we are special. Her solution to the latter problem correctly focuses on the development of metacognition. Two questions about Karmiloff-Smith's theory are raised: Can it explain its own development? Can it enhance the acquisition of expertise?