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Copyright of Academia & Derecho is the property of Universidad Libre - Seccional Cucuta and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The assumption that increasing diversity and economic hardship boost support for the far right is widespread, yet extant research comes up with contradictory findings. This article investigates the link between context and the far right by investigating the impact of immigration and unemployment on voting for Marine Le Pen in the first round of the 2017 French Presidential election. We match a large individual-level survey with contextual variables constructed from the census describing voters' residential environments. Unlike previous studies, we measure immigration and unemployment at the neighborhood level and the broader level of the department. Using a multilevel model, we find that voters in neighborhoods with high levels of immigration are less likely to vote for the far right. However, in departments, increased immigration and unemployment correlate with greater support for Le Pen. These findings suggest that contact theory and ethnic threat operate differently according to spatial scale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Outre-Mers: Revue d'Histoire Colonial et Impériale is the property of Societe Francaise d'Histoire d'Outre Mer and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Jurnal Hubungan Internasional is the property of Universitas Airlangga and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Relações Internacionais is the property of Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Populist radical right (PRR) parties have increasingly occupied positions of power in recent years, inspiring much scholarly interest in the mainstreaming consequences of government responsibility. This article analyses the extent and manner of mainstreaming of the Rassemblement National (RN) while in power at the local level of government in France. A municipal-level focus enables the novel inclusion of the party into the debate about the consequences of government participation for the PRR. We conduct a paired case study analysis of RN-led Hénin-Beaumont, the political base of Marine Le Pen and her 'de-demonization' strategy, alongside nearby Lens, which is led by a mainstream party. We analyse the policy and discourse of the administration through a qualitative content analysis of mayoral statements and data from semi-structured interviews with local politicians. The results show a partial mainstreaming due to the strategic exercise of local government power to present a more moderate and capable image, as well as the use of populist discourse to frame mainstream opposition forces and the local press as working against the interests of 'the people'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article addresses the electoral success of Marine Le Pen and the Front National in rural areas. This phenomenon is regularly interpreted as the expression of an emergent territorial cleavage between urban and peripheral areas. However, the analysis of the normative and empirical bases of this supposed spatial conflict reveals much more complex sociocultural dynamics. Based on qualitative fieldwork in the Vosges department in eastern France, I explore the links between collective narratives of deprivation, the propagation of rumours and the radical right vote in order to show that the rise of the Front National in a number of rural municipalities largely eschews a binary tale of two Frances.

Prosecuting anti-immigration party leaders for hate speech is theorized to yield electoral ramifications. We assess to what extent these trials are mediatized and whether news visibility of hate speech prosecution affects levels of anti-immigration party support. We compare four Western European countries (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) for which aggregate-level media and public opinion data are combined. We find that hate speech trials were highly mediatized, and dominated the headlines for protracted periods. This short-term news attention drives general news visibility for anti-immigration party actors. Thus, news about hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians creates a reinforcing spiral of attention by increasing the general newsworthiness of a political actor. The findings seem to point to the cautious conclusion that hate speech prosecution is either directly or indirectly related to increased electoral support. While in France and Germany, general news visibility of anti-immigration party actors is associated with higher levels of electoral support, in the Netherlands and Belgium, news about hate speech prosecution has a weak and direct positive relationship with anti-immigration party support. This finding yields implications for political communication strategies of parties by suggesting that hate speech prosecution does not undermine the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties. In fact, initiating legal actions yields unintended effects by granting these parties a media platform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Representative democracy faces a dilemma, not to say a contradiction: all citizens are equal but some are more equal than others, whether they are chosen for their greater ability, or whether having been elected without a specific mandate, they have more power than the others. The representative system adds an extra imbalance in the weighting of vote-counting, which favours certain parties. This article shows how this currently works in France. The swing from a right/left two-party contest to a three-party one as a result of the rise of the far right gives a false picture of the election results because of the two-round system. The middle trend, in this case the right, benefits from transfers from either side—from the far right when it stands against the left, and from the left when it stands against the far right, as shown in detail in the case of departmental elections. This same mechanism accounts for the victory of Fillon in the right’s primaries, situated as he was between the two extremes—Juppé close to the centre and Sarkozy close to the far right. The candidatures in the left primaries followed the same pattern, although in this case surely in vain as the two extreme candidatures fell outside the median, Macron towards the centre and Mélenchon towards the far left.

Through the reflective analysis of an ethnographic experience in a group of female and male activists of the French Front National, this contribution shows the structuration dynamics of a political group at the crossroads of several power relations. This work finds its raison-d'être in two methodological and analytical principles. First, the objectification of fieldwork relations fully contributes to the understanding of one or more aspects of the object under study, by highlighting some of its structural properties, its functioning, or its symbolic economy. Furthermore, embracing the intersectionality viewpoint allows to systematically reflect upon the articulation of several social dimensions in the production of fieldwork relations, and, consequently, the effects of this articulation in the understanding of the social processes that produce groups. Therefore, this contribution questions the stakes of fieldwork relations established in a localized FN environment at a key moment of this party’s history. Along with the arrival of Marine Le Pen at the head of the FN, the party has been increasingly integrating the French political field. While the FN staff, starting from its female president, is meant to be partially new, younger, feminized, and concerned to display an allegedly more welcoming façade of the party, I intend to question the social relations which structure the organization behind its facade. A certain social proximity with the respondents and the rare resources, in connection with my femininity, that I was able to offer them, determined the degree of openness as well as the course of the fieldwork, and defined the modalities of my commitment. This has allowed me to understand the various sources of commitment that make (and unmake) the party from below. My place within the group of female and male activists and the way I had to undertake some militant tasks demonstrate how gender and class relations, commonly harmful to women, structure the group of female and male activists by creating it almost from scratch, and reinforce the hierarchical hegemony of certain actors.

The multiple crises that the EU has faced over the last decade have provided fertile ground for the emergence of new political movements, often labelled as 'anti-system', 'populist' and 'Eurosceptics'. One defining characteristic of these parties is their claim to represent 'the people' and their reliance on the idea of sovereignty. This article aims at examining how these populist parties have framed sovereignty in relation to the economic and migration crises. It argues that the binary opposition between EU integration and national sovereignty does not tell the whole story, and that the populist upsurge reflects instead competing versions of sovereignty at the national level. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a corpus-based analysis of the discourse of four leading populist parties between 2012 and 2017: the Front National, the UK Independence Party, the Movimento cinque Stelle and Podemos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this contribution is to assess the relevance of the notion of 'exclusionary populism' for the characterisation of the Front National (FN) in France. Since its emergence in the 1970s, several categories or notions have been applied to this political party. Once considered as the resurgence of a traditional extreme right, it has since been classified as a case of a new European right-wing extremism, or as one of the neo-populist parties that obtained electoral successes in the 1990s. The recent evolution of the party has also been described as a sort of 'normalisation'. Is therefore 'exclusionary populism' still a category that can grasp the evolution of the party, as well as its present position in the French party system? To answer this question, this article examines political discourses and various electoral platforms of the Front National to gather some empirical evidence. The argument is twofold: The Front National, despite its 'dédiabolisation' strategy, is still a classic populist party characterised by exclusionary populism and a sort of 'catch-all populism'; its evolution is, however, dependent on the recent evolution of the French party system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism as a theme is omnipresent in the academic literature. Debates in the field include the definition of populism, the populist voter, and the link between populism and democracy. Yet, few studies tackle the question of how populist parties present themselves. Focusing on the typical populist radical right-wing party, the Front National (FN), I examine which of the features of right-wing populism such as peoples' centrism, anti-elitism, charismatic leadership, or nationalism, to name a few, are dominant in the official communications and in sympathizers' discourse. I do this based on an analysis of all Facebook posts by this party and comments by supporters for the past 9 years. In terms of populist features, I find that the cult of personality is the defining feature that the FN has built around her leader; it is also this feature that distinguishes the FN from the mainstream parties in France. In fact, the FN couples the personality cult around Marine Le Pen with nationalism. When it comes to other populist themes such as peoples' centrism or anti-Europeanism, these topics are not at the center of FN communications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politix is the property of De Boeck Universite and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study examines the conception of culture and the cultural policies of the French Front National. Tracing the developments of the party's cultural agenda before and after Marine Le Pen took over the leadership of the party from her father, I show how the Front National has adapted its discourse on cultural policy to its wider programmatic profile. In the context of a strategy of de-radicalisation promoted by Marine Le Pen, recent years have witnessed focussed efforts by the party leadership to professionalise and modernise the party's cultural policy programme. However, the analysis of the party's current cultural policy agenda reveals a remarkable continuity in the way the party leadership conceives of national culture and of what cultural policy should promote. This programmatic continuity becomes apparent in the analysis of the local cultural policies of municipalities won by the Front National in 2014. Exploring the cultural agendas of ten local governments with a Front National majority, I argue that the cultural policies of the Front National remain deeply rooted in a nativist understanding of culture and a dirigiste approach that wilfully excludes postcolonial minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we investigate the political theology of populism and look at the case of the Front National (FN). Considering the writings of Carl Schmitt and Ernesto Laclau, we trace the logical core of Schmitt's political theology and show how it is integrated into theories of the political and Laclau's theory of populism. We argue that the theologico-political core of populism is the simultaneous disavowal and imposition of mediation and that this stance leads to an increasing formalism. Looking at the discourse of the FN on the notion of laïcité, we find that this theologico-political structure explains how the party is able to link traditionally left- and right-wing motives in its discourse. Finally, we show how in FN's discourse, the formalist tendency of populism, which Laclau has theoretically explicated, has become overt and must be understood as part of politics, not as a universal and tran-historical logic of the political. This suggests, we argue pace Laclau, that we ought to consider both the discourse of FN and the theoretical concepts of the political or of populism, as results of one of the same historical processes which has led them to affirm their common and uninterrogated assumption: the theologico-political principle and its disavowal of the possibility of metaphysical and political mediation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will investigate the 'political crisis' in France (Amable, 2017) to highlight two aspects often set aside in public and academic discussions: 1) the technocratic, neoliberal character of the European Union (EU) that limits democratic debate about political economic issues and 2) the socio-economic context the parties operate in. Using this perspective, I add to the debate on the inherent theoretical/conceptual tension between representative democracy and populism (Taggart, 2002) by showing how the 'new economic governance' increases the democratic problems of the EU by limiting the discursive space. Representative liberal democracy has particularly marginalised anti-capitalism at EU and national level. My analysis shows that the EU's discursive strategies are aligned to those of governing parties and the employers' association. Left-wing actors and the Front National (FN) oppose the EU's discourse not necessarily for reasons of sovereignty but for political reasons concerning the politico-economic trajectory of France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-Brexit, post-Trump climate in the EU has seen a series of challenges from the right wing of politics to the liberal consensus of recent years (e.g. the rise of Gert Wilders in the Netherlands and the increased support for Alternativ für Deutschland in the 2017 German election). This article examines the gendering and embodiment of the new far right in France and the UK. It offers a comparative focus on two recent political challengers from the right who are female: Marine Le Pen (born 1968), the leader of the Front national in France since 2011, and Anne Marie Waters (born 1977), the Islam-critical candidate who was runner-up for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) leadership in the UK in 2017, and who has since started her own political party, For Britain. The article focuses on media coverage of, and self-representation by, these two figures. It argues that the discourse of the ‘right’ and ‘left’ wings has, historically, been gendered on the basis of assumptions that women are naturally more inclined towards consensus-building, collectivity and compassion (and therefore left-wing politics), by dint of their biological function as child-bearers and traditional gender role as care-givers. Right-leaning women have been treated as anomalies, by both feminist political analysts and the mainstream media. Feminist concerns over the very existence of right-wing women is suggested by books such as second-wave feminist Andrea Dworkin’s Right-Wing Women (1983), the more recent edited collection by Paola Bacchetta and Margaret Power, also called Right-Wing Women (2013) and, in the French context, Claudie Lesselier and Fiametta Venner’s L’Extrême Droite et les femmes (1997). Le Pen and Waters appear as doubly aberrant, doubly exceptional figures – firstly as (far-)right-wing women and secondly as (far-)right-wing female leaders. The article considers the stakes of our categorical understandings of (gendered and political) identity more broadly. Specifically, by introducing the original critical concept of ‘identity category violation’, it analyses the ways in which the recent trend for identity politics on the left in the West, often under the banner of ‘intersectionality’, leads to over-simplified understandings of how categories of gendered, sexual, class and race-based identities are assumed to determine political affiliation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the performance and party system diffusion of Euroscepticism of the French Front National (FN) during recent European crises. The article argues that Europe’s successive crises since 2008 have been essentially ‘absorbed’ by the FN into its existing Eurosceptic framework which is guided by its radical right-wing ideology. While allowing the FN to successfully mobilize issues and grievances about the European Union (EU), Euroscepticism is, however, significantly impeding its strategy of governmental credibility. The article identifies the main political outcomes of these crises and finds differences in impact between the different EU crises on party competition over Europe. These findings provide insight into the relationship between the radical Right, Euroscepticism, and party competition. They also inform our current knowledge of Euroscepticism in French politics, and changes that EU crises have triggered, according to party system location and whether FN influence can be postulated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims at detecting commonalities and differences between right-wing and left-wing activists. Based on 44 interviews with members of the French National Front (FN) and 88 Attac activists, I find that Attac activists are individuals with high amounts of civic skills that have been politically socialised until the age of 25. Somewhat different, my interview research indicates that the socialisation mechanisms of FN members, as well as their social and educational backgrounds are diverse. Pertaining to the activists’ values, the two groups expose values at the opposite end of the political spectrum. Whereas left-wing activists respond to globalisation and neo-liberalism by highlighting national and international solidarity and participatory democracy, the radical right-wing members respond to the same phenomena by propagating nationalism, authoritarianism and protectionist policies. Finally, I find that left-wing activists are driven by instrumental and ideological considerations, whereas right-wing activists are motivated by ideology as well as identity processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Front national has experienced such an increase in popularity under the leadership since 2011 of Marine Le Pen that some commentators have suggested the FN is now politically mainstream and question the validity of continuing to represent the party as ideologically extreme. This paper argues that although the party remains ideologically extreme, this does not prevent it from forming part of the political mainstream because it is perfectly concomitant with some form of French republicanism, specifically the national republicanism which has become hegemonic in recent decades. To more effectively combat the FN one must both recognise this and at the same time articulate an alternative, much more inclusivist vision of the French Republic, one leaving no space for the vision of the Republic articulated by the FN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, the term “populism” has become increasingly linked to reconstructed radical right parties in Europe such as the French Front National and UKIP. Through its many uses and misuses in mainstream discourse, this association has created a mythology around such parties and their appeal to the “people”. This development has facilitated the return of nationalism and racism to the forefront of the mainstream political discourse and simultaneously obscured the deeper causes for such a revival. This article explores the ways in which populist hype, based on a skewed understanding of democracy as majority, has divided the “people” along arbitrary lines, tearing communities apart at the expense of more emancipatory actions. Based predominantly on electoral analysis and discourse theory, with a particular focus on the role of abstention, the aim of this article is to examine the process through which, by way of its involuntary and constructed association with the radical right, the “people”, and the working class in particular, have become essentialised in a nationalist project, moving further away from a narrative of class struggle towards one of race struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Frequently considered a catch-all concept aiming to stigmatize political opponents, populism seems to be the political buzzword of the new century across Europe. Within this context, this article aims to map the way in which different interpretations of the idea of "people" influence the populists' critique of contemporary representative democracies. The analysis starts from an outline of the theoretical challenges linked to the concept of populism. Following these conceptual delimitations, the theoretical overview provides the background for the operationalization of the concept of "people" and of "populism". The empiric part is focused on four case studies: France Insoumise (Unbowed France), Front National (National Front), Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Stars Movement) and Lega Nord (North League). The analysis uses qualitative content analysis of the most recent public documents provided by the parties under scrutiny. The main conclusion is that the three concepts of the people have a major impact on the way the four populist parties relate themselves to democracy and the type of reforms of the traditional representative democracy they take into consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the gendered dimensions of the populist radical right discourse and policy by considering the Front national in France. The article shows how the Front national has progressively moved from a 'traditional' to a 'modern traditional' approach to issues of gender, women's work, and the family. The core of the Front national policy and ideology has remained stable over time, with regard to the interconnected issues of gender and of immigration. However, there is a significant move from the celebration of women as 'mothers of the nation', prevalent in the party until the 1990s, to an emphasis on 'working mothers' in Marine Le Pen's discourse. The article also analyses the ambivalence of Marine Le Pen's party discourse on gender, as well as the discrepancies between the party discourse and its political programme. This ambivalence mirrors the internal conflicts between the leadership and the conservative Catholic faction. This evolution of the Front national discourse on gender is linked to the party history and internal politics as well as to broader long-term social changes in French society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Immigrant integration has been on the political agenda in France since at leastthe late 1980s, yet starting in the early 2000s this issue became bound up withconcerns about the oppression of minority women. This article examines theevolution of the issue over two decades, pinpointing when and why debatesover integration took on a gendered cast. The article's explanation centres on twofactors – the growing threat of the Front National coupled with the legitimationof gender-based claims in French politics. These claims were embraced byconservative politicians seeking to adopt a harder line toward immigration andled to the refashioning of core Republican concepts such as égalité and laïcité asbeing about gender equality. The use of similar themes by the Front National as ithas sought to move in from the political fringe reveals how gendered claims canbe deployed in an effort to keep anti-immigrant policies within the boundariesof liberal values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Volume! is the property of Editions Melanie Seteun and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article investigates whether the image-building of Marine Le Pen as the leader of the Front National has helped to reinforce the idea of the renewal of her party. In particular, it focuses on Le Pen's peopolisation in order to understand whether her presentation as a family woman facing the everyday problems of the common people has played a role in the so-called process of dédiabolisation. The study is based on the analysis of Le Pen's coverage in the popular press. The results show that there is a clear consistency between Le Pen's image of a leader in the process of renewing her party and press coverage that focused on her being a modern woman and a daughter in the process of distancing herself from her father. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]