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The concept of political culture has been a staple of the literature in comparative politics since the 1960s, yet, as a paradigm for research in Latin America, it remains fresh and alluring. In the 1990s, political culture must be interpreted in a far broader context than did Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture, published in the 1960s. The first viewpoint goes back to historical interpretations of the Iberian heritage and to scholarly assumptions like those of Kalman Silvert, Gino Germani, and Kenneth Organski in the 1970s. They assumed that the political culture of Southern Europe were essentially those of Brazil and the nations of the Southern Cone in South America. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, Latin American social scientists uncovered changes in directions that support wider political participation, gradual changes in underlying values that bode well for the consolidation of democracy, at least in some nations.

Si une crise de legitimite politique dans une nation se definit comme un evenement qui se produit lorsque « des portions non negligeables de populations politiquement significatives remettent en question ou refusent la validite normative des pretentions du pouvoir en place a exercer l’autorite », l’Argentine a connu au moins sept crises de legitimite de ce type au cours des cent dernieres annees. Les causes en peuvent etre les actions de responsables politiques, le fait que des institutions politiques ne sont pas a la hauteur des demandes auxquelles elles doivent repondre, une croissance economique entravee, ou encore l’incapacite de groupes a s’entendre pour trouver des solutions acceptables de part et d’autre. Des enquetes menees depuis 1984 montrent que les Argentins ont invariablement eu moins de confiance dans les grandes institutions de leur pays que les ressortissants des autres pays d’Amerique latine et de l’ensemble du monde. De plus, leur confiance dans les institutions nationales a considerablement baisse entre 1984 et 2006. Meme si les Argentins s’interessent peu a la politique et accordent beaucoup plus de confiance aux membres de leur famille qu’aux etrangers, la plupart d’entre eux n’en estiment pas moins que la democratie est la meilleure forme de gouvernement pour leur pays. A l’avenir, si l’on veut renforcer la legitimite politique en Argentine, il semblerait que le mieux serait sans doute d’ameliorer l’efficacite des institutions politiques, de limiter la corruption, et – ce qui est sans doute le plus important – de faire en sorte que la prosperite economique se maintienne et que le travail assidu soit recompense comme il se doit.

If we define a crisis of political legitimacy in a nation as one that occurs when sizeable portions of the politically relevant population challenge or deny the normative validity of claims to authority made by its existing leadership, then Argentina has experienced at least seven such legitimacy crises in the past hundred years. The causes of these crises include the actions of political leaders, political institutions that have proven inadequate to the demands made upon them, frustrated economic growth and an inability of groups to compromise on mutually acceptable solutions. Survey data since 1984 show that Argentinians have consistently had much less confidence in the basic institutions of their society than have citizens in the rest of Latin America and in the world as a whole. Moreover, confidence in most institutions dropped precipitously between 1984 and 2006. Although Argentinians show low interest in politics and trust family members far more than outsiders, most of them still find that democracy is the best form of government for their country. In the future, some of the best ways to enhance political legitimacy in Argentina include increasing the efficiency of political institutions, limiting corruption and – perhaps most important of all – assuring that economic prosperity is maintained and that hard work is rewarded.

The Argentine economic crisis of 1999-2003 caused GDP to drop precipitously and levels of poverty and unemployment to rise greatly. Although more profound, this crisis resembled three others since 1966, and it led Argentines overwhelmingly to reject the members of their political class. In 1999, the confidence of Argentine citizens in politicians and political institutions was already very low, reflecting in part the earlier crises and the fact that income distribution in the country had become far more unequal in the 1990s. Causes for the economic crisis include economic policies, political constraints, and the structure of Argentine society and values. Although some economic growth has returned under the presidency of Néstor Kirchner since 2003, the depth of the rejection of the political class is so great that it may lead to some change in Argentine values.

Citizen confidence in the institutions of their nations is critical to democratic consolidation in Latin America. The data provided by the Latinobarometro survey in 1995 mark the beginning of significant empirical investigation in this realm. While longitudinal comparisons are not yet possible, institutional confidence for the major countries as of 1995 can be probed. This study considers three levels of generality: the comparative study of institutions in the region; patterns of confidence related to political culture; and the degree of political learning derived from the repressive dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s.

Female and male rats were administered 5 or 15 μg/kg of ethynyl estradiol in sesame oil for 14 days by subcutaneous injection, and were killed on the 15th day following a 12–14 h fasting. The very low density lipoproteins, low density lipoproteins and high density lipoproteins were isolated from the serum and the concentrations of triglyceride, cholesterol and cholesteryl esters were determined in each lipoprotein class. The concentration of triglyceride in very low density lipoprotein increased with either of the estrogen doses. Treatment with ethynyl estradiol increased the concentrations of cholesterol and cholesteryl esters in the very low density lipoprotein but decreased the concentrations of these lipids in the low density lipoprotein and high density lipoprotein. The activity of serum lecithin-cholesterol acyltransferase was increased by pretreatment with ethynyl estradiol. The secretion rates of the very low density lipoprotein triglyceride and cholesterol were measured in vivo using Triton WR-1339; ethynyl estradiol increased secretion of very low density lipoprotein lipids in both sexes. The rate of hepatic secretion of the very low density lipoprotein in females, however, exceeded that of males in control and estrogentreated animals. The concentrations of serum triglyceride were similar in untreated rats of both sexes. It is suggested that the elevated concentration of serum triglyceride, following treatment with ethynyl estradiol, results from simultaneous stimulation of hepatic production of very low density lipoprotein and peripheral utilization of the triglyceride. It is postulated that, under these conditions, production rates of very low density lipoprotein lipids exceed utilization rates. It is further postulated that the hypocholesterolemia produced by ethynyl estradiol therapy results from increased utilization of low density lipoprotein and high density lipoprotein sterol despite increased output of cholesterol in the very low density lipoprotein.

What causes a country that has experienced exceptionally high growth rates and living standards to stagnate with only poor and uneven economic advance, especially after it has achieved one of the lowest rates of population growth among the American republics? What forces lead to the intensification of civil violence and conflict among social and occupational groups, encouraging a pattern of military intervention in politics? What impact do patriotism, popular perceptions of leaders' decisions, and a sense of political legitimacy have upon these processes of economic growth and group conflict, and what kinds of leadership can best utilize appeals to constructive nationalism and self-sacrifice in order to promote growth and reduce conflict? Do long periods of frustrated expectations and economic stagnation tend to give citizens patterns of attitudes and behavior that make conflict more likely and growth more difficult?

Dans l'Amérique latine contemporaine, le catholicisme et le nationalisme semblent être en corrélation étroite et positive. Dans les pays où l'édification et l'intégration nationale sont les plus avancées, la force institutionnelle de l'Eglise est aussi à son point maximum. Une corrélation statistique a été établie dans les différentes républiques latino-américaines entre la typologie du nationalisme construite par K.H. Silvert et la proportion de prêtres par habitants. On a obtenu un coeffi cient de corrélation .554, avec un niveau de signification de .05. Cette information statistique vient appuyer ce que l'on sait sur l'interprétation que donnent du nationalisme, à travers leurs interviews et leurs déclarations, les ecclésiastiques latino américains. Les interviews et les lettres pastorales montrent que les autorités religieuses reconnaissent la force du natio nalisme et que, si certains associent les appels nationalistes à des invitations aux réformes, d'autres rejettent tout rôle poli tique ou clairement nationaliste de l'Eglise. L'analyse de la répartition du personnel religieux étranger à travers le con tinent montre que l'enracinement du nationalisme n'a qu'une faible incidence sur le nombre de prêtres attribué à chaque pays.

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the effect of government policies in Latin America that causes rush to the cities. In Latin America, as elsewhere, rapid migration to urban centers has not simply resulted from the decisions of independent citizens or the indifference of government policymakers. A principal cause remains the attractiveness of city life that is enhanced by a host of decisions and programs of national and municipal governments. A central problem is that, without tight governmental regulation of urbanization of the sort found in the Soviet Union or China, programs designed to improve the quality of life for urban residents also induce substantial migration from rural areas, thus exacerbating the crowded conditions in the cities that the original urban programs were designed to ameliorate. The growth in city size has been and will continue to be large indeed

Although Protestant missionaries in Latin America have written numerous accounts of their endeavors for over a hundred years, more systematic and theoretically oriented studies of Latin American Protestantism have begun to appear only in the 1960s. Sociologists have approached this subject in search of new data and insights for the field of religious sociology, and both Protestant and Catholic critics have evaluated Latin American Pro

Although Church-State Relations have seldom been viewed from the standpoint of nationalism, they raise a series of questions concerning the patterns of loyalty which citizens render to both Church and State. Historians frequently find common religion to be an element of nationalism, but in the nominally Catholic countries of Latin America references to “common religion” in fact hide major diversities and degrees of belief. If reiterations of a common religious heritage by the mass of a population can strengthen thensentiments of common origin and national purpose, open conflict between religious groups may also belie national unity. Religious and national loyalties may be overlapping and mutually reinforcing, or they may be contradictory and antagonistic. The nature of the loyalties differs in time even within the same national context.

O NE OF THE MOST significant and least studied aspects of the population "explosion" is its impact on the formation of national communities. Is there a connection between demographic changes and nationalism, between patterns of loyalty to a national group and changes in the size, geographic distribution and group composition of its population? How great is this connection? The continuing importance of both nationalism and the population explosion in world politics today begs exploration of the relationship between these dynamic quantitative and qualitative areas of social change. Diverse changes in the structure of world population do in fact help to forge the structure of social organization, just as do the shifts in military technology and defensibility which John H. Herz shows to have shaped the size and nature of organized social units. While the unprecedented changes in world population which became evident about 1650 paralleled Herz's gunpowder revolution in influencing the rise of national groups, the societal effects of present population changes may someday match the effects of new thermonuclear weaponry. As population trends continue to mold loyalty to national groups, they are even now affecting loyalty to the "international" group composed of all world inhabitants. Although population is at best only one factor shaping patterns of group loyalty, it may prove worthwhile to trace out the implications of demographic change not only because they are regularly overlooked but also because they in turn influence other factors which shape loyalty such as education and geographic isolation.

HUMAN toxoplasmosis has been recognized with increasing frequency since the first description of the disease by Janku 1 in 1923 and the demonstration by Wolf, Cowen, and Paige 2 of Toxoplasma as a cause of congenital encephalomyelitis with hydrocephalus, intracerebral calcifications, microcephaly, chorioretinitis, and microphthalmos. Most of the cases in the literature have been of infants, 3 and there is an impressive body of evidence that the infection is acquired in utero from mothers who present no signs of infection. 4 A few cases of toxoplasmosis occurring in adults have been described. These have differed from the infantile form in that a maculopapular rash and evidence of pneumonitis, acute encephalitis, and myocarditis were prominent in the clinical picture, whereas cerebral calcifications or chorioretinitis have been absent. 5 The first case considered to be toxoplasmosis in an adult was reported in 1940 by Pinkerton and Weinman. 6 The patient was a 22-year-old Peruvian who died after a

T HE anti-Americanism of the Mexican Revolution is usually associated with the actions of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson during the decena tragtca, with the occupationa of Veracruz, or with the Pershing expedition against Francisco Villa. In fact it had been a problem since the earliest days of the Revolution. Not simply a reaction against American military intervention, it also resulted from inherited antagonisms, from resentment against American feelings of superiority, and from dislike of the treatment given to Mexican citizens in the United States. During the Madero and Huerta administrations, two of the most powerful stimulants to anti-Americanism were personal animosities against American revolutionary fighters and the attempts of Mexican factions to win popular support through appeals to xenophobic nationalism. In the short run this anti-Yankeeism prepared Mexicans for resistance to Woodrow Wilson 's Mexican policy. In the long run it has lastingly strengthened the bonds of Mexican nationalism, even though its old stridency has largely disappeared. Even before the fall of Porfirio Diaz, the Department of State was apprehensive about Mexican antagonism to the United States. In response to a request for information on anti-Americanism during March 1911, American consuls in many parts of Mexico reported it to be deep and widespread. Consul Samuel E. Magill at Guadalajara told Secretary of State Philander C. Knox that "the anti-American sentiment is almost universal among rich and poor alike." He added that at national celebrations, such as the commemoration of Hidalgo's Grito de Dolores on the night of September 15, Mexican mobs paraded through the streets crying "Death to the Americans."1 Linking antiAmericanism with general xenophobia and with hostility to the Diaz