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On p. 142, Mees says that "business ethics has been transformed by the establishment of the UN Global Compact." Not all will come to that same conclusion; however, any academic field - whether called business and society, or CSR, or business ethics - will benefit from having a sense of history. Chapters 4 and 5 detail what Mees sees as the rise and fall of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the continuing rise of business ethics. Professor Bernard [9]: ix) says: "business history and business ethics are often neglected in business schools...An academic field [needs a] sense of its own history.". [Extracted from the article]

In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has aggressively enforced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), which prohibits bribing foreign officials for business purposes. In doing so, it has relied heavily on tips from its increasingly popular whistleblower program, including ones received from scores of foreign countries. However, foreign whistleblowers enjoy unequal protections vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts. For instance, foreign whistleblowers are not protected against retaliation for lawfully reporting information to the SEC. Worse still, some foreign whistleblowers are less protected than others due to inadequate protections in their domestic systems, and some face especially great risks for exposing corrupt officials. This Note argues that Congress should provide additional protections to foreign whistleblowers who report FCPA violations and are at greater risk of retaliation. This Note is the first to argue for immigration incentives and outlines two potential solutions: creating a new "W" visa or amending the existing S-5 "informant" visa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few decades as the number of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases has steadily climbed, and the fines associated with FCPA dispositions have skyrocketed, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has regularly issued guidance about how companies could or should assist the government in reaching a resolution to an FCPA investigation. It is now taken as a given that a company will cooperate with the DOJ in order to receive the best outcome and settlement. What “cooperation” entails has differed over the past few decades, but what is no longer on the table is the option NOT to cooperate with the DOJ, or any parallel investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or even foreign regulatory agencies. The reason companies cooperate is to be afforded the “carrot” of cooperation credit, rather than face the “stick” of increased fines and punishment. Cooperation credit is a major factor in corporations’ decisions regarding all aspects of their own internal investigations, including whether to voluntarily disclose potential violations of the FCPA, what documents to produce to the government and when, and whether to allow the government to interview (and potentially indict) executives. The recent DOJ Memorandum issued by Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco doubles down on the notion that companies must be swift in voluntarily disclosing violations, quick to point fingers at executives involved, and must produce to the government potentially damning documents immediately upon discovery. The Monaco Memo seemingly moves the needle further in favor of the government; meaning, a company must do more to meet the standard of “cooperation” in order to be eligible for cooperation credit. As the standard for cooperation becomes harder to attain, more corporations may push back. The risk to the DOJ of making cooperation credit too elusive is that the DOJ likely does not have the resources to engage in full-scale investigations of companies. Rather, the government relies upon companies to voluntarily disclose violations and to perform internal investigations at their own expense. What then happens when companies refuse to cooperate? When the carrot becomes too elusive, will companies begin taking their odds with the stick? This Article outlines the historical underpinnings of corporate cooperation, and expands upon the literature considering the structural, constitutional, and normative issues with corporate cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This composition compares and contrasts the legislation used in addressing and preventing transnational bribery and corruption at the domestic, regional, and international level. Using the history and current application of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a foundation, this composition analyzes the legislation of fifteen nations, two international organizations, and three regional bodies, and their approaches in combating the growing issue of transnational bribery and corruption. This composition analyzes and interprets the common themes, historical and contemporary patterns, as well as trends at each government level, and potential future courses of action. The denouement of this work seeks to present an egalitarian solution that accentuates the noteworthy characteristics of each level, and how they can function in a single, harmonious mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States' anti-corruption efforts do little to repair, and may even perpetuate, the inequities exacerbated by transnational public corruption. The U.S. Government has collected approximately $28 billion in criminal penalties by prosecuting U.S. firms for foreign corrupt practices, yet it regularly fails to provide restitution to those victimized by such offenses. This failure persists despite compelling legal, practical, and ethical reasons for doing so. These counterweights include statutory obligations to award restitution to all victims of federal offenses against property, the profitability of enforcement efforts, and the existence of separate U.S. Government programs that operationalize workable reparations models in the kleptocracy regulation context. This failure is, in large part, due to distinctive difficulties that arise as to the desirability and practicability of criminal restitution in the public corruption context. Beyond the analytical difficulty in determining precisely who a public corruption offense victimizes, restitution paid to foreign governments defrauded by U.S. bribe-payers may risk enabling culpable persons and institutions on the demand-side of the charged conspiracy. This Note examines these difficulties from a doctrinal perspective. Thereafter, this Note offers several considerations for policymakers to weigh as they develop improved restitution policies. Finally, this Note recommends that the United States clarify, standardize, and decolonize its policies and practices regarding restitution for foreign corruption offenses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent trends in corporate criminal investigations have signaled a greater emphasis on data access and information disclosure. These trends, compounded by a significant increase in the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws, will ultimately lead to rising demands for cross-border data transfers and processing. This Article seeks to investigate how U.S. law enforcement authorities should cope with foreign laws that restrict crossborder data transfers in the corporate investigation context. In this Article, laws that restrict the disclosure of investigation-related data to foreign regulators are collectively referred to as anti-investigative laws. Using China's newly enacted Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law as case studies, I highlight the key features of antiinvestigative laws that threaten to obstruct global corporate enforcement. I then analyze how these features may affect the investigation and prosecution of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases involving China. Ultimately, this Article proposes a conflict-of-laws approach for FCPA enforcers to understand, evaluate, and balance conflicting compliance requirements in corporate enforcement actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti‐corruption laws aim to bolster public integrity by punishing attempts to illegitimately curry favor with government decision‐makers. These laws, however, can generate integrity risks of their own. This article examines one such risk: that firms subject to scrutiny under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) may attempt to influence prosecutors by exploiting shared political leanings or related socio‐cultural ties. Drawing on social psychology, we theorize that FCPA defendants retain defense attorneys who are aligned with government officials. This behavior is consistent with a strategy of marshaling in‐group favoritism—i.e., the psychological tendency for individuals to view more favorably those that they perceive as members of the same group—to defendants' advantage. This strategy may be particularly auspicious in FCPA matters, in which prosecutors engage in subjective, trust‐based assessments of defendants' self‐investigatory efforts, typically with minimal judicial oversight. We test this theory by matching attorneys listed on court filings for all FCPA matters over eighteen years with a database of individuals' political views based on their patterns of political donations. This analysis reveals that defendants tend to hire more liberal attorneys to represent them on these filings when prosecutors lean left and during Democratic administrations, and more conservative attorneys when prosecutors lean right and during Republican presidencies. In light of these findings, we offer policy prescriptions aimed at increasing transparency and judicial oversight of FCPA matters to mitigate integrity risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses lessons from the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the sovereign wealth fund laundering conspiracy and bribery scandal involving investment banking company Goldman Sachs and strategic development company 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) .

The article discusses the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case U.S. v. Hoskins to analyze the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) covering crimes like nonjurisdictional bribery schemes.

We show that a mid-2000s increase in extraterritorial enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), characterized by greater international regulatory cooperation and more frequent use of the FCPA's accounting provisions, has a significant deterrent effect on foreign direct investment in high-corruption-risk countries. The decrease in investment is at least as large for non-U.S. as for U.S. firms, suggesting that widespread extraterritorial enforcement helps to create a level foreign investment playing field. Firms under U.S. jurisdiction with fundamental characteristics that make it more difficult to maintain effective internal controls invest less in high-corruption-risk countries after the FCPA enforcement increase, suggesting regulatory compliance costs play a role in deterring investment. Consistent with investments in accounting systems being one way, firms limit enforcement risk when investing in high-corruption-risk countries, firms pursuing new investments spend more time evaluating potential targets, and firms with existing investments report fewer restatements related to unintentional errors. JEL Classifications: F50; F60; K2; M4; O1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multinational companies (MNCs) with valuable trademarks in China seek criminal enforcement against counterfeiting because other available avenues of relief, such as administrative and judicial remedies, have proven to be ineffective. While MNCs prefer enforcement through China's Police, the Public Security Bureau (PSB), many MNCs are unaware of the significant hidden dangers of using the PSB. Most MNCs will delegate enforcement of trademark rights to their Chinese subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are known to make illegal payments to the PSB that may violate the laws of the PRC as well as the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). These acts expose MNCs to draconian penalties under PRC law and the FCPA. MNCs can be unaware of these illegal practices because many MNCs organize their business structures and intellectual property (IP) management strategies in ways that shield MNCs from reviewing some of the on-the-ground actions by their Chinese subsidiaries. This Article exposes these risks, explains how some of these risks arise, and makes suggestions on how MNCs can structure their business organizations and IP management structures in China to eliminate or mitigate these risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A double standard in bribery law has emerged. Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has broken with a century of progressive reforms by narrowly interpreting domestic bribery and other conflict-of-interest laws. This weak federal domestic bribery law now stands in stark contrast to the robust and expansive prosecutions of bribery under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which limits the ability of U.S. entities to bribe foreign public officials. As a result of this double standard, those who seek to improperly influence domestic public officials are often able to engage in behavior that looks and smells like bribery but is not bribery. Similar behavior in the foreign context, however, is punished by the FCPA. The act of bribery, whether foreign or domestic, not only undermines the practice of good governance but also delegitimizes government institutions themselves. Federal bribery laws were traditionally designed and interpreted to address both of these concerns, evolving into powerful tools of public accountability. But the Supreme Court has restricted the interpretation of federal bribery laws in ways that have weakened the domestic antibribery regime. As a result, high-profile elected officials are able to avoid punishment for acts that would have, until recently, been considered illegal. In contrast, the FCPA has not only withstood legal challenges, but is widely recognized as a powerful tool for curbing corruption. This Article explores this divergence, argues that the domestic bribery law should be modified, and identifies two aspects of the FCPA as a model for domestic statutory reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incentives to engage in corruption and bribery will only intensify so long as competition for business opportunities exist. This global problem requires global solutions. Although the adoption of multilateral treaties h governments is a step in the right direction, it is simply not enough. Indeed, in accordance with these treaties, many countries have already passed laws to criminalize foreign and domestic bribery, but enforcement of these latus remain abysmal. We propose an anti-corruption mechanism that may incentivize global cooperation in enforcing existing national laws to combat bribery. In particular, the Financial Action. Task Force's framework for combatting money laundering and terrorist financing may hold promise as a useful and helpful tool for developing a new anti-corruption mechanism for increasing the effectiveness of enforcement of bribery laws around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test the hypothesis that US corporations headquartered in states with greater public corruption are also prone to more unethical behavior when operating abroad. We exploit passage of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) that curtailed bribery of foreign officials and find firms in corrupt states, especially those exporting to more corrupt countries, suffer greater performance decline following FCPA, suggesting larger loss from anticipated bribery restrictions. Controlling for industry, firms in corrupt states are more likely to be targets of FCPA enforcement actions. They are also more likely to have paid foreign bribes, as disclosed during pre-FCPA investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on sport business corruption and legal deterrent used against international bribery is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). It mentions management corruption focuses on the administration of sport which involves the host venues, allocation of rights, media, intellectual property, nomination for positions, and commissioning constructions works for sports arenas focusing on the administration of sport and bribery is a common action within the sport business.

The article offers information on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Topics include examines that the Second Circuit held that the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) could not prosecute foreign national Lawrence Hoskins under the FCPA for conduct committed abroad on a conspiracy or aiding and-abetting theory.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is frequently used by the US law enforcement authorities to prosecute both US and foreign firms for bribery in foreign host countries. Evidence increasingly shows that anti-bribery enforcement is associated with a reduction in foreign investment inflows to host countries associated with enforcement actions. The determinants of enforcement actions remain understudied, however. I argue that enforcement actions are often political in nature, operating as de-facto sanctions against targeted countries. FCPA prosecutions can thus be viewed as a tool of economic statecraft, designed to reduce foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to targeted states and enforce US foreign policy objectives. Using data on FCPA enforcement actions along with data on UN voting patterns, alliances, and US foreign aid, I find that FCPA enforcement actions are more likely to target firms that bribe in host countries with foreign policy preferences that diverge from the United States. This paper is among the first to empirically study the determinants of anti-bribery enforcement and to explicitly consider the political nature of FCPA prosecutions. These findings have broad implication for political economy research on foreign investment, economic statecraft, and corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coping with corruption has emerged as a critical task of the global community. In this milieu, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is arguably an important contribution to the global fight against corruption. At the same time, however, robust application of the FCPA revealed various legal issues and problems. The FCPA's broad scope of application, for example, is one such problem. Ambiguous statutory terms are another. One area where robust FCPA application occurs is the defense sector. Because of the vast amount of public budget at stake and regulation of outside monitoring to protect the sensitive nature of the industry, the closed environment where defense contractors operate makes the defense industry an apt target of the FCPA. As such, the FCPA consistently served as an enforcement mechanism against defense contractors and their transactions. One peculiarity found in many defense contracts is the inclusion of an agreement provision that binds both the United States (U.S.) party and non-U.S. party to the FCPA. Such a provision in private contracts runs the risk of usurping the jurisdictional sovereignty of the foreign state to which non-U.S. contractors belong. This concern has become more acute due to increased application and enforcement of the FCPA in extraterritorial contexts. To curb jurisdictional usurpation, a more sustainable, global application of the FCPA is to establish a state-to-state bilateral agreement that specifically addresses the subject of anti-corruption and related enforcement cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A handful of nations spearhead the global anti-corruption regime through the transnational enforcement of foreign bribery laws. These laws prohibit corporations with a connection to the enforcing nation from paying or offering bribes to the officials of a foreign nation. Enforcement agencies construe the extraterritorial application of these laws broadly, establishing their global prominence. The most notable example is the United States Department of Justice's enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). Enforcement agencies typically resolve investigations against corporations through deferred prosecution agreements and other consensual settlement mechanisms known generally as non-trial resolutions. Fines and penalties paid pursuant to these agreements can extend beyond the billion-dollar mark. In most cases, money paid in fines and penalties goes to the treasury of the enforcing nation. However, a movement has emerged that advocates for the sharing of proceeds of non-trial resolutions with the victims of foreign bribery, namely, citizens and governments in the developing world. This movement is complemented by a small number of instances in which non-trial resolutions have been used to provide remediation in this manner. However, these cases do not reveal a coherent approach to remediation, and enforcement agencies do not have the benefit of any kind of conceptual or practical framework to guide the provision of remediation. The extant literature also fails to consider the many political and practical difficulties of coupling transnational foreign bribery enforcement with a remedial agenda. The purpose of this Article is to address the practicalities of when and how remediation might be written into the terms of non-trial resolutions. To achieve this goal, this Article assumes two functions. First, it offers a conceptual framework to underpin remediation by defining elusive notions such as harm, victimhood, and remediation itself. Second, it presents a list of factors to guide the provision of remediation in foreign bribery cases. The shared benefit of these conceptual and practical frameworks is that they allow remediation in foreign bribery settlements to be approached with newfound precision. These frameworks are ultimately geared toward moving practice forward in this fledging field by improving the consistency of outcomes and developing a body of precedent and best practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses issues in the compliance of corporations to government regulations and laws. Also cited are the obligations of personnel to comply with the law and their organization's code of conduct, the possible effects of noncompliance to customer satisfaction, stock prices, and employee performance, and the enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Under Canada's Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA), Canadian individuals and corporations that pay bribes to public officials abroad may be subject to criminal liability at home. This article analyzes the CFPOA by focusing on specific risk factors which may be confronted by Canadian corporations operating in China. While these risk factors have been identified in American Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prosecutions and American academic commentary, this article asks whether Canadian companies may face a similar scope of liability under the CFPOA. To answer this question, the article looks to three main risk factors from the Chinese business environment, evaluating whether they are likely to generate CFPOA liability. Given the paucity of case law in this area, the analysis largely relies on a comparative analysis of the text and interpretation of the CFPOA versus the FCPA. Ultimately, the article finds that these China-related risk factors expand the potential scope of CFPOA liability for Canadian corporations in China. Additionally, some general lessons are offered on how the analysis performed here for China-specific risk may have wider applicability and can be used to inform lawyers' advice to corporations devising anti-bribery strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits U.S.-related firms from making bribes abroad. We analyze the FCPA's effects in a model of competition between a U.S. and foreign firm for contracts in a host country. If the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it reduces that firm's competitiveness and either increases bribery by the foreign firm or reduces overall investment. If the FCPA also applies to foreign firms, it reduces total bribery, and in host countries with high corruption levels, it increases total investment. The model suggests that the FCPA will deter bribery and stimulate investment while not disadvantaging U.S. firms if its enforcement is aimed at firms who engaged in bribery in highly corrupt countries and whose main competitors are also subject to the FCPA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the anti-corruption, ethics, and compliance landscape that has changed dramatically. Topics include reports that direct consequence of a global anticorruption enforcement effort led by the United States through its enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; and examines that increase in anti-corruption enforcement has profoundly impacted large, multinational corporations.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) explicitly defines the categories of entities subject to its provisions. One such category refers to any "agent of a domestic concern." But what exactly is an agent of a domestic concern? In United States v. Hoskins, the Second Circuit decidedly refused to answer that question. This Note argues that, in the context of cross-border bribery, an agent of a domestic concern has a specific definition: a local third-party contracted by a non-local supplier to serve as a representative and to facilitate the movement of bribe payments between that supplier (the briber) and a local consumer (the bribee). In making this argument, this Note underscores the significance of the Organisation for the Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention) and its effect on FCPA enforcement. Part II provides background information to the FCPA and examines the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Hoskins. Part III explores the importance of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and juxtaposes this Note's proposed definition of an agent of a domestic concern with traditional principles of agency. Part IV applies this Note's proposed definition of an agent of a domestic concern to the facts of United States v. Hoskins and explains why courts should adopt this definition as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes the history and purpose of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and highlights the exponential uptick in prosecutions since 1977. Topics include the role of nonprofits and non-governmental organizations in international civil society and the corruption risks that U.S.-based nonprofits face when operating overseas; Act's anti-bribery provisions; and devastating financial and reputational effects that internal investigations can have on grant-funded nonprofits.

In an effort to increase accountability and compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in recent years both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) have held parent companies liable for the anti-bribery violations of their subsidiaries. Scholars and practitioners have argued that the two government agencies are applying an aggressive enforcement policy based on an overly expansive understanding of agency principles. However, because most investigations settle with deferred or non-prosecution agreements, a paucity of FCPA case law prevents corporations, prosecutors, and even judges from clearly understanding what the correct standards are for determining when a parent company is liable for the actions of its subsidiaries--especially under a principal-agent theory of liability. This Note is the first to challenge the narrative that the DOJ and SEC are improperly enforcing the FCPA antibribery provisions. It delineates the ways in which a parent can be liable for the misconduct of its subsidiaries before analyzing liability predicated on a principalagent relationship and the amount of control required to establish such a relationship. It then provides a novel formulation of the correct standard to use in assessing whether an agency relationship exists, based on the Third Restatement of Agency and corporate case law. This Note then assesses DOJ and SEC cases before concluding that while the agencies are correct in holding parent companies liable for the misconduct of their subsidiaries, they are applying agency theories inconsistently, exacerbating the existing confusion as to what the correct standards are for parent companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Foreign anti-corruption laws--laws that prohibit businesses from paying bribes abroad--present a puzzle. Why would the government of one country care to prevent corruption in other countries, especially when such laws harm domestic businesses? Unregulated foreign competitors can continue to pay bribes and win contracts while domestic companies suffer. Yet foreign anti-corruption laws now span the globe. We offer an interest-group account of the spread of foreign anti-corruption laws. Our account is bottom-up and focused on private interest groups, rather than top-down and focused on state institutions. We look at domestic political interests in the United States and abroad to explain both the enactment and the enforcement of foreign anti-corruption laws. Our principal focus is on each country's business lobby. Our account explains observed patterns of enactment and enforcement of foreign anti-corruption laws and generates predictions concerning the efficacy of such laws based on the extraterritorial operations of multinational businesses. It also suggests a limitation on the spread of such laws into countries with few or no multinational corporations and, therefore, no realistic extraterritorial enforcement risk. The essential features of our account are: (1) after the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") was enacted in 1977, U.S. businesses pressured the government to urge foreign governments to ratify multilateral anti-corruption treaties to bind foreign companies to similar anti-bribery restrictions; (2) these treaties required all signatory nations to enact foreign anti-corruption laws, which, in the United States, led to statutory amendments to the FCPA that enabled government agencies to apply the FCPA to foreign companies doing business in the United States; (3) as foreign companies operating in the United States were subject to FCPA enforcement, they supported or acquiesced in home-country enforcement of foreign anti-corruption laws to "level the playing field" against companies that did not face FCPA enforcement risk; and (4) going forward, the proliferation of enforcement of foreign anti-corruption laws among a dominant, hegemonic group of capital-exporting countries (a "k-group") may result in the global establishment of an anticorruption norm, with China potentially playing the role of counterhegemon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1977, the U.S. enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), the first law of its kind in the world governing the conduct of domestic actors in their interactions with foreign officials in foreign markets. Four decades later, this Article addresses the salient question of whether the FCPA has been successful in achieving its objectives. In addressing this difficult question, various plausible meanings of FCPA success are offered and analyzed through various FCPA enforcement statistics, FCPA enforcement agency statements, qualitative FCPA data points, and other FCPA relevant information. While answering the question posed by this Article may be inconclusive, the main goal of this Article is to foster a dialogue on the best meaning of FCPA success and force those in the FCPA space to pause, reflect, and come to their own conclusions whether the FCPA, in its four decades, has been successful in achieving its objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current power and influence of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") is really quite remarkable when one considers the statute was largely ignored for the first twenty-five years of its existence. This statute, meant to reign in corruption by United States companies doing business abroad, has generated billions of dollars in revenue for the United States government; prompted the development of law firm practice groups and law school courses; become the subject of numerous scholarly articles; and has, arguably, made anti-bribery efforts the highest of priorities for multinational corporations engaged in robust compliance efforts. Corporations, scholars, and the public would be silly to discount the importance of understanding and maintaining compliance with the FCPA and its international counterparts. And yet, might it be that prioritization of FCPA compliance is misguided in some instances? This Essay argues that governmental actors, industry leaders, corporations, and scholars must critically assess whether the current focus on FCPA compliance has created an environment where the FCPA has developed an outsized influence within corporations' compliance efforts. This Essay asks firms to consider whether they have become so concerned with ensuring compliance with the FCPA that they sometimes fail to identify other areas of risk that are equally, and in some instances, more serious. Specifically, firms might assess whether they sometimes (i) miss when there are broader deficiencies within their compliance programs; (ii) fail to see trends across compliance areas involving diverse regulatory and legal areas; and (iii) improperly prioritize necessary revisions to their compliance programs after significant misconduct is discovered. Instead of starting with the FCPA when creating a compliance program, this Essay urges firms to assess their risks more broadly and develop compliance programs closely targeted to their risk profiles while paying careful attention not to allow the FCPA to dominate those efforts. By doing so, firms can appropriately guard against potential FCPA compliance failures while also ensuring that they properly consider and address other regulatory and legal areas of concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") is a federal law that criminalizes bribery of foreign government officials. The United States Department of Justice and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission typically settle FCPA charges against companies, and so enforcement of this law largely occurs outside the judicial process. This Article discusses two implications of this extrajudicial enforcement. First, it leaves organizations facing a broad risk of foreign bribery given the government's tendency to apply the FCPA to its farthest reaches. This causes business organizations to expand the scope of their anti-corruption compliance and ethics programs, which increases the costs of these programs and interferes with doing business. Second, the government's FCPA settlements provide relatively fine-grained guidance concerning effective anti-corruption compliance and ethics programs, which may encourage business organizations to develop more credible programs. Since both implications of extrajudicial enforcement suggest practical consequences for business organizations, this Article suggests further study to understand the existence or degree of these tendencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") was not necessarily needed to combat bribery and corruption when it was adopted in 1977, it has helped shape corporate governance standards worldwide. This Article examines the four decades of the FCPA. It begins by reviewing the origins of the Act, looking at the context in which the Act emerged, and summarizing key provisions of the FCPA. The Article then highlights important developments under the FCPA. The Article concludes by providing core lessons on the subject of FCPA training and the impact the FCPA has had over the last forty years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the effect of external stimuli in curbing corruption at the national level? This article analyses the intervening impact of EU post-conditionality and GRECO monitoring on countries' anti-corruption record. It finds that "soft governance" has a positive impact and stimulates national responses against corruption. This positive influence increases when is additionally conditioned by strong internal stimuli targeting corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The USA vigorously enforces its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), increasingly on an extraterritorial basis. The application of the FCPA to persons and circumstances outside the territory of the US shapes international anti-corruption efforts in ways that may run counter to effective governance practices and meaningful anti-corruption reform in the global economy. This short essay explores three aspects of FCPA enforcement which detract from the broader goals of global anti-corruption governance: the narrow conception of corruption upon which the FCPA is based, the strategic trade frame which underlies the FCPA's internationalization, and the legitimacy problems these raise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite widespread interest in corruption and how to root it out, the problem continues to grow. Anti-corruption strategies and methods have proved ineffective in achieving lasting reductions in corruption. Anti-corruption academic research has not been free of criticism, and part of the problem is its emphasis on macro-level analysis. The case studies in corruption and anti-corruption in this symposium focus on specific areas that have received surprisingly little attention in the literature: the effectiveness of political finance supervisory bodies; the impact of European Union post-conditionality on anti-corruption efforts; and the increased use of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in shaping the way that corruption is conceptualised and combated on a global scale. Together, the articles in this symposium offer some novel insights and approaches to the issue of how best to understand and assess different ways of addressing corruption in specific sectors which have received insufficient attention in the literature to date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases involving China, and China's anti-bribery law. Topics discussed include the provisions of the FCPA, anti-bribery provisions and agencies enforcing bribery and corruption in China, and the country's business culture and the economic system. Also mentioned are the differences between China's anti-bribery laws and the FCPA, and the wide-array of potential FCPA violations.

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") criminalizes foreign bribery by (1) American defendants; (2) defendants who trade stocks in the United States or register with the SEC; and (3) foreign defendants who act in furtherance of foreign bribery while inside the United States It imposes accounting requirements on some potential defendants. Congress meant the FCPA to help developing countries eliminate bribery, and, in so doing, advance U.S. economic and political interests. However, the FCPA has some fundamental flaws--flaws which U.S. enforcement agencies have particularly abused of late. The FCPA is vague. The reticence of defendants to go to trial has kept the courts from clarifying it and allowed prosecutors to interpret it however they like. The FCPA is also imperialist. These problems can be rectified by repealing the anti-bribery provisions and replacing them with a modified accounting requirement inspired by but independent from the accounting provisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under U.S. federal law, a corporation can be held criminally liable for the crimes of its employees and agents. The Department of Justice's U.S. Attorneys' Manual lays out a list of factors prosecutors can evaluate when deciding whether or not to prosecute a corporate entity. The Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors have various tools at their disposal, including deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) as alternatives to going to trial. Prosecutors have used DPAs and NPAs in recent cases, allowing the government to ensure that corporate entities comply with investigations, enact compliance programs, and continue to follow laws and regulations. The use of DPAs and NPAs are on the rise, and these agreements are now used in cases concerning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and the U.S. Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC). Comments from the Trump Administration suggest that these agreements will continue to be used to deter corporate criminal misconduct. Many Latin American countries have recently enacted laws to impose corporate criminal liability and use some type of compliance-based program to help deter future wrongdoing. Mexico, in particular, has recently amended its Federal Penal Code to prosecute and punish corporate entities. Since the Mexican case law in this area is still developing, it is very important that Mexico adopt deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or a variation thereof that require compliance programs to enhance the public perception of the Mexican government and the judiciary. Mexico is just one of many countries amending its laws, suggesting a shift toward an implied understanding of the importance of a compliance-oriented approach. Foreign jurisdictions and the U.S. DOJ continue to enact programs to help regulate laws and deter criminal activity in many industries. The acceptance of the corporate criminal liability doctrine in several jurisdictions promotes the public interest and the integrity of the legal system, deters future illegal activity, and helps ensure corporate compliance with the law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose To explain a recent enforcement action by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) highlighting risk factors for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations.Design/methodology/approach Summarizes the basis of the SEC's enforcement action against Sanofi for violating the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions, reviews the terms of the SEC's resolution with Sanofi, explains Sanofi's remedial efforts and cooperation with the SEC's investigation, and discusses factors contributing to corruption risks in the healthcare industry.Findings The SEC's enforcement action against Sanofi, and other recent enforcement actions, underscore the importance of comprehensive anti-corruption compliance programs and strong internal controls across large multinationals and their subsidiaries.Practical implications Companies operating in high-risk industries and markets should regularly assess and address corruption risks.Originality/value Practical guidance from experienced enforcement lawyers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Long-established major U.S. corporations such as McDonald's, Walmart, and Proctor and Gamble continue to derive a majority of revenues from foreign operations. In addition, a number of relatively new U.S. technology companies such as: Airbnb (founded in 2008); Facebook (founded in 2004); Snap (founded in 2011); Twitter (founded in 2006); and Uber (founded in 2009), find themselves deep into international markets, often within just a few years of creation, and certainly by the end of their first decade of operation. Increased international commerce results in the potential for greater exposure to global demands for bribery. Bribery and corruption remains a cancer eating away at the ability of nation states to provide for their citizens. Corrupt payments siphon off funds that might otherwise be used to: provide housing; feed the hungry; fight poverty, illness and disease; and educate the masses. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework offers a valuable tool in the anti-fraud struggle and in FCPA and U.K. Bribery Act compliance. COSO's 2017 update to the Enterprise Risk Management--Integrated Framework addresses developments during recent years in integrating risk with strategy into the ERM process. Our paper proceeds in eight parts. First, we discuss the bribery and corruption problem. Second, a discussion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is presented. Third, we describe the U.K. Bribery Act. Fourth, we discuss the development and evolution of the COSO ERM Framework. Fifth, we apply the COSO ERM Framework as an anti-fraud strategy to assist in compliance with the FCPA and U.K. Bribery Act. Sixth, we discuss the application of Deferred Prosecution Agreements to the FCPA and their relevance to COSO ERM. Next, we explore the likely changes in FCPA enforcement under the Trump Administration and then we conclude. We believe this Article contributes to the bribery and corruption literature by exploring the potential benefits of the COSO framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article identifies the drastic differences in implementation and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention norms. Since its adoption and entry into force in 1999, the international community and parties to the Convention still struggle with combatting foreign bribery. The United States is a leader in implementation through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but other nations do not have similar domestic statutes and rigor in enforcement or adequate administrative structures for mutual legal assistance or penalties. This Article provides an introduction to the United States and International efforts to curb acts of bribery, provides an overview of the norms and mechanisms for enforcement under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and then analyzes the actual progress of selected G20 nations by examining the most recent Phase 3 peer-review reports and any follow-up recommendations. This data indicates that there are countries with high enforcement, moderate enforcement, and little or no enforcement. To better discourage foreign bribery in the future, OECD countries should provide more uniform and longer domestic statute of limitations, clear implementing legislation like the FCPA in the United States, national procedures for investigating bribery and coordinating administrative bodies, whistleblower protection, and more severe national penalties and confiscation of bribery funds. This will capture the spirit of the Convention and pave the way for more uniformity in deterring foreign bribery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses aspects of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) which help fight corruption in the business enterprises. It highlights the imposition of monetary sanctions and penalties for the companies that failed to comply the requirements. It also cites the importance of the FCPA for internal controls and software monitoring systems for large multinational corporations.