Search

To maximize their impact, socially responsible households can invest responsibly (SRI), consume responsibly (SRC), or do both. The key question of this paper is, which mix of SRI and SRC leads to a desired impact with the lowest loss of utility for responsible households. In a closed micro-economic model, we show that both strategies yield a symmetric impact, proportional to the responsible behavior. For the individual household, however, one strategy dominates the other depending on a condition on risk and product parameters. If responsible households can coordinate on socially responsible action, the welfare maximizing action is to completely abstain from consuming and investing in brown production if the negative externality is high. The coordination on "abstaining" becomes more likely the more households are responsible.

We consider a standard banking model with agency frictions to simultaneously study the weakening and reversal of monetary transmission and banks’ risk-taking in a low-interest environment. Both, weaker monetary transmission and higher risk-taking arise because lower policy rates impair banks’ net worth.The pass-through to deposit rates, the level of excess reserves and the extent of the agency problem between banks and depositors are crucial determinants of monetary transmission. If the deposit pass-through is sufficiently impaired, a reversal rate exists. For policy rates below the reversal rate further interest rate reductions lead to a disproportionate increase in risk-taking and a contraction in loan supply.

Capital regulation forces banks to fund a substantial amount of their investments with equity. This creates a buffer against losses but also increases the cost of funding. If higher funding costs translate into higher loan interest rates, the bank's assets are also likely to become more risky, which may destabilize the lending bank. This paper argues that the level of competition in the banking sector can determine whether the buffer or cost effect prevails. The endogenous level of competition may be crucial in determining the efficiency of capital regulation in undercapitalized banking sectors, with excess capacities and correlated risks.

To provide maturity transformation, banks need a deposit base – deposits that could be, but are not, withdrawn most of the time and are, thus, used for long-termlending. In a global-games environment, we show that a higher deposit base protects banks against panic runs. As depositors become more flexible in their bank relations, keeping multiple accounts at different institutions, the deposit base of banks changes. We analyze the impact of multi-banking on bank stability and show that in an economy with specialized institutions, households allocate too few funds to maturity-transforming institutions (banks). A policy-maker should support the banks, even though they are more fragile. If only some institutions are protected by deposit insurance, the deposit base moves away from the unprotected institutions, leaving them more prone to runs.

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of intermediation and is costly for taxpayers. We show that a mix of both instruments minimises the costs of preventing the collapse of financial intermediation. Once we allow for cross-border banking, the optimal policy is not feasible. If domestic supervisory effort is not observable, our model predicts a race to the bottom in capital requirement regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard.

This paper analyses the competitive effects of capital requirement regulation on an oligo� polistic credit market. In the first stage, banks choose the structure of refinancing their assets, thereby making an imperfect commitment to a loan capacity as a function of the chosen degree of capitalization and the regulatory capital requirement. In the second stage, loan price competition takes place. It is shown that a capital requirement regulation may not only decrease the supply of credit through an increased marginal cost effect but can have an additional collusive enhancing effect resulting in even higher credit prices and increased profits for the banks.

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, while strict supervision reduces the scope of intermediation and is costly for taxpayers. We show that the expected costs of a banking crisis are minimised with a mix of both instruments. Once we allow for cross-border banking, the optimal policy is not feasible. If domestic supervisory effort is not observable, our model predicts a race to the bottom in banking regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard.

This paper analyses the competitive effects of capital requirement regulation on an oligopolistic credit market. In the first stage, banks choose the structure of refinancing their assets, thereby making an imperfect commitment to a loan capacity as a function of the chosen degree of capitalization and the regulatory capital requirement. In the second stage, loan price competition takes place. It is shown that a capital requirement regulation may not only decrease the supply of credit through an increased marginal cost effect but can have an additional collusive enhancing effect resulting in even higher credit prices and increased profits for the banks., Working papers series, ISSN 2628-1724, 2010, Heft 12

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-10-14T14:20:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152419043_Rafael Adrian Deakin_DPDFA.pdf: 572170 bytes, checksum: 76d4a7fb1d707c62937a920bdb541bc0 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-10-14T14:20:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152419043_Rafael Adrian Deakin_DPDFA.pdf: 572170 bytes, checksum: 76d4a7fb1d707c62937a920bdb541bc0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-04-28

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-10-06T14:56:10Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152119189_Joao Matos_DPDFA_V3.pdf: 2502424 bytes, checksum: 6320d00030574f675b7310a5de9f784c (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-10-06T14:56:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152119189_Joao Matos_DPDFA_V3.pdf: 2502424 bytes, checksum: 6320d00030574f675b7310a5de9f784c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-04-28

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-10-15T09:30:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152419067_Katerina Nedyalkova_DPDFA_V2.pdf: 2176471 bytes, checksum: a027958f82fd46d0e33dcb640e9f750a (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-10-15T09:30:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152419067_Katerina Nedyalkova_DPDFA_V2.pdf: 2176471 bytes, checksum: a027958f82fd46d0e33dcb640e9f750a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-04-28

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-09-27T13:17:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152219016_José Caldeira_DPDFA.pdf: 691208 bytes, checksum: 219741a670188d65c85024c2ce711a49 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-27T13:17:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152219016_José Caldeira_DPDFA.pdf: 691208 bytes, checksum: 219741a670188d65c85024c2ce711a49 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-01-25

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-09-29T12:49:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152419036_PedroNunes_DPDFA.pdf: 622272 bytes, checksum: ccb0be67f840bdf774b15d320d94bffa (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-29T12:49:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152419036_PedroNunes_DPDFA.pdf: 622272 bytes, checksum: ccb0be67f840bdf774b15d320d94bffa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-01-25

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-11-04T14:35:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152220027_Felice d'Esposito_DPDFA.pdf: 754691 bytes, checksum: 0b089eed43fc0319def667f8916fd67b (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-11-04T14:35:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152220027_Felice d'Esposito_DPDFA.pdf: 754691 bytes, checksum: 0b089eed43fc0319def667f8916fd67b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-06-28

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-09-29T08:32:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152419021_Tiago de Almeida_DPDFA.pdf: 1487349 bytes, checksum: 175efcc205d95ef5bcaff2ed7340298e (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-29T08:32:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152419021_Tiago de Almeida_DPDFA.pdf: 1487349 bytes, checksum: 175efcc205d95ef5bcaff2ed7340298e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-01-25

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-06T09:34:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152418082_Tiago Vidal_DPDFA.pdf: 1842040 bytes, checksum: b51bd27676ce291aaef28a56bf836a78 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-06T09:34:30Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 152418082_Tiago Vidal_DPDFA.pdf: 1842040 bytes, checksum: b51bd27676ce291aaef28a56bf836a78 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-03-06T09:34:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152418082_Tiago Vidal_DPDFA.pdf: 1842040 bytes, checksum: b51bd27676ce291aaef28a56bf836a78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-01-27

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-10-20T08:19:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152415020_Joao_Pedro_Borda_DAgua_DPDFA.pdf: 2453255 bytes, checksum: bbf0f5706a2eea00be3136ef523e4f7a (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-10-20T08:20:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 152415020_Joao_Pedro_Borda_DAgua_DPDFA.pdf: 2453255 bytes, checksum: bbf0f5706a2eea00be3136ef523e4f7a (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-10-20T08:20:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152415020_Joao_Pedro_Borda_DAgua_DPDFA.pdf: 2453255 bytes, checksum: bbf0f5706a2eea00be3136ef523e4f7a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-05-28

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-10-19T10:36:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152418008_Jose_Gouveia_DPDFA_Revised2904.pdf: 1109186 bytes, checksum: b04e75270bbfebc321731c1e7b205eac (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-10-19T10:37:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 152418008_Jose_Gouveia_DPDFA_Revised2904.pdf: 1109186 bytes, checksum: b04e75270bbfebc321731c1e7b205eac (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-10-19T10:37:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152418008_Jose_Gouveia_DPDFA_Revised2904.pdf: 1109186 bytes, checksum: b04e75270bbfebc321731c1e7b205eac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-05-28

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2021-09-28T08:19:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152418095_Bana Ghebregergis_DPDFA.pdf: 1371739 bytes, checksum: cf13584e0d2c6666a1e68373695cc5b1 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-28T08:19:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152418095_Bana Ghebregergis_DPDFA.pdf: 1371739 bytes, checksum: cf13584e0d2c6666a1e68373695cc5b1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-01-25

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-04T14:41:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152418011_Andre Boturao_DPDFA.pdf: 1667706 bytes, checksum: 62f5adeb43e6c2bf215ca5af7efbe07d (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-04T14:41:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 152418011_Andre Boturao_DPDFA.pdf: 1667706 bytes, checksum: 62f5adeb43e6c2bf215ca5af7efbe07d (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-03-04T14:41:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152418011_Andre Boturao_DPDFA.pdf: 1667706 bytes, checksum: 62f5adeb43e6c2bf215ca5af7efbe07d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-01-27

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-04T10:24:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152218005_Pedro Lopes_DPDFA.pdf: 1270212 bytes, checksum: 74479f541e0d82e73137594cafdf99b2 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-04T10:24:37Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 152218005_Pedro Lopes_DPDFA.pdf: 1270212 bytes, checksum: 74479f541e0d82e73137594cafdf99b2 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-03-04T10:24:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152218005_Pedro Lopes_DPDFA.pdf: 1270212 bytes, checksum: 74479f541e0d82e73137594cafdf99b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-01-27

Submitted by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-05T14:41:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 152418066_Teresa Barros_DPDFA.pdf: 1793493 bytes, checksum: c66e14ce42ddee5e910b017fe255e494 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Maria Helena Ribeiro (helena.ribeiro@lisboa.ucp.pt) on 2020-03-05T14:41:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 152418066_Teresa Barros_DPDFA.pdf: 1793493 bytes, checksum: c66e14ce42ddee5e910b017fe255e494 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-03-05T14:41:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 152418066_Teresa Barros_DPDFA.pdf: 1793493 bytes, checksum: c66e14ce42ddee5e910b017fe255e494 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-01-27