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We propose four ways that the urban growth machine theoretical perspective can be expanded for social scientists whose focus is not necessarily urban. First, we believe the thesis is useful for analysis at larger and smaller geographic scales than the city. Second, once focused on a goal and set in motion the growth machines have inertia. This leads to continuity over time and also leaves records which are useful in analyzing how particular outcomes occur. Third, the processes growth machines set in motion can lead us to practices that are on the edge of our ability to control, potentially resulting in unanticipated and even disastrous consequences, having relevance for the study of disasters. Finally, the very success of the growth machine, particularly when growth is centered on the exploitation of land based resources can lead to the exhaustion of the very basis of its success and thus to collapse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite strong scientific consensus that global climate disruption is real and due in significant part to human activities, stories in the U.S. mass media often still present the opposite view, characterizing the issue as being “in dispute.” Even today, the U.S. media devote significant attention to small numbers of denialists, who claim that scientific consensus assessments, such as those by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), are “exaggerated” and “political.” Such claims, however, are testable hypotheses—and just the opposite expectation is hypothesized in the small but growing literature on Scientific Certainty Argumentation Methods, or SCAMs. The work on SCAMs suggests that, rather than being a reflection of legitimate scientific disagreement, the intense criticisms of climate science may reflect a predictable pattern that grows out of “the politics of doubt”: If enough doubt can be raised about the relevant scientific findings, regulation can be avoided or delayed for years or even decades. Ironically, though, while such a pattern can lead to a bias in scientific work, the likely bias is expected to be just the opposite of the one usually feared. The underlying reason has to do with the Asymmetry of Scientific Challenge, or ASC—so named because certain theories or findings, such as those indicating the significance of climate disruption, are subjected to systematically greater challenges than are those supporting opposing conclusions. As this article shows, available evidence provides significantly more support for SCAM and ASC perspectives than for the concerns that are commonly expressed in the U.S. mass media. These findings suggest that, if current scientific consensus is in error, it is likely because global climate disruption may be even worse than commonly expected to date. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the discovery of oil well drilling, energy policy (particularly offshore petroleum policy over the past three decades) has led the United States, and indeed the industrialized world, into a cycle of dependency, profit, and risk taking that made a Macondo-like blowout likely, if not inevitable. This article examines the broad political, economic, technological, and environmental contexts surrounding the growth and development of both our ability to obtain petroleum and our dependency on it. The authors use the tools of environmental sociology, environmental history, and political ecology to trace the path to the current situation in which the myth of “energy independence” is used to justify practices that are counter to the very concept. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While 'economic development' projects have long been proposed and supported by local growth machine elites, technological change has affected the social desirability of large projects in three ways. First, large development projects-we examine water transportation-have grown in size, meaning that backers often seek public funding. With increased size and the need for external funding, many years or decades can elapse by the time a project can be conceived, politically supported, funded, and built. Second, during that time, the technology of the industrial sector in question may have changed radically-to the point that the project can be obsolete, or rapidly nearing obsolescence, by the time it is actually completed. Third, the massive size of the project may also mean that even if the project is obsolete as well as environmentally harmful, we may find ourselves unable to undo it or the environmental damage that it has caused. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the best-known social scientific theories of risks are those that have been elaborated by Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck. Although their arguments differ greatly, they agree in seeing the technologically induced risks of today’s “Risk Society” as global—so pervasive that they transcend all socioeconomic as well as geopolitical and national boundaries. Most empirical work, however, provides greater support for a theoretical tradition exemplified by Short and Erikson. In this paper, we argue that many of the technological mega-risks described by Giddens and Beck as “transcending” social boundaries are better described as “Titanic risks,” referring not so much to their colossal impact as to the fact that—as was the case for the majority of the victims on the Titanic—actual risks are related to victims’ socioeconomic as well as sociogeographic locations. Previous research has shown this to be the case with high-risk technologies, such as nuclear energy and weaponry, and also with localized ones, such as toxic waste disposal. This article illustrates that the same is true even for the most genuinely “global” risks of all, namely those associated with global climate disruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author provides commentary on the influence of the work of sociologist William Catton and the impact it has had on the field of environmental sociology. The evolution of "human ecology" as conceptualized by sociologists such as Robert Park and Amos Hawley is discussed. Particular attention is paid to the influence of Catton's book "Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change," published in 1980. The author describes why "Overshoot" is required reading for his environmental studies program.

Objectives. Although many observers have interpreted Hurricane Katrina's damage to New Orleans as a case of nature striking humans, we draw on the sociological concept of the growth machine to show that much of the damage resulted instead from what humans had done to nature—in the name but not the reality of “economic development.” Methods. We triangulate findings from multiple qualitative techniques, including first-hand fieldwork, interviews, and analyses of historical records. We focus on a particularly telling illustration: the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet, a transportation canal. Results. Although the canal was widely predicted to deliver prosperity, it mainly created environmental damage, destroying wetlands that had formerly protected New Orleans from hurricanes. Despite enthusiastic predictions about its economic importance—plus millions of dollars in ongoing federal investments—the “outlet” was used by only a dozen of the ships for which it was designed during the entire last year before Katrina hit. Conclusions. This was clearly not a case of an “enduring conflict” between the environment and the economy; it was a case where economic benefits to a tiny number of beneficiaries created profound costs to the environment, and to humans in turn. Claims about supposed “economic benefits” from environmentally harmful projects need to be examined more closely in other contexts, as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disaster studies have made important progress in recognizing the unequally distributed consequences of disasters, but there has been less progress in analyzing social factors that help create "natural" disasters. Even well-known patterns of hazard-creation tend to be interpreted generically - as representing "economic development" or "capitalism" - rather than through focusing on the more specific dynamics involved. We illustrate this point with two recent and well-known cases of flooding - those in the upper Mississippi River Valley and in the Katrina-related devastation of New Orleans. In the former case, damage was caused in part by building the very kinds of higher and stronger flood walls that were shown to be inadequate in the latter. In the New Orleans case, a more important factor in the death and destruction was the excavation of a transportation canal. In both cases, and many more, the underlying causes of damage to humans as well as to the environment has involved a three-part pattern, supported by the political system - spreading the costs, concentrating the economic benefits and hiding the real risks. In very real senses, these have been floods of folly, created not just by extreme weather events, but by deadly and avoidable patterns of political-economic choices. Comparable patterns appear to deserve greater attention in other contexts, as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At least since the time of Popper, scientists have understood that science provides falsification, but not “proof.” In the world of environmental and technological controversies, however, many observers continue to call precisely for “proof,” often under the guise of “scientific certainty.” Closer examination of real-world disputes suggests that such calls may reflect not just a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of science, but a clever and surprisingly effective political-economic tactic—“Scientific Certainty” Argumentation Methods, or SCAMs. Given that most scientific findings are inherently probabilistic and ambiguous, if agencies can be prevented from imposing any regulations until they are unambiguously “justified,” most regulations can be defeated or postponed, often for decades, allowing profitable but potentially risky activities to continue unabated. An exploratory examination of previously documented controversies suggests that SCAMs are more widespread than has been recognized in the past, and that they deserve greater attention in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BACKGROUND: Although existing literature does discuss difficulties of doing science in contexts of litigation and regulation, work to date reflects little first-hand experience in such contexts. This gap is understandable but also potentially troubling: Concerns that seem important from afar may or may not match those that are most salient for scientists actually engaged in such work. OBJECTIVES: Drawing on experience on scientific committees and in lawsuits, and using skills developed through doing qualitative fieldwork, I reanalyze past experiences and field notes from the perspective of the 2006 Coronado Conference "Truth and Advocacy in Contexts of Litigation and Regulation." Although I initially shared the kinds of concerns generally stressed by other scientists and science-studies scholars—emphasizing overt, relatively sinister efforts to limit scientific objectivity-neither the literature nor my initial instincts provided adequate preparation for more subtle influences, which actually created stronger pressures toward bias. Particularly unexpected pressures came from consistent deference and praise for independence and credibility. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: The cases discussed in this article are by nature suggestive, not definitive; additional research is clearly needed. Future research, however, needs to focus not just on pressures toward bias that are easy to imagine, but also on those that are easy to overlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most discussions of legitimation focus on factors that are expected to contribute to it, such as tradition, expertise, or prosperity. Less attention has been paid to “the dark side” of legitimation, which depends heavily on evading attention. A potentially informative approach is to learn from professionals with special expertise in evading attention while making things “disappear”—magicians. Rather than seeking overt control over the audience, they perform in plain view, largely by using well-timed distractions, or “misdirection.” Preliminary evidence suggests that similar techniques may be widely used in political contexts, with some of the most effective forms of misdirection involving diversionary reframing—diverting attention away from any questions about existing distributions of privilege, not by brute force, but by changing the subject, especially by raising questions about the legitimacy of critics. These and related techniques clearly deserve to be the focus of additional research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of reactions to nuclear facilities have found consistent male/female differences, but the underlying reasons have never been well-clarified. The most common expectations involve traditional roles--with men focusing more on economic concerns and with women (especially mothers) being more concerned about family safety/health. Still, with changing gender roles, women are becoming economic providers as well as caregivers; past studies have not actually examined the interaction of employment and gender effects. This study examines a rural county where issues of risk and economic interest were both salient--a county where a nuclear waste site had been proposed but where an existing nuclear power plant was a major employer. Overall, concern levels expressed by employed mothers did not differ significantly from those in the rest of the sample, but further analyses revealed a sharp contrast: In the half of the county that was home to the existing nuclear power plant, where economic concerns could be expected to be more salient, over 90 percent of the employed mothers expressed low levels of concern; in the other half of the county, closer to the potential risks of the proposed nuclear waste site, almost 90 percent of the employed mothers expressed high levels of concern. No such differences are found for other sociodemographic groups. This county may or may not be unique; what the findings show is that the interplay of geography, gender roles and risks should receive more attention in other contexts, as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macrostructural analyses have long dominated the field of social theories of modernity, with the work of Habermas, Giddens, and Beck providing influential cases in point. Empirical studies, however, have raised questions about the applicability and empirical soundness of macrostructural approaches to risks, technology, and nature, and U.S.-based sociologists have offered alternative theories that have been identified in some studies as providing better predictions and explanations than the macrostructural analyses. Informed by all of the above theories, this article examines the “Atoms for Peace” program, which established the civilian uses of nuclear energy, providing one of the central scientific and technological achievements of modernity. Given the mixed results of nuclear technology development, the mid-range, structurally informed perspectives of Short and other U.S.-based sociologists do appear to provide the best interpretations, both for the “Atoms for Peace” program and for the broader legacy of the technological and environmental risks of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rather than seeking ivory-tower isolation, members of the Rural Sociological Society have always been distinguished by a willingness to work with specialists from a broad range of disciplines, and to work on some of the world's most challenging problems. What is less commonly recognized is that the willingness to reach beyond disciplinary boundaries can contribute not just to the solution of real-world problems, but also to the advancement of the discipline itself. This point is increasingly being illustrated in studies of environment-society relationships. Most past discussions of humans' roles in environmental problems have focused on overall or average human impacts, but rural sociologists have played leading roles in identifying what I have come to call ''the double diversion.'' First, rather than being well-represented by averages, environmental damages are often characterized by high levels of disproportionality, with much or most of the harm being created by the diversion of environmental rights and resources to a surprisingly small fraction of the relevant social actors. The disproportionality appears to be made possible in part through the second diversion, namely distraction—the diversion of attention, largely through the taken-for-granted but generally erroneous assumption that the environmental harm ''must'' be for the benefit of us all. There are good reasons why rural sociologists would have been among the first to notice both of these ''diversions''—and why they will give even greater attention to both in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental harms involve a "double diversion" -- two forms of privilege that deserve greater attention. The first involves disproportionality, or the privileged diversion of rights/resources: Contrary to common assumptions, much environmental damage is not economically "necessary" -- instead, it represents privileged access to the environment. It is made possible in part by the second diversion -- the diversion of attention, or distraction -- largely through taken-for-granted or privileged accounts, which are rarely questioned, even in leftist critiques. Data show that, rather than producing advanced materials, major polluters tend to be inefficient producers of low-value commodities, and rather than being major employers, they can have emissions-to-jobs ratios a thousand times worse than the economy as a whole. Instead of simply focusing on overall/average levels of environmental problems, sociologists also need to examine disproportionalities, analyzing the socially structured nature of environmental and discursive privileges. Doing so can offer important opportunities for insights, not just about nature, but also about the nature of power, and about the power of the naturalized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing sociological analyses express differing expectations about state control over economic actors and the political feasibility of environmental regulation. Recent literature on the environmental state sees environmental protection as becoming a basic responsibility of postindustrial states, with economic actors no longer having the autonomy they once enjoyed. In contrast, much of the work in environmental sociology expects commitments to environmental state responsibilities to be largely symbolic. Scholars working from this perspective tend to see environmental damage as proportionate to economic prosperity. To assess the differing expectations, we analyze actual environmental performance among the most prosperous nation-states focusing on national-level emissions of carbon dioxide. The strongest predictors of emissions are found to be measures of ecological efficiency, which tend to be associated with potentially less symbolic policy decisions. For the future, there is a need to move beyond broad assertions, devoting greater attention to the conditions under which states are more or less likely to impose constraints on economic actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extractive industries such as logging and mining are generally expected to bring significant economic benefits to rural regions, but a growing number of findings have now challenged that common expectation. Still, it is not clear whether the findings of less–than–desirable economic outcomes are isolated or representative. In this article, we assemble literally all of the relevant quantitative findings on mining that we have been able to identify in published and/or technical literature from the United States. In the interest of rigor, we limit the assessment to cases in which strictly nonmetropolitan mining regions are compared against other nonmetropolitan regions and/or against those regions’ own experiences over time. Overall, 301 findings meet the criteria for inclusion. Contrary to the long–established assumptions, but consistent with more recent critiques, roughly half of all published findings indicate negative economic outcomes in mining communities, with the remaining findings being split roughly evenly between favorable and neutral/indeterminate ones. Positive findings are more likely to be associated with incomes than with poverty or (especially) unemployment rates, and they are more likely to come from the western United States, where much of the mining involves relatively large, new coal strip mines. Over half of all positive findings come from the years prior to 1982. In virtually all other categories, the plurality or majority of findings have been negative. When the patterns of findings are subjected to one–sample means tests, the only way to produce a significantly positive outcome is by combining all neutral/indeterminate findings with the positive ones, while focusing exclusively on incomes; by contrast, in the case of poverty or unemployment rates—as well as for the overall body of findings—the results are consistently and significantly negative, whether the neutral/indeterminate findings are combined with negative ones or omitted from the equations altogether. Until or unless future studies produce dramatically different findings, there appears to be no scientific basis for accepting the widespread, “obvious” assumption that mining will lead to economic improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the proposal of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) regarding the importance of external perturbations in policy change in the U.S. Information on the strategies used by the ACF in dealing with policy change; Application of the proposal of the ACF to federal policies for offshore oil leasing; Discussion on the autogenic succession theory for policy change.

Social scientists should seek greater involvement in interdisciplinary scientific committees, which often play important roles in natural resource management. In addition to our acknowledged areas of expertise, we have the ability to educate other disciplines about social sciences and, importantly, also about the realities of biophysical science input into policy processes. Two examples are worth noting. First, the asymmetry of scientific challenge can mean that biophysical science views/interpretations with favorable implications for organized groups’ interests may have been “accepted” with little scrutiny, relative to work having unfavorable implications. Second and paradoxically, the structure of decision making can mean that preferences for “scientific caution” will result in resource management decisions that are anything but cautious. These and other observations need to be tested through participant observation by a greater number of social scientists on scientific committees in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academic debates can be entertaining and even useful, but they can also have drawbacks. The present debate has at least three of them. First, despite our ability to discern differing central tendencies between ''environmental'' and ''resource'' sociology, the excitement of a debate can cause such modest differences to be exaggerated, potentially being reified into a ''divide.'' Second, only a limited number of social scientists are studying resource/environmental issues, even today, so any researcher attention that is focused on navel gazing or worse, navel warfare is being diverted away from the research topics themselves. Third and most disturbingly, as human impacts on the environment grow more pervasive, we are likely to see an increasing number of cases where problems involve both ''resource'' and ''environmental'' issues, simultaneously. The true need is thus not to argue about differences or to create them but instead to develop synergies across differing points of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of ecological modernization has received growing attention over the past decade, but in the process, it has been interpreted in conflicting and sometimes contradictory ways. In this article, we attempt to bring greater clarity to the discussion. Reviewing the works both by the theory's best-known proponents and by its most outspoken critics, we note that difficulties are created not just by the combining of theoretical predictions and policy prescriptions - a point that has already been noted in the literature - but also by the stark and highly significant differences in expectations between ecological modernization and most prevailing theories of society-environment relationships. Perhaps in part because of these differences, disagreements have often been expressed in stark, black-and-white terms. If the problems are to be resolved, there will be a need for greater theoretical precision, developed in conjunction with empirical research that is more focused, more finely differentiated, and more rigorous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a response to a critique by professor Matthew S. Carroll and colleagues to a longitudinal analysis of logging industry job losses. The critique by Carroll and colleagues has two main parts. The first involves questions of scientific and technical judgments, the second has to do with what is sometimes called the moral exclusion literature and with the perceptions of those who live in the logging-dependent communities of the Pacific Northwest. There are a number of statistical and inferential problems with their argument. At the outset, however, it is worth pointing out that the arguments of Carroll and colleagues ignore the extensive work that has been done by historians who have explicitly examined the logging industry of the Pacific Northwest. Those historians, including Carroll's respected Washington State University colleague Paul Hirt, have reached a very different set of conclusions. In Hirt's memorable terminology, the ready embracing of optimistic assumptions, combined with the failure to note the more ominous warning signs, amounted to a veritable conspiracy of optimism. Still, like another distinguished historian of the forests of the region, Nancy Langston, he notes that the conspiracy was not a matter of straightforward venality. Instead another crucial consideration involved the realm of psychology.

Historically, nuclear power facilities have been popular in the specific "host" communities where they have been built. The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident may have ended that. No known preTMl host community survey showed more than 33 percent opposition; no known post-TMl survey has shown less than 50 percent opposition. Pre/postTMl status explains over 70 percent of the variation across surveys—despite major variations in question wording, survey locations, and other factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In comparison with urbanites, rural residents live in environments that are less heavily modified by human activity. They also depend more directly on the extraction or use of natural resources and are more likely to suffer the kinds of economic weaknesses that could lead them to favor economic development even at the expense of environmental protection. Yet while some studies have found rural residents to express lower levels of environmental concern than do urbanites, other studies have found that low levels of rural environmental concern may actually reflect lower concerns among farmers in particular. These varied results may be affected by methodologies, including the degree of focus on local environmental concern and the need to separate living in polluted areas from working for polluting industries. Drawing on rural areas with significant employment both in agriculture and in mining, this paper presents data on more specific local concerns about the environment and technological development. The findings show persons in agriculture express higher levels of concern than do other rural persons in the same communities. The results suggest that widespread support for environmental protection may make it difficult to isolate groups having low levels of environmental concern unless greater attention is devoted to the specific environmental issues having the greatest local salience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human beings have a dualistic relationship with the environment, being subject to physical and biological limits and yet being unique in the capacity for culture and symbolic communication. Sociology reflects this context and adds another dualism, drawing heavily from the concepts and perspectives of biological ecology, but reacting almost violently against ‘reductionism’ of any sort, specifically including social Darwinism and environmental determinism. During much of the twentieth century, the predominant trend within sociology was for scholars to downplay or even ignore the importance of the environment, particularly in the United States. This trend was ultimately counterbalanced by sociological responses to the environmental movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s and by the efforts of selected sociologists—particularly Riley Dunlap and William Cation—who helped bring together the field of ‘environmental sociology’ Given the finite nature of many natural resources and the ways in which human activities depend upon and affect the environment, the field of environmental sociology is likely to be an increasingly important one in the years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on risk perceptions in a broader perspective to include not only the individual perceivers and the risks they perceive, but also the institutions that are responsible for risk management. Recreancy can involve failings in either or both of the aspects of trust emphasized by Barber (1983)-- technical competence and fiduciary responsibility--but the term is also intended to describe cases where the failing is neither a matter of (individual) incompetence nor one of self-interest. While recreancy involves the performance of actors who occupy positions of societal trust, it is most appropriately measured not in terms of those actors' perceptions, but, through the assessments of others who have fewer vested interests in describing the legitimacy of their own actions. Risks of death have been dropping significantly for more than a century, but during that lime, there has been a dramatic growth of societal interdependence and hence of the potential for recreancy the failure of institutional actors to carry out their responsibilities with the degree of vigor necessary to merit the societal trust they enjoy.

The 1983 Supreme Court decision on Three Mile Island held it would be almost impossible to distinguish between persons suffering genuine psychological stress and those who merely opposed the facility. While this argument was treated as factual by the justices, it is merely a hypothesis. This article provides an empirical test of the hypothesis, using the only other nuclear host community known to have experienced as much opposition as Three Mile Island. If the Supreme Court hypothesis were correct, attitudes toward the facility would be almost perfectly correlated with stress symptomatology. In fact, the strongest attitude-stress correlation in this community was -.096, even though simple sociodemographic variables showed far stronger correlations with the stress measures. By contrast, the broader literature reveals growing support for the alternative hypothesis implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, namely that the risk of technological accidents may indeed be a significant predictor of psychological stress. The findings have implications for both policy and future research. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Focuses on sex differences on the attitude towards environmentalism. Feminist literature on gender socialization; Features of research on environmental and technological controversies that has addressed the issue of gender differences in attitudes; Findings on sex and attitudes toward technological/environmental risks.

This article provides illustrations of risk communication in the case of Lloyd, Florida in 1993. When corporate managements and government regulators want to institute a new project that might produce dreaded accidents, an oft-adopted strategy is to damn the torpedoes and sail full steam ahead. A common argument in intellectual and political circles is that public concerns about technology are based largely on ignorance and misinformation, and thus that risk-related problems can be overcome by public education. Research on natural hazards as well as on technological hazards shows that people care deeply about social disruption. This is why formal risk assessments usually neglect social disruption. When risk communication is merely a one-sided propaganda tool, people withdraw their trust from experts and the systems those experts work for.

The nuclear power industry has generated heated disagreement about the public control of potentially hazardous private investments. During the early years of nuclear power-from the mid-1950 to the mid-1970s--the industry was largely self-regulating by today's standards. The broader public was largely excluded from policy decisions but also expressed relatively few concerns about the technology. Over the past decade, the situation has changed substantially with one key factor being a substantial change in the public reaction to nuclear power. National samples began to show concerns about "nearby" nuclear facilities in the mid-to-late 1970s, although nuclear power remained acceptable in the abstract until the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Surveys since that time show widespread opposition to nuclear power. The opposition cannot be explained as being due to a loss of faith in science and rationality; instead it appears to reflect a rational response to personal values that are different from those found among nuclear industry supporters in combination with a loss of trust in the nuclear industry and the federal agencies that regulate it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most serious challenges lacing "advanced' industrial societies is the management of technological risks. Recently. a number of sociologists have called attention to the topics noting the significant contributions sociologists can offer to the ongoing risk debate. This article takes a complementary approach. suggesting that it is important to ask not just what sociology can do tor the study of risk, but what the study of risk can do for sociology. Particular promise is evident in studies that go beyond a focus on individuals' risk perceptions, dealing with the behaviors and interests of societal institutions entrusted with the management of risks. Still lacking, however. is a more explicit and coherent conceptual framework. one that can help guide future research toward the testing of sociologically important questions, not just what questions and issues that technologists and policymakers define as important. Working from an explicitly sociological orientation, ibis article outlines a couceptual perspective that focuses on the "framing" of risk debates by institutional actors. This approach suggests that, given the profound growth of technological efficacy, in the face at modest if any growth in the efficacy of social control mechanisms, the management of technological risk is likely to become increasingly problematic for sociology as well as for society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that applied settings offer opportunities for analysis as well as employment. The theme is discussed in the context of a recent Congressional Fellowship. The first half of the article is a relatively straightforward report on Congressional staffers and their activities: it presents background information and identifies three areas of dynamic tension that seem to deserve greater attention in future research. Building on this information. the second half of the article provides examples of three types of substantive conclusions that deserve to be encouraged in future applied work. The first is the application, in a new context, of previously familiar concepts. An example in the present case is that. despite the mans ways in which Congress is unique, it is also very much like a "typicaI" small town. The second is the questioning of common assumptions: despite the frequent criticisms of the so-called "rational model of decision making," for example, information and analysis play a significant role in policy outcomes, and knowledge is indeed power in many Congressional deliberations. The third is the recognition of broader challenges to the discipline: an example in the Congressional context is that social scientists, and sociologists in particular, have been extraordinarily ineffective in educating policy- makers on the nature of their work. Individually, each of these conclusions has implications for sociologists: collectively, they are meant to illustrate the importance of looking to applied settings as a source of insights, not just income. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The protection of habitat for an officially designated "threatened" species, the Northern Spotted Owl, is widely seen as having endangered the survival of a very different "species," namely the rural American logger. In spite of the widespread agreement on this point, however, it is not clear just how many jobs have been endangered, over just how long a period, due to the protection of spotted-owl habitat and of the environment more broadly. In the present paper, we analyze longer term employment trends in logging and milling, both nationally and in the two states of the Pacific Northwest where the spotted-owl debate has been most intense, to determine the length of time over which such environmental protection efforts have been creating the loss of logging and milling jobs. There are three potential key "turning points" since the start of high-quality employment data in 1947--the 1989 controversy over the federal "listing" of the Northern Spotted Owl under the Endangered Species Act, the earlier increase in environmental regulations accompanying the first Earth Day in 1970, and the still-earlier "locking up" of timber after the passage of the Wilderness Protection Act in 1964. We also examine the effects of two other variables that have received considerable attention in the ongoing debates--levels of U.S. Forest Service timber harvests and the exporting of raw logs. We find that the 1989 listing of the spotted owl has no significant effect on employment--not even in the two states where the debate has been most intense. Instead, the only statistically significant turning point came with the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964. The direction of the change, however, was precisely the opposite of what is generally expected. Both nationally and in the Pacific Northwest, the greatest decline in timber employment occurred from 1947 until 1964--a time of great economic growth, a general absence of "unreasonable environmental regulations," ... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a basic historical background for understanding the nature of contamination, corrosion and social order. The history of disaster research started when military planners began to wonder about the ways in which communities might respond to something as disastrous as a sneak nuclear attack, and as technological prowess and post-war prosperity combined to offer at least some prospect for managing the wildest of nature's moods, rather than merely responding to them. The professional community studying technological disasters has gone through a substantial shift in viewpoints over the past several decades. By the mid-1980s, a growing number of researchers were beginning to wonder, whether the systematic differences between natural and technological disasters might most reasonably be traced to causes that include but go beyond the kinds of obvious death and destruction that were the major preoccupation of the field during its early decades. If the aftermath of a natural disaster is typified by volunteers who come in to offer a hand, the aftermath of a technological disaster is perhaps best typified by lawyers who offer instead the back of a hand.

The implications of natural resource extraction for local economic development have become the subject of sharply conflicting expectations, with long-term outcomes predicted to range from regional economic growth and development to "progressive underdevelopment." These differences in longer-term expectations cannot be satisfactorily resolved through the use of cross-sectional or short-term data. In addition, existing theories tend to be stated in universalistic terms that discourage rather than facilitate the examination of differences across cases. These points are illustrated through a case-study examination of what has been called the first mining boom in the United States, involving lead mines in the Upper Mississippi Valley during the first half of the 19th century. The developmental consequences of this mining boom appear neither to have been as favorable as predicted by the most enthusiastic proponents of extraction nor as negative as those predicted by the harshest critics. Instead, outcomes appear to have reflected intersecting configurations of physical resource characteristics, the organizational form/scale of extractive activities, the historical period in question, and the nature of relationships among competing resource uses and users. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Raw material extraction once offered an effective route to economic development, but societal relationships with environment and technology have changed so fundamentally that extractive industries today appear more likely to lead rural regions to economic addiction. Key characteristics of addictive activities include rising costs of operation at most extractive facilities, combined with downward trends in world commodity prices. Key characteristics of vulnerable communities and regions include increasing geographic isolation, imbalances of scale and power with respect to extractive industries, and the absence of realistic alternatives for diversified development. Key pressures toward addiction are created by ambiguities that mask the addictive tendencies, including ambiguities of price signals, of employment and development possibilities for remote regions, and of resource exhaustion. The net result is that, while the encouragement to develop extractive industries is often coupled with advice to avoid developing an excessive dependency on a single economic sector, the very regions and nations having the greatest need to hear such advice may also have the lowest realistic ability to respond to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partly because of the field's efforts to deal first with the kinds of impacts that have been the most obvious and pressing, the traditional focus of social impact assessment has been on the impacts taking place during the most intensive phases of developmental activity. Recently it has become increasingly clear that a number of predictable, significant impacts take place both before and after the periods of most intense activity; these impacts are missed by social impact assessment approaches that are excessively narrow in focus. This paper offers a conceptual frame-work that is relatively simple but that deals with impacts both across time and across potentially affected systems of the human environment, doing so in such a way as to improve the promise of social impact assessment to become more nearly comprehensive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is an excursion into the heart of what many risk assessors consider the most frightening territory imaginable. It deals with two kinds of dread. The first is dread expressed by the general public toward certain kinds of facilities and technologies— the second is the dread in the scientific and technical community that proposed facilities or development plans will inspire just such reactions. The article is divided into four main sections. The first provides an overview of the growing literature on public perceptions of risks, emphasizing the three often-implicit but dramatically different models of public rationality that are revealed therein - models of ignorance/irrationality, of selfishness, and of prudence. The second section presents a close look at the available evidence for each of the three perspectives. The third section takes note of the dramatically differing policy ramifications of the three competing perspectives and explores the implications of an observation that is a theme throughout the paper-that there seems to have been a greater influence of policy discussions on empirical research than vice versa. The fourth section sketches the outlines of alternative approaches that appear to hold promise for increasing the relative influence of empirical findings in the future.

The article responds to sociologist Andy Pickering's comments, partly because of the inherent intellectual stimulation of exchanging ideas with such a distinguished colleague, but partly also because of the need for much greater interchange between the two fields, the sociology of environment and technology, on the one hand and the sociology of science on the other. Pickering's comments raise three important points about the analysis of Iron Mountain, Michigan. First, he praises what he calls papers symmetry in noting the importance of physical⁄environmental as well as social factors in understanding social outcomes. Second, he argues that people have not taken this point far enough, in large part because, he believes, the social is not sufficiently at stake in papers. Third, he argues that a fruitful antidote would be to trace the evolution of actual practices, in detail, over time.

Sociological efforts to understand environment-society relationships fall primarily into four conceptual categories. The first three, involving analytical separation, analytical primacy, and balanced dualism, all draw distinctions between biophysical and social aspects of human experience, with subsequent analyses being based on these a priori distinctions. The fourth or constructivist approach questions this naturalized dichotomy, calling attention instead to mutual contingency or conjoint constitution: What we take to be "physical facts" are likely to be strongly shaped by social construction processes, and at the same time, what we take to be "strictly social" will often have been shaped in part by taken-for-granted realities of the physical world. Technology offers important opportunities for tracing these interconnections, being an embodiment of both the physical and the social. The point is illustrated with a long-term historical analysis of a specific physiographic feature--a mountain--that has undergone little oven physical change over the centuries, but has undergone repeated changes in its social meanings and uses. Few of the changes would have been possible in the absence of the mountain's physiographic characteristics; similarly, few would have occurred in the absence of changing sociocultural definitions and possibilities. The challenge for sociology is not just to recognize the importance of bath the physical and the social factors, and certainly not to argue over the relative importance of the two, but to recognize the extent to which what we take to be "physical" and "social" factors can be conjointly constituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the difficulties of integrating environmental variables into sociological analyses is that societies have a dualistic relationship with the biophysical environment. Humans are like other species in depending on the environment, yet humans are also unique among all species in the potential for altering and sometimes evading environmental constraints. A second and related difficulty results from the degree to which humans incorporate the environment into their everyday views of reality; the process often seems so automatic that the biophysical realities can be forgotten, taken for granted, or ignored, both by residents and by those who study them. This problem is particularly significant for studies that fail to be sufficiently comparative to be able to observe significant variations in environmental and technological factors. The problem is illustrated with a study that deals with a relatively traditional social- psychological dependent variable-attitudes toward a proposed development The focus is on the apparent paradox of a form of industrial development that has been welcomed with open arms in one area of the country while virtually opening armed warfare in another, namely drilling for offshore oil. To explain the marked differences across regions, it is necessary to understand the influence of biophysical and technological variables, as well as the social and historical differences across the regions. Implications for further research are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U S environmental law requires that environmental impact statements make "integrated use" of the social sciences in identifying the impacts of certain new developments, and requires that decisionmakers give "appropriate consideration" to the impacts which are identified. Despite this fact, sociological expertise is severely underrepresented in the impact statement process--not only in the final decisions, but in the impact statements themselves. This paper draws attention to the existing situation, and offers several suggestions for improving the sociological content of impact statements in the future. The paper's final section examines potential implications of increased sociological involvement in impact assessments, it concludes that there is a good deal that could be promising about improved (and genuinely "social") impact assessments. Not only could they exert an increased influence on policy outcomes, but they hold the potential to contribute to baste sociology as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author investigates the human factors of several environmental and societal problems in the Greater Yellowstone region in the U.S. The author cites the challenges encountered in several boomtowns in the country due to the prevalence of crimes, particularly sex-related offenses, as well as the changes in social and environmental structures. The author also denotes the essence conservation biology in alleviating these problems.

Concerns about global environmental change challenge long term ecological research (LTER) to go beyond traditional disciplinary scientific research to produce knowledge that can guide society toward more sustainable development. Reporting the outcomes of a 2 d interdisciplinary workshop, this article proposes novel concepts to substantially expand LTER by including the human dimension. We feel that such an integration warrants the insertion of a new letter in the acronym, changing it from LTER to LTSER, "Long-Term Socioecological Research," with a focus on coupled socioecological systems. We discuss scientific challenges such as the necessity to link biophysical processes to governance and communication, the need to consider patterns and processes across several spatial and temporal scales, and the difficulties of combining data from in-situ measurements with statistical data, cadastral surveys, and soft knowledge from the humanities. We stress the importance of including prefossil fuel system baseline data as well as maintaining the often delicate balance between monitoring and predictive or explanatory modeling. Moreover, it is challenging to organize a continuous process of cross-fertilization between rich descriptive and causal-analytic local case studies and theory/modeling-oriented generalizations. Conceptual insights are used to derive conclusions for the design of infrastructures needed for long-term socioecological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]