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The article investigates whether there is a need for legislative action in social networks—which are similar to broadcasting—to ensure that diversity of opinion can be sufficiently expressed to protect freedom of opinion-forming. The investigation focuses on Facebook because it has the largest number of registered users worldwide and is thus the network with the greatest reach. First and foremost, it will be debated whether social networks have a power of opinion comparable to broadcasting. Based on this foundation, it is possible to assess the extent to which diversity of opinion is expressed in social networks and the extent to which freedom to form opinions is actually under threat.

The redesign of data protection in the police and judicial area is intended to create uniformity at the European level for the citizens of EU Member States. This scientific article analyses the subject of data protection in law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The focus is primarily on the existing provisions and the latest developments of the EU with regard to Directive (EU) 2016/680 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. The international level with regard to data protection in the police and judicial area and possible changes due to the developments in data protection under European law are also examined in more detail.

Certain platform operators serve as both suppliers of goods on the platform and sources of business opportunities. Platforms on which the operator himself is a provider, i.e. his own user, is referred to as hybrid or dual-role platforms. The platform operator can set and enforce the platform rules itself. Unfair treatment can take many forms, from a modification of the product ranking to the removal of products or the supplier from the platform. The ranking of products on the platform must necessarily put one provider's product ahead of another's and the platform operator must regulate in some way which providers are allowed on the platform and which are excluded from the platform. Thus, the question is whether these rules and their enforcement must be objectively justified or whether the platform operator can act on its own. This article discusses the concept of 'self-favoring.' Whether private law places restrictions on this kind of action or if the platform operator has the right to handle independently will be analyzed below. The analysis aims to furnish details regarding the operator's essential powers on his platform, which are a manifestation of the notably partial exercise of regulatory power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In some markets, there has been a spike in digitization. There may be changes in the market structure as a result of this, as well as an increase in the market strength of some huge digital enterprises. In light of this, the role of abuse control in digital markets is projected to grow in importance in the coming years. At the national and union levels, efforts are now being made to tighten abuse control on internet platforms. This thesis examines a number of topics relating to internet platform competition and market power, such as the criteria for determining market power of digital platforms and the method to follow in circumstances where the market tends to "tip" permanently in favor of a platform. Another question is whether the principles of Art. 102 TFEU appear sufficient in terms of market power in digital platforms. Central to this is the consideration that a special platform regulation, where dominant platform companies will be subject to additional obligations and stricter monitoring beyond Art. 102 TFEU could be a useful addition to the existing merger regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]