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I critically discuss Sutton’s 2012 attempt to solve the so-called “grounding problem” for coincident objects, namely, the difficulty of explaining how such objects, such as a statue and the lump of clay from which it was made, can have distinct kind and modal properties, even though they share the same proper parts and basic microphysical properties. Sutton bases her solution on an account of the extrinsic composition of the different sorts of objects involved in such cases - in particular, artefacts, organisms and persons. I show that the accounts she gives of their composition are flawed, and that her proposal therefore does not solve the grounding problem.

I present and critically examine the analysis of conspiracy theories presented by Quassim Cassam in his book Conspiracy Theories (2019a). I hold that the distinction he draws between problematic and unproblematic kinds of theories that report conspiracies is useful for an assessment of the phenomenon, but I draw attention to some shortcomings in the way he characterizes it, as well as in his treatment of the causes and the harmful effects of belief in such theories. Resumen Presento y evalúo críticamente el análisis de las teorías de la conspiración presentado por Quassim Cassam en su libro Conspiracy Theories (2019a). Sostengo que su distinción entre los tipos problemáticos y no problemáticos de las teorías que refieren a conspiraciones resulta útil a la hora de evaluar el fenómeno, pero señalo algunas debilidades en su caracterización, así como en su tratamiento de las causas y los efectos nocivos de la creencia en estas teorías.

En este trabajo, argumento que Descartes está comprometido, a la vez, con una posición compatibilista respecto de la relación entre libre albedrío y preordenación divina, esto es, una posición según la cual ambas tesis resultan verdaderas, y con una concepción libertaria del libre albedrío humano. La posición suya que, según defiendo aquí, permite al autor sostener esas dos actitudes es lo que llamo Misterismo, según el cual el carácter inmenso e incomprensible de Dios es lo que no nos permite comprender cabalmente esa compatibilidad mediante nuestra razón finita. I argue in this paper that Descartes is committed both to a compatibilist view concerning the relation between free will and divine preordination, namely, one according to which both of these views come out true, and to a libertarian view as regards human free will. I defend here that what allows our author to maintain both of these committments is what I call Mysterism, namely, the view according to which God's immense and incomprehensible nature explains our incapacity to understand fully that compatibility through our own finite reason. Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Santa Fe; Argentina

I consider some of the objections that have been raised against a conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem” (the problem of grounding the sortalish properties of material objects in their non-sortalish ones), I address in particular two objections that I call Conceptual Validity and Instantiation, and I attempt to answer them on behalf of the conceptualist. My response, in a nutshell, is that the first of these objections fails because it ascribes to the conceptualist some commitments that do not really follow from the view’s basic insight, while the second objection also fails because (among other things) it (inadvertently) denies the conceptualist resources that the alternative positions are allowed to use.

El artículo que sigue fue publicado originalmente con el título "Causation" en el Journal of Philosophy 70.17 (1973): 556-567, y luego reimpreso (con comentarios posteriores que no se incluyen enla presente versión) en Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers. Vol. II. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1986. 159-172. Esta traducción se publica conla autorización del Journal of Philosophy y de Oxford University Press.Querría agradecer aquí a Santiago Erpen, María José García Encinas,Diego Morales y Carolina Sartorio por diversos comentarios y sugerencias que me han permitido, espero, mejorar la traducción.

Traducción. Título original: “Causes and Conditions”, American Philosophical Quar-terly, Vol. 2, No. 4, Octubre de 1965, pp. 245-264 Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina

espanolExamino aqui la solucion propuesta por Nathan Salmon al problema de la trivializacion que, segun suele suponerse, aqueja a las concepciones de la rigidez para terminos generales entendida como identidad de designacion en los distintos mundos posibles. Sostengo que este autor no logra mostrar que algunos supuestos terminos generales, tales como �the colour of the sky�, son no rigidos, pero tambien que una pequena clase de ejemplos distintos que el ofrece, que se pueden entender como descripciones de segundo orden, si resultan ser terminos generales no rigidos, aunque por razones distintas que las que el supone. Englishexamine Nathan Salmon�s solution to the problem of trivialization, as it arises for conceptions of general term rigidity that construe it as identity of designation across possible worlds. I argue that he does not succeed in showing that some alleged general terms, such as �the colour of the sky� are non-rigid, but also that a small class of different examples that he presents, which can be construed as second order descriptions, are indeed non-rigid general terms, although for reasons different from those he thought.

I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means. Fil: Zerbudis, Ezequiel Jorge. Universidad Nacional del Litoral. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias. Departamento de Filosofía; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina

In the present paper I challenge what I take to be a common view concerning Kant's intellectual development between 1768 and 1770, namely, the idea that the phenomenon of incongruent counterparts has played an important role in his adoption of the thesis that sensibility and understanding are of a completely different nature. My argument has two parts. First, I try to show that the phenomenon was not considered by Kant, in 1768, as requiring any change in his conception of the cognitive faculties. On the contrary, he seems to provide an account of the knowledge of counterparts that is completely in accordance with his previous views on that matter. Second, I show that the discussion of counterparts in his 1770 Dissertation played no role in either eliciting or justifying his endorsement of dualism.