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We consider the identification of non-causal systems with arbitrary switching modes (NCS-ASM), a class of models essential for describing typical power load management and department store inventory dynamics. The simultaneous identification of causal-and-anticausal subsystems, along with the presence of possibly random switching sequences, however, make the overall identification problem particularly challenging. To this end, we develop an expectation-maximization (EM) based system identification technique, where the E-step proposes a modified Kalman filter (KF) to estimate the states and switching sequences of causal-and-anticausal subsystems, while the M-step consists in a switching least-squares algorithm to estimate the parameters of individual subsystems. We establish the main convergence features of the proposed identification procedure, also providing bounds on the parameter estimation errors under mild conditions. Finally, the effectiveness of our identification method is validated through two numerical simulations.

We design a computational approach to find equilibria in a class of Nash games possessing a hierarchical structure. By using tools from mixed-integer programming and the characterization of variational equilibria in terms of the Karush--Kuhn--Tucker conditions, we propose a mixed-integer game formulation for solving such a challenging instance. Besides providing an equivalent reformulation, we build upon our previous work and design a proximal Gauss--Seidel method with global convergence guarantees for the case in which the game enjoys a potential structure. In addition to proving the convergence of the resulting scheme, we show its performance on a numerical instance of a ride-hail market problem., Comment: submitted as a conference proceeding

We consider the problem of designing a machine learning-based model of an unknown dynamical system from a finite number of (state-input)-successor state data points, such that the model obtained is also suitable for optimal control design. We propose a specific neural network (NN) architecture that yields a hybrid system with piecewise-affine dynamics that is differentiable with respect to the network's parameters, thereby enabling the use of derivative-based training procedures. We show that a careful choice of our NN's weights produces a hybrid system model with structural properties that are highly favourable when used as part of a finite horizon optimal control problem (OCP). Specifically, we show that optimal solutions with strong local optimality guarantees can be computed via nonlinear programming, in contrast to classical OCPs for general hybrid systems which typically require mixed-integer optimization. In addition to being well-suited for optimal control design, numerical simulations illustrate that our NN-based technique enjoys very similar performance to state-of-the-art system identification methodologies for hybrid systems and it is competitive on nonlinear benchmarks.

We study coalitional games with exogenous uncertainty in the coalition value, in which each agent is allowed to have private samples of the uncertainty. As a consequence, the agents may have a different perception of stability of the grand coalition. In this context, we propose a novel methodology to study the out-of-sample coalitional rationality of allocations in the set of stable allocations (i.e., the core). Our analysis builds on the framework of probably approximately correct learning. Initially, we state a priori and a posteriori guarantees for the entire core. Furthermore, we provide a distributed algorithm to compute a compression set that determines the generalization properties of the a posteriori statements. We then refine our probabilistic robustness bounds by specialising the analysis to a single payoff allocation, taking, also in this case, both a priori and a posteriori approaches. Finally, we consider a relaxed $\zeta$-core to include nearby allocations and also address the case of empty core. For this case, probabilistic statements are given on the eventual stability of allocations in the $\zeta$-core.

We characterize the convergence properties of traditional best-response (BR) algorithms in computing solutions to mixed-integer Nash equilibrium problems (MI-NEPs) that turn into a class of monotone Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs) once relaxed the integer restrictions. We show that the sequence produced by a Jacobi/Gauss-Seidel BR method always approaches a bounded region containing the entire solution set of the MI-NEP, whose tightness depends on the problem data, and it is related to the degree of strong monotonicity of the relaxed NEP. When the underlying algorithm is applied to the relaxed NEP, we establish data-dependent complexity results characterizing its convergence to the unique solution of the NEP. In addition, we derive one of the very few sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions to MI-NEPs. The theoretical results developed bring important practical benefits, illustrated on a numerical instance of a smart building control application.

We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making use of traditional tools borrowed from robust optimization, for this class of problems we derive a tractable, finite-dimensional reformulation leading to a deterministic ''extended game'', and we show that this latter still amounts to a GNEP featuring generalized Nash equilibria ''in the worst-case''. We then design a fully-distributed, accelerated algorithm based on monotone operator theory, which enjoys convergence towards a Nash equilibrium of the original, uncertain game under weak structural assumptions. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed distributed scheme through numerical simulations, Comment: Accepted at European Control Conference (ECC) 2023

We propose a counter-example guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS) scheme for the design of control Lyapunov functions and associated state-feedback controllers for linear systems affected by parametric uncertainty with arbitrary shape. In the CEGIS framework, a learner iteratively proposes a candidate control Lyapunov function and a tailored controller by solving a linear matrix inequality (LMI) feasibility problem, while a verifier either falsifies the current candidate by producing a counter-example to be considered at the next iteration, or it certifies that the tentative control Lyapunov function actually enjoys such feature. We investigate the Lipschitz continuity of the objective function of the global optimization problem solved by the verifier, which is key to establish the convergence of our method in a finite number of iterations. Numerical simulations confirm the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Modern socio-technical systems typically consist of many interconnected users and competing service providers, where notions like market equilibrium are tightly connected to the ``evolution'' of the network of users. In this paper, we model the users' dynamics as a linear dynamical system, and the service providers as agents taking part to a generalized Nash game, whose outcome coincides with the input of the users' dynamics. We thus characterize the notion of co-evolution of the market and the network dynamics and derive dissipativity-based conditions leading to a pertinent notion of equilibrium. We then focus on the control design and adopt the light-touch policy to incentivize or penalize the service providers as little as possible, while steering the networked system to a desirable outcome. We also provide a dimensionality-reduction procedure, which offers network-size independent conditions. Finally, we illustrate our novel notions and algorithms on a simulation setup stemming from digital market regulations for influencers, a topic of growing interest.

To identify a stationary action profile for a population of competitive agents, each executing private strategies, we introduce a novel active-learning scheme where a centralized external observer (or entity) can probe the agents' reactions and recursively update simple local parametric estimates of the action-reaction mappings. Under very general working assumptions (not even assuming that a stationary profile exists), sufficient conditions are established to assess the asymptotic properties of the proposed active learning methodology so that, if the parameters characterizing the action-reaction mappings converge, a stationary action profile is achieved. Such conditions hence act also as certificates for the existence of such a profile. Extensive numerical simulations involving typical competitive multi-agent control and decision-making problems illustrate the practical effectiveness of the proposed learning-based approach., Comment: Python package available at https://github.com/bemporad/gnep-learn

We propose fully-distributed algorithms for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. We first consider the case where local constraints are present and we design an algorithm combining, for each agent, (i) the projected pseudo-gradient descent and (ii) a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the aggregative variable. To handle coupling constraints arising in generalized settings, we propose another distributed algorithm based on (i) a recently emerged augmented primal-dual scheme and (ii) two tracking mechanisms to reconstruct, for each agent, both the aggregative variable and the coupling constraint satisfaction. Leveraging tools from singular perturbations analysis, we prove linear convergence to the Nash equilibrium for both schemes. Finally, we run extensive numerical simulations to confirm the effectiveness of our methods and compare them with state-of-the-art distributed equilibrium-seeking algorithms.

We consider the design of fast and reliable neural network (NN)-based approximations of traditional stabilizing controllers for linear systems with polytopic uncertainty, including control laws with variable structure and those based on a (minimal) selection policy. Building upon recent approaches for the design of reliable control surrogates with guaranteed structural properties, we develop a systematic procedure to certify the closed-loop stability and performance of a linear uncertain system when a trained rectified linear unit (ReLU)-based approximation replaces such traditional controllers. First, we provide a sufficient condition, which involves the worst-case approximation error between ReLU-based and traditional controller-based state-to-input mappings, ensuring that the system is ultimately bounded within a set with adjustable size and convergence rate. Then, we develop an offline, mixed-integer optimization-based method that allows us to compute that quantity exactly.

The presence of uncertainties in the ride-hailing market complicates the pricing strategies of on-demand platforms that compete each other to offer a mobility service while striving to maximize their profit. Looking at this problem as a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP), we design a distributed, stochastic equilibrium seeking algorithm with Tikhonov regularization to find an optimal pricing strategy. Remarkably, the proposed iterative scheme does not require an increasing (possibly infinite) number of samples of the random variable to perform the stochastic approximation, thus making it appealing from a practical perspective. Moreover, we show that the algorithm returns a Nash equilibrium under mere monotonicity assumption and a careful choice of the step size sequence, obtained by exploiting the specific structure of the SGNEP at hand. We finally corroborate our results on a numerical instance of the on-demand ride-hailing market.

We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the agents update through iterations by choosing an exact optimal strategy; ii) the game admits an exact potential and the agents adopt approximated optimal responses. By exploiting the properties of integer-compatible regularization functions used as penalty terms, we show that both algorithms converge to either an exact or an $\epsilon$-approximate equilibrium. We corroborate our findings on a numerical instance of a Cournot oligopoly model.

We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision a scenario in which the formal expression of the underlying potential function is not available, and we design a semi-decentralized Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm. In the proposed two-layer scheme, a coordinator iteratively integrates the (possibly noisy and sporadic) agents' feedback to learn the pseudo-gradients of the agents, and then design personalized incentives for them. On their side, the agents receive those personalized incentives, compute a solution to an extended game, and then return feedback measurements to the coordinator. In the stationary setting, our algorithm returns a Nash equilibrium in case the coordinator is endowed with standard learning policies, while it returns a Nash equilibrium up to a constant, yet adjustable, error in the time-varying case. As a motivating application, we consider the ridehailing service provided by several companies with mobility as a service orchestration, necessary to both handle competition among firms and avoid traffic congestion, which is also adopted to run numerical experiments verifying our results., Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2111.03854

In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the grand coalition to form subcoalitions for unseen realizations of the uncertain parameter. In case the set of stable allocations, the so called core of the game, is empty, we propose a randomized relaxation of the core. We then show that those allocations that belong to this relaxed set can be accompanied by stability guarantees in a probably approximately correct fashion. Finally, numerical experiments corroborate our theoretical findings.

A common problem affecting neural network (NN) approximations of model predictive control (MPC) policies is the lack of analytical tools to assess the stability of the closed-loop system under the action of the NN-based controller. We present a general procedure to quantify the performance of such a controller, or to design minimum complexity NNs with rectified linear units (ReLUs) that preserve the desirable properties of a given MPC scheme. By quantifying the approximation error between NN-based and MPC-based state-to-input mappings, we first establish suitable conditions involving two key quantities, the worst-case error and the Lipschitz constant, guaranteeing the stability of the closed-loop system. We then develop an offline, mixed-integer optimization-based method to compute those quantities exactly. Together these techniques provide conditions sufficient to certify the stability and performance of a ReLU-based approximation of an MPC control law.

We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several real-world applications. For this reason, we propose a two-layer Nash equilibrium seeking scheme in which a central coordinator exploits noisy feedback from the agents to design personalized incentives for them. By making use of those incentives, the agents compute a solution to an extended game, and then return feedback measures to the coordinator. We show that our algorithm returns an equilibrium if the coordinator is endowed with standard learning policies, and corroborate our results on a numerical instance of a hypomonotone game.

During an ongoing epidemic, especially in the case of a new agent, data are partial and sparse, also affected by external factors as for example climatic effects or preparedness and response capability of healthcare structures. Despite that we showed how, under some universality assumptions, it is possible to extract strategic insights by modelling the pandemic trough a probabilistic Polya urn scheme. In the Polya framework, we provide both the distribution of infected cases and the asymptotic estimation of the incidence rate, showing that data are consistent with a general underlying process at different scales. Using European confirmed cases and diagnostic test data on COVID-19 , we provided an extensive comparison among European countries and between Europe and Italy at regional scale, for both the two big waves of infection. We globally estimated an incidence rate in accordance with previous studies. On the other hand, this quantity could play a crucial role as a proxy variable for an unbiased estimation of the real incidence rate, including symptomatic and asymptomatic cases., Comment: 22 pages, 15 figures

We evaluate the robustness of agents' traffic equilibria in randomized routing games characterized by an uncertain network demand with a possibly unknown probability distribution. Specifically, we extend the so-called hose model by considering a traffic equilibrium model where the uncertain network demand configuration belongs to a polyhedral set, whose shape is itself a-priori unknown. By exploiting available data, we apply the scenario approach theory to establish distribution-free feasibility guarantees for agents' traffic equilibria of the uncertain routing game without the need to know an explicit characterization of such set. A numerical example on a traffic network testbed corroborates the proposed theoretical results.

This paper studies the extremum seeking control (ESC) problem for a class of constrained nonlinear systems. Specifically, we focus on a family of constraints allowing to reformulate the original nonlinear system in the so-called input-output normal form. To steer the system to optimize a performance function without knowing its explicit form, we propose a novel numerical optimization-based extremum seeking control (NOESC) design consisting of a constrained numerical optimization method and an inversion based feedforward controller. In particular, a projected gradient descent algorithm is exploited to produce the state sequence to optimize the performance function, whereas a suitable boundary value problem accommodates the finite-time state transition between each two consecutive points of the state sequence. Compared to available NOESC methods, the proposed approach i) can explicitly deal with output constraints; ii) the performance function can consider a direct dependence on the states of the internal dynamics; iii) the internal dynamics do not have to be necessarily stable. The effectiveness of the proposed ESC scheme is shown through extensive numerical simulations.

We provide out-of-sample certificates on the controlled invariance property of a given set with respect to a class of black-box linear systems. Specifically, we consider linear time-invariant models whose state space matrices are known only to belong to a certain family due to a possibly inexact quantification of some parameters. By exploiting a set of realizations of those undetermined parameters, verifying the controlled invariance property of the given set amounts to a linear program, whose feasibility allows us to establish an a-posteriori probabilistic certificate on the controlled invariance property of such a set with respect to the nominal linear time-invariant dynamics. The proposed framework is applied to the control of a networked multi-agent system with unknown weighted graph.

A well-known property of linear resistive electrical networks is that the current distribution minimizes the total dissipated energy. When the circuit includes resistors with nonlinear monotonic characteristic, the current distribution minimizes in general a different functional. We show that, if the nonlinear characteristic is a threshold-like function and the energy generator is concentrated in a single point, as in the case of lightning or dielectric discharge, then the current flow is concentrated along a single path, which is a minimum path to the ground with respect to the threshold. We also propose a dynamic model that explains and qualitatively reproduces the lightning transient behaviour: initial generation of several plasma branches and subsequent dismissal of all branches but the one reaching the ground first, which is the optimal one.

We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem, and after equivalently recasting the Stackelberg game as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC), we iteratively convexify a regularized version of the MPCC as inner problem, whose solution generates a sequence of feasible descent directions for the original MPCC. Thus, by pursuing a descent direction at every outer iteration, we establish convergence to a local Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the proposed algorithm is tested on a numerical case study involving a hierarchical instance of the charging coordination of Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs).

We address the problem of assessing the robustness of the equilibria in uncertain, multi-agent games. Specifically, we focus on generalized Nash equilibrium problems in aggregative form subject to linear coupling constraints affected by uncertainty with a possibly unknown probability distribution. Within a data-driven context, we apply the scenario approach paradigm to provide a-posteriori feasibility certificates for the entire set of generalized Nash equilibria of the game. Then, we show that assessing the violation probability of such set merely requires to enumerate the constraints that ``shape'' it. For the class of aggregative games, this results in solving a feasibility problem on each active facet of the feasibility region, for which we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm. We demonstrate our theoretical results by means of an academic example.

A new data-enabled control technique for uncertain linear time-invariant systems, recently conceived by Coulson et\ al., builds upon the direct optimization of controllers over input/output pairs drawn from a large dataset. We adopt an optimal transport-based method for compressing such large dataset to a smaller synthetic dataset of representative behaviours, aiming to alleviate the computational burden of controllers to be implemented online. Specifically, the synthetic data are determined by minimizing the Wasserstein distance between atomic distributions supported on both the original dataset and the compressed one. We show that a distributionally robust control law computed using the compressed data enjoys the same type of performance guarantees as the original dataset, at the price of enlarging the ambiguity set by an easily computable and well-behaved quantity. Numerical simulations confirm that the control performance with the synthetic data is comparable to the one obtained with the original data, but with significantly less computation required.

We develop a data-driven approach to the computation of a-posteriori feasibility certificates to the solution sets of variational inequalities affected by uncertainty. Specifically, we focus on instances of variational inequalities with a deterministic mapping and an uncertain feasibility set, and represent uncertainty by means of scenarios. Building upon recent advances in the scenario approach literature, we quantify the robustness properties of the entire set of solutions of a variational inequality, with feasibility set constructed using the scenario approach, against a new unseen realization of the uncertainty. Our results extend existing results that typically impose an assumption that the solution set is a singleton and require certain non-degeneracy properties, and thereby offer probabilistic feasibility guarantees to any feasible solution. We show that assessing the violation probability of an entire set of solutions, rather than of a singleton, requires enumeration of the support constraints that "shape" this set. Additionally, we propose a general procedure to enumerate the support constraints that does not require a closed form description of the solution set, which is unlikely to be available. We show that robust game theory problems can be modelling via uncertain variational inequalities, and illustrate our theoretical results through extensive numerical simulations on a case study involving an electric vehicle charging coordination problem.

We present semi-decentralized and distributed algorithms, designed via a preconditioned forward-backward operator splitting, for solving large-scale, decomposable semidefinite programs (SDPs). We exploit a chordal aggregate sparsity pattern assumption on the original SDP to obtain a set of mutually coupled SDPs defined on positive semidefinite (PSD) cones of reduced dimensions. We show that the proposed algorithms converge to a solution of the original SDP via iterations of reasonable computational cost. Finally, we compare the performances of the two proposed algorithms with respect to others available in the literature.

We consider the charge scheduling coordination of a fleet of plug-in electric vehicles, developing a hybrid decision-making framework for efficient and profitable usage of the distribution grid. Each charging dynamics, affected by the aggregate behavior of the whole fleet, is modelled as an inter-dependent, mixed-logical-dynamical system. The coordination problem is formalized as a generalized mixed-integer aggregative potential game, and solved via semi-decentralized implementation of a sequential best-response algorithm that leads to an approximated equilibrium of the game., Comment: Accepted to the 58th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2019 Nice

State convergence is essential in several scientific areas, e.g. multi-agent consensus/disagreement, distributed optimization, monotone game theory, multi-agent learning over time-varying networks. This paper is the first on state convergence in both continuous- and discrete-time linear systems affected by polytopic uncertainty. First, we characterize state convergence in linear time invariant systems via equivalent necessary and sufficient conditions. In the presence of uncertainty, we complement the canonical definition of (weak) convergence with a stronger notion of convergence, which requires the existence of a common kernel among the generator matrices of the difference/differential inclusion (strong convergence). We investigate under which conditions the two definitions are equivalent. Then, we characterize weak and strong convergence by means of Lyapunov and LaSalle arguments, (linear) matrix inequalities and separability of the eigenvalues of the generator matrices. We also show that, unlike asymptotic stability, state convergence lacks of duality.

In this paper, we show the equivalence between a constrained, multi-agent control problem, modeled within the port-Hamiltonian framework, and an exact potential game. Specifically, critical distance-based constraints determine a network of double-integrator agents, which can be represented as a graph. Virtual couplings, i.e., pairs of spring-damper, assigned to each edge of the graph, allow to synthesize a distributed, gradient-based control law that steers the network to an invariant set of stable configurations. We characterize the points belonging to such set as Nash equilibria of the associated potential game, relating the parameters of the virtual couplings with the equilibrium seeking problem, since they are crucial to shape the transient behaviour (i.e., the convergence) and, ideally, the set of reachable equilibria., Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures

Merging two Control Lyapunov Functions (CLFs) means creating a single "new-born" CLF by starting from two parents functions. Specifically, given a "father" function, shaped by the state constraints, and a "mother" function, designed with some optimality criterion, the merging CLF should be similar to the father close to the constraints and similar to the mother close to the origin. To successfully merge two CLFs, the control-sharing condition is crucial: the two functions must have a common control law that makes both Lyapunov derivatives simultaneously negative. Unfortunately, it is difficult to guarantee this property a-priori, i.e., while computing the two parents functions. In this paper, we propose a technique to create a constraint-shaped "father" function that has the control-sharing property with the "mother" function. To this end, we introduce a partial control-sharing, namely, the control-sharing only in the regions where the constraints are active. We show that imposing partial control-sharing is a convex optimization problem. Finally, we show how to apply the partial control-sharing for merging constraint-shaped functions and the Riccati-optimal functions, thus generating a CLF with bounded complexity that solves the constrained linear-quadratic stabilization problem with local optimality.

We propose a hybrid decision-making framework for safe and efficient autonomous driving of selfish vehicles on highways. Specifically, we model the dynamics of each vehicle as a Mixed-Logical-Dynamical system and propose simple driving rules to prevent potential sources of conflict among neighboring vehicles. We formalize the coordination problem as a generalized mixed-integer potential game, where an equilibrium solution generates a sequence of mixed-integer decisions for the vehicles that trade off individual optimality and overall safety.

We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to study convergence of linear fixed-point iterations and discrete- time linear systems. We mainly focus on the so-called Krasnoselskij-Mann iteration x(k+1) = ( 1 - \alpha(k) ) x(k) + \alpha(k) A x(k), which is relevant for distributed computation in optimization and game theory, when A is not available in a centralized way. We show that convergence to a vector in the kernel of (I-A) is equivalent to strict pseudocontractiveness of the linear operator x -> Ax. We also characterize some relevant operator-theoretic properties of linear operators via eigenvalue location and linear matrix inequalities. We apply the convergence conditions to multi-agent linear systems with vanishing step sizes, in particular, to linear consensus dynamics and equilibrium seeking in monotone linear-quadratic games.