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The article discusses the need of departments and colleges to recognize and reward faculty engaged in their efforts, and mentions taskforce created by the Government Department of the University of Texas to identify challenges of the department in respect to diversity and inclusion.

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00465.x Byline: Michael G. Findley (*), Scott Edwards ([dagger]) Abstract: This paper addresses a puzzle of how conflicts characterized by significant power asymmetries often play out much differently than dominant powers expect. We adapt the notions of institutionalized peace and riot systems from the literature on ethnic violence to identify ways in which social institutions attenuate collective action dilemmas, thereby increasing capability for a less-powerful group. Dominant groups often miscalculate the true nature of capability relationships by failing to account for these group-specific institutions that operate in the face of exogenous threats. We illustrate our model with two episodes of Chechen mobilization in the 1990s. Author Affiliation: (*)Brigham Young University ([dagger])University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Through a field experiment and audit study, we test how the electoral calendar affects the use of local economic development policies. We explore how electoral timing along with local political institutions and party composition affect local governments' offers of investment incentives to outside firms. We legally incorporated a consultancy and, on behalf of a real investor in manufacturing, approached roughly 3,000 U.S. municipalities with inquiries. The main experimental results show no greater tendency to offer incentives for investment anticipated prior to than after elections—a null result that is estimated with high precision. Limiting the sample to municipalities that specialize in manufacturing, the relevant subgroup, suggests that election timing matters in this most likely set of locales. Some observational findings include additional evidence on how direct elections of executives and partisanship correlate with incentive offers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a field experiment and audit study, we test how the electoral calendar affects the use of local economic development policies. We explore how electoral timing along with local political institutions and party composition affect local governments' offers of investment incentives to outside firms. We legally incorporated a consultancy and, on behalf of a real investor in manufacturing, approached roughly 3,000 U.S. municipalities with inquiries. The main experimental results show no greater tendency to offer incentives for investment anticipated prior to than after elections—a null result that is estimated with high precision. Limiting the sample to municipalities that specialize in manufacturing, the relevant subgroup, suggests that election timing matters in this most likely set of locales. Some observational findings include additional evidence on how direct elections of executives and partisanship correlate with incentive offers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Open Aid Malawi initiative has collected an unprecedented database that identifies as much location-specific information as possible for each of over 2500 individual foreign aid donations to Malawi since 2003. The efficient use and distribution of such aid is important to donors and to Malawi citizens. However, because of individual donor goals and difficulty in tracking donor coordination it is difficult to determine whether aid allocation is efficient. We compare several Bayesian spatial generalized linear mixed models to relate aid allocation to various economic indicators within seven donation sectors. We find that the spatial gamma regression model best predicts current aid allocation. While we are cautious about making strong claims based on this exploratory study, we provide a methodology by which one could (i) evaluate the efficiency of aid allocation via a study of the locations of current aid allocation as compared to the need at those locations and (ii) come up with a strategy for efficient allocation of resources in conditions where there exists an ideal relationship between aid allocation and economic sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]