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We study stochastic pairwise interaction network systems whereby a finite population of agents, identified with the nodes of a graph, update their states in response to both individual mutations and pairwise interactions with their neighbors. The considered class of systems include the main epidemic models -such as the SIS, SIR, and SIRS models-, certain social dynamics models -such as the voter and anti-voter models-, as well as evolutionary dynamics on graphs. Since these stochastic systems fall into the class of finite-state Markov chains, they always admit stationary distributions. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of these stationary distributions in the limit as the population size grows large while the interaction network maintains certain mixing properties. Our approach relies on the use of Lyapunov-type functions to obtain concentration results on these stationary distributions. Notably, our results are not limited to fully mixed population models, as they do apply to a much broader spectrum of interaction network structures, including, e.g., Erd\"oos-R\'enyi random graphs., Comment: 13 pages

Two-color ratio pyrometry is commonly used to measure the surface temperature of aerospace materials during plasma wind tunnel experiments. However, the effect of the plasma radiation on the measurement accuracy is often neglected. In this paper we formulate a model of the instrument response to analyze the systematic error induced by the gas radiation along the optical path. CFD simulations of the plasma flow field, together with a radiation code, allow to compute the gas spectral radiance within the instrument wavelength range. The measurement error is numerically assessed as a function of the true object temperature and emittance value. Our simulations explain the typical behavior observed in experiments, showing that a significant bias can affect the measured temperature during the material heating phase. For an actual experiment on a ceramic-matrix composite, a correction to the measured data is proposed, while comparative measurements with a spectrometer corroborate the results.

We study a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemic model on a network of $n$ interacting subpopulations. We analyze the transient and asymptotic behavior of the infection dynamics in each node of the network. In contrast to the classical scalar epidemic SIR model, where the infection curve is known to be unimodal (either always decreasing over time, or initially increasing until reaching a peak and from then on monotonically decreasing and asymptotically vanishing), we show the possible occurrence of multimodal infection curves in the network SIR epidemic model with $n\ge2$ subpopulations. We then focus on the special case of rank-$1$ interaction matrices, modeling subpopulations of homogeneously mixing individuals with different activity rates, susceptibility to the disease, and infectivity levels. For this special case, we find $n$ invariants of motion and provide an explicit expression for the limit equilibrium point. We also determine necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of the equilibrium points. We then establish an upper bound on the number of changes of monotonicity of the infection curve at the single node level and provide sufficient conditions for its multimodality. Finally, we present some numerical results revealing that, in the case of interaction matrices with rank larger than $1$, the single nodes' infection curves may display multiple peaks.

We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum unit price p. The market clears at the price at which the aggregate demand intersects the total supply and firms are paid the bid prices. We study a game theoretic model of competition among such firms and focus on its equilibria (Supply function equilibrium). The game we consider is a generalization of both models where firms can either set a fixed quantity (Cournot model) or set a fixed price (Bertrand model). Our main result is to prove existence and provide a characterization of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in the space of K-Lipschitz supply functions., Comment: 6 pages, 5 figures, to appear Proc. of the 22nd International Federation of Automatic Control World Congress (IFAC 2023)

We study a network formation game where $n$ players, identified with the nodes of a directed graph to be formed, choose where to wire their outgoing links in order to maximize their PageRank centrality. Specifically, the action of every player $i$ consists in the wiring of a predetermined number $d_i$ of directed out-links, and her utility is her own PageRank centrality in the network resulting from the actions of all players. We show that this is a potential game and that the best response correspondence always exhibits a local structure in that it is never convenient for a node $i$ to link to other nodes that are at incoming distance more than $d_i $ from her. We then study the equilibria of this game determining necessary conditions for a graph to be a (strict, recurrent) Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in the homogeneous case, where players all have the same number $d$ of out-links, we characterize the structure of the potential maximizing equilibria and, in the special cases $ d=1 $ and $ d=2 $, we provide a complete classification of the set of (strict, recurrent) Nash equilibria. Our analysis shows in particular that the considered formation mechanism leads to the emergence of undirected and disconnected or loosely connected networks., Comment: 42 pages, 11 figures

Social influence is largely recognized as a key factor in opinion formation processes. Recently, the role of external forces in inducing opinion displacement and polarization in social networks has attracted significant attention. This is in particular motivated by the necessity to understand and possibly prevent interference phenomena during political campaigns and elections. In this paper, we formulate and solve a targeted intervention problem for opinion displacement minimization on a social network. Specifically, we consider a min-max problem whereby a social planner (the defender) aims at selecting the optimal network intervention within her given budget constraint in order to minimize the opinion displacement in the system that an adversary (the attacker) is instead trying to maximize. Our results show that the optimal intervention of the defender has two regimes. For large enough budget, the optimal intervention of the social planner acts on all nodes proportionally to a new notion of network centrality. For lower budget values, such optimal intervention has a more delicate structure and is rather concentrated on a few target individuals.

Consider discrete-time linear distributed averaging dynamics, whereby agents in a network start with uncorrelated and unbiased noisy measurements of a common underlying parameter (state of the world) and iteratively update their estimates following a non-Bayesian rule. Specifically, let every agent update her estimate to a convex combination of her own current estimate and those of her neighbors in the network. As a result of this iterative averaging, each agent obtains an asymptotic estimate of the state of the world, and the variance of this individual estimate depends on the matrix of weights the agents assign to self and to the others. We study a game-theoretic multi-objective optimization problem whereby every agent seeks to choose her self-weight in such a convex combination in a way to minimize the variance of her asymptotic estimate of the state of the unknown parameters. Assuming that the relative influence weights assigned by the agents to their neighbors in the network remain fixed and form an irreducible and aperiodic relative influence matrix, we characterize the Pareto frontier of the problem, as well as the set of Nash equilibria in the resulting game., Comment: Accepted as a regular paper by MTNS 2022 conference

We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the markets and links are the physical lines with a finite capacity connecting them. Producers play a networked Cournot game on such a network together with a centralized authority, called market maker, that facilitates the trade between geographically separate markets via the constrained power network and aims to maximize a certain welfare function. We first prove a general result that links the optimal action of the market maker with the capacity constraint enforced on the power network. Under mild assumptions, we study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and exploit our general result to prove a connection between capacity bottlenecks in the power network and the emergence of price differences between different markets that are separated by saturated lines, a phenomenon that is often observed in real power networks.

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more complex behaviors. In fact, depending on the network structure, such games may even fail to have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. An example is represented by the well-known matching pennies (discoordination) game. In this work, we first provide graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games of arbitrary size. For the case where such conditions are met, we then study the asymptotic behavior of best-response dynamics and provide sufficient conditions for finite-time convergence to the set of Nash equilibria. Our results build on an extension and refinement of the notion of network cohesiveness and on the formulation of the new concept of network indecomposibility.

We study asynchronous dynamics in a network of interacting agents updating their binary states according to a time-varying threshold rule. Specifically, agents revise their state asynchronously by comparing the weighted average of the current states of their neighbors in the interaction network with possibly heterogeneous time-varying threshold values. Such thresholds are determined by an exogenous signal representing an external influence field modeling the different agents' biases towards one state with respect to the other one. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions for global stability of consensus equilibria, i.e., equilibria where all agents have the same state, robustly with respect to the (constant or time-varying) external field. Our results apply to general weighted directed interaction networks and build on super-modularity properties of certain network coordination games whose best response dynamics coincide with the linear threshold dynamics. In particular, we introduce a novel notion of robust improvement paths for such games and characterize conditions for their existence., Comment: 16 pages, 7 figures

The multidomain protein gelsolin (GSN) is composed of six homologous modules, sequentially named G1 to G6. Single point substitutions in this protein are responsible for AGel amyloidosis, a hereditary disease characterized by progressive corneal lattice dystrophy, cutis laxa, and polyneuropathy. Several different amyloidogenic variants of GSN have been identified over the years, but only the most common D187N/Y mutants, in G2, have been thoroughly characterized, and the underlying functional mechanistic link between mutation, altered protein structure, susceptibility to aberrant furin cleavage and aggregative potential resolved. Little is known about the recently identified mutations A551P, E553K and M517R hosted at the interface between G4 and G5, whose aggregation process likely follows an alternative pathway. We demonstrate that these three substitutions impair temperature and pressure stability of GSN but do not increase its susceptibility to furin cleavage, the first event of the canonical aggregation pathway. The variants are also characterized by a higher tendency to aggregate in the unproteolysed forms and show a higher proteotoxicity in a C. elegans-based assay. Structural studies point to a destabilization of the interface between G4 and G5 due to three different structural determinants: beta-strand breaking, steric hindrance and/or charge repulsion, all implying the impairment of interdomain contacts. All available evidence suggests that the rearrangement of the protein global architecture triggers a furin-independent aggregation of the protein, supporting the existence of a non-canonical pathway of gelsolin amyloidosis pathogenesis., Comment: main: 28 pages, 7 figures; supplementary: 11 pages, 6 figures

We study extensions of the classical SIR model of epidemic spread. First, we consider a single population modified SIR epidemics model in which the contact rate is allowed to be an arbitrary function of the fraction of susceptible and infected individuals. This allows one to model either the reaction of individuals to the information about the spread of the disease or the result of government restriction measures, imposed to limit social interactions and contain contagion. We study the effect of both smooth dependancies of the contact rate for which we prove the existence of a threshold phenomenon that generalizes the well-known dichotomy associated to the reproduction rate parameter in the classical SIR model, and discontinuous feedback terms, which can be studied using tools from sliding mode control. Finally, we consider network SIR models involving different subpopulations that interact on a contact graph and present some preliminary simulations of modified versions of the classic SIR network., Comment: 6 pages. 4 figures. Accepted to the 2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

Protein-protein interactions are the basis of many important physiological processes and are currently promising, yet difficult, targets for drug discovery. In this context, inhibitor of apoptosis proteins (IAPs)-mediated interactions are pivotal for cancer cell survival; the interaction of the BIR1 domain of cIAP2 with TRAF2 was shown to lead the recruitment of cIAPs to the TNF receptor, promoting the activation of the NF-\kappa B survival pathway. In this work, using a combined in silico-in vitro approach, we identified a drug-like molecule, NF023, able to disrupt cIAP2 interaction with TRAF2. We demonstrated in vitro its ability to interfere with the assembly of the cIAP2-BIR1/TRAF2 complex and performed a thorough characterization of the compound's mode of action through 248 parallel unbiased molecular dynamics simulations of 300 ns (totaling almost 75 {\mu}s of all-atom sampling), which identified multiple binding modes to the BIR1 domain of cIAP2 via clustering and ensemble docking. NF023 is, thus, a promising protein-protein interaction disruptor, representing a starting point to develop modulators of NF-\kappa B-mediated cell survival in cancer. This study represents a model procedure that shows the use of large-scale molecular dynamics methods to typify promiscuous interactors.

We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging to a single population exchange information through pairwise interactions, whereby they get aware of the actions played by the other players and the corresponding rewards. Using this information, they can revise their current action, imitating the one of the players they interact with. The pattern of interactions regulating the learning process is determined by a community structure. First, the set of equilibrium points of such network imitation dynamics is characterized. Second, for the class of potential games and for undirected and connected community networks, global asymptotic convergence is proved. In particular, our results guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium from every fully supported initial population state in the special case when the Nash equilibria are isolated and fully supported. Examples and numerical simulations are offered to validate the theoretical results and counterexamples are discussed for scenarios when the assumptions on the community structure are not verified., Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures. Under review

We study an optimal targeting problem for super-modular games with binary actions and finitely many players. The considered problem consists in the selection of a subset of players of minimum size such that, when the actions of these players are forced to a controlled value while the others are left to repeatedly play a best response action, the system will converge to the greatest Nash equilibrium of the game. Our main contributions consist in showing that the problem is NP-complete and in proposing an efficient iterative algorithm with provable convergence properties for its solution. We discuss in detail the special case of network coordination games and its relation with the notion of cohesiveness. Finally, we show with simulations the strength of our approach with respect to naive heuristics based on classical network centrality measures.

We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude of a perturbation that makes a Nash equilibrium of the original game stop being so in the perturbed game. Then, we investigate what the maximally robust equilibria are in some standard network games such as the coordination and the anti-coordination game. Finally, as an application, we provide some sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in network games with a mixture of coordinating and anticoordinating games., Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures

We consider graphical games as introduced by Kearns et al. (2001). First we analyse the interaction of graphicality with a notion of strategic equivalence of games, providing a minimal complexity graphical description for games. Then we study the interplay between graphicality and the classical decomposition of games proposed by Candogan et al. (2011), characterizing the graphical properties of each part of the decomposition., Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures, accepted for presentation at the 21rst IFAC World Congress

We present the notion of separable game with respect to a forward directed hypergraph (FDH-graph), which refines and generalizes that of graphical game. First, we show that there exists a minimal FDH-graph with respect to which a game is separable, providing a minimal complexity description for the game. Then, we prove a symmetry property of the minimal FDH-graph of potential games and we describe how it reflects to a decomposition of the potential function in terms of local functions. In particular, these last results strengthen the ones recently proved for graphical potential games. Finally, we study the interplay between separability and the decomposition of finite games in their harmonic and potential components, characterizing the separability properties of both such components., Comment: 22 pages, 5 figures