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The authors of the paper discuss various reasons for power of one agent over another. These are status, the right to manage resources, force, monopoly, economic dependence, energy of a particular person. Examples of different types of power are given. The idea of interdependence and interpenetration of these types is explained. The main causes for emergence and stabilisation of various forms of dependence are analysed. It is shown that the widespread belief about the predominance of power of property in the market economy is based on a simplified model of market mechanisms. Special attention is given to implicit forms of power, including hidden monopolies and voluntary economic dependence. Reasons for existence of hidden monopolies that lead to subordination of economic agents are highlighted. Situations when economic agents become subordinate after being tempted by current benefits of collaboration (the mousetrap effect) are analysed. The historical development of power is examined. The authors come to the conclusion that in the modern world combined forms of coordination of economic activity as well as hybrid forms of power take place. It is mentioned that new types of power foundations do not replace the old ones but coexist with them modifying actions and traditional factors of economic dependence. At the same time foundations of this dependence become more and more disguised. Contemporary versions of voluntary alliances and coordination of activities of formally independent agents - relational contracts, networks, unions etc. - do not eliminate the problem of dependence as well as the problem of unequal distribution of costs and benefits making it even more complex.

Comparing the literature on hold-up and strategic entry deterrence leads to a puzzling role for sunk or specific investments in affecting investor's incentive. In one case, non-redeployable investments decrease investor's ex-post bargaining power. In the other they increase it. When the entry deterrence effect is acknowledged, the threat of hold-up against investor is largely weakened. Contrary to previous literature, in this respect, asset specificity may even constitute an endogenous enforcement device for incomplete contracts. We conclude that the impact of asset specificity on investor's post-contractual power, far from being general, depends on the nature of interactions between contractual arrangements and market structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empowerment and social change can occur in many ways (Nagda & Harding, 1999). However, to truly overcome racist and disempowering systems and practices, large-scale change should be conducted in a methodical, organized manner. Learning to overcome racist and oppressive systems must begin with social work educational institutions. Social work programs in Canada should demonstrate a more healthy and productive way to structure all of our organizations (Goodman, 2001). There has been much debate in the field of Organizational Development (OD) about the various ways to achieve truly diverse and inclusive organizations (Chesler, 1994). Although the consensus-oriented model of organizational change is easier to implement, true organizational transformation and integration is rare (Chesler, 1994; Hyde, 2004). The Multicultural Organizational Development (MCOD) model is one conflict-oriented change model that strives for fundamental transformation of organizations. Both the Maritime School of Social Work and the University of Toronto's Faculty of Social Work are Canadian educational institutions that have used the MCOD model to address the challenge of inclusive and diverse education. This paper proposes that all Canadian social work schools should use the Multicultural Organizational Development (MCOD) model to assist them not only to meet their accreditation requirements, but also fundamentally transform their schools to achieve long-term change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]