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Dirty Hands theorists disagree about how agents should resolve a high-cost moral dilemma, but their disagreement is partly because they tend to discuss widely different cases of a broad and heterogeneous phenomenon. Moralists are typically concerned with problems that often involve an agent who is under coercion and is asked to engage in an activity that will cause severe and certain harm to individuals. Realists, on the other hand, base their observations on cases where political parties negotiate to form coalitions or policy platforms; these compromises may affect the political integrity and representative credibility of the agent, but less so their moral integrity as measured by universal moral standards. Yet, both types of Dirty Hand scenarios concern the same phenomenon: an urgency to make a morally costly compromise. As a result, we propose to evaluate Dirty Hands problems by placing them on a dual continuum based on two conditions: their projected outcomes, and their external circumstances. We propose that the position of a moral problem on this continuum affects the extent to which a compromise is or is not excusable. Finally, we consider the implications of our findings for the Dirty Hands debate and for the study of political ethics more broadly.

On a common characterization, moral luck occurs when factors beyond agents’ control affect their moral responsibility. The existence of moral luck is widely contested, however. In this paper, I present a new challenge for deniers of moral luck. It seems that some factors beyond agents’ control—such as moral principles about blame- and praiseworthiness—clearly affect moral responsibility. Thus, moral luck deniers face a dialectical burden that has so far gone unnoticed. They must either point to a relevant difference between factors like moral principles and the kind of factors that according to them do not affect moral responsibility or show how they can avoid having to point to such a difference. I argue that no obvious way to meet the challenge presents itself and that it thus amounts to a serious worry for deniers of moral luck.

In this paper Johan Dahlbeck sets out to propose a pedagogy of “as if,” seeking to address the educational paradox of how students can be influenced to approximate a life guided by reason without assuming that they are already sufficiently rational to adhere to dictates of practical reason. He does so by outlining a fictionalist account, drawing primarily on Hans Vaihinger's systematic treatment of heuristic fictions and on Spinoza's ideas about how passive affects can be made to strengthen reason. Dahlbeck suggests that such an account can help us overcome the problem of assuming that reason needs to be enlisted as an instrument in the educational endeavor to live according to the guidance of reason. The reason this is so is that fictions can use passive affects that are prosocial and that thereby strengthen the sense of community necessary for laying a cooperative foundation for successful joint striving. Dahlbeck suggests further that exemplary teachers are crucial to this endeavor insofar as they can offer educational fictions as imaginative and temporary placeholders for the truth, allowing students to act “as if” they were already guided by reason.

In his well-known thought experiment regarding artificial intelligence (AI), John Searle sketched out the philosophic idea of “The Chinese room” – a room in which comprehensible rules (a program) allow a person to perfectly correlate one set of unknown linguistic symbols (a question) with another (an answer) of the same unfamiliar kind. In our creation of an AI-based micro-opera for humans and machines, we have come to reflect upon our concept as an artistic response to Searle’s arguments and a mirroring complement to his debated figure. Our immersive and interactive opera was conceived as a modular series of musically paced meetings between individual visitors and a singing seeress in contact with the digital realm. As an analogy to the Delphic oracle, the seeress delivered AI-prompted answers to the visitors’ questions in real time, framed by poetical, musical, and theatrical structures. In Searle’s Chinese room, goal-oriented computational mechanisms remain detached from understanding during the linguistic operation. In our Delphic room, understanding is key for carrying out the aesthetic operations intended to artistically stimulate a coupling of intellectual and visceral information processing in open-ended and personal ways.

In recent years, the metaverse—some form of immersive digital extension of the physical world—has received much attention. As tech companies present their bold visions, scientists and scholars have also turned to metaverse issues, from technological challenges via societal implications to profound philosophical questions. This article contributes to this growing literature by identifying the possibilities of two dystopian metaverse scenarios, namely one based on the experience machine and one based on demoktesis—two concepts from Nozick (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, 1974). These dystopian scenarios are introduced, and the potential for a metaverse to evolve into either of them is explained. The article is concluded with an argument for why the two dystopian scenarios are not strongly wedded to any particular theory of ethics or political philosophy, but constitute a more general contribution., Open access funding provided by RISE Research Institutes of Sweden. The author received no external funding for this work.

As more decisions are made by automated algorithmic systems, the transparency of these systems has come under scrutiny. While such transparency is typically seen as beneficial, there is a also a critical, Foucauldian account of it. From this perspective, worries have recently been articulated that algorithmic transparency can be used for manipulation, as part of a disciplinary power structure. Klenk (Philosophy & Technology 36, 79, 2023) recently argued that such manipulation should not be understood as exploitation of vulnerable victims, but rather as indifference to whether the information provided enhances decision-making by revealing reasons. This short commentary on Klenk uses Berlin’s (1958) two concepts of liberty to further illuminate the concept of transparency as manipulation, finding alignment between positive liberty and the critical account., Open access funding provided by RISE Research Institutes of Sweden. The author received noexternal funding for this work.

Understanding causation in social-ecological systems (SES) is indispensable for promoting sustainable outcomes. However, the study of such causal relations is challenging because they are often complex and intertwined, and their analysis involves diverse disciplines. Although there is agreement that no single research approach (RA) can comprehensively explain SES phenomena, there is a lack of ability to deal with this diversity. Underlying this diversity and the challenge of dealing with it are different causal reasonings that are rarely explicit. Awareness of hidden assumptions is essential for understanding how the causal reasoning of an RA is constituted, and for promoting the integration, translation, or juxtaposition of different RAs. We identify the following elements as particularly relevant for understanding causal reasoning: methods, frameworks and theories, accounts of causation, analytical focus, and causal notions. We begin with the idea that one of these elements typically figures as an entry point to an RA. This entry point is particularly important because it generates a path dependence that orients causal reasoning. In a subsequent step, when an approach is applied, causal reasoning concretizes as a result of a particular constellation of the remaining elements. We come to these insights by studying the application of four different RAs to the same social-ecological case (the collapse of Baltic cod stocks in the 1980s). On the basis of our findings we developed a guide for the analysis of causal reasoning by raising awareness of the assumptions, key elements, and the relations between these key elements for a given RA. The guide can be used to elicit the causal reasoning of RAs, facilitate interdisciplinary collaboration, and support disclosure of ethical/political dimensions that underlie management/governance interventions that are formulated on the basis of causal findings of research studies.

Cognitive representations are typically analysed in terms of content, vehicle and format. While current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this paper we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, i.e., the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, it makes space for a variety of different formats, and is intimately tied to the computational approach to cognition in cognitive science and artificial intelligence.

How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.

In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople’s testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labelled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable.

Recent research papers and tests in real life point in the direction that machines in the future may develop some form of possibly rudimentary inner life. Philosophers have warned and emphasized that the possibility of artificial suffering or the possibility of machines as moral patients should not be ruled out. In this paper, I reflect on the consequences for moral development of striving for AGI. In the introduction, I present examples which point into the direction of the future possibility of artificial suffering and highlight the increasing similarity between, for example, machine–human and human–human interaction. Next, I present and discuss responses to the possibility of artificial suffering supporting a cautious attitude for the sake of the machines. From a virtue ethical perspective and the development of human virtues, I subsequently argue that humans should not pursue the path of developing and creating AGI, not merely for the sake of possible suffering in machines, but also due to machine–human interaction becoming more alike to human–human interaction and for the sake of the human’s own moral development. Thus, for several reasons, humanity, as a whole, should be extremely cautious about pursuing the path of developing AGI—Artificial General Intelligence., The Artificial Public Servant

In a recent article in this journal, Eli Pitcovski puts forward a novel, explanation-based account of harm. We seek to show that Pitcovski’s account, and his arguments in favor of it, can be substantially improved. However, we also argue that, even thus improved, the account faces a dilemma. The dilemma concerns the question of what it takes for an event, E, to explain why a state, P, does not obtain. Does this require that P would have obtained if E had not occurred? Pitcovski’s theory faces problems no matter how one answers that question.

Straightening the current ‘value-laden turn’ (VLT) in the philosophical literature on values in science, and reviving the legacy of the value-free ideal of science (VFI), this paper argues that the influence of extra-scientific values should be minimised— not excluded—in the core phase of scientific inquiry where claims are accepted or rejected. Noting that the original arguments for the VFI (ensuring the truth of scien- tific knowledge, respecting the autonomy of science results users, preserving public trust in science) have not been satisfactorily addressed by proponents of the VLT, it proposes four prerequisites which any model for values in the acceptance/rejection phase of scientific inquiry should respect, coming from the fundamental requirement to distinguish between facts and values: (1) the truth of scientific knowledge must be ensured; (2) the uncertainties associated with scientific claims must be stated clearly; (3) claims accepted into the scientific corpus must be distinguished from claims taken as a basis for action. An additional prerequisite of (4) simplicity and systematicity is desirable, if the model is to be applicable. Methodological documents from interna- tional institutions and regulation agencies are used to illustrate the prerequisites. A model combining Betz’s conception (stating uncertainties associated with scientific claims) and Hansson’s corpus model (ensuring the truth of the scientific corpus and distinguishing it from other claims taken as a basis for action) is proposed. Additional prerequisites are finally suggested for future research, stemming from the requirement for philosophy of science to self-reflect on its own values: (5) any model for values in science must be descriptively and normatively relevant; and (6) its consequences must be thoroughly assessed.

Some things that we take to be the case in a fictional work are never made explicit by the work itself. For instance, we assume that Sherlock Holmes does not have a third nostril, that he wears underpants and that he has never solved a case with a purple gnome, even though neither of these things is ever mentioned in the narration. This article argues that examples like these can be accounted for through the same content-enriching reasoning that we employ when confronted with non-fictional discourse, with the important difference that fictional discourse essentially involves pretence. Fictional discourse works in much the same way as non-fictional discourse, and what is conveyed without being stated can accordingly be explained through familiar pragmatic mechanisms. It is argued that this account carries some distinct advantages over competing views.

Fair priority setting is based on morally sound criteria. Still, there will be cases when these criteria, our primary considerations, are tied and therefore do not help us in choosing one allocation over another. It is sometimes suggested that such cases can be handled by tiebreakers. In this paper, we discuss two versions of tiebreakers suggested in the literature. One version is to preserve fairness or impartiality by holding a lottery. The other version is to allow secondary considerations, considerations that are not part of our primary priority setting criteria, to be decisive. We argue that the argument for preserving impartiality by holding a lottery is sound, while the argument for using tiebreakers as secondary considerations is not. Finally, we argue that the instances where a tiebreaker seems necessary are precisely the situations where we have strong reasons for preferring a lottery. We conclude that factors that we consider valuable should all be included among the primary considerations, while ties should be settled by lotteries., Funding Agencies|Norges Forskningsrad [303724]

Technologies have been theorised to understand their powers to produce spacetimes – notably through Bernard Stiegler’s reading of technics as constitutive of human ontology. However, less attention has been paid to how technologies shape spacetimes according to their own distinct logics of evolution, the result being a tendency to reduce technological agency to a question of its effects on human being. The first half of the paper elaborates this problem in conversation with geographies of the digital turn. The second half introduces an alternative approach through Gilbert Simondon’s ontogenetic notion of technology characterised by its own logics of evolution – what I term techno-genesis.

In The Epistemology of Rhetoric: Plato, Doxa, and Post-Truth, Erik Bengtson sets out to formulate a contemporary epistemology of rhetoric considering the prevailing post-truth condition. In pursuit of this objective, Bengtson challenges dominant myths surrounding Plato's influence on rhetoric and examines the contemporary scholarly discourse on doxa, shedding light on its various facets. He also introduces the concepts of sedimentation and erosion as tools for comprehending the protracted nature of argumentation on foundational issues. This work not only advances our comprehension of rhetoric in the context of the post-truth era. It also invites readers to reconsider established perspectives, offering fresh insights into the dynamics of argumentationover time.

The aim of this thesis is to elaborate the analysis of economic class within Burman’s ontological framework. To alleviate some shortcomings of Burman’s framework, I will make use of concepts presented by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Further, I will draw on Sally Haslanger’s notion of structural explanation to distinguish micro from macro-level explanations and situate the second kind of explanation within class analysis. I will, following some analytical Marxists, argue that there is a possible distinction to be made between metaphysical reduction and explanatory reduction, and that class analysis requires macro-level explanations. I will provide an outline account of how Burman’s framework can be modified to accommodate macro-level explanations.

How do letters differ from other letters, or other symbols? Is it the shape, sound, or use? The metaphysicality and ontology of words has been discussed extensively, but the discussion about letters is far from being conclusive. Due to this I will, by bringing forth a background on words, discuss letters’ origins and metaphysical distinction. I will examine a Platonist proposal of words, and then theories about shape, sound, meaning and origin. Nurbay Irmak opposes said theories and instead means that it is history that makes words ontologically distinct, which J.T.M. Miller disagrees with. I apply all these theories on the metaphysicality of letters and symbols and explain why they do not work for symbols either. Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore have previously discussed symbols and sign systems, and I will use their conclusions to strengthen my arguments. Lastly, I will argue for and against three of my own theories: Relation, Equivalence and Context. The point of this essay is to examine the metaphysicality of letters and symbols. What is it that makes symbols metaphysically distinct?

Humeans say that laws depend on their instances. Another way of saying this is that the instances explain the laws. However, laws are often used in science to help explain these same instances. If this is true it appears as though the instances help explain themselves, which would be a serious problem for the Humeans (Miller, 2015, pp. 1314-1317). In this essay I expand on a solution proposed by Miller (2015, pp. 1328-1331) that the laws are not explained by their instances but rather grounded by a set of global facts. I develop this into a new framework in which it would be expected for the laws to not be grounded by their instances. I call this framework conjunction monism since the core idea is a that conjunctions ground their conjuncts. I finish with a discussion about the compatibility of conjunction monism and Humeanism.

In this thesis, I make intelligible Plotinus’ notion of sympathy by explicating the cause of sympathy within Plotinus’ universe and the effects of sympathy. I do this by using a framework inspired by the Stoic literature on sympathy which distinguishes between three interrelated features of sympathy: Unity, global sympathy, and local sympathy. I show that for Plotinus sympathetic interactions are possible because of the numeric identity of soul with all its parts. I also show that the cause of this unity is the result of two metaphysical principles which govern a series of productions, which results in a diminishing unity from Plotinus first principle, the One, to matter which has no unity. I argue that the unity of soul is both necessary and sufficient for global sympathy (part-to-whole sympathetic interaction) but only necessary for local sympathy (part-to-part sympathetic interaction). In addition, I also explicate the underlying mechanisms of both local and global sympathy by appealing to the likeness principle (for local sympathy) and the inherent ‘Love’ and ‘Strife’ within the universe (for global sympathy).

This thesis explores Friedrich Nietzsche's use of history for philosophical purposes, focusing on two central themes in Nietzsche's writings: the genealogical methodology, and perspectival epistemology. My aim is to demonstrate how Nietzsche's concept of "historical philosophizing" is intricately connected to his moral philosophy. Using a genealogical methodology, Nietzsche traces the historical development of moral concepts back to their foundations, unveiling the underlying power structures and complex mechanisms that underpin moral discourse. Additionally, perspectival epistemology challenges conventional notions of truth and objectivity, serving as a critique of moral semantics. I argue that these elements are interconnected and should be studied as parts of a unified whole. By providing insights into an overlooked theme in Nietzschean methodology, this essay may enrich our understanding of his philosophy as well as contribute to broader debates within contemporary philosophy.

In this essay I attempt to show that both the weak interpretation and the strong interpretation of what John Searle calls the principle of self–referentiality for social phenomena should be abandoned. This, I argue, is because they give rise to what I, following Burman (2023), call ”location problems” for opaque social phenomena and for social wholes, as well as a faulty understanding of social power. Instead, I propose that we understand social phenomena as constitued by social practices, in turn constituted by individuals who have the know–how necessary to participate in the social practices (in the sense that they are reliably able to do so), while not necessarily knowing that they are participating in them. In doing this, I draw on Robert B. Brandom’s notion of a social practice from Making it Explicit (1994).

An investigation into whether Plato was committed to separate Forms in the Phaedo. Two accounts of separation are distinguished: Gail Fine's modal account where separation is a capacity to exist independendently from sensible particulars, and Daniel D. Devereux' non-modal account where separation is equivalent with non-immanence. I analyse multiple key passages of the Phaedo using these accounts of separation, to see whether any passage commits Plato to separation understood in either modal or non-modal terms. I argue and conclude that there is no evidence of Plato being committed to separation in the Phaedo, understanding separation in either modal or non-modal terms.

In our society it’s implied that humans have a duty to work. In his article “The Duty to Work” the philosopher Michael Cholbi (2018) challenging that normative narrative of our contemporary society. Cholbi hold the thesis that the common argument of fair play is invalid in our industrialized society and therefore are most individuals living in the circumstances of such society free from the interpersonal duty to work. I will in this paper analyse Cholbis’ arguments and try to bring nuance to the debate by bringing in other perspectives such as empirical studies about empty labor (meaningless work) of sociologist Roland Paulsen (2015). I will also try to show how structural powers hinders the individual to both talk and act outside of the norms of our work centred culture. The duty to work can be described in two aspects, the interpersonal duty to work, but also personal. I will argue that for most individuals, either personal or interpersonal duty exists.

Within the area of animal ethics, there has been ongoing discussion around whether people in developed countries are justified in consuming animal based products or not, some argue that we are, and some argue that we aren't. In this paper I present a kind of middle-way position in response to the ongoing discussion, in which I argue that a decent chunk of a population in developed countries are justified in consuming certain animal products, but only so far as the exclusion of these animal based products would cause harm to the boycotter. Many of the arguments that are raised in order to defend the consumption of animal products, often rely on controversial assumptions or stances in order to make their claim. In this paper I attempt to distance myself from these types of arguments, by giving an argument that only relies on already commonly held moral beliefs that we all already take to be true, and the argument I make is therefore just an extension of a moral belief that we already have, which is that it is morally justifiable to consume animal products in order to avoid a personal harm. The claim very simply put is the following: We already believe that a person is morally justified to consume animal products from animals that yield relatively low amounts of food in order to survive, if we take this to be true, then we should also believe that a person is morally justified to consume animal products from animals that have a much greater yield of food, but where the food is used not to survive, but to avoid personal harms that stem from boycotting animal products. To give a more precise description on why the former (to survive) entails the latter (to avoid harms from boycotting) is because firstly, the amount of harm that's being done to the animal to avoid both cases is the same, and secondly, the level of harm that's being prevented by consuming the products that come from that animal are also the same. I conclude therefore, that if we want to remain morally cons

In 1957, H.P Grice published his reflexive model of meaning. Here, the production of meaning is described as the intentional co-operation between conversational parties to mutually interpret and communicate in the manner they believe will lead to mutual understanding. Green (2007) claims that intent to cause belief is not necessary for speaker meaning to occur, and that meaning is produced simply when one intends to express. In this essay i will show that Greens’ model may involve all verbal and non-verbal acts, and that if this is the case, that the use of these acts can be meaningful if done intentionally.

I detta arbete undersöks och analyseras några möjligheter och utmaningar med elevers användning av generativa AI-verktyg såsom ChatGPT ur filosofilärarens perspektiv med fokus på filosofiämnet i gymnasieskolan. Bland möjligheterna avhandlas individanpassning av undervisningen och bland utmaningarna källkritik och kritiskt tänkande och hur läraren säkrar tillförlitligheten vid examinationer i ljuset av fenomenet generativ AI. En kvalitativ undersökning har utförts bestående av intervjuer med ett litet antal gymnasielärare i filosofi kring hur de förhåller sig till elevers användning av AI-verktyg. Frågor om lärares förhållningssätt till elevers (faktiska eller potentiella) användning av generativ AI och vilka eventuella nya överväganden som AI-verktyg aktualiserar för läraren utreds och diskuteras samt hur filosofiläraren möter de nya utmaningar och realiserar de nya möjligheter som AI aktualiserar. Några goda och dåliga sätt på vilka elever kan använda AI inom filosofi identifieras och förutsättningar för en god elevanvändning analyseras. Filosofiämnet kan bidra till att stärka förutsättningarna för en god användning av AI genom att träna eleverna i förmågor som kritiskt tänkande, att formulera frågor och värdera information samt fördjupning av insikter om centrala begrepp som kunskap och sanning.

Social ontologists commonly think that our ideas about social entities, and about other people also inhabiting the social realm, play an important role in making those entities into what they are. At the same time, we know that our ideas are often indeterminate in character, which presumably would mean that this indeterminacy should carry over to the social realm. And yet social indeterminacy is a neglected topic in social ontology. It is argued that this neglect can be traced to how a particular approach that favors ahistorical reconstructions in making sense of social entities has come to dominate social ontology. If we think beyond the parameters set by this approach, however, we can see that recognizing indeterminacy as a pervasive phenomenon in the social realm might open up new interpretative possibilities in relation to different social categories. This argument is at least partly in line with recent calls for a move towards nonideal social ontology.

The aim of this paper is to strike a blow for the relevance of the debasing demon originally summoned by Jonathan Schaffer. I do so by, first, defending this skeptical hypothesis against critics and, second, by noting important similarities between the workings of this demon and implicit bias. Along the way, I elucidate the structure of this skeptical argument by comparing it to other better-known skeptical arguments. I also clarify the kinds of access the debasing skeptical scenario, as well as some of the replies, operate with. Apart from being interesting in its own right as a different skeptical challenge, the debasing demon raises important issues regarding bias, as I will show by using an example from epistemic decolonialization.

Does the failure of others to comply with collective duties create duties for us to step in and do their share? Defenders of the so-called duty to take up the slack answer this question in the positive. Against their view, defenders of fair shares argue that we only have a duty to contribute our fair share to discharging the collective duty. This paper offers a partial vindication of Liam Murphy’s account of fair shares. I argue that three common objections to fair shares fail to rebut Murphy’s account. On the reading I propose, fair shares may ground as – or more – extensive duties towards third parties as the duty to take up the slack. In addition, fair shares provides something that defenses of slack-taking tend to omit – an account of the limits of our nonideal duties. The paper highlights previously overlooked aspects of Murphy’s account and paves the way for future discussions about slack-taking in the domain of global politics.

Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199(3–4):8701–8740, 2021) and Steel and Bartha (Risk Analysis 43(2):260–268, 2023) argue that we should understand the precautionary principle as the injunction to maximise lexical utilities. They show that the lexical utility model has important pragmatic advantages. Moreover, the model has the theoretical advantage of satisfying all axioms of expected utility theory except continuity. In this paper I raise a trilemma for any attempt at modelling the precautionary principle with lexical utilities: it permits choice cycles or leads to paralysis or implies that the smallest value difference that is possible in a context has extreme axiological implications.