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Cognition presents evolutionary research with one of its greatest challenges. Cognitive evolution has been explained at the proximate level by shifts in absolute and relative brain volume and at the ultimate level by differences in social and dietary complexity. However, no study has integrated the experimental and phylogenetic approach at the scale required to rigorously test these explanations. Instead, previous research has largely relied on various measures of brain size as proxies for cognitive abilities. We experimentally evaluated these major evolutionary explanations by quantitatively comparing the cognitive performance of 567 individuals representing 36 species on two problem-solving tasks measuring self-control. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that absolute brain volume best predicted performance across species and accounted for considerably more variance than brain volume controlling for body mass. This result corroborates recent advances in evolutionary neurobiology and illustrates the cognitive consequences of cortical reorganization through increases in brain volume. Within primates, dietary breadth but not social group size was a strong predictor of species differences in self-control. Our results implicate robust evolutionary relationships between dietary breadth, absolute brain volume, and self-control. These findings provide a significant first step toward quantifying the primate cognitive phenome and explaining the process of cognitive evolution.

Previous research has demonstrated that adults are successful at visually tracking rigidly moving items, but experience great difficulties when tracking substance-like "pouring" items. Using a comparative approach, we investigated whether the presence/absence of the grammatical count-mass distinction influences adults and children's ability to attentively track objects versus substances. More specifically, we aimed to explore whether the higher success at tracking rigid over substance-like items appears universally or whether speakers of classifier languages (like Japanese, not marking the object-substance distinction) are advantaged at tracking substances as compared to speakers of non-classifier languages (like Swiss German, marking the object-substance distinction). Our results supported the idea that language has no effect on low-level cognitive processes such as the attentive visual processing of objects and substances. We concluded arguing that the tendency to prioritize objects is universal and independent of specific characteristics of the language spoken.

Pigeons are susceptible to several size and length illusions, but in some cases the bias has been shown to be opposite to that seen in humans. To further investigate how their perceptual system works, we asked how pigeons perceive orientation illusions. We used the Zollner illusion, in which parallel lines look non-parallel due to series of short crosshatches superimposed on the lines. First, we trained six birds to peck at the narrower (or wider) of the two gaps at the end of a pair of non-parallel target lines. After adapting the subjects to target lines with randomly oriented crosshatches (which result in no illusion at least to humans), we tested the pigeons' responses on randomly inserted probe trials, in which crosshatches that should induce the standard Zollner-like illusion for humans replaced the random-oriented ones. The results suggested that pigeons do perceive an illusion from Zollner figures, but in the direction opposite to that of humans. We propose that pigeons, contrary to humans, may assimilate the two lines of different orientations (each main line and crosshatch), which results in underestimation of acute angles, and this in turn may lead to a reversed Zollner illusion. Such assimilation dominance appears consistent with previous reports obtained for line length and size illusions in this species. (Contains 4 figures.)

In a previous study, Adachi, Kuwahata, Fujita, Tomonaga & Matsuzawa demonstrated that infant Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) form cross-modal representations of conspecifics but not of humans. However, because the subjects in the experiment were raised in a large social group and had considerably less exposure to humans than to conspecifics, it was an open question whether their lack of cross-modal representation of humans simply reflected their lower levels of exposure to humans or was caused by some innate restrictions on the ability. To answer the question, we used the same procedure but tested infant Japanese macaques with more extensive experience of humans in daily life. Briefly, we presented monkeys with a photograph of either a monkey or a human face on an LCD monitor after playing a vocalization of one of these two species. The subjects looked at the monitor longer when a voice and a face were mismatched than when they were matched, irrespective of whether the preceding vocalization was a monkey's or a human's. This suggests that once monkeys have extensive experience with humans, they will form a cross-modal representation of humans as well as of conspecifics.

Six tree shrews and 8 rats were tested for their ability to infer transitively in a spatial discrimination task. The apparatus was a semicircular radial-arm maze with 8 arms labeled A through H. In Experiment 1, the animals were first trained in sequence on 4 discriminations to enter 1 of the paired adjacent arms, AB, BC, CD, and DE, with right (or left, for half the animals) symbols signifying positive options; then they were tested with the previously unused pair of arms, FH. All tree shrews and 4 rats transitively chose H (or F for half the animals). In Experiment 2, all tree shrews and 5 rats transitively chose H (or F) on 3-option tests of FGH. The results suggest that these animals used transitive relation in solving novel problems. (Contains 5 figures and 2 tables.)