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After the euro crisis, politicization patterns led the institutions of the European Union to gradually redirect the bloc's socioeconomic governance away from austerity. It is less clear whether the erosion of austerity was mirrored in national economic discourses. To fill this gap, this article provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis of parliamentary budget debates in four country cases: France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal, from 2014 to 2020. The results show contrasting patterns of "fiscal discipline" frame resilience in national economic discourse in ways consistent with intergovernmental bargaining around the pandemic recovery agenda. Moreover, shared preoccupations relating to investment in the economy, social inequality, and climate change emerge as major threads shaping budget making. These findings suggest an increasingly integrated multi‐level system of economic governance and call for further investigation into the links between ideas shaping EU economic governance and economic discourses in member states. Related Articles: Pi Ferrer, Laia, and Pertti Alasuutari. 2019. "The Spread and Domestication of the Term 'Austerity:' Evidence from the Portuguese and Spanish Parliaments." Politics & Policy 47(6): 1039–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12331. Zamponi, Lorenzo, and Lorenzo Bosi. 2016. "Which Crisis? European Crisis and National Contexts in Public Discourse." Politics & Policy 44(3): 400–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12156. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of CLIVATGE is the property of Universitat de Barcelona - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Este artículo se propone describir los incentivos económicos e institucionales que delimitan el papel de China como proveedor de bienes públicos en la gobernanza económica global. Tras la formulación del XIII Plan Quinquenal en el 2016 China plantea convertirse en un importante contribuyente a la gobernanza global por medio del impulso al desarrollo de la economía mundial. Sin embargo, ha asumido una participación selectiva dentro de los diferentes regímenes del actual sistema económico internacional y su apropiación de las prácticas económicas liberales aún son limitadas. En esta contradicción entre metas y medios, China no tiene como alternativa proponer o modificar un sistema alternativo o modificar sustancialmente el sistema actual. En su lugar, la mejora promovida desde el Estado de sus capacidades y competencias productivas le permitirían incentivar una competencia por una mejor provisión global de bienes públicos específicamente a través del régimen de estándares técnicos.

This article extends the debate on finance versus institutions and measurement of property rights institutions (PRI). We assess the relationships between various components of PRI and private investment, notably: political, economic, and institutional governances. Comparative concurrent relationships of financial dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity, and size are also investigated. The findings provide support for the quality of institutions as a better positive correlate of private investment than financial intermediary development. The interaction of finance and governance is not significant in potentially promoting private investment, perhaps due to substantially documented surplus liquidity issues in African financial institutions. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996‐2010. Policy measures are discussed for reducing financial deposits, increasing financial activity, and hence, improving financial efficiency. Related Articles: Aideyan, Osaore. 2016. "Political and Institutional Prerequisites for Monetary Union: Assessing Progress in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)." Politics & Policy 44 (6): 1192‐1212. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12183 Asongu, Simplice A., and Joseph Nnanna. 2019. "Foreign aid, Instability, and Governance in Africa." Politics & Policy 47 (4): 807‐848. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12320 Scarlato, Margherita, and Giorgio d'Agostino. 2019. "The Political Dimension of Cash Transfers in Latin America and Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Comparative Perspective." Politics & Policy 47 (6): 1125‐1155. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12332 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and focusing on foreign aid instability instead of foreign aid. We assess the role of foreign aid instability on governance dynamics in 53 African countries for the period 1996‐2010. An autoregressive endogeneity‐robust generalized method of moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of variance of the errors and standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors, and bilateral aid. Principal component analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice and accountability and political stability/no violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption control), and general governance (political, economic, and institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance standards, especially political and general governance. Policy implications are discussed. Related Articles: Beal, Amanda L., and Leah Graham. 2014. "Foundations for Change: Rule of Law, Development, and Democratization." Politics & Policy 42 (3): 311‐345. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12077 Fails, Matthew D. 2014. "Leader Turnover, Volatility, and Political Risk." Politics & Policy 42 (3): 369‐399. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12078 Jakubow, Alexander. 2014. "State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation." Politics & Policy 42 (1): 3‐36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Razón Crítica is the property of La Fundacion Universidad de Bogota Jorge Tadeo Lozano and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The history of Europe is a continuous advance overcoming crisis. Today we are leaving the polycrisis of 2010-2015 behind, perhaps the most serious in our history: economic and financial crisis, migration challenge, Brexit, terrorism, neighbourhood... To all these challenges has been added an unexpected, anachronistic, absurd and dangerous nationalist upsurge. The Europe that comes out of the elections of May 26, 2019, is however, a Europe that advances, as Junker said in his "State of the European Union" speech in 2018, "the wind is back in Europe's sails". Nevertheless European project continues to face serious risks and only by strengthening our unity and taking essential steps towards integration our ship will continue to advance. This article analyses risks and challenges for the future of Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of FORO: Revista de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales Nueva Epoca is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Estudios Políticos is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Estudios Políticos is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

L’objectiu d’aquest treball és tractar alguns exemples d’asimetries creades pel marc legal de la nova governança econòmica europea, intentant subratllar algunes ambigüitats que sorgeixen d’aquest escenari. Pel que fa a l’estructura, aquest estudi es divideix en tres parts: en primer lloc, s’explora la dimensió asimètrica de la legislació de la Unió Europea. En segon lloc, s’analitzen algunes provisions rellevants del Tractat d'estabilitat, coordinació i governança. Finalment, s’ofereixen algunes conclusions generals sobre l’estat actual d’integració.

El establecimiento del mede, un organismo que facilita la ayuda financiera bajo unas condiciones estrictas, proporcionando de este modo el apoyo a la estabilidad de la zona euro, fue una clara respuesta de la Unión Europea ante la crisis económica vigente. Dicha entidad, que forma parte del actual modelo de gobernanza económica de la UE, es un elemento clave en el proceso de coordinación y vigilancia económica reforzadas, lo que hace que su estudio se considere de máxima relevancia y actualidad. Por eso, el principal objetivo de este artículo consiste en examinar su estructura jurídica, la configuración, el modelo de financiación y la capacidad de actuación, para poder analizar posteriormente su viabilidad y el grado de déficit de legitimidad que presenta.

Copyright of Regional Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article offers an overview of the eurozone's economic development since the beginning of the crisis, highlighting the underlying deficiencies in the architecture of the EMU that the crisis revealed. It examines the political response to the challenges that the crisis has brought to the fore, showing that this political response has been substantial and has contributed to attenuating the immediate negative effects of the crisis and to reconstructing a more sustainable framework for the EMU. It offers an overall picture of the challenges that remain and, lastly, presents possible political avenues to be taken in the near future with the goal of moving towards a strong authentic EMU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to analyse the role allotted to the social economy in the latest EU initiative to be proposed since the crisis. After the launch of Strategy 2020, and in view of the difficulties in meeting its aims due to the crisis, we focus on the start-up of the new architecture of governance in the EU. Based initially on fiscal discipline, it progressively adds social goals, supervising and influencing their achievement, while control of public expenditure and the different recommendations for coordinating social and economic policies constitute a framework that concerns the social economy. In relation to this, we pay attention to the different initiatives connected with promoting social values in the market as well as to those that assign a specific function to the social economy in the search for answers to the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A crise financeira, económica e máis tarde de débeda soberana afectou de modo es-pecial á Unión Económica e Monetaria (UEM). Para salvagardar o euro e facerlle fronte á crise os Estados membros pertencentes á UEM seguiron un dobre enfoque: primeiro, levar a cabo un proceso de consolidación fiscal, isto é, de austeridade; e segundo, mellorar a gobernanza eco-nómica da UE. Con respecto á austeridade, os países realizaron fortes axustes reducindo gasto público e en moitos casos aumentando impostos. Esta política tivo un efecto positivo sobre a disciplina orzamentaria, e un efecto moi negativo sobre o crecemento e o emprego, que pode traducirse nunha nova recesión no ano 2012. En relación coa gobernanza económica, repásase a que existía antes da crise, poñendo de manifesto os fallos na súa implementación. Posterior-mente, examínase o novo marco de gobernanza económica, que supón a supervisión europea en tres ámbitos: o orzamentario, o macroeconómico e o financeiro. Para levala a cabo estable-céronse novos instrumentos, algúns dos cales só afectan aos países da zona euro. Este traba-llo mostra as carencias dalgúns deles. A nova gobernanza económica supón un avance impor-tante, pero non resolve os problemas de fondo da UE e máis especificamente da zona euro. En efecto, non se avanza na unión fiscal, non se crea un mecanismo de rescate con dotación sufi-ciente para facerlles fronte aos problemas que poidan presentar países como Italia e España, non se avanza en converter o Banco Central Europeo en prestamista en última instancia, e tampouco non se creou un instrumento que permita a mutualización da débeda pública dos paí-ses da zona euro. A solución para a zona euro consistiría na cesión de soberanía por parte dos Estados membros a un ministerio de finanzas que, entre outras funcións, fose responsable do ámbito fiscal, da supervisión macroeconómica e orzamentaria dos distintos países e da emisión de eurobonos.

This paper examines the similarities and differences between the Greek (2009-...) and the Mexican (1994-1995) crisis. Both of them had regional impacts, in Europe in the first case and in South America in the second case. After the crisis, important decisions that were taken changed the way economic policy is made in both countries. Measures taken to resolve the crises involved several key players, both at the national and the supranational level. In both crises, Greece and Mexico received a number of recommendations to be applied in their economic policies. The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact and role of national and supranational key players involved in the resolution of both crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the reforms adopted by the EU and its Member States addressed at introducing and consolidating in their respective legal systems the basic principle of financial or budgetary balance, commonly known as the "golden rule "; that is to say, the requirement by which the whole of the public administration, at its different levels of government, must keep on a regular basis a situation of balanced budget or with surplus. In this line, this article analyzes firstly the precedents of this legal requirement in comparative constitutional law and then the amendments made by Germany, Spain and Italy on their constitutional texts, but also the frustrated constitutional reform initiated in France. And secondly, this article analyzes the reforms made in the economic governance of the EU by means of both politicalstrategic documents - which establish the general framework and the basic governing principles - and legal provisions which develop and implement them. In this respect, this article analyzes political-strategic documents such as the Stability and Growth Pact, Europe 2020, the Euro Plus Pact; and the legal provisions of Art. 126 of the TFEU and the excessive deficit procedure; the amendment of Art. 136 of the TFEU and the European Stability Mechanism; the set of six legal instruments commonly known as "The Six Pack ": and the new reinforcing set of two legal instruments - still under discussion - commonly known as "The Two Pack ". Finally, this article analyzes also the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Un ion, agreed outside the framework of the EU legal system, and the recent proposals adopted by European Council of June 28- 29, 2012, concerning a new "Compact for Growth and Jobs" and the President of the European Council report "Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union ". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]