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Part 1 of 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1268 I. INNOVATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE 1276 A. Agency Innovation Under Chevron 1276 B. The Demise of Chevron in [...], The Supreme Court of the United States has generally been a very aggressive enforcer of legal limitations on governmental power. In various periods in its history, the Court has gone far beyond enforcing clearly expressed and easily ascertainable constitutional and statutory provisions and has suppressed innovation by the other branches that do not necessarily transgress widely held social norms. Novel assertions of legislative power, novel interpretations of federal statutes, statutes that are in tension with well-established common law rules, and state laws adopted by only a few states are suspect simply because they are novel or rub up against tradition. In periods of governmental innovation and assertions of expanded authority, this aggression becomes evident and perhaps more robust. In recent years, the Court has created new barriers to government innovation even as government is confronted with serious threats to the health and welfare of mankind. Chief among this new set of limitations on the power of federal administrative agencies is an interpretive device that has become known as the Major Questions Doctrine (MQD). This doctrine purports to be based on a traditional view of legislative intent and judicial role, but in reality it resonates more with conservative anti-regulatory political views. Under this new doctrine, the Court rejects agency assertions of regulatory authority when it finds that the agency's action would have major social and economic effects and lacks crystal clear congressional authorization. Ironically, because the MQD has no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or prior law, the Court has in effect created a major new doctrine of administrative law severely limiting agency authority without clear authorization from Congress. The Court has also suppressed agency innovation by confining Chevron deference to unimportant issues of statutory construction. Chevron, for all of its faults, has the virtue of validating agency policy innovation so long as Congress had not clearly denied agency authority. This reform to Chevron, together with the creation and application of the Major Questions Doctrine, in effect accomplishes the aim of some Justices to impose a more robust nondelegation doctrine, making agency innovation even more difficult. In addition, the Court has worked to prevent innovation in other areas of law, such as agency structure, gun control, and the spending power, preventing the state and federal governments from taking action to deal with pressing social problems. The current Court has truly become an anti-innovation Court.

Part 2 of 2 B. The Spending Power and Coercion Perhaps the most striking recent example of the Court imposing its will over that of Congress is its rejection of [...]

Donald Trump has https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-department-of-government-efficiency-doge-elon-musk-ramaswamy/ loyalist and the richest man in the world, Elon Musk, along with former presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, to spearhead an initiative called the Department of Government [...]

I Introduction In the Australian federation, judicial review of both administrative and legislative action is axiomatic and fundamental to the constitutional assumption of the rule of law. But it is [...], This article focuses on a hitherto underexplored but increasingly important area of public expenditure: act of grace payments. Act of grace payments are voluntary, highly discretionary gifts of money made by the executive in the absence of any legal duty to do so. The expenditure on such payments in Australia has been significant, and a lack of transparency creates serious risks to integrity. Further, the cases of Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Williams v Commonwealth and Williams v Commonwealth [No 2] have transformed the constitutional framework for public expenditure. Accordingly, this article conducts a fine-grained analysis of the constitutional legality of act of grace payments at the Commonwealth, state and territory levels. The authors argue that there are significant constitutional issues with act of grace payments at the Commonwealth level, and that many state-based act of grace payments are likely to be illegal. To address these issues, and to reduce the risk that payments will be made illegally, the authors recommend several legislative and soft law changes.

I. INTRODUCTION 201 II. FEDERAL ABORTION LAWS 202 III.OVERTURNING ROE V. WADE 203 A. THE DOBBS V. JACKSON DECISION 204 B. LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS OF ABORTION 206 C. BANS BASED ON [...]

Every couple of years, it seems, the debt limit shows up to wreak havoc in American law and public finance. By capping the face value of government securities that can be "outstanding at one time," the statutory limit regularly threatens the Treasury's ability to raise the revenue needed to fund required government spending. Brinksmanship over the limit has shut down the government, cost the country billions of dollars, and mired financial markets in uncertainty. And yet, despite its obvious and longstanding importance, the limit remains poorly understood. Commentators attribute its beginnings to 1917 and 1941, before which it is assumed that Congress itself designed each debt instrument and did so only during rare emergencies. For some, the presumed recency of the limit makes it easy to dismiss. It is regarded as a quixotic provision that can and should yield to more significant spending mandates, or a provision that is itself unlawful--at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment's cryptic command that public debts "shall not be questioned." For others, the limit is regarded as either a cataclysmic threat to the financial system, or a necessary hindrance to runaway government spending, or both. We are warned, by politicians and commentators alike, that a binding debt limit will lead to default, and the cratering of the American economy--and also that having no limit would be an "irresponsible" concession to our profligate spending instincts. But each piece of this conventional wisdom is wrong. Debt limits--authorities for the Executive Branch to borrow that come with limits attached--have existed since 1790, and flow naturally from the Constitution's reservation of the borrowing power to Congress. I provide a corrective account of those early limits and draw on public laws and Treasury borrowing records to provide an overview of the Executive Branch's borrowing authority between 1790 and 1910. That historical excavation has important doctrinal and policy implications for how we think about public finance today and helps clear the myth and confusion surrounding the debt limit. Under current doctrine, the limit is lawful. It is a form of statutory direction and commitment that was common at the ratification of both the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. The limit is binding. When the limit conflicts with spending provisions, longstanding practice suggests that it is spending--and not the limit--that must yield. And, finally, the implications of the modern limit remain woefully misunderstood. There is no good reason to think that default follows from a binding limit: tax revenue is more than sufficient to cover debt service. But there is excellent reason to think that the modern limit has become so divorced from its original appropriations purpose--which was to make spending cheaper, not harder--that the case for reform is ripe., Table of Contents I. THE STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIMIT A. How to Conceptualize Debt Limits B. Why Constitutionalize and Limit Borrowing? C. Debt Limits Before 1917 1. The [...]