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This exploratory study takes a look at the puzzle of what type of contracts are suitable for governing innovation, with particular atte ntion to inter-firm networks. It employs a conceptual framework that integrates organizational theory of formal coordination with economic perspectives on contracting, and innovate previous analyses in two ways: developing an assessment of alternative contractual forms in terms of knowledge governance and not only in terms of conflict resolution; analyzing contracts according to the intensity at which they incorporate not only market-like mechanisms, but also hierarchical and bureaucratic mechanisms, and a usually neglected array of associational and democratic mechanisms, as related to the level of uncertainty and innovation. A new type of 'associational' and 'constitutional' contract, resource based rather than action-based, is singled out as particularly fit to the governance of innovation. The framework is empirically applied to content analyze the written agreements regulating inter firm alliances for innovation in a comparative case study approach.

Organizational economics tends to express a pessimistic view on the effectiveness of inter-firm contracts under uncertainty, and sees the use of authority and of relational governance as possible remedies. Organization theory inspires some skepticism on the effectiveness of these therapies. In particular, it identifies also reasons to expect a sustained level of formalization in strategic alliances and, conversely, to expect a moderate use of centralization. To help filling this gap, this study empirically assesses the relationship between uncertainty and complexity in the context of strategic alliances, and the use of formalization and centralization for their governance. The assessment extends to the intensity of use and the relationships of three modes of governance: contractual, formal extra-contractual, and informal and social. This exercise is carried out on a new database that collects in formation on 540 project-based alliances. We find that inter-organizational projects employ a mix of contractual and extra-contractual governance mechanisms. Different from usual conceptualization, these agreements are not characterized by high informality. Extra contractual governance seems to be employed to respond to additional factors, rather than to substitute or complement formal agreements. Finally, the pattern of allocation of property rights also interestingly deviates from standard property right theory predictions, to conform to a more pluralist, negotiation based view.

The choice of efficient contractual form is often framed as the selection of a degree of hierarchical intensity suitably matching the level of contractual hazards. We posit that technology collaboration contracts are also responsive to the configuration of resources and to coordination concerns and that contractual solutions may be multidimensional and differ 'in kind'. A sample of joint R&D biotechnology agreements provides broad support for propositions concerning the antecedents. Moreover, we find that the way certain contracts are chosen in response to various contingencies, challenges the idea that they can be usefully characterized as 'intermediate' between polar forms of governance.

Although contracts are characterized by a certain logical and artifactual unity, the typical approach of economic and organizational studies focuses on particular contract clauses. Another common perspective, that addresses contracts as unitary entities, directs the attention to the choice between axiomatically defined alternative governance forms, with little or no investigation of empirical types. This state of things reflects the lack of an accepted framework for the development and testing of hypotheses about contract design. This study tries to redress this situation by analyzing actual contracts as configurations of a wide array of elements. In developing an analytical framework, this study develops a perspective that considers contracts as an organizational phenomenon, expands the set of mechanisms considered beyond incentive provisions and pricing structures, and includes procedural elements inspired both by organizational theory and by the empirical literature on contracting. The constructs so identified are applied to the analysis of a set of pharmaceutical biotechnology agreements. We employed categorical principal component analysis to determine underlying dimensions that differentiate among different contracts. Cluster analysis then produced an empirical taxonomy of these technology agreements.

The choice of efficient contractual form is often framed as the selection of a degree of hierarchical intensity suitably matching the level of contractual hazards. We posit that technology collaboration contracts are also responsive to the configuration of resources and to coordination concerns and that contractual solutions may be multidimensional and differ 'in kind'. A sample of joint R&D biotechnology agreements provides broad support for propositions concerning the antecedents. Moreover, we find that the way certain contracts are chosen in response to various contingencies, challenges the idea that they can be usefully characterized as 'intermediate' between polar forms of governance.

This study aims at deepening our understanding of the contractual governance of technology alliances. For this purpose we carry out an in depth analysis of four contracts of pharmaceutical biotechnology alliances. The application of the framework contrasting transactional and relational contracts proves not sufficiently discriminating: all the contracts investigated are relational latu sensu, and considerable heterogeneity remains unexplained. A competing framework contrasting action-based and resource-based contracts provides a useful focusing device to analyze the texture of the different types of relations observes. Through resources the interpretation of alliance contracts is connected to fundamental sociological research on human sociality. This allows us to develop a framework that explains the configuration of contractual governance in terms of the relational model adopted by the parties. Our framework also proposes that the distribution of core competences among the parties is an important predictor of the relational model. Finally, testable propositions deriving from the study are offered as guidelines for further research.

This paper inquires into how contracts can regulate the complex and uncertain matters on which strategic alliances get formed. It highlights that contracts can be 'light' without being mistakenly incomplete. It is argued that the contracts constituting and regulating strategic alliances are composed by an associational core, focused on resource commitments and on the specification of property rights, broadly intended; and of a belt of contractual clauses incorporating a variety of coordination mechanisms (including, and actually privileging, joint decision making procedures). The interpretive power of the framework is illustrated through the analys is of three alliance contracts.

A highly-deformed rotational band has been identified in the N=Z nucleus 36Ar. At high spin the band is observed to its presumed termination at I=16+, while at low spin it has been firmly linked to previously known states in 36Ar. Spins, parities, and absolute excitation energies have thus been determined throughout the band. Lifetime measurements establish a large low-spin quadrupole deformation (beta_2=0.46+-0.03) and indicate a decreasing collectivity as the band termination is approached. With effectively complete spectroscopic information and a valence space large enough for significant collectivity to develop, yet small enough to be meaningfully approached from the shell model perspective, this rotational band in 36Ar provides many exciting opportunities to test and compare complementary models of collective motion in nuclei., Invited talk at "High Spin Physics 2001", see http://www.fuw.edu.pl/~hs2001/, to be published in Acta Physica Polonica B

A highly-deformed rotational band has been identified in the N = Z nucleus 36Ar. At high spin the band is observed to its presumed termination at Iπ = 16+, while at low spin it has been firmly linked to previously known states in 36Ar. Spins, parities, and absolute excitation energies have thus been determined throughout the band. Lifetime measurements establish a large low-spin quadrupole deformation (β2 = 0.46 ±0.03) and indicate a decreasing collectivity as the band termination is approached. With effectively complete spectroscopic information and a valence space large enough for significant collectivity to develop, yet small enough to be meaningfully approached from the shell model perspective, this rotational band in 36Ar provides many exciting opportunities to test and compare complementary models of collective motion in nuclei.