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Just a few decades ago, we viewed airpower primarily as rated aircrews operating combat aircraft and dropping bombs on targets. Today, it means so much more. For example, 16 of the 18 Airmen whose heroic accomplishments are highlighted in the latest edition of the Air Force chief of staff s Portraits in Courage are not flyers, and 15 are enlisted personnel. All of them, however, delivered airpower on the front lines of combat, whether driving convoys, disposing of explosive ordnance, providing security outside the wire, serving as instructors to Afghan and Iraqi forces, or calling in precision strikes from aircraft flying above. In fact, the most recent version of our capstone doctrine document, AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command, recognizes this changing nature of airpower by defining it as the ability to project military power or influence through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. General of the Air Force Henry Hap Arnold offered sage counsel when he declared that we must think in terms of tomorrow. A large part of airpower s tomorrow will take place in the emerging operational domain of cyberspace. Rapid advancement in computer and communication technologies, as well as the tight coupling of the digital domain to physical operations, makes cyberspace increasingly important to military success. The challenges presented by cyberspace reflect its global nature, the political sovereignties it transcends, and the fact that operations take place at the speed of light. By no stretch of the imagination does the United States enjoy the clear, asymmetrical advantage in cyberspace that we do in the land, sea, air, and space domains., Published in Air & Space Journal, p4-11 Sep-Oct 2012.

This paper focuses on the expansion of NATO through Russian membership. Many dismiss Russian membership as a political nonstarter due the perceived high economic and political costs. This paper argues that the US should advocate Russian membership into NATO as a means to counter internal threats to Russian democratization, construct an effective security architecture for post-Cold War Europe, and address emerging challenges to Asia-Pacific security, notably, China's rise as a regional "peer competitor", and its burgeoning relationship with Russia. US support for Russian NATO membership would combat the threats to Russian democratization. These threats include the steady expansion of organized crime, the popular nationalist-authoritarian political elite, and an increasingly discontented military. Russian membership would also provide an "air of security" in which the fledgling democracy can take flight. If the US truly intends to go beyond the Cold War barriers it entrenched, it must lead Europe in the construction of a genuine pan- continental security structure that includes Russia as a full member.

Throughout air power's inaugural century, theorists have posited numerous schemes to best exploit the inherent flexibility and ubiquity of the aircraft as a tool of war. The evolution of air power theory has been fashioned by harsh lessons of war, remarkable advances in technology, and the visionary concepts of a few select airmen. Two modern day theorists, Colonels John Boyd and John Warden, have significantly contributed to this evolution through their respective works on strategic paralysis. Although currently in vogue in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the notion of strategic paralysis has a long history. Its roots reach back to the writings of the Eastern philosopher of war- Sun Tzu. The quest for paralysis underpins all theories of strategic and conventional aerial warfare. Characterized by its nonlethal intent and promise of force economization, strategic paralysis differs markedly from the more traditional strategies of annihilation and attrition. Boyd and Warden represent a major transition in the evolution of air power doctrine. In contrast to the traditional theory, Boyd and Warden contend that an air campaign should target enemy command and control. This is control warfare based upon command targeting, not economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. The present Information Revolution will likely change the focus again, shifting toward decentralized targets of noncooperative centers of gravity- horizontal information channels instead of vertical, hierarchical command channels. John Boyd and John Warden have contributed significantly to this evolutionary process of air theory development.