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We show that commercial mortgage borrowers behave opportunistically to attempt to obtain principal reductions. We develop a model in which lenders cannot perfectly observe borrowers' use values and renegotiation is costly. We then exploit a tax rule change that reduced the cost of renegotiation. Consistent with the model predictions, borrowers with high private use values of the property are more likely to transfer into special servicing when lenders have a higher capacity to negotiate principal reductions after the rule change. Our results suggest adverse consequences of principal forgiveness for lenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) intensifies competitive pressure by tying executive compensation to the profits of rivals. We show that these contracts make loan syndication harder by reducing banks' willingness to participate in loans underwritten by banks named in their RPE contracts. Lead arranger banks, which are more frequently named in RPE, hold larger shares of the loans they syndicate, and their borrowers receive smaller and fewer loans and face higher spreads. Our results highlight the tension between the normal benefits of competition versus the need for cooperation in loan syndication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A two-sided "credit-line channel"—relating to drawdowns and repayments—explains the severe drop and partial subsequent recovery in bank stock prices during the COVID-19 pandemic. Banks with greater exposure to undrawn credit lines saw larger stock price declines but performed better outside of crises periods. Despite deposit inflows, high drawdowns led to reduced bank lending, suggestive of capital encumbrance upon drawdowns. Repayments of credit lines unencumbered capital which explains the stock price recovery starting Q2 2020. Bank provision of credit lines resembles writing put options on aggregate risk, and we propose how to incorporate this feature into bank stress tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How much of a loan should a lender retain, and how do loan sales affect loan performance? We address these questions in a model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and monitoring after origination, but is subject to moral hazard. The optimal lender-investor contract can be implemented by requiring the lender to initially retain a share of the loan that it gradually sells to investors, rationalizing loan sales after origination. The model generates novel predictions linking loan and lender characteristics to initial retention, sales dynamics, and loan performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks' incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that lender of last resort (LOLR) policy exacerbates bank interconnectedness. Using novel micro-level data, we analyze LOLR's haircut gaps: the differences between the private market and central bank haircuts. LOLR policy incentivizes banks to increase pledging and holdings of higher haircut-gap bonds, especially those issued by domestic and systemically important banks. Effects only apply to banks, not to nonbanks without LOLR access. LOLR funding revives bank bond issuance associated with higher haircut gaps and increases the subsequent correlation between pledging and issuing banks' bond prices, in particular during periods of low-market returns and for domestic, systemically important banks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We identify two issues in the work of Ouazad and Kahn (2022). Correcting either reverses the original result. The two changes are to use the correct FHFA conforming loan limits for each county and year and to compare the individual loan amount to that limit correctly. There is no evidence that lenders transfer climate risk by altering loan origination and securitization behavior. None of our results calls into question the value and importance of the O&K model as a test for adverse selection. The question addressed and the setup of the test are important and should be replicated over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate the effect of carbon pricing policy on bank credit to greenhouse-gas-emitting firms. Our analyses exploit the geographic restrictions inherent in California's cap-and-trade bill and a discontinuity in the embedded free permit threshold of the federal Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill. Affected high emission firms face shorter loan maturities, lower access to permanent forms of bank financing, higher interest rates, and higher participation of shadow banks in their lending syndicates. These effects are concentrated among private firms, while credit terms of public firms are largely unaffected. Overall, we show that banks respond quickly to realizations of transition risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test for gender bias in promotions at financial institutions using two central predictions of Becker's (1957 , 1993) model: firms with bias will (1) raise the promotion bar for marginally promoted female workers, and (2) incur costs from forgoing efficient employment practices. We find support for both of these predictions using a new nationwide panel of mortgage loan officers and their managers encompassing approximately 72,000 workers from over 1,000 shadow banks from 2014 to 2019. Overall, our findings provide evidence that gender bias is an important factor in gender gaps at financial institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We find that disclosing bank-specific information reallocates systemic risk, but whether it mitigates systemic bank runs depends on the nature of information disclosed. Disclosure reveals banks' resilience to adverse shocks and shifts systemic risk from weak to strong banks. Yet, only disclosure of banks' exposure to systemic risk can mitigate systemic bank runs because it shifts systemic risk from more vulnerable banks to those less vulnerable. Disclosure of banks' idiosyncratic shortfalls of funds does not differentiate such exposure, rendering the resultant reallocation of systemic risk ineffective in mitigating systemic runs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stress tests convey information about the strictness of future tests, creating incentives for banks to alter their future lending behavior. Regulators recognize and use this influence: they may conduct softer stress tests to encourage lending or tougher stress tests to reduce risk-taking. This information management can lead to inefficiencies when (a) the test loses credibility or (b) the test becomes self-fulfilling. In addition, banks may distort their lending behavior in anticipation of the stress test design, leading to further surplus losses. The analysis applies to banking supervision and regulation more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Basel I introduced capital requirements for undrawn commitments, but only for revolvers with an original maturity greater than one year. We use this regulatory discontinuity to estimate the impact of capital regulation on the cost and composition of credit. Following Basel I, short-term commitment fees declined relative to long-term commitments and issuance of short-term facilities increased. Our results highlight the sensitivity of credit provision to capital regulation, particularly for banks with less capital. We are able to infer that low-capital banks are willing to forego twice as much income from fees to reduce required regulatory capital by a dollar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the distributional effects of macroprudential policy on mortgage cycles by exploiting the U.K. mortgage register and a 2014 15% limit imposed on lenders' high loan-to-income (LTI) mortgages. Constrained lenders issue fewer and more expensive high-LTI mortgages, with stronger effects on low-income borrowers. Unconstrained lenders strongly substitute high-LTI loans in local areas with higher constrained lender presence, but not high-LTI loans to low-income borrowers—consistent with adverse selection problems—implying lower overall credit to low-income borrowers. Consistently, policy-affected areas experience lower house price growth postregulation and, following the Brexit referendum (negative aggregate shock), better house price growth and lower mortgage defaults for low-income borrowers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We characterize the interaction between banks' liquid assets purchases and deposit issuance decisions. Using global games, we derive a liquidity multiplier : the amount of deposits a bank can create when endowed with one additional unit of liquid asset to maintain a given level of liquidity risk. In our central theorem, we prove it is larger than unity. This entails that banks have a special role in enhancing liquidity provision, "multiplying" liquid assets into a larger quantity of deposits. Our theory has implications for banks' balance sheet choices, the pricing of liquid securities, and the role of public liquidity provision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a model of strategic renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a credit chain, gives rise to externalities, as each lender's willingness to provide concessions to its borrower depends on how this lender's own liabilities are expected to be renegotiated. We highlight how government interventions aimed at preventing default waves should account for private renegotiation incentives and interlinkages. In particular, we contrast the consequences of targeted subsidy and debt reduction programs following economic shocks, such as pandemics and financial crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the design of stress tests that provide information about aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in banks' portfolios and impose contingent capital requirements. In the optimal static test, an adverse scenario fails all weak and some strong banks, limiting the stigma of failure. Sequential tests outperform static tests. Under natural conditions, the optimal sequential test consists of a precautionary recapitalization, followed by a scenario that fails only weak banks, similar to TARP in 2008, followed by SCAP in 2009. Our results also shed light on the Federal Reserve's decision to test the banks twice in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine innovation following the Great Depression using data on a century's worth of U.S. patents and a difference-in-differences design that exploits regional variation in the crisis severity. Harder-hit areas experienced large and persistent declines in independent patenting, mostly reflecting the disruption in access to finance during the crisis. This decline was larger for young and inexperienced inventors and lower-quality patents. In contrast, innovation by large firms increased, especially among young and inexperienced inventors. Overall, the Great Depression contributed to the decline in technological entrepreneurship and accelerated the shift of innovation into larger firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the near universe of U.S. consumer credit cards, we show that banks transmit their wholesale funding shocks to consumers by reducing their credit card limits. Credit-constrained consumers who are unable to hedge against the transmitted shock by accessing other credit cards experience a stronger and more persistent reduction in aggregate credit card limits at the consumer level. Consequently, these credit-constrained consumers reduce their aggregate credit card borrowing. Our results document a credit card lending channel for the transmission of adverse bank shocks and show who bears the costs of fragile bank funding structures. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does creditor health affect the pass-through of monetary policy to households? Using data on the universe of U.S. credit unions, I document that creditor asset losses increase the sensitivity of consumer credit to monetary policy. Identification exploits plausibly exogenous variation in asset losses and high-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks. Weaker lenders can respond more if they face financial frictions that easing alleviates. The estimates imply constraints on monetary policy become more costly in financial crises featuring creditor asset losses and that an additional benefit of monetary easing is that it weakens the causal, contractionary effect of asset losses. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using account-level credit card data from a large Turkish bank, we study the impact of a unique credit card policy that increases minimum payment on consumption and debt repayment. We show that the policy reduces credit card spending and debt, boosts existing debt repayment, and reduces credit card delinquency. The credit card debt of affected consumers falls on average by 50 |$\%$| two years into the policy's implementation. An increase in minimum payment has a stronger effect than does a decrease of a similar magnitude. We build a benchmark life cycle model with soft liquidity constraint to explain the reduction in credit card spending. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]