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This study was aimed at exploring the reasons why a group of men convicted of sexual offences against children desisted from further sexual offending. The research employed a qualitative methodology aimed at gaining a phenomenological understanding of participants' perceptions of the desistance process. A total of 32 participants were interviewed using a semi-structured life story interview. Data was analysed using thematic analysis, looking for commonalities across and within narratives. Theory was developed using a grounded theory methodology. The results show that desistance from sexual offending, for the study group, was largely a process of identity change. It involved a rejection of the label 'sex offender' and the adoption of a more positive, prosocial identity. As part of this process participants were inclined to minimise their offending and distance themselves from the perception that they were an 'offender'. They tended to describe their offending as being situational, and accounted for their offences as being an abberation. Social capital in the form of relationships and work was of great importance to the study group but did not appear to be directly linked to their desistance. However, future planning was a central part of the desistance process and, for most participants, involved plans for the development of new relationships and employment. The above themes are developed into a theory of desistance from sexual offending. The practical implications of the research are discussed. These include proposals to improve the treatment of men convicted of sexual offences: practitioners should emphasise responsibility for future actions rather than past ones, should encourage future planning, and give practical assistance for the development of new relationships and safe employment. They should encourage and support identity change, and should use a 'language of desistance, rather than defining people by the risk they present.

The purpose of this study is to examine how corporate performance influences Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay in UK public listed companies. Specifically it is to identify evidence of relative performance evaluation in CEO pay, following the recommendation in the Combined Code (2003) to link long-term incentive compensation to relative firm performance. The major and a novel contribution of this study is the focus on the payments received by CEOs from performance-based long-term incentive schemes. The pay-for-performance relationship is investigated in a longitudinal setting using random and fixed-effect panel data estimation methods. An unbalanced panel of CEOs is drawn from 204 of the largest, nonfinancial UK companies, between 2003 and 2007. From a principal-agent theory perspective it is hypothesised that firm performance is positively associated with chief executive pay and from a relative performance evaluation theory perspective it is hypothesised that, whilst controlling for actual firm performance, peer group performance is negatively associated with chief executive pay. The CEO compensation data are hand collected exclusively for this study and provides a level of detail not previously found in the literature. The findings demonstrate that it is crucial to distinguish between the different elements of pay and the different performance conditions that attach to those elements in order to establish a comprehensive understanding of the pay-for-performance relationship. New and convincing evidence shows that actual bonus pay is determined relative to annual FTSE-350 market performance and actual long-term pay is determined relative to three-year FTSE-350 sector performance. These findings provide robust evidence that is consistent with the principal-agent framework of executive pay and corporate performance. This study may alleviate the concerns held by some stakeholder groups that pay is not clearly linked to corporate performance. These findings will be of particula r practical importance to investors who expect the interests of executives to be aligned with those of the company shareholders, via an incentive contract that rewards executives for enhanced corporate performance and consequently shareholder wealth maximisation. The findings also confirm that changes introduced to improve corporate governance practice in the field of executive pay are working to the benefit of shareholders.