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The strategy of integrated deterrence is a repackaged version of Cold War strategies. The integration of assets to deter adversaries was part of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations' overarching strategies that forced the military services to change their operating concepts, capabilities, and doctrine simultaneously. The US Army is an example of how national strategy forces organizational changes. This article assesses how the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations forced institutional change while considering the significance of integrating deterrence. These examples will assist US military and policy practitioners with adapting their organizations to existing national defense strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars focused on NATO nuclear strategy during the Cold War have devoted little attention to the dynamics of how the Alliance would decide to use nuclear weapons. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the internal debates about how a nuclear use decision would be taken, particularly balancing the desire to ensure adequate consultation of the non-nuclear members without undermining the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent by giving them a veto. To avoid undermining Alliance cohesion, the nuclear use decision process was kept deliberately vague, despite the problems that would almost certainly have arisen in a war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

About two decades after the signing of the Washington Treaty, through which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into being, the reference strategic framework for the efforts to ensure the security and defence of member states has undergone substantial transformations. These were reflected in the adoption, at the end of 1967, of a new Strategic Concept, which had as its main element the development of the potential for crisis response on coordinates of flexibility, through the superior exploitation of NATO's potential. The implementation of this approach overlapped with a series of events having a profound impact on the security equation during the Cold War. One of the implementation formulas for Flexible Response Strategy would be applied in NATO's defence system including the development of innovative instruments and procedures. It focused both on the aspects of supporting allied forces and on strengthening the level of interoperability between them in order to meet higher requirements. The creation of an intensive training program (REFORGER), simultaneously with the expansion of the support potential through the prepositioning of equipment (POMCUS) are steps that have contributed to the maturation of the NATO planning process. For the entire duration of the Cold War, these instruments have been constantly used and improved, with beneficial effects in terms of strengthening political and military cohesion between Member States, while providing more coherence in ensuring an effective deterrence posture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this new round of power network development, the concept of coordinated and optimized operation of power network interconnection and smart grid "source network load" has gradually attracted attention. Based on the analysis of the impact of the flexible DC distribution network on the complex energy system with multiple data sources and large data volume under the big data platform, the coordinated dispatching of the source and load of the big data flexible DC distribution network is studied. Therefore, a source-load matching index that can evaluate the impact of different types of loads on the stability of the flexible DC grid is constructed and incorporated into the load recovery optimization model. First, use the scene reduction method to process all generated scenes; next, take the reduction technology and the scene generation method into account of the uncertainty caused by the prediction error and incorporate them into the multi-objective function optimization model; finally, the membership function of fuzzy numbers is used to model uncertainty. So as to construct a load recovery model that can coordinate the load recovery amount, importance and system dynamic response. The actual meaning of the matching index is explained through model solving and actual case analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2018 is rich with anniversaries. In the current international context the 50th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is certainly having special relevance. However, in the view of the need to examine the prospects of ensuring strategic stability, the role of nuclear weapons in world politics and the contours of the new world order yet another anniversary – twenty years from the beginning of the ‘second nuclear age’ – is just as important. In order to identify the substantive aspects of this phenomenon this paper provides a comparative analysis of distinctive features of both the first and the second nuclear ages. The author identifies the causes and prerequisites for the beginning of the ‘first nuclear age’ and examines, on the basis of a wide range of policy papers and analytical reports, the evolution of the United States’ approaches to nuclear strategy, deterrence and military and political goal setting. Special focus is on such issues as the achievement of strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States and the role of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the development of the concept of strategic stability and informal code of conduct of nuclear powers. The paper emphasizes that although the ‘first nuclear age’ coincides chronologically with the Cold War, these two phenomena are not identical. As for the ‘second nuclear age’, the author links its emergence with such developments as India and Pakistan joining the nuclear ‘club’, long-range missile tests carried out by the DPRK, and the revision of the U.S. policy regarding the anti-missile defense which led to the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The author concludes that defining characteristics of the ‘second nuclear age’ include the retention of the ‘central deterrence’ accompanied by a growing importance of new political formats involving both nuclear and non-nuclear states, many of which have culturally specific approaches to military policy and strategic planning. All these factors combined form a backbone of military and political interactions between the leading powers within the emerging world order.

Deterrence is one of the most perennial concept in human history being conventionally associated with the capacity of a given actor to dissuade another actor from embarking into an aggressive action based on demonstrative potential to react decisively. This is only one of the existing definitions of the deterrence which is in fact the constant ingredient of every decision-making process. Deterrence become the main norm for generating efficient strategies with practical applicability developed in the aftermath of Second World War. Since then deterrence theory developed significantly, most often in support of the strategic decisions adopted during Cold War. In this framework, it represented the central recourse of supporting the stability of international system based on a mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities. The end of Cold War brought a new reality in which risks and challenges are more interconnected, thus, requiring more synergetic and multidisciplinary approaches in designing the right framework for deterrence. The most common area for implementing deterrence is defence being extensively tested in the last decade, especially within the framework of NA TO. But this is only one perspective from which deterrence could be perceived. Nowadays deterrence is common to various areas in our societies, becoming one of the main instruments in tackling the contemporary asymmetry. Ensuring the right formulas for having a comprehensive deterrence is a continuous process which has to be correlated with the undertaking of creating resilient societies. The necessary solutions could not be identified without implementing flexible approach and structuring practical cooperation formulas which can maximize the support for deterrence strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this study is to explain and to frame the American Grand Strategy during the Cold War with special emphasis on the Johnson Administration era. Hence the structure of the study is threefold. Firstly, it addresses the theoretical framework of the American Grand Strategy during the Early Cold War. Secondly, it's dwell on the parameters that ensure applicability of the Grand Strategy. Accordingly, in the period between 1948-1964, doctrine and concept-based changes, which evolved and provided continuance of the Grand Strategy, will be analyzed with examples. Thirdly, "Cyprus Question" and the US-Turkey tension during the Johnson Administration are to be expound on the perspective of Grand Strategy from the Central Intelligence Agency documents available on the CIA Reading Room. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The India–Pakistan near war of February–March 2019 highlights India's ongoing evolution in strategic thought and practice since its emergence in 1998 as an overt nuclear-weapon possessor. These changes, involving an increasing willingness to engage in the intentional escalation of conflict with a nuclear-armed rival willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons, challenge certain academic assumptions about the behavior of nuclear-weapon states. In particular, they undermine the expectations of the nuclear-revolution theory—which anticipates nuclear and conventional restraint among nuclear-armed rivals through fear of mutual assured destruction—and the model of nuclear learning which underpins this theory, in which new nuclear-weapon states gradually absorb this restraint through policy-maker learning. This article explores how India's learning pathway since 1998 has deviated from these expectations. India is instead pursuing its own "revolution," in the direction of creating capabilities for flexible response and escalation dominance. It concludes by illuminating the similarities between Indian strategic behavior and contemporary practices of other nuclear-armed states, and suggests that New Delhi's emerging de facto nuclear doctrine and posture is part of a broader empirical challenge to our current conceptions of the nuclear revolution and of nuclear learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author presents different definitions of the term Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), which has become more prevalent in military documents, articles and assessments over the past two decades. Moreover, it is shown that, despite A2/ AD being prevalent in current studies and discussions, it is principally not a new threat. Simply put, A2/AD is the response to Western force projection, precision strike, and highly-networked C2 capabilities. Since attrition warfare must not be the first option for NATO, technical solutions and creative concepts have to be found to assure future mission success. Also, NATO doctrine should be reviewed in order to reflect the highly integrated joint and combined processes needed in countering A2/AD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]