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Much has been written about US efforts to solve the 'German problem' after the Second World War. Scholars have carefully studied US attempts to de-Nazify, pacify and democratise post-war Germany and have identified the creation of large-scale student exchange programmes as an integral part of that agenda. As this article shows, 1945 was not the first time in the twentieth century that US policy-makers and educators had pondered the German problem and sought to address Germany's apparently deficient democratisation and excessive militarism, as well as the alarmingly narrow horizons of its youth. Based on long-neglected or inaccessible archival materials in Europe and the United States, this article charts the development of US student exchanges with inter-war Germany and demonstrates that a fuller understanding of US re-education policies in West Germany requires paying attention to the 1920s and 1930s. The article traces the discovery of the German student as an object of US democratisation efforts in the inter-war period and shows that US re-education policy after 1945 was deeply informed by the experiences made, connections forged and convictions won (sometimes without reliable evidence) by US internationalists in the inter-war years. Facing the German problem after the First World War, the article argues, helped establish a modus operandi —and a modus cogitandi —with regard to the German student that would inform US cultural diplomacy well into the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sinking of the Lusitania sharpened debate in Washington over whether the United States should make the defense of neutral rights a casus belli. The hard line that President Woodrow Wilson adopted regarding German violations of neutral rights caused his secretary of state to resign in protest, with the redlines established in 1915 generating a precarious neutrality that lasted less than two years. This article examines the links between Wilson's wartime policies, the revisionist literature of the interwar period, and the Neutrality Acts of the mid-1930s. It argues that "history's lessons" may mislead rather than inform if context is ignored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1945 to 1961, the United States Army Historical Division collaborated with German officers to write a history of the Second World War. As relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated and the U.S. Army prepared for a war against the U.S.S.R., the Historical Division and other parties endeavored to exploit the operational knowledge of these German officers while ignoring their attempts at mythologizing the past. This article argues, however, that a substantial intellectual baggage of racist, Social Darwinist, and generally anti-Russian beliefs underpinned even the "purely operational" German lessons that shaped U.S. Army doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article charts some of the historical paths that have helped bring forth, in late-modern societies, what I call scientised educational discourses and practices. Though the project of forming the 'scientific man' can be traced back to the nineteenth century, it is argued that the nature of the project changed once it became aligned with the Cold War sciences, especially cybernetics, computer science and psychology. How former military scientists and researchers from various disciplines generated algorithmic and computational ideas of the human mind that entered the fields of education, teaching and learning during the Cold War era is reconstructed. These ideas not only had a decisive role in shaping scientised subjects such as the lifelong learner, they also inspired the emergence of new scientific disciplines. One example is the field of empirically based educational research in West Germany, which – in its 'scientised form – was not very well established in West Germany prior to the 1960s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Soft balancing has recently been framed as a general foreign policy strategy that is basically open to any state. However, what coalitions can actually engage in joint soft-balancing behavior? To date, the literature has focused on more traditional foe-foe constellations and less traditional friend-friend constellations. In the former, all the soft-balancing partners are foes of the opponent; in the latter, all the soft-balancing partners are friends/allies of the opponent. But what about mixed soft-balancing coalitions in which one partner is a foe of the opponent whereas another partner is an ally/friend of the opponent? This article sets out to argue that such mixed soft-balancing coalitions are not possible. It moreover contends that the reason for this is the fact that the execution of soft-balancing behavior is more demanding and more consequential than one might think upon hearing the term "soft." The hurdles for the ally/friend of the opponent in such a (theoretical) mixed soft-balancing coalition are therefore too high to actually follow through with such a strategy. To support its arguments, the article analyzes a crucial case study based on a most-likely-case design. More precisely, it looks into Sino-German reactions to US president Donald Trump's "America First" approach. The article indeed finds that while both China and Germany have lamented Trump's "America First" approach, the leap for Germany as a US ally and friend to translating the complaints about Trump into tangible soft-balancing activities together with China has simply been too big. Even though Germany and China are themselves close partners, Germany ultimately remains too close to the USA, and US positions on China, for Sino-German soft balancing against the USA to be a workable option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the construction and channels of German-U.S. perceptions since the World War II. It mentions that the U.S. had been around for decades for a regular and curiously eyed object of the media; and talks about the state-organized exchange programs for specialists and managers, multipliers, students and scientists. It mentions about less number of research on the New World at German universities.

The article talks about the relationship between the various conservatisms in the U.S. and West Germany in the formative first post-war decade. It mentions that relations between them had developed a new concept of liberalism; and sharing religion as a traditional instrument of order. It also mentions about their approaches towards conservatism and catholicism.

The article talks about the economic relations between Germany and the U.S. It mentions that German and U.S. companies are among the most important foreign investors and employers in each other's market; and the U.S. had deteriorated in the Covid-19 pandemic period. It also mentions that 1993 started as a phase of sustained, largely inflation-free growth in the U.S. with almost full employment.

The article talks about the partnership, controversy and distrust in the German-U.S. relationships since the end of World War II. It mentions that German politician Helmut Schmidt, has expressed disparagingly about the inexperienced in foreign policy under U.S. President Jimmy Carter; and also mentions that former U.S. President Barack Obama has floated on the cover of the great spirit of his Predecessor.

The article discusses the changes in bilateral relations of Germany and the U.S. Topics discussed include gains of free trade to civilization missions and humanitarian goals to justify the Imperialism; impact of world domination of the U.S. from the globalization of World economy; and role of multilateral associations of nation states like NATO or the World Bank in shortened the power asymmetry and strengthened the interest of the dependent countries in participating in the U.S. empire.

Das Podium Zeitgeschichte wirft ein kritisches Schlaglicht auf die deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs. Dabei werden Faktoren der Stabilität und des Wandels herausgearbeitet, Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren untersucht, das spezifische Gewicht organisatorischer Strukturen der internationalen Politik bestimmt, der Einfluss personeller Konstellationen problematisiert und die Grenzen des transatlantischen Verständnisses ausgelotet. Dazu präsentiert das Podium Zeitgeschichte fünf sektorale Analysen auf Feldern von besonderer Bedeutung: erstens die bilateralen politischen Beziehungen im Kontext der internationalen Politik (Philipp Gassert); zweitens Partnerschaft und Kontroversen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sicherheits- und Bündnispolitik (Andreas Etges); drittens Wirtschaft, Handel und Finanzen als ebenso stabilisierende wie konfliktbehaftete Säule des transatlantischen Austauschs (Stormy-Annika Mildner); viertens Konjunkturen des Konservatismus als Gradmesser für Kommunikationskanäle und -blockaden zwischen der Bundesrepublik und den USA (Michael Hochgeschwender); fünftens gegenseitige Wahrnehmungen, Bilder und Stereotype, deren Dekonstruktion eine bessere Bestimmung des Grads von Nähe oder Fremdheit zulässt (Reinhild Kreis und Jan Logemann). The "Contemporary History Podium" takes a critical look at German-American relations since the end of the Second World War. In this process, it identifies factors of stability and change, investigates continuities and caesuras, measures the specific weight of organisational structures in international politics, critically examines the influence of the compatibility of personalities and fathoms the limits of transatlantic understanding. The "Contemporary History Podium" thus presents five sectoral analyses of fields with special importance: One, the bilateral political relations in the context of international politics (Philipp Gassert); two, partnership and controversies with special emphasis on security and alliance policy (Andreas Etges); three, economy, trade and finance as both stabilising and conflict-laden pillars of transatlantic exchange (Stormy-Annika Mildner); four, boom and bust of conservatism as a measure for communication channels and blockages between Germany and the USA (Michael Hochgeschwender); five, mutual perceptions, images and stereotypes, whose deconstruction allows for a better understanding of the degree of proximity or unfamiliarity (Reinhild Kreis and Jan Logemann). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article privileges an institutional explanation rooted in the financial sector for the persistent German trade surpluses of the past 15 years. Specifically, it explains the disruptive consequences of a long-running stagnation in domestic investment in combination with rising German savings, particularly from corporate and government actors. It links these outcomes primarily to policy changes in the early and mid-2000s. The article also offers a constructivist explanation of how German elites have understood (and often misunderstood) the trade surplus. I characterise German elites as using a formula of 'normalise and apologise' to explain away worries about the surplus. The result is what one might call a 'political narrative of unbalanced growth.' The argument concludes with implications for the tense German-American economic relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is first to report on the secret European five-partner sigint alliance Maximator that started in the late 1970s. It discloses the name Maximator and provides documentary evidence. The five members of this European alliance are Denmark Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and France. The cooperation involves both signals analysis and crypto analysis. The Maximator alliance has remained secret for almost fifty years, in contrast to its Anglo-Saxon Five-Eyes counterpart. The existence of this European sigint alliance gives a novel perspective on western sigint collaborations in the late twentieth century. The article explains and illustrates, with relatively much attention for the cryptographic details, how the five Maximator participants strengthened their effectiveness via the information about rigged cryptographic devices that its German partner provided, via the joint U.S.-German ownership and control of the Swiss producer Crypto AG of cryptographic devices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Operation Rubicon was probably one of the most successful intelligence operations of our time. Recent press revelations detail this secret partnership between the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), focused on the purchase and control of Crypto AG. Supported by German technical giants like Siemens, the company sold and produced compromised cypher machines. This article challenges the idea that the dominant sigint powers were within the Anglosphere during the Cold War. Instead suggesting Rubicon evidences that the centre of gravity for intelligence lay 'elsewhere'. It also explores the complex ethical implications of Germany's involvement in Rubicon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the notable exception of the Ukraine crisis, Berlin has pursued a cooperative policy vis-à-vis Moscow, demonstrating a unique measure of understanding. This policy is consistent with the two roles that Germany has played in the international system since World War II—as a 'civilian power' and as a 'trading state'. Both have proven successful in foreign policy and economic terms, but have also created a path dependency that complicated adaptability to changed conditions: indecisiveness and a propensity for the middle ground have proven to be its questionable side-effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the effects of tourism on foreign policy of countries by analyzing the diplomatic actions taken by the government of Germany on U.S. tourists from the 1890s to early 1930s. Other topics include the origins and conduct of German public diplomacy, the autocratic tourism policies during the Interwar period and Cold War, Germany's strategy to use tourism as a way to secure political and economic support from the U.S., and the role of competition, mutual observation, and emulation in Europe's transition to new diplomacy.

In this article, I address two salient issues in IR trust research: first, I introduce a longitudinal, content analysis to measure foreign policy trust. Second, I provide an in-depth analysis of how recent crises affected German political elites' trust of the United States. I begin with a brief conceptual sketch of foreign policy trust and argue that treating it as a trusting discourse is a useful way to bridge the micro–macro gap. Next, I introduce a content analysis to measure trust, present coding rules and discuss advantages and problems of the approach. The empirical section consists of data generated from coding German Bundestag speeches and newspaper op-eds from 2000 through 2014. By disaggregating the data to specify who trusts whom and regarding which issues, I propose the following: First, there is a significant decline in trust among the traditionally pro-American German center-right politicians. Second, there is a steady decline in trust in the United States as a state entity, as opposed to strongly fluctuating trust in different U.S. presidents. Third, the NSA crisis directly affected German elites' trust in the bilateral security partnership, an area where trust was stable even during the Bush presidency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines debates over the requisitioning of real estate by the US Army during the decade after the end of World War II. Requisitioning quickly emerged as one of the most contentious issues in the relationship between German civilians and the American occupation. American policy changed several times as the physical presence of the occupiers shrank during the postwar period then expanded again after the outbreak of the Korean War. I show that requisitioning became a key site of contestation during the early years of the Federal Republic. The right to assert authority over real property served as a visible reminder of the persistent limits of German sovereignty. By pushing back against American requisitioning policy, Germans articulated an increasingly assertive claim to sovereign rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on realities of German-American relations, particularly, the sexual economy created by martial rule and Germany's economic distress. It mentions exploring American-German sexual interactions within the power imbalances of martial rule, patriarchal structures, and the economic and social upheaval sweeping Germany. It also mentions Occupation of the Rhineland was an Allied condition of the cease-fire and a precondition for beginning the formal peace negotiations.

This paper explains the different trajectories of German and American competition policy and its permissiveness toward economic concentration in the last few decades. While the German political economy had moved to a stronger antitrust regime after 1945 and stuck to it even after the economic governance shifts of the 1980s, the traditional antitrust champion, the United States, has shed considerable parts of its basic governance toolkit against anticompetitive conduct since the 1960s. Drawing on theories of institutional change driven by bureaucratic and professional elites, the paper claims that different pathways of professional ideas in competition policy can account for the cross-country differences. In the 1960s and early 1970s, movements to strengthen competition policy enforcement emerged in both countries. While German as well as American professionals reacted to the seemingly increasing encroachment of societal concerns into antitrust with economized notions of the policies' goals, they did so in fundamentally different ways. Whereas US professionals proposed an effect-based approach in which consumer welfare and gains in efficiency may justify less competition, the more strongly law-based profession in Germany to a degree strengthened a form-based approach aiming at the preservation of competitive market structures. Such extrapolitical pathways of ideas, we argue, provide important guidelines for the implementation of competition policy by administrations and courts, whose decisions can have a far-reaching impact on industries and political economies as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on American and German evidence, Stephan Kieninger's contribution looks into Henry Kissinger's ambivalent relationship with Germany scrutinizing both the parallels between Kissinger's détente and Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik as well as the frictions and the competition between both approaches. Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's priority was international stability provided by the understanding between the USA and the Soviet Union, whereas Willy Brandt's dynamic détente approach was aimed at Europe's transformation overcoming the Iron Curtain. In Nixon's and Kissinger's balance of power policy, stability was essential to cement what they perceived as an endangered status quo in Europe. Brandt and his foreign policy advisor Egon Bahr saw détente as a way to facilitate liberalizing changes. They envisaged stability in international relations a precondition to guarantee the regimes behind the Iron Curtain the kind of security that would over time allow them to open up their societies for Western influence. Finally, the overlaps between both approaches prevailed. Examining Kissinger's initial doubts over Ostpolitik's feasibility, the essay depicts his way to control the détente process in Europe through the Quadripartite negotiations over Berlin in 1971. Eventually, Ostpolitik's success was a catalyst and a prerequisite for Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's own approach to the Soviet Union despite the escalation of the Vietnam War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on life of Katharina Morgan-Schmid began her journey to travel to the U.S. in 1815, when the first World War had already broken out, and in 1915, three days before her arrival in Boston, Massachusetts the Germans used nerve gas for the first time on a battlefield. It reports how she was accused of being a German spy and collecting information to damage the U.S. in favor of the enemy.

The German-American relationship has become the pivot in the larger transatlantic partnership. This is the result of both the rise of Germany as a foreign policy actor due to an increase of its power as well as the decline of France and Britain as European powers. As American policy makers reassess the role of Europe in their broader foreign policy, Germany will be seen as a key partner both in Europe and on broader global issues. However there are limits to this partnership and it is likely to be an uneven one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the transnational impact of two diaries written by the female German journalists Ruth Andreas-Friedrich and Ursula von Kardorff, whose journals shed light on German wartime experiences, resistance activities, and, to a lesser extent, the press. In the postwar years, both journalists sought to influence (West) Germany's relationship with its former enemies, in particular the United States. In their autobiographical writing, they presented both an image of Germany as a victim of Nazism, as well as an early acknowledgment of German crimes. In this way, they achieved a balanced narrative that received a positive reception from American and German audiences. Though the ways in which Friedrich and Kardorff presented aspects of journalism and everyday life in the Third Reich were not unique, their dual identity as women and journalists underlay their ability to act as "legitimate" mediators for Germany's rehabilitation. Western allied occupation authorities and overseas audiences viewed them, in contrast to men, as largely apolitical because they were women, and as objective witnesses because they were journalists. Through their autobiographical writings, both journalists situated themselves among the predominantly male US and German elites devoted to developing amicable relations between the two countries via soft-power diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the views of General John J. Pershing, commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces during the Great War, opposing an armistice with Germany and states that it appears to contradict views he expressed just a short time earlier. Topics discussed include Pershing's earlier insistence that the armistice provide a guarantee against resumption of hostilities.

The article offers information on the periodical on topics including editorial board members Magnus Brechtken and Thomas Raithel; Subscription policy of the periodical along with a table of content for the issue on topics including German military histotiography; and German-American relations.

For several years both national governments as well as international organisations are increasingly discussing political management tools which rely on findings of the behavioural sciences. Unlike rules, economic incentives and awareness-raising measures, so-called nudges especially promise gentle, effective and cost-efficient management by exploiting the systematic distortion of human decision-making behaviour. While the current nudging euphoria can mostly be traced back to the rise of behavioural economics since the 1980s, the current article argues that simultaneously discussions of ecological regulation exhibited a similar development. During the 1980s, disappointment that greater environmental awareness did not result in more adequate behaviour towards the environment and the recognition of the limits of economic management instruments led to the rise of "environmental conduct" as an independent category which social and behavioural scientists sought to describe and influence. This simultaneous change of the discourse in both the field of political regulation as well as theoretical reflection is traced back to four factors: the academic success story of the behavioural sciences, the disenchantment with idealised presumptions of rationality and the project of science-driven policy, the change of planning culture as well as the processes of deregulation and marketisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores and explains Germany’s pre-emptive ‘No’ to the war in Iraq and argues that the ‘No’ was not a structural break in the relationship with the US, although for many its dramatic consequences appeared as a ‘parting of ways’ of two close allies. With the European Union deeply divided and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization split into two camps, the result was a profound disunity of the West. After the war in Kosovo and the German military contribution to the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan, there was no chance that the SPD/Green coalition would have been able to put together its own majority for an additional war effort in Iraq. Opposing a perceived US unilateralism was popular and an opportunity to stand up to the Bush administration. On a more fundamental level, Germany reclaimed the right to national sovereignty in spite of its commitment to multilateralism. This self-assertion was a new development for German foreign policy and it will also characterise Germany’s actions in the future. With the arrival of the Trump administration in Washington and its challenge to the liberal world order America created after World War II, the US and Germany could end up on an even more profound collision course. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia has been both a divisive and a unifying force in the German-American relationship. It has been the focal point in this relationship since the end of World War II. During the cold war, the Soviet threat held Washington and Bonn together despite some important divergences in interests and policies. During the 1950s Adenauer's ‘policy of strength’ emphasised western solidarity and a strong military approach based on NATO and the European Community (EC), reinforced by the stationing of over 200,000 American military personnel in West Germany and West Berlin. Adenauer believed this policy of western solidarity would allow West Germany to draw East Germany (DDR) toward unification through the magnetism of western economic success combined with its military resolve. A corollary to this was the Hallstein Doctrine which barred the Federal Republic from having diplomatic relations with any country which recognised the DDR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the impact of the 2008-09 global financial crisis on the dynamics of transatlantic relations. The financial crisis has revealed systemic weaknesses in the governance of the eurozone and fundamental divisions between national governments in the EU on how these should be addressed. In the context of German domestic politics the financial crisis has resulted in increasing scepticism towards US-style liberal market capitalism. Germany managed to maintain its strong economic standing under the adverse circumstances of the financial crisis. Domestically the post-crisis political consensus has hence emphasised the strengths of Germany’s coordinated market economy in contrast to the liberal model of the US. This article offers a comparative analysis of how the crisis was perceived and how it has been addressed in Germany and the US. It argues that the financial crisis has significantly changed the parameters of the bilateral relations between Germany and the US in the context of wider EU-US transatlantic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines recent dynamics of collective memory in German-American relations. After an introduction which outlines the importance of history and memory for bilateral relations, the article traces the evolution of collective memories of the two countries and identifies the key filters through which they evaluate each other. It then identifies the key characteristics of German-American relations since the advent of Donald Trump to the American presidency. This is followed by an analysis which examines Trump’s use and abuse of history and memory and what that means for his foreign policy in general and German-American relations in particular. In view of the way Donald Trump has taken the subjective nature of collective memories to an extreme by largely disconnecting these memories from their historical context at the same time as extensively referencing his own history and experience, the article argues that we might be witnessing the end of memory, in particular the end of memory’s direct impact on political discourse and policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the authors discuss various reports within the issue on topics including the relationship of Germany and the U.S., the political relationship of U.S. President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the global financial crisis in 2008-2009.

This paper examines German and American responses to international terrorism from the end of the cold war to today. While terrorism was not a priority for much the 1990s, the 9/11 attacks generated a long list of domestic counterterrorism measures in both countries. In the international realm, the German government ended up participating in many US initiatives designed to hunt down al-Qaeda operatives and prevent them from launching another attack inside the United States. However, German support was often secret and cooperation in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’ was considered controversial at home. When comparing German and US counterterrorism approaches, the paper takes a unique approach by analysing how parliamentary and presidential government structures affected responses in terms of content and scope. The comparative analysis illustrates various similarities between German and US decision-making processes and argues that checks and balances continue to balance executive power gains in both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given their radically different historical approaches to immigration and refugees, one would expect Germany and the United States to have adopted diverging policies in these domains following the ‘9/11’ attacks. More surprising is the extent to which they have ‘traded places’ regarding their respective ‘leadiator’ and ‘laggard’ roles concerning asylum rights. Although both countries embraced restrictive practices during the 1980s, US law now concentrates on ‘security first’, relying heavily on exclusionary border control and national security framing. Whereas the old FRG used complex, exclusionary laws to limit all forms of migration prior to 1998, united Germany has redefined itself as a ‘welcoming culture’, upholding human rights, open borders and pro-active resettlement policies. Focusing on the ‘migration—security’ nexus, this study compares fundamental changes in the admission and resettlement policies each now applies to persons seeking international protection. It reviews securitisation dynamics in the USA, followed by a treatment of developments at the European level that have conditioned reforms in German since 2005. The refusal of some EU member states to accept their fair share of the humanitarian burden invoked by the 2015-2016 refugee crisis has ironically contributed to Chancellor Angela Merkel's new image as Lady Liberty, ‘lifting her lamp besides the golden door’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the foreign relations of the U.S. and Germany. Topics mentioned include the perception of German on the foreign policies of U.S. President Donald Trump, the transatlantic partnership of Germany and the U.S., and the effects of political culture of two countries in their relationship. Also mentioned are immigration policy of two countries and the importance of their international cooperation.

German Chancellor Merkel and US President Donald Trump did not get off to a good start. Their relationship so far has been lukewarm at best. Trump's deficits in understanding and lack of support for democracy and the liberal world order as it was established by Trump's predecessors in the mid-1940s deeply worries European politicians. In view of their own past history and the expectation that Germany may have to step in and become the western world's leading defender of western values, most German policy makers, including the long-serving chancellor, are particularly annoyed and distraught about the developments in the US. This article will analyse the evolving relationship between Angela Merkel and Donald Trump since the latter moved into the Oval Office in January 2017. The article will highlight both the more fundamental structural problems and the day-to-day political hurdles in German-American relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores and explains Germany’s pre-emptive ‘No’ to the war in Iraq and argues that the ‘No’ was not a structural break in the relationship with the US, although for many its dramatic consequences appeared as a ‘parting of ways’ of two close allies. With the European Union deeply divided and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization split into two camps, the result was a profound disunity of the West. After the war in Kosovo and the German military contribution to the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan, there was no chance that the SPD/Green coalition would have been able to put together its own majority for an additional war effort in Iraq. Opposing a perceived US unilateralism was popular and an opportunity to stand up to the Bush administration. On a more fundamental level, Germany reclaimed the right to national sovereignty in spite of its commitment to multilateralism. This self-assertion was a new development for German foreign policy and it will also characterise Germany’s actions in the future. With the arrival of the Trump administration in Washington and its challenge to the liberal world order America created after World War II, the US and Germany could end up on an even more profound collision course. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between demilitarization and reconstruction during the American occupation of Germany by focusing on the significance of captured enemy material. In the devastation of the post-war years, the US Military Government initially used this material to meet the needs of the Displaced Persons and German populations, but this changed as the US Military Government started concentrating on German reconstruction. This led to the formation of the STEG corporation (Staatliche Erfassungsgesellschaft für öffentliches Gut m.b.H.) whose responsibilities included demilitarizing military depots scattered across the German landscape, recycling these materials, and making them available to the German economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany played a significant role in the genesis of the International Criminal Court (ICC) during the 1990s. The analysis of contemporary government documents, many of which have been declassified ahead of schedule, reveals how extensively and persistently the Federal Republic supported the setting up of the ICC. German diplomat Hans-Peter Kaul, later himself a judge at the ICC, emerged as a key figure over the many years of international negotiations. The German government saw international criminal law as a means to secure the influence of Germany in the changed global order after the end of the Cold War. During the dramatic course of the Rome diplomatic conference in June and July 1998, the German delegation became the most uncompromising proponent of a strong and independent criminal court and thus found itself in opposition to all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council shortly before the end of the conference. Especially in the dispute with the United States, the German side developed a new self-confidence, the influence of which was to affect German-American relations during the following years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since April 2014 to March 2015, the European Central Bank expansionary monetary policy instigates a huge depreciation of the euro in terms of dollar. According to the mainstream monetary theory, these dynamics should make the exports cheaper and at the same time make the imports more expensive. Has real depreciation of the euro helped in the improvement of European countries’ trade balances? Following the main methodologies in the recent literature, our study analyses the effects of this depreciation both for Italy and Germany towards the US. We use industry-level data at monthly frequency. The results are different from each bilateral relationship. We find that 11 industries register a long-run improvement (8 for Italy and 3 for Germany). The J-curve effect is proven just in six cases, always for Italy. The inverted J-curve effect is proven in eight cases, four for Germany, and four for Italy. These results seem to be an indirect demonstration of the structural asymmetries between German and Italian economies: German economic system is more able to be competitive with a strong currency, than Italy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]