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This paper formulates the action of psychedelics by integrating the free-energy principle and entropic brain hypothesis. We call this formulation relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) and the anarchic brain, founded on the principle that-via their entropic effect on spontaneous cortical activity-psychedelics work to relax the precision of high-level priors or beliefs, thereby liberating bottom-up information flow, particularly via intrinsic sources such as the limbic system. We assemble evidence for this model and show how it can explain a broad range of phenomena associated with the psychedelic experience. With regard to their potential therapeutic use, we propose that psychedelics work to relax the precision weighting of pathologically overweighted priors underpinning various expressions of mental illness. We propose that this process entails an increased sensitization of high-level priors to bottom-up signaling (stemming from intrinsic sources), and that this heightened sensitivity enables the potential revision and deweighting of overweighted priors. We end by discussing further implications of the model, such as that psychedelics can bring about the revision of other heavily weighted high-level priors, not directly related to mental health, such as those underlying partisan and/or overly-confident political, religious, and/or philosophical perspectives. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Psychedelics are capturing interest, with efforts underway to bring psilocybin therapy to marketing authorisation and legal access within a decade, spearheaded by the findings of a series of phase 2 trials. In this climate, a compelling unified model of how psychedelics alter brain function to alter consciousness would have appeal. Towards this end, we have sought to integrate a leading model of global brain function, hierarchical predictive coding, with an often-cited model of the acute action of psychedelics, the entropic brain hypothesis. The resulting synthesis states that psychedelics work to relax high-level priors, sensitising them to liberated bottom-up information flow, which, with the right intention, care provision and context, can help guide and cultivate the revision of entrenched pathological priors.

We introduce a mass-univariate framework for the analysis of whole-brain structural trajectories using longitudinal Voxel-Based Morphometry data and Bayesian inference. Our approach to developmental and aging longitudinal studies characterizes heterogeneous structural growth/decline between and within groups. In particular, we propose a probabilistic generative model that parameterizes individual and ensemble average changes in brain structure using linear mixed-effects models of age and subject-specific covariates. Model inversion uses Expectation Maximization (EM), while voxelwise (empirical) priors on the size of individual differences are estimated from the data. Bayesian inference on individual and group trajectories is realized using Posterior Probability Maps (PPM). In addition to parameter inference, the framework affords comparisons of models with varying combinations of model order for fixed and random effects using model evidence. We validate the model in simulations and real MRI data from the Alzheimer's Disease Neuroimaging Initiative (ADNI) project. We further demonstrate how subject specific characteristics contribute to individual differences in longitudinal volume changes in healthy subjects, Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI), and Alzheimer's Disease (AD).

This article provides a neurobiological account of symptoms that have been called 'hysterical', 'psychogenic' or 'medically unexplained', which we will call functional motor and sensory symptoms. We use a neurobiologically informed model of hierarchical Bayesian inference in the brain to explain functional motor and sensory symptoms in terms of perception and action arising from inference based on prior beliefs and sensory information. This explanation exploits the key balance between prior beliefs and sensory evidence that is mediated by (body focused) attention, symptom expectations, physical and emotional experiences and beliefs about illness. Crucially, this furnishes an explanation at three different levels: (i) underlying neuromodulatory (synaptic) mechanisms; (ii) cognitive and experiential processes (attention and attribution of agency); and (iii) formal computations that underlie perceptual inference (representation of uncertainty or precision). Our explanation involves primary and secondary failures of inference; the primary failure is the (autonomous) emergence of a percept or belief that is held with undue certainty (precision) following top-down attentional modulation of synaptic gain. This belief can constitute a sensory percept (or its absence) or induce movement (or its absence). The secondary failure of inference is when the ensuing percept (and any somatosensory consequences) is falsely inferred to be a symptom to explain why its content was not predicted by the source of attentional modulation. This account accommodates several fundamental observations about functional motor and sensory symptoms, including: (i) their induction and maintenance by attention; (ii) their modification by expectation, prior experience and cultural beliefs and (iii) their involuntary and symptomatic nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At what levels of brain organization might pathological change in schizophrenia be anatomically expressed: global, regional or supra-regional? We hypothesized that brain structure reflects a set of supra-regional anatomical systems with common developmental influences. We conducted an exploratory analysis to identify supra-regional brain systems and to investigate whether abnormal brain architecture in schizophrenia is manifested within one or more of these systems. Magnetic resonance (MR) images were acquired from 27 patients with schizophrenia and 37 control subjects. After segmentation and registration of each individual MRI dataset in the standard space of Talairach and Tournoux, grey matter and ventricular-cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) maps were automatically parcellated into 104 regions. We used principal components analysis of the multiple regional grey matter and ventricular-CSF measurements, on all 64 subjects, to extract the five main normative supra-regional systems. The first two of these components represented global variation in grey matter and ventricular-CSF regional measures. We interpreted the other three components as representing supra-regional systems comprising: a frontal-parietal system, a frontal-temporal system and a frontal-basal ganglia system. Schizophrenic group mean scores on the first component (global grey matter-ventricular contrast) and fourth component (frontal-temporal system) were significantly reduced compared to controls. These results suggest that pathological changes in schizophrenia may be expressed at two mutually independent levels of anatomical organization: global change in a grey matter/ventricular system and supra-regional change in a frontal-temporal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents information on a study which used Positron Emission Tomography to define areas of brain activation during musical hallucinosis in a single subject with deafness but no psychiatric or central neurologic condition. Nature of musical hallucinations; Method used in the study; Discussion.

Competing Interests: Declaration of Competing Interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Learning new motor skills relies on neural plasticity within motor and limbic systems. This study uniquely combined diffusion tensor imaging and multiparametric mapping MRI to detail these neuroplasticity processes. We recruited 18 healthy male participants who underwent 960 min of training on a computer-based motion game, while 14 were scanned without training. Diffusion tensor imaging, which quantifies tissue microstructure by measuring the capacity for, and directionality of, water diffusion, revealed mostly linear changes in white matter across the corticospinal-cerebellar-thalamo-hippocampal circuit. These changes related to performance and reflected different responses to upper- and lower-limb training in brain areas with known somatotopic representations. Conversely, quantitative MRI metrics, sensitive to myelination and iron content, demonstrated mostly quadratic changes in gray matter related to performance and reflecting somatotopic representations within the same brain areas. Furthermore, while myelin and iron-sensitive multiparametric mapping MRI was able to describe time lags between different cortical brain systems, diffusion tensor imaging detected time lags within the white matter of the motor systems. These findings suggest that motor skill learning involves distinct phases of white and gray matter plasticity across the sensorimotor network, with the unique combination of diffusion tensor imaging and multiparametric mapping MRI providing complementary insights into the underlying neuroplastic responses., (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permission@oup.com.)

Using neuroimaging and electrophysiological data to infer neural parameter estimations from theoretical circuits requires solving the inverse problem. Here, we provide a new Julia language package designed to i) compose complex dynamical models in a simple and modular way with ModelingToolkit.jl, ii) implement parameter fitting based on spectral dynamic causal modeling (sDCM) using the Laplace approximation, analogous to MATLAB implementation in SPM12, and iii) leverage Julia's unique strengths to increase accuracy and speed by employing Automatic Differentiation during the fitting procedure. To illustrate the utility of our flexible modular approach, we provide a method to improve correction for fMRI scanner field strengths (1.5T, 3T, 7T) when fitting models to real data.

This study assesses the reliability of resting-state dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of magnetoencephalography (MEG) under conductance-based canonical microcircuit models, in terms of both posterior parameter estimates and model evidence. We use resting-state MEG data from two sessions, acquired 2 weeks apart, from a cohort with high between-subject variance arising from Alzheimer's disease. Our focus is not on the effect of disease, but on the reliability of the methods (as within-subject between-session agreement), which is crucial for future studies of disease progression and drug intervention. To assess the reliability of first-level DCMs, we compare model evidence associated with the covariance among subject-specific free energies (i.e., the 'quality' of the models) with versus without interclass correlations. We then used parametric empirical Bayes (PEB) to investigate the differences between the inferred DCM parameter probability distributions at the between subject level. Specifically, we examined the evidence for or against parameter differences (i) within-subject, within-session, and between-epochs; (ii) within-subject between-session; and (iii) within-site between-subjects, accommodating the conditional dependency among parameter estimates. We show that for data acquired close in time, and under similar circumstances, more than 95% of inferred DCM parameters are unlikely to differ, speaking to mutual predictability over sessions. Using PEB, we show a reciprocal relationship between a conventional definition of 'reliability' and the conditional dependency among inferred model parameters. Our analyses confirm the reliability and reproducibility of the conductance-based DCMs for resting-state neurophysiological data. In this respect, the implicit generative modelling is suitable for interventional and longitudinal studies of neurological and psychiatric disorders., (© 2024 The Author(s). Human Brain Mapping published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

A paradigmatic account may suffice to explain behavioral evolution in early Homo. We propose a parsimonious account that (1) could explain a particular, frequently-encountered, archeological outcome of behavior in early Homo - namely, the fashioning of a Paleolithic stone 'handaxe' - from a biological theoretic perspective informed by the free energy principle (FEP); and that (2) regards instances of the outcome as postdictive or retrodictive, circumstantial corroboration. Our proposal considers humankind evolving as a self-organizing biological ecosystem at a geological time-scale. We offer a narrative treatment of this self-organization in terms of the FEP. Specifically, we indicate how 'cognitive surprises' could underwrite an evolving propensity in early Homo to express sporadic unorthodox or anomalous behavior. This co-evolutionary propensity has left us a legacy of Paleolithic artifacts that is reminiscent of a 'snakes and ladders' board game of appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular archeological traces of Paleolithic behavior. When detected in the Early and Middle Pleistocene record, anthropologists and archeologists often imagine evidence of unusual or novel behavior in terms of early humankind ascending the rungs of a figurative phylogenetic 'ladder' - as if these corresponded to progressive evolution of cognitive abilities that enabled incremental achievements of increasingly innovative technical prowess, culminating in the cognitive ascendancy of Homo sapiens. The conjecture overlooks a plausible likelihood that behavior by an individual who was atypical among her conspecifics could have been disregarded in a community of Hominina (for definition see Appendix 1) that failed to recognize, imagine, or articulate potential advantages of adopting hitherto unorthodox behavior. Such failure, as well as diverse fortuitous demographic accidents, would cause exceptional personal behavior to be ignored and hence unremembered. It could disappear by a pitfall, down a 'snake', as it were, in the figurative evolutionary board game; thereby causing a discontinuity in the evolution of human behavior that presents like an evolutionary puzzle. The puzzle discomforts some paleoanthropologists trained in the natural and life sciences. They often dismiss it, explaining it away with such self-justifying conjectures as that, maybe, separate paleospecies of Homo differentially possessed different cognitive abilities, which, supposedly, could account for the presence or absence in the Pleistocene archeological record of traces of this or that behavioral outcome or skill. We argue that an alternative perspective - that inherits from the FEP and an individual's 'active inference' about its surroundings and of its own responses - affords a prosaic, deflationary, and parsimonious way to account for appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of particular behavioral outcomes and skills of early humankind., Competing Interests: Declaration of competing interest The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (Copyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Goal-directed actions are characterized by two main features: the content (i.e., the action goal) and the form, called vitality forms (VF) (i.e., how actions are executed). It is well established that both the action content and the capacity to understand the content of another's action are mediated by a network formed by a set of parietal and frontal brain areas. In contrast, the neural bases of action forms (e.g., gentle or rude actions) have not been characterized. However, there are now studies showing that the observation and execution of actions endowed with VF activate, in addition to the parieto-frontal network, the dorso-central insula (DCI). In the present study, we established-using dynamic causal modeling (DCM)-the direction of information flow during observation and execution of actions endowed with gentle and rude VF in the human brain. Based on previous fMRI studies, the selected nodes for the DCM comprised the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the premotor cortex (PM), and the DCI. Bayesian model comparison showed that, during action observation, two streams arose from pSTS: one toward IPL, concerning the action goal, and one toward DCI, concerning the action vitality forms. During action execution, two streams arose from PM: one toward IPL, concerning the action goal and one toward DCI concerning action vitality forms. This last finding opens an interesting question concerning the possibility to elicit VF in two distinct ways: cognitively (from PM to DCI) and affectively (from DCI to PM)., Competing Interests: Competing interests statement:The authors declare no competing interest.

While the ubiquity and importance of narratives for human adaptation is widely recognized, there is no integrative framework for understanding the roles of narrative in human adaptation. Research has identified several cognitive and social functions of narratives that are conducive to well-being and adaptation as well as to coordinated social practices and enculturation. In this paper, we characterize the cognitive and social functions of narratives in terms of active inference, to support the claim that one of the main adaptive functions of narrative is to generate more useful (i.e., accurate, parsimonious) predictions for the individual, as well as to coordinate group action (over multiple timescales) through shared predictions about collective behavior. Active inference is a theory that depicts the fundamental tendency of living organisms to adapt by proactively inferring the causes of their sensations (including their own actions). We review narrative research on identity, event segmentation, episodic memory, future projections, storytelling practices, enculturation, and master narratives. We show how this research dovetails with the active inference framework and propose an account of the cognitive and social functions of narrative that emphasizes that narratives are for the future -even when they are focused on recollecting or recounting the past. Understanding narratives as cognitive and cultural tools for mutual prediction in social contexts can guide research on narrative in adaptive behavior and psychopathology, based on a parsimonious mechanistic model of some of the basic adaptive functions of narrative., Competing Interests: Authors MR and KF were employed by the VERSES Research Lab. The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. The author(s) declared that they were an editorial board member of Frontiers, at the time of submission. This had no impact on the peer review process and the final decision., (Copyright © 2024 Bouizegarene, Ramstead, Constant, Friston and Kirmayer.)

Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over (i) the expected sensory consequences of action and (ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher-order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing., (Copyright © 2024 Parvizi-Wayne, Sandved-Smith, Pitliya, Limanowski, Tufft and Friston.)

Anthropogenic climate change is affecting people's health, including those with neurological and psychiatric diseases. Currently, making inferences about the effect of climate change on neurological and psychiatric diseases is challenging because of an overall sparsity of data, differing study methods, paucity of detail regarding disease subtypes, little consideration of the effect of individual and population genetics, and widely differing geographical locations with the potential for regional influences. However, evidence suggests that the incidence, prevalence, and severity of many nervous system conditions (eg, stroke, neurological infections, and some mental health disorders) can be affected by climate change. The data show broad and complex adverse effects, especially of temperature extremes to which people are unaccustomed and wide diurnal temperature fluctuations. Protective measures might be possible through local forecasting. Few studies project the future effects of climate change on brain health, hindering policy developments. Robust studies on the threats from changing climate for people who have, or are at risk of developing, disorders of the nervous system are urgently needed., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests HMo chairs Dyson's Scientific Advisory Board and the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change; holds a patent relating to a means to improve patient hydration in hospitals; is a member of the UK Climate and Health Council; is a cofounder of Real Zero (a non-profit company helping decarbonise health care); and has received honoraria for talks on climate change, but none for talks related to the topic of this Personal View. NCF is the member of the Research Strategy Council of Alzheimer's Society (UK). DJW has received grant funding from the Stroke Association and British Heart Foundation; speaking honoraria from Bayer; speaking and chairing honoraria from Alexion and NovoNordisk; and consultancy fees from Alnylam, Bayer, and NovoNordisk. DW has also participated on a data safety monitoring board for OXHARP, and the TICH-3, RESTART, MACE-ICH, and PLINTH Trial Steering Committees. MAK has received payments from Bloomsbury Genetic Therapies and PTC; holds shares in Bloomsbury Genetic Therapies (unrelated to this work as involvement pertains to the development of gene therapies for rare neurometabolic disorders); has leadership or fiduciary role in LifeArc grants committee (not relevant to this work as this membership pertains to the review of grants and allocation of funding through the Philanthropic fund); is the theme lead for the National Institute for Health Research Great Ormond Street Hospital Biomedical Research Centre Accelerating Novel Therapies; and has patents, issued or pending, for DTDS viral vector. OC reports speaking honoraria from Merck and Biogen and for participation on a data safety monitoring board for Novartis. MM has grants or contracts from Ehlers Danlos Society, Abbott, and Medtronic; reports consulting fees from AbbVie, Kriya, TEVA, Lundbeck, Eli Lilly, Salvia, and Pfizer, all paid to their institution; reports payment or honoraria for lectures, presentations, speakers bureaux, manuscript writing, or educational events from AbbVie, Pfizer, and Eli Lilly; reports patents (planned, issued, or pending) for WO2018051103A1: System and method for diagnosing and treating headaches; and is the president of the medical advisory board of CSF Leak Association and a board member of the Anglo Dutch Migraine Association. All other authors declare no competing interests., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved, including those for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.)

Collective motion is ubiquitous in nature; groups of animals, such as fish, birds, and ungulates appear to move as a whole, exhibiting a rich behavioral repertoire that ranges from directed movement to milling to disordered swarming. Typically, such macroscopic patterns arise from decentralized, local interactions among constituent components (e.g., individual fish in a school). Preeminent models of this process describe individuals as self-propelled particles, subject to self-generated motion and "social forces" such as short-range repulsion and long-range attraction or alignment. However, organisms are not particles; they are probabilistic decision-makers. Here, we introduce an approach to modeling collective behavior based on active inference. This cognitive framework casts behavior as the consequence of a single imperative: to minimize surprise. We demonstrate that many empirically observed collective phenomena, including cohesion, milling, and directed motion, emerge naturally when considering behavior as driven by active Bayesian inference-without explicitly building behavioral rules or goals into individual agents. Furthermore, we show that active inference can recover and generalize the classical notion of social forces as agents attempt to suppress prediction errors that conflict with their expectations. By exploring the parameter space of the belief-based model, we reveal nontrivial relationships between the individual beliefs and group properties like polarization and the tendency to visit different collective states. We also explore how individual beliefs about uncertainty determine collective decision-making accuracy. Finally, we show how agents can update their generative model over time, resulting in groups that are collectively more sensitive to external fluctuations and encode information more robustly., Competing Interests: Competing interests statement:The authors declare no competing interest.

There are considerable gaps in our understanding of the relationship between human brain activity measured at different temporal and spatial scales. Here, electrocorticography (ECoG) measures were used to predict functional MRI changes in the sensorimotor cortex in two brain states: at rest and during motor performance. The specificity of this relationship to spatial co-localisation of the two signals was also investigated. We acquired simultaneous ECoG-fMRI in the sensorimotor cortex of three patients with epilepsy. During motor activity, high gamma power was the only frequency band where the electrophysiological response was co-localised with fMRI measures across all subjects. The best model of fMRI changes across states was its principal components, a parsimonious description of the entire ECoG spectrogram. This model performed much better than any others that were based either on the classical frequency bands or on summary measures of cross-spectral changes. The region-specific fMRI signal is reflected in spatially and spectrally distributed EEG activity.

How can one conciliate the claim that humans are uncertainty minimizing systems that seek to navigate predictable and familiar environments with the claim that humans can be creative? We call this the Enlightened Room Problem (ERP). The solution, we suggest, lies not (or not only) in the error-minimizing brain but in the environment itself. Creativity emerges from various degrees of interplay between predictive brains and changing environments: ones that repeatedly move the goalposts for our own error-minimizing machinery. By (co)constructing these challenging worlds, we effectively alter and expand the space within which our own prediction engines operate, and that function as 'exploration bubbles' that enable information seeking, uncertainty minimizing minds to penetrate deeper and deeper into artistic, scientific and engineering space. In what follows, we offer a proof of principle for this kind of environmentally led cognitive expansion. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.