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Gesetzliche Maßnahmen im Bereich der Auslandsfinanzierung von zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen werden inzwischen als zentraler Bestandteil von schrumpfenden zivilgesellschaftlichen Räumen angesehen. Allerdings existiert in der Literatur bisher kein Konsens über die Angemessenheit eines expliziten staatlichen Eingriffs in diesem Bereich. Der Artikel entwickelt deswegen einen konzeptionellen Rahmen, um den einschränkenden Charakter von staatlichen Eingriffen empirisch präziser als bisher bestimmen zu können. Wir plausibilisieren unser konzeptionelles Argument anhand von sechs kurzen Fallstudien zu Deutschland, Österreich, der Türkei, Ungarn, Uruguay und Venezuela. Damit tragen wir in dreifacher Art und Weise zur Debatte über schrumpfende zivilgesellschaftliche Räume bei. Wir zeigen erstens, dass gesetzliche Maßnahmen in Bezug auf die ausländische Finanzierung von Zivilgesellschaft nicht zwangsläufig als Teil eines weltweiten repressiven Trends anzusehen sind. Zweitens schlagen wir eine neue analytische Einordnung vor, die über das bisher dominante binäre Verständnis hinausgeht, welches gerade im Global Süden jeglicher Anpassung gesetzlicher Maßnahmen in diesem Bereich repressive Tendenzen unterstellt. Drittens versuchen wir eine Sicht der internationalen Menschenrechte zur Vereinigungsfreiheit mit einer auf nationalen verfassungsrechtlichen Normen fokussierten Perspektive in Verbindung zu bringen, um damit empirisch-analytisch präziser auf die in vielen Ländern existierenden rechtsnormativen Unterschiede zwischen diesen beiden Ebenen aufmerksam zu machen.

Seit Jahren erodiert die Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der Europäischen Union (EU), vor allem in Polen und Ungarn. Dem Rat der EU hat es bisher an politischem Willen gemangelt, dieser Aus­zehrung Einhalt zu gebieten; überdies erschweren vertragliche Hürden eine Sank­tio­nie­rung der betroffenen Länder bis hin zur Aussetzung ihres Stimmrechts. Die Corona-Pandemie könnte das ändern. Als Reaktion auf den wirtschaft­lichen Ein­bruch wurde gleichzeitig mit dem mehrjährigen EU-Haushalt (2021-27) beschlossen, den Mitgliedstaaten zusätzlich beträchtliche Finanzmittel zu gewähren. Wie auch der Haushalt selbst sind diese Mittel konditioniert: Ländern, die die Rechtsstaatlichkeit missachten, können sie gesperrt oder gar gekürzt werden. Dieser Hebel sollte konse­quent genutzt werden. Dafür sprechen neben dem im EU-Vertrag (EUV) verankerten Selbstverständnis der EU als Werte- und Demokratieunion drei aktuelle Herausforderungen, vor denen die Union steht: EU-Gelder effektiv einzusetzen; ihre Handlungs­fähigkeit durch Mehrheits­entscheidungen zu stärken; sich im Wettbewerb mit auto­kratischen Regimen zu behaupten. Nur als Demokratieunion kann sie diese Herausforderungen meistern. (Autorenreferat)

Azerbaijan has a population of more than 10 million, of which women accounted for 50% in 2020. At the same time, 93% of Azerbaijan's citizens describe themselves as Muslims. Since the beginning of independence, Azerbaijan has been a secular state by virtue of Article 48 of the Constitution, which guarantees the freedom of worship, choice, or nonpractice of religion and the freedom of expression of one's own views on religion. This article aims to assess the changes in the self-employment of women in Azerbaijan through a deductive analysis of data and observation of changes in the structure of resources based on generally available macroeconomic data. This study focuses on the situation of women on the Azerbaijani labour market over the two decades of the 21st century. The numbers of economically active women, including those in employment and the unemployed, and economically inactive women are specified. Further, the government's legal and financial policy in respect of women's self-employment is analysed. The author determines what percentage of companies were set up by women and in which sectors and locations.

This article analyses the development of financial assistance in the Eurozone since 2010. It argues that reforms to instruments and bodies, notably the European Financial Stability Facility, the European Stability Mechanism, and the current Covid-19 recovery fund, are best explained by a re-occurring pattern of negotiations between potential creditors and debtors based on common Eurozone interests and national cost-benefit considerations. Building on a liberal intergovernmentalist approach, this article shows how this pattern influenced the step-by-step reform of financial assistance in the Eurozone. The threat to Eurozone stability served as a constant factor encouraging member states to expand and deepen the assistance formula. Creditors’ cost-benefit considerations were key for retaining disincentives, a limited liability for common debt, and intermediary borrowing and lending within the financing design. However, on the back of common Eurozone interests, debtors were able to push for an increase in assistance, an expansion of assistance into areas of banking sector support, and a softening of moral hazard elements in the more recent Covid-19 pandemic. Due to creditors’ continuous insistence on safeguards and limited burden-sharing, reform outcomes were repeatedly unable to resolve the difficulties at hand.

Taiwan has benefited from her timely response to the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak, which has limited the extent of economic and social damage the virus could have inflicted. Unlike many countries, economic activities and social lives in Taiwan have remained above water; and have shown signs of rebounding in recent months. Past experiences with public health crises such as SARS have offered valuable lessons for the government to cope with similar pandemic threats. Effective countermeasures have created favourable circumstances for the government to deploy social policy as a safety net. Almost all the major responses are of a temporary nature, and a programmatic extension of the existing social security institutions (e.g., social assistance and specific in-cash benefits targeted at specific occupational or population groups). In addition, the government granted financial support to those enterprises in difficulties to disincentivize them from dismissing their employees. All these measures have largely offset the adverse consequences of the pandemic crisis. Against this backdrop, Taiwan should be amongst those countries to recover first from the pandemic shock.

The paper maps out South Korea’s key social policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic based on an analysis of legislation and budget proposals adopted between January 2020 and September 2020. Both data sources indicate that the South Korean government clearly utilized social policy tools to mitigate the damage incurred by the pandemic. First, eight out of 32 social policy laws were explicitly designed in response to the pandemic. Second, an unprecedented four rounds of supplementary budgets were approved to protect both the economic and public health of the people. In light of the speed and the degree of political consensus vis-à-vis comparable years in the past, it is clear that South Korea's social policy response to Covid-19 was swift and bipartisan. Moreover, judging by the country’s previous experience of turning "a crisis" into "an opportunity" for welfare expansion, the current pandemic has the potential to lead to a consolidation of South Korea's welfare state.

The major landmark in Eswatini’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic was the adoption of the Coronavirus (Covid-19) Regulations 2020 under Section 43 of the National Disaster Management Act, Legal Notice No 72 of 27 March 2020. Though this statutory instrument provides mainly for containment measures against the spread of the pandemic, it also established a National Disaster Management Task Force responsible for the provision of relief assistance to the poor and vulnerable. Other measures that were adopted by the government include the postponement of increases in water and electricity prices, relief assistance to workers who lose their jobs, suspension of the dismissal of employees during the pandemic and the reduction of fuel prices twice since the arrival of the pandemic. Responses to the social impacts of the pandemic have largely been as a result of government decisions and pronouncements rather than legislative processes. Moreover, relief efforts have largely been donor-driven, which brings into question issues of sustainability, which suggests the need for establishing robust social protection systems in order to promote the wellbeing of all Swazis.

This report analyses Ghana’s policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic, with particular attention to the social sector. It highlights the various policies that were adopted to help minimise the impact of the pandemic, ranging from the provision of free/subsidised water and electricity, and the distribution of food to vulnerable groups during the partial lockdown of the country. The report argues that whilst these social interventions were useful in mitigating the hardships posed by the pandemic, their overall impact was undermined by a number of factors, including the lack of a reliable database on the poor and vulnerable, ineffective targeting mechanisms, and the politicisation of the distribution of benefits.

The social policy response of the Nicaraguan government to the Covid-19 pandemic has been negligible. No significant social policy measures were adopted to alleviate the negative effects that this health crisis has on the general population. No quarantine or state of emergency was declared. The wearing of face masks in public was not made mandatory. On the contrary, the government actively promoted mass gatherings of political supporters and state employees. It even went so far as to prohibit the medical personnel of public hospitals the use of masks. This was severally criticized by the Nicaraguan opposition, media outlets and international human rights organizations. It was seen as a strategy that favored the political and economic interests of the governing party over the lives of the Nicaraguan people. To explain why this course of action was taken, this report looks at the country’s current economic and political conditions. The extremely limited response to the Covid-19 pandemic is seen as the attempt of the ruling party to reduce, as much as possible, the laming or standstill of the Nicaraguan economy, in order to avoid its negative political repercussions.

This report discusses Indonesia’s social policy response to Covid-19 as well as the public’s response to this policy response. It finds that the Indonesian social policy response to the pandemic was mainly through reallocations within the government budget to finance targeted social safety net programs covering social assistance, family support, and labor market benefits. These budget reallocations, however, have been insufficient to cover all the poor, thus the government sought financial support from the World Bank, global bonds, and local governments. The government’s social policies stimulated public responses, including both support and opposition from politicians and community members. The most salient support stemmed from the community in the form of collectively working to informally provide assistance to the poor. Community support for the poor and the participation of global agencies in welfare provision underline the limitations of state social policy during times of socio-economic adversity, particularly due to budget constraints. During the crisis, the state, which should be able to protect its citizens, was less capable of providing social protection, prompting it to seek support from both global and local welfare providers.

This report summarises and analyses Kenya’s social policy response to Covid-19. Following the global outbreak of the pandemic, Kenya’s parliament passed several economic and social laws. Tax law amendments aimed to cushion citizens and businesses from the negative effects of the disease by increasing household income for basic needs and enabling businesses to remain in operation. Other significant measures instituted were social protection interventions in the form of cash transfers and public works programmes targeted to poor and vulnerable households. Kenya’s social policy response to the pandemic followed a continuity path of minimal state provisioning. The government’s overreliance on cash transfers as the major form of social policy intervention resulted in an inadequate, exclusionary and ill-suited response.

In 2016, after 25 years of international isolation, Uzbekistan started to open up and modernize its economy. In this phase, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the economy and society hard. The government reacted with a harsh lockdown. As an immediate crisis response, it allocated funds from international donors and the national budget to protect the economy and vulnerable groups. Due to a lack of data and public and scientific discourses, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these measures. As in other countries, the pandemic revealed well-known structural and institutional problems, such as inequality, poverty and the informal labor sector as well as the vulnerability of labor migrants. The budget for the healthcare system was increased significantly in 2020 and again in 2021. It is not yet possible to predict whether the pandemic will lead to policy changes in the long term. In addition to restrictions on personal liberty in the wake of the lockdown and curfew, the government also enacted a law that criminalizes the dissemination of false information, which has been criticized by human rights experts. It is safe to say that the reforms and opening up of the country since 2016 have significantly improved the government's crisis response capabilities. However, problems with the continuation of top-down decision-making also became apparent.

Zimbabwe’s social policy response to Covid-19 unfolded in a context of enduring socioeconomic and political crises. Its main instruments were temporary food relief and cash transfers, though it also included healthcare measures, an economic stimulus package, pension benefits, and “cushioning allowances”. The expansion of food relief and cash transfers was based on existing social protection programmes, and beneficiaries were, at least in theory determined through means-testing and targeting. Local and international civil society organisations supported the government’s response. While the breadth and timing of Zimbabwe’s social policy response are noteworthy, it remained largely inadequate and temporary.

This report reviews Ukraine’s social policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic between March and September 2020. In mid-March the government decided on a lockdown, which lasted until the end of May. Simultaneously, the government and parliament approved mitigating measures to support vulnerable groups, which were expected to suffer due to the resulting economic downturn. The decisions were largely fragmented and primarily directed to supporting business and the labour market. Education institutions went into a remote working regime in mid-March, which resulted in inequality of access to education due to the digital divide. Health personnel received top-ups to their wages, but only if they have been working in the secondary level of the healthcare system. Most mitigation measures were financed from the budgetary Fund for Combatting Covid-19, which was actually largely directed towards financing road construction. In summer, the quarantine measures were loosened, and adaptive quarantine was introduced. The supporting measures mostly evaporated as the government faced budget constraints and the economy was recovering more quickly than initially expected.

This report discusses South Africa’s initial social policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic. It provides a timeline of the early stages of the pandemic and of the government’s legislative interventions. South Africa’s social policy response was premised on the country’s post-apartheid development agenda, which is significantly informed by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In response to the pandemic, South Africa’s government rolled out a social relief and economic support package worth approximately 10% of GDP. This package funded, for instance, a special Covid-19 “Social Relief of Distress Grant” for all those individuals who were unemployed and did not receive any other form of social assistance. South Africa could roll out such a massive social relief and economic support package because the necessary institutional infrastructure was already in place. The report concludes with some reflections on the broader social implications of the pandemic.

In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese government has utilized and pragmatically adjusted existing welfare institutions to ensure social and economic stability. This report describes the Chinese social policy responses in 2020 to mitigate the effects of the coronavirus crisis and focuses on specific countermeasures, such as cash benefits and benefits-in-kind for vulnerable people in the fields of health, social assistance, unemployment, and elderly care. Moreover, social insurance contributions for enterprises were reduced and deferred to help revive the economy. As shown in this report, many countermeasures were of a temporary nature, and can be defined as adaptations of the existing basic social security net, supplemented by administrative innovations such as the digitalization of means testing, for instance.

Uruguay’s social policy response to Covid-19 built on a strong social protection system and a favorable social situation that existed before the pandemic arrived. The country’s favorable position in the region enabled the government to gradually reformulate key existing social policies to cover a broad proportion of the population. The newly installed government’s response occurred within the country’s structurally divided social protection architecture, which covers both formal workers and families not covered by the social security system. However, efforts in the two parts of the system have not been equally effective and there remains a portion of the population not covered by any of these social protection policies.

This report examines Ecuador's social policy response to mitigate the Covid-19 pandemic's effects and protect vulnerable populations. It chronologically traces containment, closure policies, social policies and programmes put in place following the announcement of Covid-19 as a global pandemic. A combination of external constraints and domestic structures, i.e. informality and weak coordination, led to truncated efforts in the healthcare response, while persistent inequalities in access to technology and high levels of informality led to fragmented education, labour policies and social protection responses. The report zooms into the Family Protection Grant (Bono de Protección Familiar or BPF), a new social protection programme that covers informal workers, which captures the difficulties in reaching unregistered populations amid lockdown and containment measures.

The Covid-19 containment measures taken in Uganda have been amongst the most radical in Africa: closure of the borders, a ban on public and private transport, closure of non-essential shops, and a ban on political, religious and cultural meetings. Even before the identification of the first case of Covid-19, the Ugandan government had taken measures to prevent the dissemination of the disease, helped by a solid experience in managing pandemics. Nonetheless, and despite the strong reactivity of the Ugandan government to take firm sanitary measures to fight the disease, the response to the socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic was extremely limited and mainly directed toward the formal private sector. Informal urban workers, despite being the most affected by the crisis, were only targeted by rudimentary relief measures that could be described as humanitarian “band-aids”. Indeed, social protection is still a very young preoccupation of the Ugandan government, but this has to be analyzed within the broader context of the presidential election that took place in January 2021. The incumbent government used the containment measures to muzzle the opposition on the one hand, and to monopolize actions and discourses on the disease on the other.

Peru has one of the highest number of deaths proportional to its population and a severely hit economy, even though it was one of the first countries to implement strict social distancing measures and an ambitious plan for fiscal stimulus and economic relief for households. The response of the state was mostly based on (i) various cash transfers for the most vulnerable; (ii) policies to activate the economy such as a program to guarantee loans to firms; and (iii) allowing withdrawals from individual pension pots. Unfortunately, a combination of low financial inclusion, deficiencies in registers and structural limitations compromised the effectiveness of the social transfers, reaching recipients late or never. Furthermore, depleting pension funds may ease liquidity concerns in the short run, but the negative consequences on securing a pension for the future are immense. Worse, individuals who are not experiencing hardship can also make these withdrawals. Other countries, like Chile, have followed, paving the way for a dangerous trend that can jeopardize old-age security.

Turkey's social policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic combined various conventional and unconventional social policy tools. In a context of already persistently high unemployment rates, the government put an emphasis on labor market reforms to protect employment, with a short-time work scheme playing an important role. For those left unprotected by protective labor market policies, the government provided relatively meagre one-off social assistance payments that reached large parts of the poor. While these policies cushioned the social impact of the pandemic to some degree, they also amplified already existing inequalities: Labor market insiders (regular employees) were far more effectively protected than labor market outsiders (self-employed, people in informal employment). In addition to these social policy instruments the government also implemented 'social policy by other means', which included boosting consumer credit. With regards to future prospects, it remains unclear whether the social policy response that was devised as a temporary intervention will be unwound or result in more permanent changes to the country's welfare regime.

As a major hub for global trade and travel, Singapore was badly affected by the Covid-19 global pandemic. However, the city-state has since managed to curb local transmission of the coronavirus and return employment levels to pre-pandemic levels. These positive outcomes are a result of Singapore’s social policy response to Covid-19. In this report, I highlight the range of labour market interventions that were implemented to maintain employment and blunt the economic impacts of the pandemic. These include a Jobs Support Scheme that subsidised a significant portion of the resident wage bill for firms and employers, a Self-Employed Income Relief Scheme to support self-employed persons, and a Covid-19 Support Grant to help those who were laid off from their jobs during the Covid-19 pandemic. A range of cash pay-outs and subsidies were also provided to households and citizens while subsidies and grants were introduced to support retraining and education in the Singaporean workforce. In sum, Singapore’s social policy response to Covid-19 has focused on maintaining employment and self-sufficiency among its resident population, with financial support provided to the poor and unemployed.

Argentina's initial social policy response to Covid-19 focused on protecting employment, wages and basic living conditions. Key policies included cash transfers and food programs for vulnerable families, wage subsidies for private sector workers and subsidized loans for firms and self-employed workers. The government also dictated a set of new regulations on employment, prices and housing, among others, to reduce the social costs of the pandemic. This paper offers an overview of Argentine social policy response measures taken up until September 2020. It focuses on the social policy instruments specifically oriented to the most vulnerable workers and families, including a new cash transfer program for adults with no regular income (Emergency Family Income or IFE), reaching about 8.6 million people in the first round. Overall, Argentina's social policy response involved multiple instruments aimed to operate on several fronts; however, the social and economic costs remain very high and are still unfolding.

Solomon Islands was caught off guard when Covid-19 was declared a global pandemic. Most of its initial efforts were to ensure that the deadly virus did not venture beyond its borders into the community. As a result, it has only recorded 18 border cases to date (8 February 2021). In Solomon Islands, the negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic was mitigated by two main sources: the community and the state. People's survival and livelihood were primarily supported by a set of relational networks made possible by customary land tenure and social capital at the local level, known as the wantok system. In addition, a plan called the Economic Stimulus Package was at the core of the government’s formal social policy response.

Azerbaijan’s social assistance and income support schemes adopted during the Covid-19 pandemic need to be seen within the context of the country’s existing social protection system and safety nets. While the existing system is operational and has the technical capacity to respond and deliver social policies, it has had two key shortcomings: (1) low benefit rates and (2) issues in coverage, notably the exclusion of informal employees and migrant workers. Left unaddressed ex ante, they caught the system off-guard ex post when the coronavirus pandemic broke out. As a result, although Covid-related social assistance measures (especially cash transfers) were implemented without delay and provided some immediate relief for vulnerable and affected social groups, they fell short of covering sizable sections of the population, namely informal workers and Azerbaijanis working in Russia. It is also doubtful that such assistance can improve future wellbeing of vulnerable groups, whose living standards are likely to worsen during and after the economic fallout from the pandemic.

Zambia's social policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic is unfolding against a background of severe financial challenges, a squeezed social sector and limited state capacity. There are also concerns about the upcoming general election in August 2021, which is already beginning to shape policy and spending decisions. Much of Zambia’s social policy response has focused on the formal sector, despite the country’s large informal sector, high unemployment rate and food insecurity across urban and rural areas. A Covid-19 emergency cash transfer (ECT) has been the most significant social policy intervention to help the poorest households to cope with the effects of the pandemic. However, this programme has been largely driven and funded by international donors, while the government has increased payments to agricultural subsidies and empowerment funds. Claims that the ruling party is using the ECT for election rigging suggests that there is some political interest in this scheme, but other more powerful constituencies - particularly farmers and young people - continue to be prioritised. This reflects the political dynamics of Zambia's social protection response more broadly, with domestic incentives shaping the level of government support and funding directed at various programmes.

This report examines the social policy response of the Government of Armenia to the Covid-19 crisis. Official data on the implemented programs suggest that since March 2020, around USD 55 million has been transferred to individuals and households as wage support, unemployment and family benefits, utility payment subsidies and tuition fee support. Survey data suggest that despite being early and extensive, government assistance has not been effective in relieving the financial stress and anxiety caused by the pandemic, while public expectations about the future remain pessimistic. As individuals most and least in need have benefited equally from the implemented programs, government assistance has also not been well-targeted.

During the pandemic, Brazil has provided its citizens with support in the areas of long-term care and disability, the labor market, social assistance, education, and pensions. This report focuses on two social policy areas, healthcare and family benefits (including labor policies), as these were the most crucial social policies implemented in Brazil during the Covid-19 pandemic in terms of the resources allocated and the magnitude of social impact. Brazil’s relatively generous social policies were uncoordinated with public health interventions, which contributed to poor compliance with these public health interventions. This suggests that social policy initiatives alone are insufficient in mitigating the social consequences of the pandemic. They need to be accompanied by and coordinated with public health measures, including regulations on testing, social distancing and mask wearing.

This report offers an analysis of the Mexican federal government’s social policy response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The report provides an overview of developments in six policy areas where change associated with the pandemic can be observed: healthcare, pensions, family benefits, education, the labour market and housing. This analysis across policy areas shows that the Mexican government’s response does not correspond to the dimensions of the crisis. Apart from healthcare, few new specific measures have been introduced. The government has largely decided to respond to the pandemic with the group of new programmes created during 2019, as a result of an overhaul of the country’s social policy. However, the potential of those programmes to deal with the pandemic’s effects could well be limited, since it is not even clear yet if they represent cases of welfare expansion or retrenchment compared to previous programmes. At the same time, proposals from civil society and opposition parties to introduce comprehensive basic income schemes have been ignored. If the path of minimal action is not rectified, grim social, economic and political consequences await Mexican society in the foreseeable future.

With its strong public healthcare system and social security regime, Costa Rica was better prepared to face the Covid-19 pandemic than most countries in the Global South. However, the pandemic hit at a time when its social policy regime had already been weakened by three decades of neoliberal inspired policies. Since the first Covid-19 case was identified in March 2020, the country implemented a series of legislative and institutional measures in different social policy areas that sought to build on the country’s institutional heritage to provide social protection to its population. In this report, we analyze whether these measures represented more focalized temporary "band-aid" measures or were inspired by the historic commitment to universal social policy. For this, we first describe the social policy measures taken during the Covid-19 crisis. Then we focus on three key policy areas – health, pensions, social assistance, to analyze whether these measures positively or negatively affect universalism in Costa Rica, understood as a multidimensional concept. We find that Costa Rica's initial quick, and later unsure measures took two paths: A first set of measures in explicit response to Covid-19, and a second set was aimed at guaranteeing the continuity of the country’s universal social security system.

Der Europäische Rat hat Ende Juli keinen klaren Mechanismus für eine Koppelung von EU-Finanzzahlungen an den Respekt für die Grundwerte der Union gemäß Arti­kel 2 EU-Vertrag (EUV) vereinbart. Das Europäische Parlament (EP) verlangt mehrheitlich eine solche Konditionalisierung gegenüber einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten. Erst dann will es seine Zu­stimmung zum nächsten Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen geben. Ein neuer gesamteuropäischer Bericht der Europäischen Kommission über die Rechtsstaatlichkeit, der diesen September vorgestellt werden soll, wird die Konfrontation mit Ungarn und Polen verschärfen. Eine langfristige Betrachtung der europäischen Politik in Sachen Rechtsstaatlichkeit relativiert zwar ein wenig die Sorge, dass unter deutscher Ratspräsidentschaft die letzte effektive Gelegenheit zum Handeln besteht. Allerdings wird das Vertagen der politischen Konflikte um die Kernwerte der Union immer kostenintensiver. Der EuGH und die Kommission können nicht allein als Hüter der Verträge agieren. (Autorenreferat)