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In recent years, many developing countries have begun to introduce digital or biometric identity cards (eIDs), in an attempt to improve citizen-state legibility (Scott 1998, Lee and Zhang 2016). In the best case, expanding and deepening legibility can help states govern more efficiently and fairly, and expand citizen access to public services. But eID initiatives also represent a significant expansion of state surveillance, and raise important questions about citizen privacy and data protection, especially for groups with a history of mistrust in or conflict with the state. We conceptualize two types of marginalized group relations with the state: (1) politically marginalized (“opposition groups”) and (2) security marginalized (“securitized groups”), and compare their responses to those of dominant group relations with the state. We conceptualize opposition groups as those historically marginalized in national politics and we conceptualize securitized groups as those disproportionately policed by the state, e.g. for (stated) reasons of national security. Through these comparisons, we assess whether eID initiatives could ultimately have the effect of exacerbating, rather than reducing, inequality in access to public goods and services. We use the example of the legally contested rollout of an eID system in Kenya – the Huduma Namba card program – as an entry point to explore the perceived costs and benefits of increasing citizen legibility to the state and implications for intergroup inequality. In a conjoint experiment with 2,050 respondents drawn from regions across Kenya, we examine how potential policies governing the eID program, including those on data security, integration with voting and taxation systems, and information about program benefits affect support for the eID program, intended eID uptake, and views on the implications of eIDs for data privacy, ease of access to services, and considerations surrounding political participation. Focusing on heterogeneous treatment effects among historically dominant, opposition, and securitized groups, we examine the degree to which different groups are willing to “trade off” privacy for potentially better access to public goods and services.

Why do some autocrats tightly control internet access while others do not? Since the early days of the internet, political scientists have studied the dilemma facing authoritarian regimes in the digital age: On one hand, adopting internet technologies has become inevitable for economic growth; on the other, authoritarian governments risk losing their monopoly over information and communication when granting internet access to the broader population. To mitigate potential challenges arising from access to new information and communication technologies, some authoritarian governments strictly control internet access by censoring, blocking, or manipulating digital information flows. This thesis investigates authoritarian governments motive and capacity to exert control over internet access. Methodologically, it combines large-N statistical analyses with case studies and in-depth interviews to shed light on the ways in which authoritarian governments respond to increasing digitalisation. My research highlights the shortcomings of comparative studies treating the internet as a technical black box and contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the conditions under which internet access and use can challenge authoritarian rule. The thesis consists of four studies that are presented in related but independent research papers. Evidence from the first study, analysing Ugandas presidential elections in 2016, suggests that opposition supporters benefit from internet access to report about electoral malpractice and mobilise support; at the same time, opposition supporters with higher internet access face greater risk of electoral violence. In another set of studies, I focus on the role of internet service provider (ISP) ownership in shaping a governments capacity to exert control over internet access. The second study theorises the way in which ownership reflects state-business relations and demonstrates that state ownership is negatively associated with democratisation. The third study zooms into the determinants of ISP ownership and finds that authoritarian governments that rely on repression of their population attract more foreign investors from other autocracies. Finally, the fourth study investigates the effects of ISP state ownership. The results suggest that state ownership of ISPs facilitates the blocking internet access during politically contested times, yet also point to further mechanisms of government control over ISPs.

The Internet is often portrayed as offering new communication and information channels resistant to state control because of its decentralization. At the same time, the Internet relies on a hierarchical physical infrastructure that, connecting the individual customer to the Internet, provides states with control opportunities. We argue that ownership of the Internet infrastructure, in particular Internet service providers (ISPs), is critical to understanding state Internet control because most direct forms of control require ISPs to comply with government requests. Using qualitative comparative analysis, we systematically link documented Internet shutdowns in sub-Sahara African countries to configurations of ISP state majority ownership, regime type, and election violence. The results support a positive relationship between a temporary halt of Internet provision and ISP majority ownership by authoritarian states when facing election-related violence. Our study underlines the importance of varying ownership structures in explaining political effects of Internet penetration, including its role in challenging authoritarian rule.