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Hypothesis-driven research rests on clearly articulated scientific theories. The building blocks for communicating these theories are scientific terms. Obviously, communication - and thus, scientific progress - is hampered if the meaning of these terms varies idiosyncratically across (sub)fields and even across individual researchers within the same subfield. We have formed an international group of experts representing various theoretical stances with the goal to homogenize the use of the terms that are most relevant to fundamental research on visual distraction in visual search. Our discussions revealed striking heterogeneity and we had to invest much time and effort to increase our mutual understanding of each others use of central terms, which turned out to be strongly related to our respective theoretical positions. We present the outcomes of these discussions in a glossary and provide some context in several essays. Specifically, we explicate how central terms are used in the distraction literature and consensually sharpen their definitions in order to enable communication across theoretical standpoints. Where applicable, we also explain how the respective constructs can be measured. We believe that this novel type of adversarial collaboration can serve as a model for other fields of psychological research that strive to build a solid groundwork for theorizing and communicating by establishing a common language. For the field of visual distraction, the present paper should facilitate communication across theoretical standpoints and may serve as an introduction and reference text for newcomers.

There has been a lengthy debate about whether salient stimuli have the power to automatically capture attention, even when entirely task irrelevant. Theeuwes (2022) has suggested that an attentional window account could explain why capture is observed in some studies, but not others. According to this account, when search is difficult, participants narrow their attentional window, and this prevents the salient distractor from generating a saliency signal. In turn, this causes the salient distractor to fail to capture attention. In the present commentary, we describe two major problems with this account. First, the attentional window account proposes that attention must be focused so narrowly that featural information from the salient distractor will be filtered prior to saliency computations. However, many previous studies observing no capture provided evidence that featural processing was sufficiently detailed to guide attention toward the target shape. This indicates that the attentional window was sufficiently broad to allow featural processing. Second, the attentional window account proposes that capture should occur more readily in easy search tasks than difficult search tasks. We review previous studies that violate this basic prediction of the attentional window account. A more parsimonious account of the data is that control over feature processing can be exerted proactively to prevent capture, at least under certain conditions.

Luck et al. (2021) reviewed evidence that observers can learn to suppress attentional capture by salient distractors. Several commentaries were written in response to this review paper, many of which raised important and interesting issues. Here, we respond to these commentaries. Although there has been substantial progress in the attentional capture debate, there are still remaining issues that need to be addressed before the debate is completely resolved. Specifically, we summarize the need for an independent measure of bottom-up salience and better metrics of how attentional control unfolds over time. Ultimately, the field may need a more refined theoretical model of visual attention that distinguishes between attentional priority, attentional orienting, and attentional engagement.

Schizophrenia is widely thought to involve elevated distractibility, which may reflect a general impairment in top-down inhibitory processes. Schizophrenia also appears to involve increased priming of previously performed actions. Here, we used a highly refined eye-tracking paradigm that makes it possible to concurrently assess distractibility, inhibition, and priming. In both healthy control subjects (HCS, N = 41) and people with schizophrenia (PSZ, N = 46), we found that initial saccades were actually less likely to be directed toward a salient "singleton" distractor than toward less salient distractors, reflecting top-down suppression of the singleton. Remarkably, this oculomotor suppression effect was as strong or stronger in PSZ than in HCS, indicating intact inhibitory control. In addition, saccades were frequently directed to the location of the previous-trial target in both groups, but this priming effect was much stronger in PSZ than in HCS. Indeed, PSZ directed gaze toward the location of the previous-trial target as often as they directed gaze to the location of the current-trial target. These results demonstrate that-at least in the context of visual search-PSZ are no more distractable than HCS and are fully capable of inhibiting salient-but-irrelevant stimuli. However, PSZ do exhibit exaggerated priming, focusing on recently attended locations even when this is not beneficial for goal attainment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

For over 25 years, researchers have debated whether physically salient stimuli capture attention in an automatic manner, independent of the observer's goals, or whether the capture of attention depends on the match between a stimulus and the observer's task set. Recent evidence suggests an intermediate position in which salient stimuli automatically produce a priority signal, but the capture of attention can be prevented via an inhibitory mechanism that suppresses the salient stimulus. Here, proponents from multiple sides of the debate describe how their original views have changed in light of recent research, as well as remaining areas of disagreement. These perspectives highlight some emerging areas of consensus and provide new directions for future research on attentional capture.

Physically salient stimuli, such as uniquely colored objects, seem to have an inherent power to capture our attention, but formal research on this topic has produced conflicting results and theories. Here, we review evidence that the attentional capture debate can be resolved by positing a new suppressive process. This suppressive process can occur before attentional shifting to prevent salient items from attracting attention. In the current article, we review converging evidence that salient items are suppressed to avoid attentional capture comes from studies of psychophysics, eye movements, single-unit recordings, and event-related potentials (ERPs). Crucially, the ability to inhibit salient distractors seems to be learned as participants gain experience with the simple features of the to-be-ignored stimuli.

Several studies have demonstrated that salient distractors can be proactively inhibited to prevent attentional capture. Traditional theories frame attentional guidance effects such as this in terms of explicit goals. However, several researchers have recently argued that that unconscious factors-such as the features of attended and ignored items on previous trials (called selection history)-play a stronger role in guiding attention and can overpower explicit goals. The current study assessed whether voluntary inhibition can overpower selection history. We directly compared both forms of top-down control by measuring the control of eye movements, which offer an unambiguous measure of which location has won the competition for attention. We repeatedly found that selection history overpowered any effects of voluntary goals, such that observers were unable to avoid fixating a salient distractor of a known color if the target had been presented in that color on the previous trial. Moreover, a salient distractor of a particular color captured gaze even when the observer had voluntarily chosen this color to be the distractor color just moments before. Taken together, these experiments suggest that the ability to inhibit a salient color singleton is primarily a result of recent experience and not a result of explicit goals.

Researchers have long debated how salient-but-irrelevant features guide visual attention. Pure stimulus-driven theories claim that salient stimuli automatically capture attention irrespective of goals, whereas pure goal-driven theories propose that an individual's attentional control settings determine whether salient stimuli capture attention. However, recent studies have suggested a hybrid model in which salient stimuli attract visual attention but can be actively suppressed by top-down attentional mechanisms. Support for this hybrid model has primarily come from ERP studies demonstrating that salient stimuli, which fail to capture attention, also elicit a distractor positivity (PD) component, a putative neural index of suppression. Other support comes from a handful of behavioral studies showing that processing at the salient locations is inhibited compared with other locations. The current study was designed to link the behavioral and neural evidence by combining ERP recordings with an experimental paradigm that provides a behavioral measure of suppression. We found that, when a salient distractor item elicited the PD component, processing at the location of this distractor was suppressed below baseline levels. Furthermore, the magnitude of behavioral suppression and the magnitude of the PD component covaried across participants. These findings provide a crucial connection between the behavioral and neural measures of suppression, which opens the door to using the PD component to assess the timing and neural substrates of the behaviorally observed suppression.

Previous research has revealed that people can suppress salient stimuli that might otherwise capture visual attention. The present study tests between 3 possible mechanisms of visual suppression. According to first-order feature suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of simple feature values. According to second-order feature suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of local discontinuities within a given feature dimension. According to global-salience suppression models, items are suppressed on the basis of their dimension-independent salience levels. The current study distinguished among these models by varying the predictability of the singleton color value. If items are suppressed by virtue of salience alone, then it should not matter whether the singleton color is predictable. However, evidence from probe processing and eye movements indicated that suppression is possible only when the color values are predictable. Moreover, the ability to suppress salient items developed gradually as participants gained experience with the feature that defined the salient distractor. These results are consistent with first-order feature suppression models, and are inconsistent with the other models of suppression. In other words, people primarily suppress salient distractors on the basis of their simple features and not on the basis of salience per se. (PsycINFO Database Record

Researchers have long debated whether salient stimuli can involuntarily 'capture' visual attention. We review here evidence for a recently discovered inhibitory mechanism that may help to resolve this debate. This evidence suggests that salient stimuli naturally attempt to capture attention, but capture can be avoided if the salient stimulus is suppressed before it captures attention. Importantly, the suppression process can be more or less effective as a result of changing task demands or lapses in cognitive control. Converging evidence for the existence of this suppression mechanism comes from multiple sources, including psychophysics, eye-tracking, and event-related potentials (ERPs). We conclude that the evidence for suppression is strong, but future research will need to explore the nature and limits of this mechanism.

Attention researchers have long debated the roles of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in controlling attention. Theeuwes (2018) has argued that that top-down control is much less common than typically assumed and that a third mechanism-selection history-plays an underappreciated role in guiding visual attention. Although Theeuwes has made a strong case for the importance of selection history, his arguments for a limited role of top-down mechanisms involve conflating the terms "top-down" and "voluntary." Cognitive psychologists typically use the term "top-down" processing to refer to any perceptual phenomenon that is influenced by context, learning, or expectation, which would include selection history. This highlights a broad problem in attention capture research: The terms used to describe attentional control are often poorly defined, and much current debate seems to be related to the meaning of words. To move forward in understanding the actual mechanisms of attentional control, we must agree on what terms such as "top-down" and "bottom-up" actually mean.

Attention is a limited resource that must be carefully controlled to prevent distraction. Much research has demonstrated that distraction can be prevented by proactively suppressing salient stimuli to prevent them from capturing attention. It has been suggested, however, that prior studies showing evidence of suppression may have used stimuli that were not truly salient. This claim has been difficult to test because there are currently no agreed-upon methods to demonstrate that an object is salient. The current study aims to help resolve this by introducing a new technique to test the role of salience in attentional capture. Low- and high-salience singletons were generated via a manipulation of color contrast. An initial experiment then verified the manipulation of salience using a search task where the color singleton was the target and could only be found via its bottom–up popout. High-salience singletons were found much more easily than low-salience singletons, suggesting that salience powerfully influenced attention when task relevant. A following experiment then used the same stimulus displays but adapted the task so that the singletons were task-irrelevant distractors. Both low- and high-salience singletons were suppressed, suggesting neither was able to capture attention. These results challenge purely stimulus-driven accounts by showing that improving salience only enhances attentional allocation in situations where the object is also task relevant. The results are instead consistent with the signal suppression hypothesis, which predicts that task-irrelevant singletons can be suppressed. Public Significance Statement: Salient stimuli, such as brightly colored objects, are often used to attract attention in everyday life. The current study aimed to understand how salience influences attentional allocation. We found that improving the salience of a stimulus can improve its ability to attract attention, but only when the object is made relevant to the task being performed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than 2 decades, researchers have debated the nature of cognitive control in the guidance of visual attention. Stimulus-driven theories claim that salient stimuli automatically capture attention, whereas goal-driven theories propose that an individual's attentional control settings determine whether salient stimuli capture attention. In the current study, we tested a hybrid account called the signal suppression hypothesis, which claims that all stimuli automatically generate a salience signal but that this signal can be actively suppressed by top-down attentional mechanisms. Previous behavioral and electrophysiological research has shown that participants can suppress covert shifts of attention to salient-but-irrelevant color singletons. In this study, we used eye-tracking methods to determine whether participants can also suppress overt shifts of attention to irrelevant singletons. We found that under conditions that promote active suppression of the irrelevant singletons, overt attention was less likely to be directed toward the salient distractors than toward nonsalient distractors. This result provides direct evidence that people can suppress salient-but-irrelevant singletons below baseline levels.

ERP experiments generate massive datasets, often containing thousands of values for each participant, even after averaging. The richness of these datasets can be very useful in testing sophisticated hypotheses, but this richness also creates many opportunities to obtain effects that are statistically significant but do not reflect true differences among groups or conditions (bogus effects). The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how common and seemingly innocuous methods for quantifying and analyzing ERP effects can lead to very high rates of significant but bogus effects, with the likelihood of obtaining at least one such bogus effect exceeding 50% in many experiments. We focus on two specific problems: using the grand-averaged data to select the time windows and electrode sites for quantifying component amplitudes and latencies, and using one or more multifactor statistical analyses. Reanalyses of prior data and simulations of typical experimental designs are used to show how these problems can greatly increase the likelihood of significant but bogus results. Several strategies are described for avoiding these problems and for increasing the likelihood that significant effects actually reflect true differences among groups or conditions.

Researchers have long debated whether attentional capture is purely stimulus driven or purely goal driven. In the current study, we tested a hybrid account, called the signal-suppression hypothesis, which posits that stimuli automatically produce a bottom-up salience signal, but that this signal can be suppressed via top-down control processes. To test this account, we used a new capture-probe paradigm in which participants searched for a target shape while ignoring an irrelevant color singleton. On occasional probe trials, letters were briefly presented inside the search shapes, and participants attempted to report these letters. Under conditions that promoted capture by the irrelevant singleton, accuracy was greater for the letter inside the singleton distractor than for letters inside nonsingleton distractors. However, when the conditions were changed to avoid capture by the singleton, accuracy for the letter inside the irrelevant singleton was reduced below the level observed for letters inside nonsingleton distractors, an indication of active suppression of processing at the singleton location.

Although mindfulness, or the self-regulation of attention, has been found beneficial in reducing teacher stress and burnout and in increasing students' cognitive and emotional regulatory skills, no study has explored students' attitudes toward meditation practices in depth. This mixed-methods study reports results from a randomized, controlled trial of a 10-week mindfulness intervention in a public school setting with 28 4th-grade students from lower income and ethnic minority backgrounds. Over the course of the intervention, students were asked to respond to writing and drawing prompts about their feelings and attitudes toward mindfulness. At the end of the intervention, the experimental teacher rated students on how often they had practiced mindfulness breathing during class. Qualitative analysis of journal entries yielded personality traits of students who were receptive or resistant to mindfulness training. Practical strategies for identifying and remediating resistant students and for implementing mindfulness interventions in a school setting are discussed.