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Fear that the Internet promotes harmful political rumoring is merited but not for reasons originally anticipated. Although the network accelerates and widens rumor circulation, on the whole, it does not increase recipient credulity. E-mail, however, which fosters informal political communication within existing social networks, poses a unique threat to factual political knowledge. A national telephone survey conducted immediately after the 2008 U.S. presidential election provides evidence that aggregate Internet use promotes exposure to both rumors and their rebuttals, but that the total effect on rumor beliefs is negligible. More troublingly, the data demonstrate that rumors e-mailed to friends/family are more likely to be believed and shared with others and that these patterns of circulation and belief exhibit strong political biases.

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2009.01470.x Byline: R. Lance Holbert (1), R. Kelly Garrett (1), Laurel S. Gleason (1) Abstract: This article takes up Bennett and Iyengar's (2008) call for debate about the future of political communication effects research. We outline 4 key criticisms. First, Bennett and Iyengar are too quick to dismiss the importance of attitude reinforcement, long recognized as an important type of political media influence. Second, the authors take too narrow a view of the sources of political information, remaining fixated on news. Third, they offer an incomplete portrayal of selective exposure, exaggerating the extent to which individuals avoid attitude-discrepant information. Finally, they lean toward determinism when describing the role technologies play in shaping our political environment. In addition, we challenge Bennett and Iyengar's assertion that only brand new theory can serve to help researchers understand today's political communication landscape. We argue that existing tools, notably the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), retain much utility for examining political media effects. Contrary to Bennett and Iyengar's claims, the ELM suggests that the contemporary political information environment does not necessarily lead to minimal effects. Author Affiliation: (1)School of Communication, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Article note: R. L. Holbert; e-mail: r.lance.holbert@gmail.com

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2009.01452.x Byline: R. Kelly Garrett (1) Abstract: This article seeks to reframe the selective exposure debate by demonstrating that people exhibit a preference for opinion-reinforcing political information without systematically avoiding opinion challenges. The results are based on data collected in a national random-digit-dial telephone survey (n = 1,510) conducted prior to the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Analyses show that Americans use the control afforded by online information sources to increase their exposure to opinions consistent with their own views without sacrificing contact with other opinions. This observation contradicts the common assumption that reinforcement seeking and challenge avoidance are intrinsically linked aspects of the selective exposure phenomenon. This distinction is important because the consequences of challenge avoidance are significantly more harmful to democratic deliberation than those of reinforcement seeking. Author Affiliation: (1) School of Communication, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43221, USA Article note: R. Kelly Garrett; e-mail: garrett.258@osu.edu

The limited influence of corrective messages is one of the most striking observations in the misperceptions literature. We elaborate on this well-known outcome, showing that correction effectiveness varies according to recipients' judgment strategy. Using data from two online experiments, we demonstrate that individuals' responses to corrective messages are less biased by prior attitudes when they engage in on-line rather than memory-based processing. We also show that individuals are more responsive to one-sided messages under conditions of on-line rather than memory-based processing. Unexpectedly, two-sided messages, which repeat the inaccuracy before correcting it, performed better than one-sided messages among individuals using memory-based processes. These findings contribute to our understanding of fact-checking, and suggest strategies that could help promote greater responsiveness to corrective messages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research suggests that ostracism could promote endorsement of partisan falsehoods. Socially excluded individuals are uniquely attentive to distinctions between in-groups and out-groups, and act in ways intended to promote group belonging, potentially including a greater willingness to accept claims made by other group members. We test this assertion with a 2 (ostracism) X 2 (anonymity) X 2 (topic) mixed factorial design using the Ostracism Online paradigm with a demographically diverse online sample of Americans (N = 413). Results suggest that when ostracized, both Democrats and Republicans are more likely to endorse party-line falsehoods about the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. These effects are contingent on several individual-level differences, including strength of ideological commitment, cognitive reflection, and faith in intuition for facts. These patterns failed to replicate with fracking, a politically charged science topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bulk of current literature on partisan media explores its various detrimental influences on the democratic sphere. This study highlights a possible positive outcome of partisan media consumption: enhanced political participation. It is hypothesized that consumption of congruent partisan media will tilt perceptions of opinion climate so that it is viewed as more supportive of one’s views, while consumption of incongruent partisan media is viewed as less supportive. Consequently, consumers of congruent partisan media will participate more, and vice versa. The hypotheses are tested using two panel studies: the first conducted during the 2012 U.S. presidential elections (N = 377) whereas the second, during the 2013 Israeli election (N = 340). In the Israeli case, survey data are supplemented with behavioral measures. All hypotheses are supported except the one regarding the effects of incongruent partisan media exposure. The results are discussed in light of the spiral of silence theory and the selective exposure hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The information environment that social movements face is increasingly complex, making traditional assumptions about media, messaging, and communication used in social movement studies less relevant. Building on work begun within the study of digital protest, we argue that a greater integration of political communication research within social movement studies could offer substantial research contributions. We illustrate this claim by discussing how a greater focus on audiences and message reception, as well as message context, could advance the study of social movements. Specifically, we discuss a range of topics as applied to movement research, including information overload, selective attention, perceptions of bias, the possibilities that entertainment-related communications open up, and priming, among other topics. We suggest the risks of not adapting to this changing information environment, and incorporating insights from political communication, affect both the study of contemporary (including digital) protest, as well as potentially historical protest. The possibilities opened up by this move are immense including entirely new research programs and questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]