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Bayesian inference typically focuses upon two issues. The first is estimating the parameters of some model from data, and the second is quantifying the evidence for alternative hypotheses—formulated as alternative models. This paper focuses upon a third issue. Our interest is in the selection of data—either through sampling subsets of data from a large dataset or through optimising experimental design—based upon the models we have of how those data are generated. Optimising data-selection ensures we can achieve good inference with fewer data, saving on computational and experimental costs. This paper aims to unpack the principles of active sampling of data by drawing from neurobiological research on animal exploration and from the theory of optimal experimental design. We offer an overview of the salient points from these fields and illustrate their application in simple toy examples, ranging from function approximation with basis sets to inference about processes that evolve over time. Finally, we consider how this approach to data selection could be applied to the design of (Bayes-adaptive) clinical trials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can one conciliate the claim that humans are uncertainty minimizing systems that seek to navigate predictable and familiar environments with the claim that humans can be creative? We call this the Enlightened Room Problem (ERP). The solution, we suggest, lies not (or not only) in the error-minimizing brain but in the environment itself. Creativity emerges from various degrees of interplay between predictive brains and changing environments: ones that repeatedly move the goalposts for our own error-minimizing machinery. By (co)constructing these challenging worlds, we effectively alter and expand the space within which our own prediction engines operate, and that function as 'exploration bubbles' that enable information seeking, uncertainty minimizing minds to penetrate deeper and deeper into artistic, scientific and engineering space. In what follows, we offer a proof of principle for this kind of environmentally led cognitive expansion. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a variational formulation of natural selection, paying special attention to the nature of 'things' and the way that different 'kinds' of 'things' are individuated from—and influence—each other. We use the Bayesian mechanics of particular partitions to understand how slow phylogenetic processes constrain—and are constrained by—fast, phenotypic processes. The main result is a formulation of adaptive fitness as a path integral of phenotypic fitness. Paths of least action, at the phenotypic and phylogenetic scales, can then be read as inference and learning processes, respectively. In this view, a phenotype actively infers the state of its econiche under a generative model, whose parameters are learned via natural (Bayesian model) selection. The ensuing variational synthesis features some unexpected aspects. Perhaps the most notable is that it is not possible to describe or model a population of conspecifics per se. Rather, it is necessary to consider populations of distinct natural kinds that influence each other. This paper is limited to a description of the mathematical apparatus and accompanying ideas. Subsequent work will use these methods for simulations and numerical analyses—and identify points of contact with related mathematical formulations of evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a concise description of the free energy principle, starting from a formulation of random dynamical systems in terms of a Langevin equation and ending with a Bayesian mechanics that can be read as a physics of sentience. It rehearses the key steps using standard results from statistical physics. These steps entail (i) establishing a particular partition of states based upon conditional independencies that inherit from sparsely coupled dynamics, (ii) unpacking the implications of this partition in terms of Bayesian inference and (iii) describing the paths of particular states with a variational principle of least action. Teleologically, the free energy principle offers a normative account of self-organisation in terms of optimal Bayesian design and decision-making, in the sense of maximising marginal likelihood or Bayesian model evidence. In summary, starting from a description of the world in terms of random dynamical systems, we end up with a description of self-organisation as sentient behaviour that can be interpreted as self-evidencing; namely, self-assembly, autopoiesis or active inference. [Display omitted] • This paper provides a concise derivation of the free energy principle. • The FEP is a normative account of self-organisation and sentient behaviour: • It describes self-organisation as maximizing Bayesian model evidence, • And sentient behaviour as optimal Bayesian design and decision-making. • Altogether, we start from a description of the world as a random dynamical system, • And end with a Bayesian mechanics that can be read as a physics of sentience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I enjoyed reading this compelling account of Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT). As a theoretical neurobiologist, I recognised – and applauded – the tenets of CNT. My commentary asks whether its claims could be installed into a Bayesian mechanics of decision-making, in a way that would enable theoreticians to model, reproduce and predict decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) states that under suitable conditions of weak coupling, random dynamical systems with sufficient degrees of freedom will behave so as to minimize an upper bound, formalized as a variational free energy, on surprisal (a.k.a., self-information). This upper bound can be read as a Bayesian prediction error. Equivalently, its negative is a lower bound on Bayesian model evidence (a.k.a., marginal likelihood). In short, certain random dynamical systems evince a kind of self-evidencing. Here, we reformulate the FEP in the formal setting of spacetime-background free, scale-free quantum information theory. We show how generic quantum systems can be regarded as observers, which with the standard freedom of choice assumption become agents capable of assigning semantics to observational outcomes. We show how such agents minimize Bayesian prediction error in environments characterized by uncertainty, insufficient learning, and quantum contextuality. We show that in its quantum-theoretic formulation, the FEP is asymptotically equivalent to the Principle of Unitarity. Based on these results, we suggest that biological systems employ quantum coherence as a computational resource and – implicitly – as a communication resource. We summarize a number of problems for future research, particularly involving the resources required for classical communication and for detecting and responding to quantum context switches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This technical report describes the dynamic causal modelling of mitigated epidemiological outcomes during the COVID-9 coronavirus outbreak in 2020. Dynamic causal modelling is a form of complex system modelling, which uses 'real world' timeseries to estimate the parameters of an underlying state space model using variational Bayesian procedures. Its key contribution—in an epidemiological setting—is to embed conventional models within a larger model of sociobehavioural responses—in a way that allows for (relatively assumption-free) forecasting. One advantage of using variational Bayes is that one can progressively optimise the model via Bayesian model selection: generally, the most likely models become more expressive as more data becomes available. This report summarises the model (on 6-Nov-20), eight months after the inception of dynamic causal modelling for COVID-19. This model—and its subsequent updates—is used to provide nowcasts and forecasts of latent behavioural and epidemiological variables as an open science resource. The current report describes the underlying model structure and the rationale for the variational procedures that underwrite Bayesian model selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Newly emerging infectious diseases, such as the coronavirus (COVID-19), create new challenges for public healthcare systems. Before effective treatments, countering the spread of these infections depends on mitigating, protective behaviours such as social distancing, respecting lockdown, wearing masks, frequent handwashing, travel restrictions, and vaccine acceptance. Previous work has shown that the enacting protective behaviours depends on beliefs about individual vulnerability, threat severity, and one's ability to engage in such protective actions. However, little is known about the genesis of these beliefs in response to an infectious disease epidemic, and the cognitive mechanisms that may link these beliefs to decision making. Active inference (AI) is a recent approach to behavioural modelling that integrates embodied perception, action, belief updating, and decision making. This approach provides a framework to understand the behaviour of agents in situations that require planning under uncertainty. It assumes that the brain infers the hidden states that cause sensations, predicts the perceptual feedback produced by adaptive actions, and chooses actions that minimize expected surprise in the future. In this paper, we present a computational account describing how individuals update their beliefs about the risks and thereby commit to protective behaviours. We show how perceived risks, beliefs about future states, sensory uncertainty, and outcomes under each policy can determine individual protective behaviours. We suggest that these mechanisms are crucial to assess how individuals cope with uncertainty during a pandemic, and we show the interest of these new perspectives for public health policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding information processing in the brain—and creating general-purpose artificial intelligence—are long-standing aspirations of scientists and engineers worldwide. The distinctive features of human intelligence are high-level cognition and control in various interactions with the world including the self, which are not defined in advance and are vary over time. The challenge of building human-like intelligent machines, as well as progress in brain science and behavioural analyses, robotics, and their associated theoretical formalisations, speaks to the importance of the world-model learning and inference. In this article, after briefly surveying the history and challenges of internal model learning and probabilistic learning, we introduce the free energy principle, which provides a useful framework within which to consider neuronal computation and probabilistic world models. Next, we showcase examples of human behaviour and cognition explained under that principle. We then describe symbol emergence in the context of probabilistic modelling, as a topic at the frontiers of cognitive robotics. Lastly, we review recent progress in creating human-like intelligence by using novel probabilistic programming languages. The striking consensus that emerges from these studies is that probabilistic descriptions of learning and inference are powerful and effective ways to create human-like artificial intelligent machines and to understand intelligence in the context of how humans interact with their world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a Bayesian mechanics for adaptive systems. Firstly, we model the interface between a system and its environment with a Markov blanket. This affords conditions under which states internal to the blanket encode information about external states. Second, we introduce dynamics and represent adaptive systems as Markov blankets at steady state. This allows us to identify a wide class of systems whose internal states appear to infer external states, consistent with variational inference in Bayesian statistics and theoretical neuroscience. Finally, we partition the blanket into sensory and active states. It follows that active states can be seen as performing active inference and well-known forms of stochastic control (such as PID control), which are prominent formulations of adaptive behaviour in theoretical biology and engineering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that the free-energy principle (FEP) can indeed be used to articulate a conception of the boundaries of cognitive systems that meets the desiderata of third-wave extended-mind research. We point out that Markov blankets under the FEP definitionally constitute the means through which internal and external states are coupled, and so do not isolate systems from their environment. We argue that the nested, multiscale boundaries of the FEP formulation are indeed plastic and open to re-negotiation. Finally, we appeal to the formulation of niche construction under the FEP to argue that the extension of cognitive boundaries in this formulation is both synchronic and diachronic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behavior, from which special and important cases—for example, reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design—can be derived. Active inference finesses the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this letter, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about "what would happen if I did that" to "what I would believe about what would happen if I did that." The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme using numerical simulations of deep decision problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns the distributed intelligence or federated inference that emerges under belief-sharing among agents who share a common world—and world model. Imagine, for example, several animals keeping a lookout for predators. Their collective surveillance rests upon being able to communicate their beliefs—about what they see—among themselves. But, how is this possible? Here, we show how all the necessary components arise from minimising free energy. We use numerical studies to simulate the generation, acquisition and emergence of language in synthetic agents. Specifically, we consider inference, learning and selection as minimising the variational free energy of posterior (i.e., Bayesian) beliefs about the states, parameters and structure of generative models, respectively. The common theme—that attends these optimisation processes—is the selection of actions that minimise expected free energy, leading to active inference, learning and model selection (a.k.a., structure learning). We first illustrate the role of communication in resolving uncertainty about the latent states of a partially observed world, on which agents have complementary perspectives. We then consider the acquisition of the requisite language—entailed by a likelihood mapping from an agent's beliefs to their overt expression (e.g., speech)—showing that language can be transmitted across generations by active learning. Finally, we show that language is an emergent property of free energy minimisation, when agents operate within the same econiche. We conclude with a discussion of various perspectives on these phenomena; ranging from cultural niche construction, through federated learning, to the emergence of complexity in ensembles of self-organising systems. • Communication—and language in particular—is an emergent property of agents that seek evidence for generative models of their shared world. • Nested free energy minimising—evidence maximising—processes explain the emergence of language and its transmission over generations. • Reading these processes as inference integrates perspectives on communication; from generalised synchrony to cultural niche construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bettinger, J. S., K. J. Friston. Conceptual Foundations of Physiological Regulation incorporating the Free Energy Principle & Self-Organized Criticality. NEUROSCI BIOBEHAV REV 23(x) 144-XXX, 2022. Since the late nineteen-nineties, the concept of homeostasis has been contextualized within a broader class of "allostatic" dynamics characterized by a wider-berth of causal factors including social, psychological and environmental entailments; the fundamental nature of integrated brain-body dynamics; plus the role of anticipatory, top-down constraints supplied by intrinsic regulatory models. Many of these evidentiary factors are integral in original descriptions of homeostasis; subsequently integrated; and/or cite more-general operating principles of self-organization. As a result, the concept of allostasis may be generalized to a larger category of variational systems in biology, engineering and physics in terms of advances in complex systems, statistical mechanics and dynamics involving heterogenous (hierarchical/heterarchical, modular) systems like brain-networks and the internal milieu. This paper offers a three-part treatment. 1) interpret "allostasis" to emphasize a variational and relational foundation of physiological stability; 2) adapt the role of allostasis as "stability through change" to include a "return to stability" and 3) reframe the model of homeostasis with a conceptual model of criticality that licenses the upgrade to variational dynamics. • Allostasis "allo" + "stasis" as "variational & relational stability" • Allostasis as "stability through change" return to stability (physiological resilience) • Regulatory physiological processing should also operate at/near critical phase transitions • Variational/relational stability of allostatic processing is associated with a Griffiths region • To minimize free energy is to self-organize internal states into a Griffiths regime [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies suggest that the practice of long-term (months to years) mindfulness meditation induces structural plasticity in gray matter. However, it remains unknown whether short-term (<30 days) mindfulness meditation in novices could induce similar structural changes. Our previous randomized controlled trials (RCTs) identified white matter changes surrounding the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) within 2 to 4 weeks, following 5-10 h of mindfulness training. Furthermore, these changes were correlated with emotional states in healthy adults. The PCC is a key hub in the functional anatomy implicated in meditation and other perspectival processes. In this longitudinal study using a randomized design, we therefore examined the effect of a 10 h of mindfulness training, the Integrative Body-Mind Training (IBMT) on gray matter volume of the PCC compared to an active control—relaxation training (RT). We found that brief IBMT increased ventral PCC volume and that baseline temperamental trait—an index of individual differences was associated with a reduction in training-induced gray matter increases. Our findings indicate that brief mindfulness meditation induces gray matter plasticity, suggesting that structural changes in ventral PCC—a key hub associated with self-awareness, emotion, cognition, and aging—may have important implications for protecting against mood-related disorders and aging-related cognitive declines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies suggest that the practice of long-term (months to years) mindfulness meditation induces structural plasticity in gray matter. However, it remains unknown whether short-term (<30 days) mindfulness meditation in novices could induce similar structural changes. Our previous randomized controlled trials (RCTs) identified white matter changes surrounding the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) within 2 to 4 weeks, following 5-10 h of mindfulness training. Furthermore, these changes were correlated with emotional states in healthy adults. The PCC is a key hub in the functional anatomy implicated in meditation and other perspectival processes. In this longitudinal study using a randomized design, we therefore examined the effect of a 10 h of mindfulness training, the Integrative Body-Mind Training (IBMT) on gray matter volume of the PCC compared to an active control—relaxation training (RT). We found that brief IBMT increased ventral PCC volume and that baseline temperamental trait—an index of individual differences was associated with a reduction in training-induced gray matter increases. Our findings indicate that brief mindfulness meditation induces gray matter plasticity, suggesting that structural changes in ventral PCC—a key hub associated with self-awareness, emotion, cognition, and aging—may have important implications for protecting against mood-related disorders and aging-related cognitive declines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This letter considers a class of biologically plausible cost functions for neural networks, where the same cost function is minimized by both neural activity and plasticity. We show that such cost functions can be cast as a variational bound on model evidence under an implicit generative model. Using generative models based on partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDP), we show that neural activity and plasticity perform Bayesian inference and learning, respectively, by maximizing model evidence. Using mathematical and numerical analyses, we establish the formal equivalence between neural network cost functions and variational free energy under some prior beliefs about latent states that generate inputs. These prior beliefs are determined by particular constants (e.g., thresholds) that define the cost function. This means that the Bayes optimal encoding of latent or hidden states is achieved when the network's implicit priors match the process that generates its inputs. This equivalence is potentially important because it suggests that any hyperparameter of a neural network can itself be optimized—by minimization with respect to variational free energy. Furthermore, it enables one to characterize a neural network formally, in terms of its prior beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• New (hierarchical) generative model for linguistic interactions. • Builds on active inference formulations of dyadic interactions. • We simulate agents that ask and answer questions together. • Theta-gamma coupling emerges from belief updating under this framework. This paper presents a biologically plausible generative model and inference scheme that is capable of simulating communication between synthetic subjects who talk to each other. Building on active inference formulations of dyadic interactions, we simulate linguistic exchange to explore generative models that support dialogues. These models employ high-order interactions among abstract (discrete) states in deep (hierarchical) models. The sequential nature of language processing mandates generative models with a particular factorial structure—necessary to accommodate the rich combinatorics of language. We illustrate linguistic communication by simulating a synthetic subject who can play the 'Twenty Questions' game. In this game, synthetic subjects take the role of the questioner or answerer, using the same generative model. This simulation setup is used to illustrate some key architectural points and demonstrate that many behavioural and neurophysiological correlates of linguistic communication emerge under variational (marginal) message passing, given the right kind of generative model. For example, we show that theta-gamma coupling is an emergent property of belief updating, when listening to another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theme of this special issue of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology is on predictive processing and how it can improve our fundamental understanding of neuropsychiatric disorders. Several articles focus on psychosis and demonstrate how the field of computational psychosis research has evolved and matured in recent years through the application of predictive processing theory. These articles suggest that whereas the computational mechanisms underlying psychosis may be complex, careful empirical and theoretical work-using more sophisticated models-can bridge gaps between previous results that appeared to be at odds while providing more explanatory power. There is a particular focus on processing hierarchies; defining which priors are maladaptive and at what stage of illness they become so; and finding compelling neurobiological correlates of computational processes. These articles provide a blueprint for future empirical work. This work-that is licensed theoretically by predictive processing-may improve our understanding of psychosis and its treatment and open new avenues for biomarker and therapeutic development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The moment‐to‐moment focus of our mind's eye results from a complex interplay of voluntary and involuntary influences on attention. Previous neuroimaging studies suggest that the brain networks of voluntary versus involuntary attention can be segregated into a frontal‐versus‐parietal or a dorsal‐versus‐ventral partition—although recent work suggests that the dorsal network may be involved in both bottom‐up and top‐down attention. Research with nonhuman primates has provided evidence that a key distinction between top‐down and bottom‐up attention may be the direction of connectivity between frontal and parietal areas. Whereas typical fMRI connectivity analyses cannot disambiguate the direction of connections, dynamic causal modeling (DCM) can model directionality. Using DCM, we provide new evidence that directed connections within the dorsal attention network are differentially modulated for voluntary versus involuntary attention. These results suggest that the intraparietal sulcus exerts a baseline inhibitory effect on the frontal eye fields that is strengthened during exogenous orienting and attenuated during endogenous orienting. Furthermore, the attenuation from endogenous attention occurs even with salient peripheral cues when those cues are known to be counter predictive. Thus, directed connectivity between frontal and parietal regions of the dorsal attention network is highly influenced by the type of attention that is engaged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Active inference is an approach to understanding behaviour that rests upon the idea that the brain uses an internal generative model to predict incoming sensory data. The fit between this model and data may be improved in two ways. The brain could optimise probabilistic beliefs about the variables in the generative model (i.e. perceptual inference). Alternatively, by acting on the world, it could change the sensory data, such that they are more consistent with the model. This implies a common objective function (variational free energy) for action and perception that scores the fit between an internal model and the world. We compare two free energy functionals for active inference in the framework of Markov decision processes. One of these is a functional of beliefs (i.e. probability distributions) about states and policies, but a function of observations, while the second is a functional of beliefs about all three. In the former (expected free energy), prior beliefs about outcomes are not part of the generative model (because they are absorbed into the prior over policies). Conversely, in the second (generalised free energy), priors over outcomes become an explicit component of the generative model. When using the free energy function, which is blind to future observations, we equip the generative model with a prior over policies that ensure preferred (i.e. priors over) outcomes are realised. In other words, if we expect to encounter a particular kind of outcome, this lends plausibility to those policies for which this outcome is a consequence. In addition, this formulation ensures that selected policies minimise uncertainty about future outcomes by minimising the free energy expected in the future. When using the free energy functional—that effectively treats future observations as hidden states—we show that policies are inferred or selected that realise prior preferences by minimising the free energy of future expectations. Interestingly, the form of posterior beliefs about policies (and associated belief updating) turns out to be identical under both formulations, but the quantities used to compute them are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this review was to integrate leading paradigms in psychology and neuroscience with a theory of the embodied, situated human brain, called the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM). The HMM describes the brain as a complex adaptive system that functions to minimize the entropy of our sensory and physical states via action-perception cycles generated by hierarchical neural dynamics. First, we review the extant literature on the hierarchical structure of the brain. Next, we derive the HMM from a broader evolutionary systems theory that explains neural structure and function in terms of dynamic interactions across four nested levels of biological causation (i.e., adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism). We then describe how the HMM aligns with a global brain theory in neuroscience called the free-energy principle, leveraging this theory to mathematically formulate neural dynamics across hierarchical spatiotemporal scales. We conclude by exploring the implications of the HMM for psychological inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Predictive processing (e.g., predictive coding) is a predominant paradigm in cognitive neuroscience. This Primer considers the various levels of commitment neuroscientists have to the neuronal process theories that accompany the principles of predictive processing. Specifically, it reviews and contextualises a recent PLOS Biology study of alpha oscillations and travelling waves. We will see that alpha oscillations emerge naturally under the computational architectures implied by predictive coding-and may tell us something profound about recurrent message passing in brain hierarchies. Specifically, the bidirectional nature of forward and backward waves speaks to opportunities to understand attention and how it nuances bottom-up and top-down influences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Recent advances in research on stress and, respectively, on disorders of perception, learning, and behaviour speak to a promising synthesis of current insights from (i) neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and psychology of stress and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (ii) computational psychiatry approaches to pathophysiology (e.g. of schizophrenia and autism). Methods: Specifically, we apply this synthesis to PTSD. The framework of active inference offers an embodied and embedded lens through which to understand neuronal mechanisms, structures, and processes of cognitive function and dysfunction. In turn, this offers an explanatory model of how healthy mental functioning can go awry due to psychopathological conditions that impair inference about our environment and our bodies. In this context, auditory phenomena—known to be especially relevant to studies of PTSD and schizophrenia—and traditional models of auditory function can be viewed from an evolutionary perspective based on active inference. Results: We assess and contextualise a range of evidence on audition, stress, psychosis, and PTSD, and bring some existing partial models of PTSD into multilevel alignment. Conclusions: The novel perspective on PTSD we present aims to serve as a basis for new experimental designs and therapeutic interventions that integrate fundamentally biological, cognitive, behavioural, and environmental factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many physiological and pathological changes in brain function manifest in eye-movement control. As such, assessment of oculomotion is an invaluable part of a clinical examination and affords a non-invasive window on several key aspects of neuronal computation. While oculomotion is often used to detect deficits of the sort associated with vascular or neoplastic events; subtler (e.g. pharmacological) effects on neuronal processing also induce oculomotor changes. We have previously framed oculomotor control as part of active vision, namely, a process of inference comprising two distinct but related challenges. The first is inferring where to look, and the second is inferring how to implement the selected action. In this paper, we draw from recent theoretical work on the neuromodulatory control of active inference. This allows us to simulate the sort of changes we would expect in oculomotor behaviour, following pharmacological enhancement or suppression of key neuromodulators—in terms of deciding where to look and the ensuing trajectory of the eye movement itself. We focus upon the influence of cholinergic and GABAergic agents on the speed of saccades, and consider dopaminergic and noradrenergic effects on more complex, memory-guided, behaviour. In principle, a computational approach to understanding the relationship between pharmacology and oculomotor behaviour affords the opportunity to estimate the influence of a given pharmaceutical upon neuronal function, and to use this to optimise therapeutic interventions on an individual basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• To predict the precision of its predictions, brain relies on its own beliefs; that is to say about the confidence of its prior predictions. • Fluency—the subjective experience associated with any cognitive treatment—plays a key role in prediction because it reflects the precision of (i.e., confidence placed in) predictions. • It is not fluency itself that is perceived but rather changes in fluency. • Changes in fluency orient attentional selection in response to violations and unexplained prediction errors. • Fluency can be read as recognising and contextualising unfelt fluency; where unfelt fluency optimises predictions of the precision of sensory processing. For a growing number of researchers, it is now accepted that the brain is a predictive organ that predicts the content of the sensorium and crucially the precision of—or confidence in—its own predictions. In order to predict the precision of its predictions, the brain has to infer the reliability of its own beliefs. This means that our brains have to recognise the precision of their predictions or, at least, their accuracy. In this paper, we argue that fluency is product of this recognition process. In short, to recognise fluency is to infer that we have a precise 'grip' on the unfolding processes that generate our sensations. More specifically, we propose that it is changes in fluency — from unfelt to felt — that are both recognised and realised when updating predictions about precision. Unfelt fluency orients attention to unpredicted sensations, while felt fluency supervenes on—and contextualises—unfelt fluency; thereby rendering certain attentional processes, phenomenologically opaque. As such, fluency underwrites the precision we place in our predictions and therefore acts upon our perceptual inferences. Hence, the causes of conscious subjective inference have unconscious perceptual precursors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Variational Laplace (VL) is a scheme for Bayesian modelling. • VL is widely used in neuroimaging, in particular DCM. • This paper provides a tutorial explanation of the math and algorithms. • New standalone code is provided to enable re-implementation. • The supplementary materials provide worked derivations. This article details a scheme for approximate Bayesian inference, which has underpinned thousands of neuroimaging studies since its introduction 15 years ago. Variational Laplace (VL) provides a generic approach to fitting linear or non-linear models, which may be static or dynamic, returning a posterior probability density over the model parameters and an approximation of log model evidence, which enables Bayesian model comparison. VL applies variational Bayesian inference in conjunction with quadratic or Laplace approximations of the evidence lower bound (free energy). Importantly, update equations do not need to be derived for each model under consideration, providing a general method for fitting a broad class of models. This primer is intended for experimenters and modellers who may wish to fit models to data using variational Bayesian methods, without assuming previous experience of variational Bayes or machine learning. Accompanying code demonstrates how to fit different kinds of model using the reference implementation of the VL scheme in the open-source Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software package. In addition, we provide a standalone software function that does not require SPM, in order to ease translation to other fields, together with detailed pseudocode. Finally, the supplementary materials provide worked derivations of the key equations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowing how another’s preferences relate to our own is a central aspect of everyday decision-making, yet how the brain performs this transformation is unclear. Here, we ask whether the putative role of the hippocampal–entorhinal system in transforming relative and absolute spatial coordinates during navigation extends to transformations in abstract decision spaces. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects learned a stranger’s preference for an everyday activity—relative to one of three personally known individuals—and subsequently decided how the stranger's preference relates to the other two individuals’ preferences. We observed entorhinal/subicular responses to the absolute distance between the ratings of the stranger and the familiar choice options. Notably, entorhinal/subicular signals were sensitive to which familiar individuals were being compared to the stranger. In contrast, striatal signals increased when accurately determining the ordinal position of choice options in relation to the stranger. Paralleling its role in navigation, these data implicate the entorhinal/subicular region in assimilating relatively coded knowledge within abstract metric spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The locus coeruleus (LC) in the pons is the major source of noradrenaline (NA) in the brain. Two modes of LC firing have been associated with distinct cognitive states: changes in tonic rates of firing are correlated with global levels of arousal and behavioural flexibility, whilst phasic LC responses are evoked by salient stimuli. Here, we unify these two modes of firing by modelling the response of the LC as a correlate of a prediction error when inferring states for action planning under Active Inference (AI). We simulate a classic Go/No-go reward learning task and a three-arm ‘explore/exploit’ task and show that, if LC activity is considered to reflect the magnitude of high level ‘state-action’ prediction errors, then both tonic and phasic modes of firing are emergent features of belief updating. We also demonstrate that when contingencies change, AI agents can update their internal models more quickly by feeding back this state-action prediction error–reflected in LC firing and noradrenaline release–to optimise learning rate, enabling large adjustments over short timescales. We propose that such prediction errors are mediated by cortico-LC connections, whilst ascending input from LC to cortex modulates belief updating in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In short, we characterise the LC/ NA system within a general theory of brain function. In doing so, we show that contrasting, behaviour-dependent firing patterns are an emergent property of the LC that translates state-action prediction errors into an optimal balance between plasticity and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proportional recovery rule asserts that most stroke survivors recover a fixed proportion of lost function. To the extent that this is true, recovery from stroke can be predicted accurately from baseline measures of acute post-stroke impairment alone. Reports that baseline scores explain more than 80%, and sometimes more than 90%, of the variance in the patients' recoveries, are rapidly accumulating. Here, we show that these headline effect sizes are likely inflated. The key effects in this literature are typically expressed as, or reducible to, correlation coefficients between baseline scores and recovery (outcome scores minus baseline scores). Using formal analyses and simulations, we show that these correlations will be extreme when outcomes are significantly less variable than baselines, which they often will be in practice regardless of the real relationship between outcomes and baselines. We show that these effect sizes are likely to be over-optimistic in every empirical study that we found that reported enough information for us to make the judgement, and argue that the same is likely to be true in other studies as well. The implication is that recovery after stroke may not be as proportional as recent studies suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this work, we address the neuronal encoding problem from a Bayesian perspective. Specifically, we ask whether neuronal responses in an in vitro neuronal network are consistent with ideal Bayesian observer responses under the free energy principle. In brief, we stimulated an in vitro cortical cell culture with stimulus trains that had a known statistical structure. We then asked whether recorded neuronal responses were consistent with variational message passing based upon free energy minimisation (i.e., evidence maximisation). Effectively, this required us to solve two problems: first, we had to formulate the Bayes-optimal encoding of the causes or sources of sensory stimulation, and then show that these idealised responses could account for observed electrophysiological responses. We describe a simulation of an optimal neural network (i.e., the ideal Bayesian neural code) and then consider the mapping from idealised in silico responses to recorded in vitro responses. Our objective was to find evidence for functional specialisation and segregation in the in vitro neural network that reproduced in silico learning via free energy minimisation. Finally, we combined the in vitro and in silico results to characterise learning in terms of trajectories in a variational information plane of accuracy and complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the neural substrates of depression is crucial for diagnosis and treatment. Here, we review recent studies of functional and effective connectivity in depression, in terms of functional integration in the brain. Findings from these studies, including our own, point to the involvement of at least four networks in patients with depression. Elevated connectivity of a ventral limbic affective network appears to be associated with excessive negative mood (dysphoria) in the patients; decreased connectivity of a frontal‐striatal reward network has been suggested to account for loss of interest, motivation, and pleasure (anhedonia); enhanced default mode network connectivity seems to be associated with depressive rumination; and diminished connectivity of a dorsal cognitive control network is thought to underlie cognitive deficits especially ineffective top‐down control of negative thoughts and emotions in depressed patients. Moreover, the restoration of connectivity of these networks—and corresponding symptom improvement—following antidepressant treatment (including medication, psychotherapy, and brain stimulation techniques) serves as evidence for the crucial role of these networks in the pathophysiology of depression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To act upon the world, creatures must change continuous variables such as muscle length or chemical concentration. In contrast, decision making is an inherently discrete process, involving the selection among alternative courses of action. In this article, we consider the interface between the discrete and continuous processes that translate our decisions into movement in a Newtonian world—and how movement informs our decisions. We do so by appealing to active inference, with a special focus on the oculomotor system. Within this exemplar system, we argue that the superior colliculus is well placed to act as a discrete-continuous interface. Interestingly, when the neuronal computations within the superior colliculus are formulated in terms of active inference, we find that many aspects of its neuroanatomy emerge from the computations it must perform in this role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces an active inference formulation of planning and navigation. It illustrates how the exploitation-exploration dilemma is dissolved by acting to minimise uncertainty (i.e. expected surprise or free energy). We use simulations of a maze problem to illustrate how agents can solve quite complicated problems using context sensitive prior preferences to form subgoals. Our focus is on how epistemic behaviour—driven by novelty and the imperative to reduce uncertainty about the world—contextualises pragmatic or goal-directed behaviour. Using simulations, we illustrate the underlying process theory with synthetic behavioural and electrophysiological responses during exploration of a maze and subsequent navigation to a target location. An interesting phenomenon that emerged from the simulations was a putative distinction between ‘place cells’—that fire when a subgoal is reached—and ‘path cells’—that fire until a subgoal is reached. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An editorial is presented on the work brings together advanced data analytics and theoretical neurobiology to paint a compelling and mechanistic picture of the disintegration of the psyche in schizophrenia. Topics include the conversational style to unpack the simplicity and importance of this work and cuts across emerging themes in schizophrenia research, and the clear evidence for aberrant belief updating in the kind of higher cognitive processing that people with schizophrenia.

How to account for the power that art holds over us? Why do artworks touch us deeply, consoling, transforming or invigorating us in the process? In this paper, we argue that an answer to this question might emerge from a fecund framework in cognitive science known as predictive processing (a.k.a. active inference). We unpack how this approach connects sense-making and aesthetic experiences through the idea of an 'epistemic arc', consisting of three parts (curiosity, epistemic action and aha experiences), which we cast as aspects of active inference. We then show how epistemic arcs are built and sustained by artworks to provide us with those satisfying experiences that we tend to call 'aesthetic'. Next, we defuse two key objections to this approach; namely, that it places undue emphasis on the cognitive component of our aesthetic encounters—at the expense of affective aspects—and on closure and uncertainty minimization (order)—at the expense of openness and lingering uncertainty (change). We show that the approach offers crucial resources to account for the open-ended, free and playful behaviour inherent in aesthetic experiences. The upshot is a promising but deflationary approach, both philosophically informed and psychologically sound, that opens new empirical avenues for understanding our aesthetic encounters. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adversarial collaboration has been championed as the gold standard for resolving scientific disputes but has gained relatively limited traction in neuroscience and allied fields. In this perspective, we argue that adversarial collaborative research has been stymied by an overly restrictive concern with the falsification of scientific theories. We advocate instead for a more expansive view that frames adversarial collaboration in terms of Bayesian belief updating, model comparison, and evidence accumulation. This framework broadens the scope of adversarial collaboration to accommodate a wide range of informative (but not necessarily definitive) studies while affording the requisite formal tools to guide experimental design and data analysis in the adversarial setting. We provide worked examples that demonstrate how these tools can be deployed to score theoretical models in terms of a common metric of evidence, thereby furnishing a means of tracking the amount of empirical support garnered by competing theories over time. Corcoran et al. present a Bayesian treatment of adversarial collaboration that operationalizes competing theoretical hypotheses as generative models. This approach enables the evaluation of alternative theories in terms of the evidential support their models garner across (potentially disparate) experimental settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gilead et al. raise some fascinating issues about representational substrates and structures in the predictive brain. This commentary drills down on a core theme in their arguments; namely, the structure of models that generate predictions. In particular, it highlights their factorial nature – both in terms of deep hierarchies over levels of abstraction and, crucially, time – and how this underwrites agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do we navigate a deeply structured world? Why are you reading this sentence first – and did you actually look at the fifth word? This review offers some answers by appealing to active inference based on deep temporal models. It builds on previous formulations of active inference to simulate behavioural and electrophysiological responses under hierarchical generative models of state transitions. Inverting these models corresponds to sequential inference, such that the state at any hierarchical level entails a sequence of transitions in the level below. The deep temporal aspect of these models means that evidence is accumulated over nested time scales, enabling inferences about narratives (i.e., temporal scenes). We illustrate this behaviour with Bayesian belief updating – and neuronal process theories – to simulate the epistemic foraging seen in reading. These simulations reproduce perisaccadic delay period activity and local field potentials seen empirically. Finally, we exploit the deep structure of these models to simulate responses to local (e.g., font type) and global (e.g., semantic) violations; reproducing mismatch negativity and P300 responses respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We offer a scientific approach to the philosophical 'hard problem' of consciousness, as formulated by David Chalmers in this journal. Our treatment is based upon two recent insights concerning (1) the endogenous nature of consciousness and (2) the minimal thermodynamic conditions for being alive. We suggest that a combination of these insights specifies sufficient conditions for attributing feeling to being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the relationship between resting-state functional connectivity and task-related activity has been addressed, the relationship between task and resting-state directed or effective connectivity – and its behavioral concomitants – remains elusive. We evaluated effective connectivity under an N-back working memory task in 24 participants using stochastic dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of 7 T fMRI data. We repeated the analysis using resting-state data, from the same subjects, to model connectivity among the same brain regions engaged by the N-back task. This allowed us to: (i) examine the relationship between intrinsic (task-independent) effective connectivity during resting (A rest ) and task states (A task ), (ii) cluster phenotypes of task-related changes in effective connectivity (B task ) across participants, (iii) identify edges (B task ) showing high inter-individual effective connectivity differences and (iv) associate reaction times with the similarity between B task and A rest in these edges. We found a strong correlation between A rest and A task over subjects but a marked difference between B task and A rest . We further observed a strong clustering of individuals in terms of B task , which was not apparent in A rest . The task-related effective connectivity B task varied highly in the edges from the parietal to the frontal lobes across individuals, so the three groups were clustered mainly by the effective connectivity within these networks. The similarity between B task and A rest at the edges from the parietal to the frontal lobes was positively correlated with 2-back reaction times. This result implies that a greater change in context-sensitive coupling – from resting-state connectivity – is associated with faster reaction times. In summary, task-dependent connectivity endows resting-state connectivity with a context sensitivity, which predicts the speed of information processing during the N-back task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the cognitive consistency and active inference based on the psychology. The topics addressed include details on an epistemic and motivational Value in active inference and differences between the trivial and nontrivial inconsistencies, stating that trivial inconsistencies can be associated with belief updates about latent states of the world and nontrivial inconsistencies change beliefs about behavior.

Given that eye movement control can be framed as an inferential process, how are the requisite forces generated to produce anticipated or desired fixation? Starting from a generative model based on simple Newtonian equations of motion, we derive a variational solution to this problem and illustrate the plausibility of its implementation in the oculomotor brainstem. We show, through simulation, that the Bayesian filtering equations that implement ‘planning as inference’ can generate both saccadic and smooth pursuit eye movements. Crucially, the associated message passing maps well onto the known connectivity and neuroanatomy of the brainstem – and the changes in these messages over time are strikingly similar to single unit recordings of neurons in the corresponding nuclei. Furthermore, we show that simulated lesions to axonal pathways reproduce eye movement patterns of neurological patients with damage to these tracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Predictive coding models, such as the ‘free-energy principle’ (FEP), have recently been discussed in relation to how interoceptive (afferent visceral feedback) signals update predictions about the state of the body, thereby driving autonomic mediation of homeostasis. This study appealed to ‘interoceptive inference’, under the FEP, to seek new insights into autonomic (dys)function and brain–body integration by examining the relationship between cardiac interoception and autonomic cardiac control in healthy controls and patients with forms of orthostatic intolerance (OI); to (i) seek empirical support for interoceptive inference and (ii) delineate if this relationship was sensitive to increased interoceptive prediction error in OI patients during head-up tilt (HUT)/symptom provocation. Measures of interoception and heart rate variability (HRV) were recorded whilst supine and during HUT in healthy controls (N = 20), postural tachycardia syndrome (PoTS, N = 20) and vasovagal syncope (VVS, N = 20) patients. Compared to controls, interoceptive accuracy was reduced in both OI groups. Healthy controls' interoceptive sensibility positively correlated with HRV whilst supine. Conversely, both OI groups' interoceptive awareness negatively correlated with HRV during HUT. Our pilot study offers initial support for interoceptive inference and suggests OI cohorts share a central pathophysiology underlying interoceptive deficits expressed across distinct cardiovascular autonomic pathophysiology. From a predictive coding perspective, OI patients' data indicates a failure to attenuate/modulate ascending interoceptive prediction errors, reinforced by the concomitant failure to engage autonomic reflexes during HUT. Our findings offer a potential framework for conceptualising how the human nervous system maintains homeostasis and how both central and autonomic processes are ultimately implicated in dysautonomia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many analysis methods exist to extract graphs of functional connectivity from neuronal networks. Confidence in the results is limited because, (i) different methods give different results, (ii) parameter setting directly influences the final result, and (iii) systematic evaluation of the results is not always performed. Here, we introduce MULAN (MULtiple method ANalysis), which assumes an ensemble based approach combining multiple analysis methods and fuzzy logic to extract graphs with the most probable structure. In order to reduce the dependency on parameter settings, we determine the best set of parameters using a genetic algorithm on simulated datasets, whose temporal structure is similar to the experimental one. After a validation step, the selected set of parameters is used to analyze experimental data. The final step cross-validates experimental subsets of data and provides a direct estimate of the most likely graph and our confidence in the proposed connectivity. A systematic evaluation validates our strategy against empirical stereotactic electroencephalography (SEEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The brain is thought to generate internal predictions to optimize behaviour. However, it is unclear whether predictions signalling is an automatic brain function or depends on task demands. Here, we manipulated the spatial/temporal predictability of visual targets, and the relevance of spatial/temporal information provided by auditory cues. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure participants’ brain activity during task performance. Task relevance modulated the influence of predictions on behaviour: spatial/temporal predictability improved spatial/temporal discrimination accuracy, but not vice versa. To explain these effects, we used behavioural responses to estimate subjective predictions under an ideal-observer model. Model-based time-series of predictions and prediction errors (PEs) were associated with dissociable neural responses: predictions correlated with cue-induced beta-band activity in auditory regions and alpha-band activity in visual regions, while stimulus-bound PEs correlated with gamma-band activity in posterior regions. Crucially, task relevance modulated these spectral correlates, suggesting that current goals influence PE and prediction signalling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is associated with decreased top-down emotion modulation from medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) regions, a pathophysiology accompanied by hyperarousal and hyperactivation of the amygdala. By contrast, PTSD patients with the dissociative subtype (PTSD + DS) often exhibit increased mPFC top-down modulation and decreased amygdala activation associated with emotional detachment and hypoarousal. Crucially, PTSD and PTSD + DS display distinct functional connectivity within the PFC, amygdala complexes, and the periaqueductal gray (PAG), a region related to defensive responses/emotional coping. However, differences in directed connectivity between these regions have not been established in PTSD, PTSD + DS, or controls. Methods: To examine directed (effective) connectivity among these nodes, as well as group differences, we conducted resting-state stochastic dynamic causal modeling (sDCM) pairwise analyses of coupling between the ventromedial (vm)PFC, the bilateral basolateral and centromedial (CMA) amygdala complexes, and the PAG, in 155 participants (PTSD [ n = 62]; PTSD + DS [ n = 41]; age-matched healthy trauma-unexposed controls [ n = 52]). Results: PTSD was characterized by a pattern of predominant bottom-up connectivity from the amygdala to the vmPFC and from the PAG to the vmPFC and amygdala. Conversely, PTSD + DS exhibited predominant top-down connectivity between all node pairs (from the vmPFC to the amygdala and PAG, and from the amygdala to the PAG). Interestingly, the PTSD + DS group displayed the strongest intrinsic inhibitory connections within the vmPFC. Conclusions: These results suggest the contrasting symptom profiles of PTSD and its dissociative subtype (hyper- vs. hypo-emotionality, respectively) may be driven by complementary changes in directed connectivity corresponding to bottom-up defensive fear processing versus enhanced top-down regulation. Hum Brain Mapp 38:5551-5561, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]