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The threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a neglected and under-prioritized problem across the US government, requiring a dramatic change of approach. Most proposals for Goldwater-Nichols reform focus on geography, either increasing or decreasing the number of geographic commands. Based on our personal experience as Joint military planners at strategic-level headquarters, we argue that the change needs to go further, focusing on global national security problems instead of geography. This article's analysis and conclusions will provoke conversation across the national security enterprise about how the United States competes with multiple global threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the events of 1989 a radical change of the Romanian political regime took place, a change that had as main effect the democratization of the Romanian society, with special implications of a political, economic, social and implicit military nature. From a military point of view, the Romanian Army underwent extensive transformations that took place in several successive stages. These consisted of starting the process of modernizing the military body on all levels: doctrinal and organizational changes in command and force structures, the concepts of training and their use in operations, and starting the process of replacing certain categories of equipment and some categories of weapons systems with newer and more efficient ones. All these transformations also affected the military engineering branch, in terms of the organization and attributions of the engineer command structures, as well as the structure of engineer forces, on the line of organization, endowment, training. In the following lines we will make a brief review of the transformations to which the Romanian Army was subjected, and implicitly, the military engineering command structures, in the period after 1989.

Copyright of Bulletin of the 'Carol I' National Defence University / Buletinul Universitatii Nationale de Aparare 'Carol I' is the property of Carol I National Defence University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the Cyprus Emergency (1955–1959) to test the force structure thesis. According to the thesis, armies that deploy more manpower per armored vehicle would succeed in counterinsurgency because they could win people's trust, secure intelligence from civilians, and use force selectively. Using the congruence method of within-case analysis, I show that the causal process and logic of the force structure argument are not confirmed in the favorable case of Cyprus. Despite its preference for infantry and police units, the British garrison failed to win over the people and persuade civilians to share information about the insurgent; besides, Britain's intelligence breakthroughs and selective violence did not result from the logic of the force structure thesis, nor did the conflict end as the argument would predict. Political conditions, instead, played a greater role. Ultimately, the case of Cyprus warns against the reassuring belief, inherent in the force structure thesis, that military organizational adjustments in favor of manpower can pave the way to victory against irregular opponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Internasjonal Politikk is the property of Cappelen Damm Akademisk and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since Australia's latest Defence white paper was published in February 2016, the pace of strategic change in our region has forced the government to order a review of defence policy and the white paper's proposed force structure which was driven more by the longer-term needs of defence industry than those of national defence. The region's big strategic challenges are likely to be tested much earlier than envisaged by the white paper and should be the focus of a new 'Plan B'. Herein, Mr Jennings identifies nine short-term measures that the government should now consider. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined changes in variability, accuracy, frequency composition, and temporal regularity of force signal from visionguided to memory-guided force-matching tasks in 17 subacute stroke and 17 age-matched healthy subjects. Subjects performed a unilateral isometric knee extension at 10, 30, and 50% of peak torque [maximum voluntary contraction (MVC)] for 10 s (3 trials each). Visual feedback was removed at the 5-s mark in the first two trials (feedback withdrawal), and 30 s after the second trial the subjects were asked to produce the target force without visual feedback (force recall). The coefficient of variation and constant error were used to quantify force variability and accuracy. Force structure was assessed by the median frequency, relative spectral power in the 0-3-Hz band, and sample entropy of the force signal. At 10% MVC, the force signal in subacute stroke subjects became steadier, more broadband, and temporally more irregular after the withdrawal of visual feedback, with progressively larger error at higher contraction levels. Also, the lack of modulation in the spectral frequency at higher force levels with visual feedback persisted in both the withdrawal and recall conditions. In terms of changes from the visual feedback condition, the feedback withdrawal produced a greater difference between the paretic, nonparetic, and control legs than the force recall. The overall results suggest improvements in force variability and structure from vision- to memory- guided force control in subacute stroke despite decreased accuracy. Different sensory-motor memory retrieval mechanisms seem to be involved in the feedback withdrawal and force recall conditions, which deserves further study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a historical institutionalist approach, this article addresses the future of Southeast Asia’s naval forces. Much analysis on this subject employs a linear Realist model in which Southeast Asia’s navies are expected to be the beneficiaries of declining internal security challenges and a deteriorating external threat environment. However, to date neither of these factors, including increasing Chinese assertiveness in the maritime domain, appear to have significantly accelerated naval force development in Southeast Asia. While there have been some capability increases in areas such as submarines, growth has mainly been in patrol boat and fast attack craft classes. Numbers of larger offshore surface combatants like frigates have fallen. This article argues that in countries where army dominance has become institutionalized, and civil control of the military is weak, governments may be unwilling or unable to reallocate funding away from armies to maritime forces. In a funding environment in which national economic growth is moderate, and spending on defence is a lower priority, naval modernization and expansion can be blocked. This article examines the cases of Thailand, Indonesia and Myanmar to demonstrate how their armies became dominant and how this may have diminished the growth prospects of their navies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues India is laying the foundation to move away from “no-first-use” (NFU) as its nuclear weapons employment policy. Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, India has claimed NFU as the centerpiece of its nuclear strategy. But India has a history of developing foundational changes to its nuclear weapons program before such changes actually occur. For example, the infrastructure of India’s nuclear weapons program was already being created in the 1950s under the guise of civilian nuclear power. Similarly, the weaponization of India’s program, which did not officially occur until after the 1998 tests, had its genesis in far earlier decisions. A close examination of trends in India’s nuclear weapons production complex, its delivery systems, and its command and control complex all lead to the conclusion that India is laying the groundwork for more flexible employment options, up to and including first use. This article does not argue such a decision has been taken. Rather, it argues the underpinning is in place to allow for a move to more flexible options, perhaps very quickly, at some point in the future. This could occur during crisis or it could occur incrementally over time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]