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The critical studies on Dostoevsky's 'The Dream of a Ridiculous Man' have never diverged to a very great extent from the two interpretative lines developed many years ago by Mikhail Bakhtin and Nikolai Berdyaev, which concern, on the one hand, the Menippean satirical structure of this short story and, on the other, its general motif of 'utopia vs. anti-utopia.' Although these two views are unquestionably enlightening, mainly because they reflect Dostoevsky's poetics from the 1870s, they still do not seem to have fully considered the central problem the ridiculous man raises throughout his monologue. This problem concerns the main character's fundamental quest for truth. This article offers a reading of Dostoevsky's story, with a new interpretation of it that does not exclude but, in fact, extends Bakhtin's and Berdyaev's views. While the purpose of the Menippean satire is, as Bakhtin suggested, to test an idea, in 'The Dream of a Ridiculous Man' Dostoevsky examines three different ideas of 'truth' each of which correspond to the protagonist's various stages of awareness that occur in the three main parts of the narrative: before, during, and after the dream. These ideas are: a nihilistic solipsism of a higher consciousness; the natural perfection of a pantheistic universe; and the primacy of life over thought. The result of this analysis leads to the philosophical problem of 'difference,' understood as a 'transcendent difference' à la Fichte, which offers a new insight into Dostoevsky's 'higher realism.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the research based on the analysis of the works “On the form and principles of the sensory and intelligible world” and “The only possible basis for proving the existence of God,” it is proved that I. Kant consciously based his philosophical system on the metaphysics of mystical pantheism, according to which the earthly world is the result of the “internal” transformation of the apophatic Absolute, and human consciousness must be considered as an act of the Absolute that realizes this transformation. With this approach, space and time, as forms of pure sensory contemplation, may be interpreted as an expression of the coexistence of all things in the Absolute and the constancy of their connection with the Absolute. It is precisely this understanding of them that is present in Kant’s early works. The article substantiates the assertion that the ontological proof of the existence of God constitutes an important component of Kant’s philosophy. In the pre-critical period, he had not yet completely gotten rid of his adherence to orthodox, church ideas about God, and therefore the ontological proof was contradictory and inconsistent. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not reject the ontological proof, but makes it truly consistent, fully consistent with the metaphysics of mystical pantheism. What is being proven here is not the existence of God the Absolute (this is impossible, since God is Divine Nothing), but the presence in consciousness of unconditional being (“matter of perception”), which is the manifestation of the Absolute in its finit form and from which the objective world is created through acts of consciousness. The article shows the presence of many parallels between Kant’s system and the teachings of John Scotus Eriugena and Nicholas of Cusa, who created the most famous versions of mystical pantheism.

Even if the present work has a purely critical-reconstructive approach to Hegelian thought in the various phases of his philosophical activity, it intends to show in detail the very close and intrinsic connection between the system and the concept of right both from a phenomenological and epistemic point of view. Since the beginning of Hegel's reflection, a close and repeatedly in-depth dealing with the juridical theme and in particular that of Person has been documented precisely because it represents the foundation of a 'substantialization' of the subject in its objectivity which finds in the will the constitutive moment of its same freedom. Alternatively, the subject would be inexorably relegated to the more or less natural indeterminacy of its own formal subjectivity without true content. At the level of secondary literature, based on what it has been possible to consult, it appears that the analysis has bene focused rather on the separate content of Recht's Hegelian concept and its articulations while the connection with the system has not been made at least sufficiently explicit and seems mantained rather in the background. As just hinted at, Hegel’s philosophy of right is a pivotal element inside his system and his theoretical evolution since his early thinking activity. Its concept is essentially what can be called ‘substance’, namely objectivity concerning the subjective finite subject and determining its real infinity, wherein its will by aspiring to it its will finds its authentic (initial) freedom. The concept of right is necessarily treated both phenomenologically so that the finite spirit experiences this juridical will in the Wirklichkeit of its apparent form, and epistemologically so as to present its true philosophical concept or idea inside the science of the objective spirit.

This article delves into the shifts in Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s early and late religious philosophical thought, particularly his understanding and interpretation of moral religion within different contexts of the Wissenschaftslehre. In the early stage, Fichte focuses on the relationship between the infinite and the finite, primarily exploring the connection between God and humans from the perspective of practical philosophy. In his late stage, Fichte turns to discussing the ontological relationship between the one and the many, emphasizing an ontological analysis of the relationship between God and humans. This article aims to demonstrate that the theoretical changes in Fichte’s religious philosophy from early to late stages are mainly due to changes in perspective rather than the development or transformation of his thought. Fichte’s late ontological religion still retains the early stance of moral religion, asserting that the core of religion lies in promoting human moral action. Despite the different emphases in various periods, the central issue of his religious philosophy remains the relationship between God and humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At first glance, Fichte and Nietzsche might strike us as intellectual contraries. This impression is reinforced by Nietzsche's disparaging remarks about Fichte. The dearth of critical literature comparing the two thinkers also could easily lead us to believe that they are, for all intents and purposes, irrelevant to one another. In this paper, however, I argue that their theories of subjectivity are in many respects remarkably similar and worthy of comparison. But I further explain how, despite this convergence, their normative philosophies end up so conspicuously at odds with one another. After examining the resemblance between their denials of the substantial self, I respectively analyse Fichte's and Nietzsche's positive accounts of subjectivity, self-cultivation, and the political preconditions of self-cultivation. I locate the conceptual juncture at which their practical outlooks begin to part ways in their divergent drive psychologies and in their distinct conceptions of conscience. These apparently minor theoretical differences generate a large-scale disagreement regarding the political systems they believe best enable self-cultivation, with Fichte favouring a democratic regime, while Nietzsche opts for a markedly more aristocratic one. I close by sketching a possible way out of this dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a translation of selections from Part One, Chapter One of Rehberg's Investigations, which contains his critique of the philosophical principles animating the French Revolution. No English translation of the text currently exists. The Investigations was one of the most influential philosophical treatments of the Revolution in eighteenth-century Germany and remains an important specimen of ‘Kantian’ political theory from the 1790s. The Investigations had a clear impact on Kant's political philosophy and the work of the early Fichte. The translation is accompanied by an editorial introduction that introduces the reader to Rehberg and outlines his core arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Catholics condemn Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as a fanatic; he fails to cushion ‘Never lie' with a distinction between venial and mortal sin. But Kant has secular substitutes: lie/mislead, candor/honesty, commission/omission, deception/illusion, discursive/pictorial. Kant weaves these distinctions into a safety net for polite society, business, politics, and religion. Kant's break-away disciple, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) removes this safety net. Any intentional propagation of error suffices for lying. Ditto for refraining to correct a remedial error. Why? Because we all have a duty to perfect each other. This moral development requires rational informed choice. Being misinformed subverts freedom. The medium of misinformation is irrelevant: utterances, silences, pictures, music, dance, private thoughts, telepathy. To Fichte's relief, Kant overcame the temptation to save an innocent man from murder by lying. But Fichte still thought Kant manifested a corrupt mind by merely considering lying! [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Johann Gottlieb Fichte's thinking is part of the Sattelzeit, in which the foundation for the modern use of important concepts is laid. The stages of Fichte's philosophy and his various theories of religion and Christianity reflect attempts to determine the function of religion in a modern society. Important is the philosophical foundation of religion, which is transformed from a moral theology based on Kant to a unified theory of the philosophy of mind. Fichte thus offers an alternative to Hegel and Schelling. This alternative has only been taken up in Protestant theology at a small number of points, but all the more intensively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to investigate the presence of the figure of Mary of Nazareth within Fichte's theological and philosophical reflection. Indeed, through the reading of a youthful sermon that German philosopher dedicates to the Holy Virgin, it is also possible to find in later works of a philosophical nature an influence of meditation on the meaning of the Incarnation in the elaboration of concepts fundamental to Fichte's philosophical system, such as those of will and bliss. Indeed, in precisely such a mature text as The Way Towards the Blessed Life it is possible to see these concepts united in the moving description of the Mother of God, seen as an ideal of supersensible beauty and an example of religious life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Journal of Legal Theory / Jogelméleti Szemle / Zeitschrift für Rechtstheorie is the property of Journal of Legal Theory / Jogelmeleti Szemle / Zeitschrift fur Rechtstheorie and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Cogency: Journal of Reasoning & Argumentation is the property of Cogency Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper I return to the familiar territory of the Lord-Bondsman "dialectic" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in order to raise the question of the relation of Hegel's use of the theme of recognition there to Fichte's. Fichte had introduced the notion of recognition in his Foundations of Natural Right, to "deduce" the social existence of humans within relations of mutual recognition as a necessary condition of their very self-consciousness. However, there it also functioned as part of a solution to a problem within the work on which the theory of rights was meant to be based, the earlier Foundation of the Complete Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-5. In Hegel's classic account in chapter 4 of the Phenomenology we find recognition offered as a solution to a problem within an account of "self-consciousness" that has a number of clearly Fichtean features. But I suggest that to the degree that the lord-bondsman episode there expresses any "theory of recognition", it is not Hegel’s own theory but rather his interpretation of Fichte's, a theory of which he is critical. Freed from this misleading assumption that the "lord-bondsman dialectic" represents something deep about Hegel's own philosophy, we might then be more able to get clearer about Hegel's actual views about recognition and the role it plays in his own philosophy.

In this paper I return to the familiar territory of the Lord-Bondsman "dialectic" in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in order to raise the question of the relation of Hegel's use of the theme of recognition there to Fichte's. Fichte had introduced the notion of recognition in his Foundations of Natural Right, to "deduce" the social existence of humans within relations of mutual recognition as a necessary condition of their very self-consciousness. However, there it also functioned as part of a solution to a problem within the work on which the theory of rights was meant to be based, the earlier Foundation of the Complete Wissenschaftslehre of 1794-5. In Hegel's classic account in chapter 4 of the Phenomenology we find recognition offered as a solution to a problem within an account of "self-consciousness" that has a number of clearly Fichtean features. But I suggest that to the degree that the lord-bondsman episode there expresses any "theory of recognition", it is not Hegel's own theory but rather his interpretation of Fichte's, a theory of which he is critical. Freed from this misleading assumption that the "lord-bondsman dialectic" represents something deep about Hegel's own philosophy, we might then be more able to get clearer about Hegel's actual views about recognition and the role it plays in his own philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigates, in light of a debate carried out by post-Kantian authors, Sigmund Freud's conception of activity. In order to do so, we engage in a dialogue between the psychoanalyst and two authors, Fichte and Marx, and delimit, albeit not exhaustively, Freud's place in the construction of a crucial concept for the History of Philosophy during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"I am only what I make myself to be", Fichte tells us. In this paper, I outline Fichte's views on sex, marriage and gender, with two aims. Firstly, to elucidate an aspect of his moral theory which has received little attention, and secondly to argue that Fichte's distinctive stance on selfhood, freedom, and normativity lead to a revisionary account of gender expression and identity, where people can freely carve out their own identity, irrespective of "nature". In this paper, I therefore outline Fichte's own views, highlighting what I see as a tension in the texts between essentialism and anti-essentialism about gender, before reconstructing a neo-Fichtean view which foregrounds the anti-essentialist aspect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay investigates what a nuanced and revisionary interpretation of Fichte's Critical-idealist philosophy could reveal about its impact on the philosophic thought of Friedrich Schlegel. It argues that Schlegel sees the Wissenschaftslehre through the lens of the distinction Fichte famous draws between the "spirit" (Geist) and the "letter" (Buchstaben) of a philosophy. He considers the spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre to lie in its acute awareness of its own limitation as a work of art and its letter in the deductive or demonstrative form it inevitably assumes upon being expounded. In the face of the discrepancy, Schlegel rejects the letter of the Wissenschaftslehre in favor of its spirit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper has two related aims. The first is to argue that Fichte's concept of freedom is perfectionist. By 'perfectionism,' I mean a moral theory according to which our good, ultimately, is realizing our true nature; Fichte also holds a perfectionist view of freedom, according to which we achieve freedom only to the extent that we succeed in making ourselves good or realizing our true nature. The second aim of this paper is to show how Fichte's perfectionist concept of freedom solves two problems confronting Kantian autonomy: the "paradox" of Kantian autonomy and the "dilemma" of post-Kantian autonomy. As I contend, Fichte's perfectionist concept of freedom avoids these two problems by enabling us to view self-determination as a form of self-causation, and by showing that we can be responsible for our immoral actions even if we are not fully free when we perform them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that Kant and Fichte develop a conception of "obscuring reason." This conception allows us to explain our reasons for immoral actions although we are not able to cognize the original ground of evil. The paper analyzes Kant's conception of rationalizing (Vernünfteln) as obscuring reason. By rationalizing, we imputably misuse our faculty of reason in order to construct a viewpoint from which we are no longer bound to the absolute demand of the moral law. Fichte draws on Kant and distinguishes three kinds of operations to obscure the moral law, namely (i) abstraction, (ii) delaying, and (iii) downgrading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers an interpretation of the thesis developed by Fichte in the Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre following "the philosophy one chooses depends on the man one is" as a deepening of symbolic practices and dispositions that philosophy shares with ordinary consciousness. To support this interpretation, the paper describes how Fichte defines individual character formation and how it relates to a historical determinate is presented through a quick excursion in the Nicolaischrift of 1801 (§2). Through a critical and synthetic view of the process of initiation into philosophy, the paper shows how the choice of philosophy is a choice for philosophy (§ 3) and invests a certain "skill" that is produced in the pre-philosophical dimension (§ 4). Through discussion of the Fichtian concepts of "instinct of reason" and "new sensory," how the choice for philosophy, interpretable as the production of a new habitus, the fichtean doctrine of Science realizes itself fully as 'critique' (§ 5). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Briefe an Fichte (1799) wirft Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi der Spekulation vor, dem Nihilismus zu verfallen. Dabei betont er das Künstliche des wissenschaftlichen Verfahrens, das den Dualismus abschafft. Mit Anspielungen auf die alchimistische, poetische und die sophistische Kunst wird die ontologische Tragweite der Wissenschaft hinterfragt, denn „Selbst von unserem eigenen Daseyn haben wir ein Gefühl; aber keinen Begriff“. Im vorliegenden Artikel rückt die Frage nach der Imitation in den Mittelpunkt, weil der Logos und das Seiende das verborgene Hauptproblem sind. Die wissenschaftliche Operation besteht darin, das natürliche Seelenauge als unkörperliches Wahrnehmungsorgan auszustechen und die Menschen in Polypheme zu verwandeln. ORCID

L’articolo mette in luce le ragioni della sostituzione del concetto di tendere della ragione con quello di volontà negli ultimi scritti di J. G. Fichte, prendendo in considerazione, in particolare, le lezioni sui Fatti della coscienza del 1813. L’obiettivo è quello di ridimensionare l’interpretazione di R. Lauth, secondo la quale il filosofare fichtiano avrebbe ripensato il primato attribuito dalla modernità al sapere teorico riuscendo a costruire una filosofia ‘nova methodo’, senza tuttavia superare una concezione ‘orizzontale’ della ragione in vista della formazione di una filosofia ‘prima methodo’. Quest’ultima partirebbe, non dalla correlazione tendere-affezione, ma dalla autochiarificazione della ragione in funzione del compito che essa pone a se stessa. Dopo una panoramica della dottrina del tendere nell’ambito di un’esposizione filosofica nova methodo, (§2) l’articolo definisce il modo in cui Fichte lo ripensa nei termini di una volontà capace di ordinare in modo coerente costellazioni di eventi e come tale ordine stia alla base di una comprensione del mondo come orizzonte di un coerente agire umano (§3).

The early nineteenth century was a time between empires in German-speaking lands, following the collapse of the holy Roman empire in 1806. This was also the time at which modern concepts of nations, nationalism, and the state entered theological discourse, bound together with emerging notions of world historical progress. From this time until the First World War, the task of conceptualizing national identity and the nature of the 'Christian state' became a pressing theological problem. This essay seeks to locate Schleiermacher's reflections on the Christian state within this developing problematic. Schleiermacher's philosophical and theological works closely engaged emerging ideas of the nation, state, and historical progress. However, he departed from the more totalizing affirmations of national spirit and the Christian state of many of his contemporaries, arguing for a more limited conception of the state as a point of transition in the ongoing historical development of the reign of God. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) is the property of Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi (FLSF) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This essay traces Hegel's conceptualisation of "the spirit and the letter", from the period of his early theological writings to that of the Science of Logic, with particular reference to his correspondence. This dialectic, for Hegel, concerns the realisation of the truth or "spirit" of something from the specificity and fixity of its particular details -- its "letter". It also concerns, then, the freedom to interpret the spirit of something in spite of the apparent authority of any supposed original meanings or authorial intentions. We find him using the phrase in a variety of contexts, with reference to politics, Biblical hermeneutics, textual criticism, the history of philosophy and education. While originally derived from St Paul's dictum -- "the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life" (2 Cor 3:6) -- Hegel's early invocations of "the spirit and the letter" are inspired by Fichte, who sought to distinguish the spirit from the letter of Kant's philosophy. However, while Fichte conceives of the "spirit" as an "aesthetic sense" with which to take creative liberties with the letter, the later Hegel finds that it is only by tarrying with the contradictions of the dead letter that the spirit might be brought to life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Novalis was a central figure in early German Romantic philosophy. Whilst the importance of both Fichte and Spinoza for the development of Romanticism is well established, the vital influence of the Platonic tradition in allowing the Romantics to synthesise these divergent philosophies merits closer attention. Essential to the development of Novalis' thought was his exposure to Plotinus. This examination first sets out the religious and philosophical problems in Germany at the close of the eighteenth century and situates Novalis in relation to this intellectual environment. Following this, a brief survey of Plotinus-scholarship at the close of the eighteenth century in Germany frames how Novalis came into contact with Plotinus through Dieterich Tiedemann. The examination proceeds to consider how Tiedemann shaped Novalis reception of Plotinus and allowed him to develop a synthesis of Spinoza and Fichte. Finally, it briefly examines the poetic realisation of this synthesis through Novalis' late poetic work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Neo-Kantianism is traditionally seen as a philosophy that was formed to develop and actualise Kant’s philosophy and Kantian transcendental methodology. However, Kant was the determining, but by no means the only, influence on the emergence of the neo-Kantian tradition. Neo-Kantianism was strongly influenced by the entire German post-Kantian philosophy, especially by Fichte and Hegel, although neo-Kantians have repeatedly tried to dissociate themselves from the great idealists. In many ways neo-Kantianism was cultivated by the Fichtean reading of Kant, which enabled succeeding philosophers, notably H.-G. Gadamer, to consider neo-Kantianism to be “hidden neo-Fichteanism”. The main goal of this study is a historical-philosophical reconstruction of the image of Fichtean philosophy formed within German neo-Kantianism. To achieve this aim I have analysed the key projects of the German neo-Kantians in which the influence of Fichte’s philosophy, in particular his interpretation of the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of practical reason, is most clearly manifested. I show that the theory of values of the Southwest neo-Kantians and the ethics of pure will of the Marburg neo-Kantians are associated with the Fichtean revision of Kant’s doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. The following, in my opinion, are the main features of the image of Fichte’s philosophy: it is close to neo-Kantians precisely because it strives to combine theoretical and practical reason; it is in ethics that Fiche’s ideas are most manifest in neo-Kantianism; neo-Kantian original theories contain the ideas of self-consciousness “in the spirit” of Fichte. The conclusion is drawn that the growth of the metaphysical component in neo-Kantian doctrines may be connected with the influence of Fichte’s philosophy.

George Canning and John Hookham Frere's satire on German plays and their radical English readers, The Rovers; or, The Double Arrangement (1798), marked the beginning of a short period of intense engagement with German drama and philosophy in the conservative periodical press in Britain. The Rovers appeared in the Anti-Jacobin; or, Weekly Examiner, a magazine written largely by Foreign Office politicians. The Anti-Jacobin's monthly successor, the Anti-Jacobin Review, mounted a more earnest attack on German philosophy, and its contributors introduced some of the ideas of Fichte, Kant, and Herder to a conservative Anglican and Scottish Episcopalian readership. This article shows that some contributions display signs of extreme paranoia and exaggeration inspired by Jacobin-Illuminati conspiracy theories, while others demonstrate a considerable knowledge of the German books and ideas that they are attacking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s thinking is part of the Sattelzeit, in which the foundation for the modern use of important concepts is laid. The stages of Fichte’s philosophy and his various theories of religion and Christianity reflect attempts to determine the function of religion in a modern society. Important is the philosophical foundation of religion, which is transformed from a moral theology based on Kant to a unified theory of the philosophy of mind. Fichte thus offers an alternative to Hegel and Schelling. This alternative has only been taken up in Protestant theology at a small number of points, but all the more intensively.

The article considers a little-known topic in the history of the social thought, which has regained relevance under the pandemic - the discussion between the outstanding philosophers of the German idealism on the conceptual interpretation of police as an earlymodern form of biopolitical control. In the introductory part, the author argues that the critique of the science and practice of policing by the classics of the German idealism is paradigmatic for the present-day study of the new/old functions and powers of the sanitary-police state concerning the modern civil society’s self-reflection. In the first part, the author describes the tension between the Enlightenment philosophy and the ‘science of policing’ developed by the Cameralists of the 17th-18th centuries, and emphasizes the significant intellectual contribution of the Enlightenment thinkers, primarily Kant’s legal doctrine, to the radical innovations in the political semantics at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries. Such innovations became the philosophical basis for the rule of law which questioned the discourse of the absolutist state control over its subjects’ welfare by means of police. In the second part, the article presents a brief reconstruction of Fichte’s attempts to combine the old Cameralist ideas with the new modern principles of individual freedoms at the end of the 18th-century era of the science of police - after Kant’s explicit criticism of the state care unauthorized from below. The third part of the article focuses on Hegel’s critique: in the history of the political thought he was often considered an apologist of the authoritarian Prussian state, but questioned the very possibility of the police-scientific idea of the total biopolitical control over social and economic activities of free modern-type individuals. The author reconstructs Hegel’s argumentation of the absurdity of the total sanitary-police regulation as suggested by Fichte, and insists on the relevance of these thinkers, concepts and thematic fields for reconsidering the failure of the Early-Modern biopolitical utopia under the current intersections of lockdowns and sovereignty.

Este artículo parte de la doctrina de la intersubjetividad como base del concepto de derecho en Fichte y Hegel. Se muestra que esa teoría no sólo constituye una relación formal (transcendental o pragmático-lingüística) entre las conciencias, sino que contiene una dimensión real en tanto que crítica de la economía política (libre mercado). En Fichte, la vinculación entre reconocimiento y propiedad comporta un modelo económico planificado; en Hegel, implica la necesaria intervención del Estado para corregir la dinámica destructiva de la sociedad civil. El legado de ambos es así determinante en la elaboración conceptual del Estado social/ socialista de derecho

Este artículo propone considerar la obra de Fichte como un precedente de la idea de inconsciente. Pero no se limita a señalar algunos de los elementos del pensamiento de Freud que pueden encontrarse en Fichte como antecedentes del psicoanálisis. También se sirve de la crítica que Foucault plantea al psicoanálisis. En particular se establece un paralelismo entre lo que Foucault llama implante y la construcción del deseo y su reverso artificial en Fichte a través de la idea de facultad superior de desear en su relación con la facultad inferior, que constituiría la primera versión del inconsciente.

Este artículo se plantea la tarea de cuestionar la relación de Fichte con la doctrina del derecho natural mediante un estudio de algunas enigmáticas evocaciones de “Hobbes” tanto en su obra, como en la literatura secundaria. El punto de partida e hilo rojo será la pregunta acerca de una posible afinidad entre Fichte y Hobbes de la cual habla Nicolovius, un funcionario prusiano, en una carta destinada a Charlotte Jacobi en 1807. A partir de ella, se tratará luego, por un lado, de definir el marco de la confrontación de Fichte con la ciencia política de su tiempo codificada por el Staatsrecht alemán del Setecientos y, por el otro, de criticar la forma en que esta confrontación ha sido tratada por los comentaristas.