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Abstract Background Continuous monitoring of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in Uganda involves testing bacterial isolates from clinical samples at national and regional hospitals. Although the National Microbiology Reference Laboratory (NMRL) analyzes these isolates for official AMR surveillance data, there's limited integration into public health planning. To enhance the utilization of NMRL data to better inform drug selection and public health strategies in combating antibiotic resistance, we evaluated the trends and spatial distribution of AMR to common antibiotics used in Uganda. Methods We analyzed data from pathogenic bacterial isolates from blood, cerebrospinal, peritoneal, and pleural fluid from AMR surveillance data for 2018–2021. We calculated the proportions of isolates that were resistant to common antimicrobial classes. We used the chi-square test for trends to evaluate changes in AMR resistance over the study period. Results Out of 537 isolates with 15 pathogenic bacteria, 478 (89%) were from blood, 34 (6.3%) were from pleural fluid, 21 (4%) were from cerebrospinal fluid, and 4 (0.7%) were from peritoneal fluid. The most common pathogen was Staphylococcus aureus (20.1%), followed by Salmonella species (18.8%). The overall change in resistance over the four years was 63–84% for sulfonamides, fluoroquinolones macrolides (46–76%), phenicols (48–71%), penicillins (42–97%), β-lactamase inhibitors (20–92%), aminoglycosides (17–53%), cephalosporins (8.3–90%), carbapenems (5.3–26%), and glycopeptides (0–20%). There was a fluctuation in resistance of Staphylococcus aureus to methicillin (60%-45%) (using cefoxitin resistance as a surrogate for oxacillin resistance) Among gram-negative organisms, there were increases in resistance to tetracycline (29–78% p

Abstract Background The Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic overwhelmed health systems and disrupted the delivery of health services globally. Community Health Workers (CHWs) play a critical role in linking communities to health systems, supporting the prevention and control of diseases in many low- and middle-income countries. However, their roles, barriers, and facilitators in the response and control of the COVID-19 pandemic have not been well documented. We described the roles of CHWs in the COVID-19 response, including the barriers and facilitators. Methods A cross-sectional study design was used to assess the COVID-19 response in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. This involved 110 key informant interviews with policymakers, health facility managers, district health managers, and CHWs to understand the role of CHWs in the COVID 19 response, selected purposively. The total sample size was based on information saturation in each of the countries. A document review on the COVID-19 response was also conducted. We searched Google, Google Scholar, and PubMed for published and grey literature. Data from the selected documents were extracted into a Google master matrix in MS Excel and analyzed thematically. Results In COVID-19 Control, CHWs supported community-based surveillance, contact tracing, risk communication, community mobilization, and home-based care. To support the continuity of other non-COVID-19 services, the CHWs conducted community mobilization, sensitizations, outreaches, referrals, and patient follow-ups. CHWs were challenged by movement restrictions, especially in the initial stages of the lockdown, inadequate PPE, increased workload, low allowances, and motivation. CHW were facilitated by trainings, the development of guidelines, development partners’ support/funding, and the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE) and tools. Conclusion CHWs supported both the COVID-19 control and continuity of non-COVID-19 health care during the COVID-19 pandemic. CHWs are a critical resource that must be adequately supported to build resilient health systems.

Abstract Background The COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed the capacity of health facilities globally, emphasizing the need for readiness to respond to rapid increases in cases. The first wave of COVID-19 in Uganda peaked in late 2020 and demonstrated challenges with facility readiness to manage cases. The second wave began in May 2021. In June 2021, we assessed the readiness of health facilities in Uganda to manage the second wave of COVID-19. Methods Referral hospitals managed severe COVID-19 patients, while lower-level health facilities screened, isolated, and managed mild cases. We assessed 17 of 20 referral hospitals in Uganda and 71 of 3,107 lower-level health facilities, selected using multistage sampling. We interviewed health facility heads in person about case management, coordination and communication and reporting, and preparation for the surge of COVID-19 during first and the start of the second waves of COVID-19, inspected COVID-19 treatment units (CTUs) and other service delivery points. We used an observational checklist to evaluate capacity in infection prevention, medicines, personal protective equipment (PPE), and CTU surge capacity. We used the “ReadyScore” criteria to classify readiness levels as > 80% (‘ready’), 40–80% (‘work to do’), and

Abstract Introduction As part of efforts to rapidly identify and care for individuals with COVID-19, trace and quarantine contacts, and monitor disease trends over time, most African countries implemented interventions to strengthen their existing disease surveillance systems. This research describes the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learnt from the COVID-19 surveillance strategies implemented in four African countries to inform the enhancement of surveillance systems for future epidemics on the continent. Methods The four countries namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda, were selected based on their variability in COVID-19 response and representation of Francophone and Anglophone countries. A mixed-methods observational study was conducted including desk review and key informant interviews, to document best practices, gaps, and innovations in surveillance at the national, sub-national, health facilities, and community levels, and these learnings were synthesized across the countries. Results Surveillance approaches across countries included - case investigation, contact tracing, community-based, laboratory-based sentinel, serological, telephone hotlines, and genomic sequencing surveillance. As the COVID-19 pandemic progressed, the health systems moved from aggressive testing and contact tracing to detect virus and triage individual contacts into quarantine and confirmed cases, isolation and clinical care. Surveillance, including case definitions, changed from contact tracing of all contacts of confirmed cases to only symptomatic contacts and travelers. All countries reported inadequate staffing, staff capacity gaps and lack of full integration of data sources. All four countries under study improved data management and surveillance capacity by training health workers and increasing resources for laboratories, but the disease burden was under-detected. Decentralizing surveillance to enable swifter implementation of targeted public health measures at the subnational level was a challenge. There were also gaps in genomic and postmortem surveillance including community level sero-prevalence studies, as well as digital technologies to provide more timely and accurate surveillance data. Conclusion All the four countries demonstrated a prompt public health surveillance response and adopted similar approaches to surveillance with some adaptations as the pandemic progresses. There is need for investments to enhance surveillance approaches and systems including decentralizing surveillance to the subnational and community levels, strengthening capabilities for genomic surveillance and use of digital technologies, among others. Investing in health worker capacity, ensuring data quality and availability and improving ability to transmit surveillance data between and across multiple levels of the health care system is also critical. Countries need to take immediate action in strengthening their surveillance systems to better prepare for the next major disease outbreak and pandemic.

BackgroundAfrican countries leveraged testing capacities to enhance public health action in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper describes experiences and lessons learned during the improvement of testing capacity throughout the COVID-19 response in Senegal, Uganda, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).MethodsThe four countries’ testing strategies were studied using a mixed-methods approach. Desk research on COVID-19 testing strategies was conducted and complemented by interviewing key informants. The findings were synthesized to demonstrate learning outcomes across the four countries.ResultsThe four countries demonstrated severely limited testing capacities at the onset of the pandemic. These countries decentralized COVID-19 testing services by leveraging preexisting laboratory systems such as PCR and GeneXpert used for the diagnosis of tuberculosis (TB) to address this gap and the related inequities, engaging the private sector, establishing new laboratories, and using rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) to expand testing capacity and reduce the turnaround time (TAT). The use of digital platforms improved the TAT. Testing supplies were sourced through partners, although access to global markets was challenging. Case detection remains suboptimal due to high costs, restrictive testing strategies, testing access challenges, and misinformation, which hinder the demand for testing. The TAT for PCR remained a challenge, while RDT use was underreported, although Senegal manufactured RDTs locally. Key findings indicate that regionally coordinated procurement and manufacturing mechanisms are required, that testing modalities must be simplified for improved access, and that the risk-based testing strategy limits comprehensive understanding of the disease burden.ConclusionAlthough testing capacities improved significantly during the pandemic, case detection and access to testing remained suboptimal. The four countries could benefit from further simplification of testing modalities and cost reduction. Local manufacturing and pooled procurement mechanisms for diagnostics are needed for optimal pandemic preparedness and response.

Abstract Background Anthrax is a zoonotic infection caused by the bacteria Bacillus anthracis. Humans acquire cutaneous infection through contact with infected animals or animal products. On May 6, 2018, three cows suddenly died on a farm in Kiruhura District. Shortly afterwards, a sub-county chief in Kiruhura District received reports of humans with suspected cutaneous anthrax in the same district. The patients had reportedly participated in the butchery and consumption of meat from the dead cows. We investigated to determine the magnitude of the outbreak, identify exposures associated with illness, and suggest evidence-based control measures. Methods We conducted a retrospective cohort study among persons whose households received any of the cow meat. We defined a suspected human cutaneous anthrax case as new skin lesions (e.g., papule, vesicle, or eschar) in a resident of Kiruhura District from 1 to 26 May 2018. A confirmed case was a suspected case with a lesion testing positive for B. anthracis by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). We identified cases through medical record review at Engari Health Centre and active case finding in the community. Results Of the 95 persons in the cohort, 22 were case-patients (2 confirmed and 20 suspected, 0 fatal cases) and 73 were non-case household members. The epidemic curve indicated multiple point-source exposures starting on May 6, when the dead cows were butchered. Among households receiving cow meat, participating in slaughtering (RR = 5.3, 95% CI 3.2–8.3), skinning (RR = 4.7, 95% CI = 3.1–7.0), cleaning waste (RR = 4.5, 95% CI = 3.1–6.6), and carrying meat (RR = 3.9, 95% CI = 2.2–7.1) increased the risk of infection. Conclusions This cutaneous anthrax outbreak was caused by handling infected animal carcasses. We suggested to the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries to strengthen surveillance for possible veterinary anthrax and ensure that communities do not consume carcasses of livestock that died suddenly. We also suggested that the Ministry of Health equip health facilities with first-line antibiotics for community members during outbreaks.

Abstract Background Private entities play a major role in health globally. However, their contribution has not been fully optimized to strengthen delivery of public health services. The COVID-19 pandemic has overwhelmed health systems and precipitated coalitions between public and private sectors to address critical gaps in the response. We conducted a study to document the public and private sector partnerships and engagements to inform current and future responses to public health emergencies. Methods This was a multi-country cross-sectional study conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda between November 2020 and March 2021 to assess responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. We conducted a scoping literature review and key informant interviews (KIIs) with private and public health sector stakeholders. The literature reviewed included COVID-19 country guidelines and response plans, program reports and peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed publications. KIIs elicited information on country approaches and response strategies specifically the engagement of the private sector in any of the strategic response operations. Results Across the 4 countries, private sector strengthened laboratory systems, COVID-19 case management, risk communication and health service continuity. In the DRC and Nigeria, private entities supported contact tracing and surveillance activities. Across the 4 countries, the private sector supported expansion of access to COVID-19 testing services through establishing partnerships with the public health sector albeit at unregulated fees. In Senegal and Uganda, governments established partnerships with private sector to manufacture COVID-19 rapid diagnostic tests. The private sector also contributed to treatment and management of COVID-19 cases. In addition, private entities provided personal protective equipment, conducted risk communication to promote adherence to safety procedures and health promotion for health service continuity. However, there were concerns related to reporting, quality and cost of services, calling for quality and price regulation in the provision of services. Conclusions The private sector contributed to the COVID-19 response through engagement in COVID-19 surveillance and testing, management of COVID-19 cases, and health promotion to maintain health access. There is a need to develop regulatory frameworks for sustainable public–private engagements including regulation of pricing, quality assurance and alignment with national plans and priorities during response to epidemics.

In 2020 and 2021, Governments across the globe instituted school closures to reduce social interaction and interrupt COVID-19 transmission. We examined the consequences of school closures due to COVID-19 across four sub-Saharan African countries: the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. We conducted a qualitative study among key informants including policymakers, school heads, students, parents, civil society representatives, and local leaders. The assessment of the consequences of school closures was informed by the Diffusion of Innovations theory which informed the interview guide and analysis. Interview transcripts were thematically analysed. Across the four countries, schools were totally closed for 120 weeks and partially closed for 48 weeks. School closures led to: i) Desirable and anticipated consequences: enhanced adoption of online platforms and mass media for learning and increased involvement of parents in their children's education. ii) Desirable and unanticipated consequences: improvement in information, communication, and technology (ICT) infrastructure in schools, development and improvement of computer skills, and created an opportunity to take leave from hectic schedules. iii) Undesirable anticipated consequences: inadequate education continuity among students, an adjustment in academic schedules and programmes, and disrupted student progress and grades. iv) Undesirable unanticipated: increase in sexual violence including engaging in transactional sex, a rise in teenage pregnancy, and school dropouts, demotivation of teachers due to reduced incomes, and reduced school revenues. v) Neutral consequences: engagement in revenue-generating activities, increased access to phones and computers among learners, and promoted less structured learning. The consequences of school closures for COVID-19 control were largely negative with the potential for both short-term and far-reaching longer-term consequences. In future pandemics, careful consideration of the type and duration of education closure measures and examination of their potential consequences in the short and long term is important before deploying them.

Abstract Background Prior to the first recorded outbreak of Rift Valley fever (RVF) in Uganda, in March 2016, earlier studies done until the 1970’s indicated the presence of the RVF virus (RVFV) in the country, without any recorded outbreaks in either man or animals. While severe outbreaks of RVF occurred in the neighboring countries, none were reported in Uganda despite forecasts that placed some parts of Uganda at similar risk. The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) undertook studies to determine the RVF sero-prevalence in risk prone areas. Three datasets from cattle sheep and goats were obtained; one from retrospective samples collected in 2010–2011 from the northern region; the second from the western region in 2013 while the third was from a cross-sectional survey done in 2016 in the south-western region. Laboratory analysis involved the use of the Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assays (ELISA). Data were subjected to descriptive statistical analyses, including non-parametric chi-square tests for comparisons between districts and species in the regions. Results During the Yellow Fever outbreak investigation of 2010–2011 in the northern region, a total sero-prevalence of 6.7% was obtained for anti RVFV reacting antibodies (IgG and IgM) among the domestic ruminant population. The 2013 sero-survey in the western region showed a prevalence of 18.6% in cattle and 2.3% in small ruminants. The 2016 sero-survey in the districts of Kabale, Kanungu, Kasese, Kisoro and Rubirizi, in the south-western region, had the respective district RVF sero-prevalence of 16.0, 2.1, 0.8, 15.1and 2.7% among the domestic ruminants combined for this region; bovines exhibited the highest cumulative sero-prevalence of 15.2%, compared to 5.3 and 4.0% respectively for sheep and goats per species for the region. Conclusions The absence of apparent outbreaks in Uganda, despite neighboring enzootic areas, having minimal restrictions to the exchange of livestock and their products across borders, suggest an unexpected RVF activity in the study areas that needs to be unraveled. Therefore, more in-depth studies are planned to mitigate the risk of an overt RVF outbreak in humans and animals as has occurred in neighboring countries.

Abstract Objective To assess the knowledge, attitude and practices (KAP) of animal and human health professionals towards rabies management and also to establish the level of relationship between KAP. Methods A cross-sectional study was conducted between December 2012 and March 2013 among 147 randomly selected animal and human health professionals in Mbale District. Of these, only 16 were animal health professionals. Quantitative data was obtained using a semi-structured questionnaire while qualitative data was obtained from 4 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and 2 Key Informant (KI) interviews. Quantitative data was entered into EpiInfo version 3.5.1 and proportions computed while qualitative data was summarised into themes and sub-themes resulting from content analysis of interview scripts. Findings Of all the respondents, only 44% (65/147) had sufficient knowledge about rabies while 25% (37/147) had positive attitude towards rabies management. A half of the respondents (50%, 73/147) had limited good practices. Respondents knowledgeable about rabies were more likely to have positive attitude towards rabies management (OR = 3.65; 95% CI: 1.60–8.3) while respondents with positive attitudes, were more likely to have good practices towards rabies management (OR: 2.22; 95% CI: 1.01–4.86). Conclusion Respondents had low knowledge, negative attitude and limited good practices of rabies management. Regular refresher trainings about rabies to broaden staff knowledge and improve their attitudes and hence practices of rabies management should be conducted by the District leaders. Harnessing multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary collaborative efforts (“One Health” approach) for rabies control should be instituted to reduce the incidence of the disease in the District.

Abstract Background On 23 February 2018, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MOH) declared a cholera outbreak affecting more than 60 persons in Kyangwali Refugee Settlement, Hoima District, bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). We investigated to determine the outbreak scope and risk factors for transmission, and recommend evidence-based control measures. Methods We defined a suspected case as sudden onset of watery diarrhoea in any person aged ≥ 2 years in Hoima District, 1 February–9 May 2018. A confirmed case was a suspected case with Vibrio cholerae cultured from a stool sample. We found cases by active community search and record reviews at Cholera Treatment Centres. We calculated case-fatality rates (CFR) and attack rates (AR) by sub-county and nationality. In a case-control study, we compared exposure factors among case- and control-households. We estimated the association between the exposures and outcome using Mantel-Haenszel method. We conducted an environmental assessment in the refugee settlement, including testing samples of stream water, tank water, and spring water for presence of fecal coliforms. We tested suspected cholera cases using cholera rapid diagnostic test (RDT) kits followed by culture for confirmation. Results We identified 2122 case-patients and 44 deaths (CFR = 2.1%). Case-patients originating from Demographic Republic of Congo were the most affected (AR = 15/1000). The overall attack rate in Hoima District was 3.2/1000, with Kyangwali sub-county being the most affected (AR = 13/1000). The outbreak lasted 4 months, which was a multiple point-source. Environmental assessment showed that a stream separating two villages in Kyangwali Refugee Settlement was a site of open defecation for refugees. Among three water sources tested, only stream water was feacally-contaminated, yielding > 100 CFU/100 ml. Of 130 stool samples tested, 124 (95%) yielded V. cholerae by culture. Stream water was most strongly associated with illness (odds ratio [OR] = 14.2, 95% CI: 1.5–133), although tank water also appeared to be independently associated with illness (OR = 11.6, 95% CI: 1.4–94). Persons who drank tank and stream water had a 17-fold higher odds of illness compared with persons who drank from other sources (OR = 17.3, 95% CI: 2.2–137). Conclusions Our investigation demonstrated that this was a prolonged cholera outbreak that affected four sub-counties and two divisions in Hoima District, and was associated with drinking of contaminated stream water. In addition, tank water also appears to be unsafe. We recommended boiling drinking water, increasing latrine coverage, and provision of safe water by the District and entire High Commission for refugees.

Abstract Background Since the declaration of the 10th Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in DRC on 1st Aug 2018, several neighboring countries have been developing and implementing preparedness efforts to prevent EVD cross-border transmission to enable timely detection, investigation, and response in the event of a confirmed EVD outbreak in the country. We describe Uganda’s experience in EVD preparedness. Results On 4 August 2018, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) activated the Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) and the National Task Force (NTF) for public health emergencies to plan, guide, and coordinate EVD preparedness in the country. The NTF selected an Incident Management Team (IMT), constituting a National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) that supported activation of the District Task Forces (DTFs) and District Rapid Response Teams (DRRTs) that jointly assessed levels of preparedness in 30 designated high-risk districts representing category 1 (20 districts) and category 2 (10 districts). The MoH, with technical guidance from the World Health Organisation (WHO), led EVD preparedness activities and worked together with other ministries and partner organisations to enhance community-based surveillance systems, develop and disseminate risk communication messages, engage communities, reinforce EVD screening and infection prevention measures at Points of Entry (PoEs) and in high-risk health facilities, construct and equip EVD isolation and treatment units, and establish coordination and procurement mechanisms. Conclusion As of 31 May 2019, there was no confirmed case of EVD as Uganda has continued to make significant and verifiable progress in EVD preparedness. There is a need to sustain these efforts, not only in EVD preparedness but also across the entire spectrum of a multi-hazard framework. These efforts strengthen country capacity and compel the country to avail resources for preparedness and management of incidents at the source while effectively cutting costs of using a “fire-fighting” approach during public health emergencies.

Rabies is a vaccine-preventable fatal zoonotic disease. Uganda, through the veterinary surveillance system at National Animal Disease Diagnostics and Epidemiology Centre (NADDEC), captures animal bites (a proxy for rabies) on a monthly basis from districts. We established trends of incidence of animal bites and corresponding post-exposure prophylactic anti-rabies vaccination in humans (PEP), associated mortality rates in humans, spatial distribution of animal bites, and pets vaccinated during 2013-2017. We reviewed rabies surveillance data at NADDEC from 2013-2017. The surveillance system captures persons reporting bites by a suspected rabid dog/cat/wild animal, human deaths due to suspected rabies, humans vaccinated against rabies, and pets vaccinated. Number of total pets was obtained from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. We computed incidence of animal bites and corresponding PEP in humans, and analyzed overall trends, 2013-2017. We also examined human mortality rates and spatial distribution of animal bites/rabies and pets vaccinated against rabies. We identified 8,240 persons reporting animal bites in Uganda during 2013-2017; overall incidence of 25 bites/ 100,000population. The incidence significantly decreased from 9.2/100,000 in 2013 to 1.3/100,000 in 2017 (OR = 0.62, p = 0.0046). Of the 8,240 persons with animal bites, 6,799 (82.5%) received PEP, decreasing from 94% in 2013 to 71% in 2017 (OR = 0.65, p

Zoonotic diseases continue to be a public health burden globally. Uganda is especially vulnerable due to its location, biodiversity, and population. Given these concerns, the Ugandan government in collaboration with the Global Health Security Agenda conducted a One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization Workshop to identify zoonotic diseases of greatest national concern to the Ugandan government.The One Health Zoonotic Disease Prioritization tool, a semi-quantitative tool developed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, was used for the prioritization of zoonoses. Workshop participants included voting members and observers representing multiple government and non-governmental sectors. During the workshop, criteria for prioritization were selected, and questions and weights relevant to each criterion were determined. We used a decision tree to provide a ranked list of zoonoses. Participants then established next steps for multisectoral engagement for the prioritized zoonoses. A sensitivity analysis demonstrated how criteria weights impacted disease prioritization.Forty-eight zoonoses were considered during the workshop. Criteria selected to prioritize zoonotic diseases were (1) severity of disease in humans in Uganda, (2) availability of effective control strategies, (3) potential to cause an epidemic or pandemic in humans or animals, (4) social and economic impacts, and (5) bioterrorism potential. Seven zoonotic diseases were identified as priorities for Uganda: anthrax, zoonotic influenza viruses, viral hemorrhagic fevers, brucellosis, African trypanosomiasis, plague, and rabies. Sensitivity analysis did not indicate significant changes in zoonotic disease prioritization based on criteria weights.One Health approaches and multisectoral collaborations are crucial to the surveillance, prevention, and control strategies for zoonotic diseases. Uganda used such an approach to identify zoonoses of national concern. Identifying these priority diseases enables Uganda's National One Health Platform and Zoonotic Disease Coordination Office to address these zoonoses in the future with a targeted allocation of resources.